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THE  
ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE  
ILLUSTRATED WITH  
ESSAYS AND NOTES.

BY

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I DEDICATE THIS BOOK  
TO THE  
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REGIUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK, MASTER OF BALLIOL COLLEGE, AND  
VICE-CHANCELLOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD;  
THE SOCRATES OF MY YOUTH;  
MY UNFAILING FRIEND DURING NEARLY FORTY YEARS;  
THE WISEST AND BEST MAN THAT I HAVE EVER KNOWN.



# PREFACE

TO  
THE FOURTH EDITION.

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THE call for a new edition of a book on Aristotle's *Ethics*, after an interval of ten years, gives an opportunity for second thoughts, which indeed are necessitated by the valuable work, in connection not only with this treatise, but with the Aristotelian writings in general, which has been done by scholars in the meantime.

Accordingly, after reading Zeller's<sup>1</sup> learned demonstration that all the great works of Aristotle were known to the world during the last 250 years before the Christian era, I have modified the view, too hastily adopted in former editions, of 'the fate of Aristotle's writings' (see *Essay I.* p. 10).

A good deal of scrutiny has of late been directed

<sup>1</sup> In the third edition of his *Philosophie der Griechen* (Leipsic, 1879), pp. 147-152.

upon the text of Books V., VI., and VII. of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which has given rise to various opinions being expressed by scholars as to the authorship of these Books. The question has certainly entered a new phase since I first ventured to write on the subject, some twenty-seven years ago. At that time almost everyone in Oxford accepted the three Books, without suspicion, as an integral part of the *Nicomachean* treatise. Spengel, however, had proved to the satisfaction of the Germans that the *Eudemian Ethics* were not by Aristotle, but were a modified copy of Aristotle's treatise, written by his disciple Eudemus; and he had also pronounced Book VII. of the *Nicomachean Ethics* to belong to the *Eudemians*, while he maintained that Books V. and VI. were *Nicomachean* Books. Fischer and Fritzsche had gone further, and had given up Book VI. also as *Eudemian*, while they held to Book V. (with the exception of the last chapter) as belonging to the original work of Aristotle.

It seemed to me then, and it does so now, that an *onus probandi* rests on those who would separate Book V. from Books VI. and VII. and say that it stands on quite a different footing from them. The three Books together form part of the *Eudemian* treatise, with which they agree very well, and this by

itself would seem a *prima facie* ground for supposing that whatever theory you adopt about one or two of them must hold good of them all.

But one common characteristic of these Books, tending to separate them from the other Books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, has lately been brought into prominence—namely, the peculiar condition of their text. Hildenbrand,<sup>2</sup> who only considers Book V., says that in this Book ‘a number of passages, partly by their construction, partly by their position, excite suspicion,’ and that ‘corruption of the text by external circumstances must have contributed to this, though the *Nicomachean Ethics* are, on the whole, among the best preserved of the Aristotelian writings.’ Rassow<sup>3</sup> says: ‘It is incredible that the three Books, in the form in which they come before us, can\* have been published by Aristotle himself. The faults in these Books are such that they cannot be ascribed to the carelessness of copyists, nor can

<sup>2</sup> *Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie* (Leipsic, 1860), vol. i. p. 324.

<sup>3</sup> *Forschungen über die Nikomakische Ethik des Aristoteles* (Weimar, 1874). This interesting little work, full of acumen, consists chiefly of suggestions for the amendment of the text. Doubtless if all Rassow’s emendations were adopted, the *Ethics* of Aristotle would read more smoothly.

But after all they are conjectures, however happy. Therefore, except in a few cases, where it was a question of changing a letter or two, I have thought it best to adhere to the text of Bekker, in which the difficulties, if sometimes caused by the errors of editors or copyists, are certainly also sometimes due to the carelessness of the original writer.

they be the result of any confusion that took place in the leaves of the original MS.' (pp. 49-50). 'The theory of a Double Recension, of which traces are undoubtedly to be found in these, and also to some extent in the other books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, is not sufficient to account for the striking peculiarities of these Books. Undeniably they contain portions which are not of Aristotelian origin' (p. 50). 'The copyists, I think, must be left out of the question, for it would be too remarkable if in Books V., VI., and VII. they had committed more faults than in all the rest of the Books put together. A displacement of the leaves of the original MS. will not do, for no rearrangement succeeds in putting the *disjecta membra* into their proper place' (p. 39).

Ramsauer<sup>4</sup> says: 'Books V., VI., and VII. have this in common—that there is more corruption and confusion in them than in the seven remaining Books' (p. 641). He also says that 'Book V. is far the most corrupted of all the Books' (*ib.*).

Mr. Cook Wilson<sup>5</sup> says: 'The Seventh Book of the *Ethics* is not the only one which seems to be a compilation; most of the Books show more or less traces of something of the kind: after the Seventh

<sup>4</sup> *Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea*: *edidit et Commentario Continuo instruxit G. Ramsauer* (Leipsic, 1878).

<sup>5</sup> *Aristotelian Studies* (Oxford, 1879). Part I.

Book the most remarkable is perhaps the Fifth. The resolution is more obvious in the Seventh, the evidence of divers authorship stronger in the Fifth and Sixth' (p. 4).

Rassow having strongly stated, as we have seen, the corrupt condition of the three Books, adds (p. 50) : 'No criticisms, however, touch the peculiar kernel of these Books, which wears so much the garb of genuineness that the attempt of Fischer, Fritzsche, and Grant to claim these Books wholly or in part for the *Eudemian Ethics* must be considered a failure. Nothing remains but to suppose that the genuine Books were worked over by some strange hand. This, I believe, is the safe result, to which all inquiry, up to the present time, leads ; every step further conducts us into a dark, perhaps never to be enlightened, field, which I decline to tread' (p. 50). 'Besides a double recension, we must suppose numerous interpolations. Allowing that it has been made probable that the suspected portions were taken out of the *Eudemian Ethics*, the question is, whether all the difficulties may not have arisen from the same source—namely, that the genuine Books of Aristotle having perhaps become mutilated, were afterwards completed out of the *Eudemian Ethics*' (p. 51).

Ramsauer gives, only more indefinitely, the same or a similar view. He says (page 641): ‘There is only one Aristotelian treatise on the matter contained in the three Disputed Books. Is it not likely, that the loss of the one treatise was connected with the corruption of the text of the other? The confusions arose at that time when the one treatise, we know not how, went to ruin (*pessum iret*), and its contents somehow were badly transferred to the other. This you may fancy to have been done by those who thought in this way to preserve what was already mutilated and confused.’

Rassow’s theory, it must be observed, gives no explanation of the manner in which the treatise on Pleasure in Book VII. came to be introduced into the *Nicomachean Ethics*. He very distinctly pronounces against its having been written by Aristotle, saying (p. 48): ‘If one does not wish to attribute to Aristotle that which in other writers one would consider absolutely monstrous, one must agree with those who reject the treatise on Pleasure in Book VII. Look at the state of matters. In two Books are found two lengthy treatises on Pleasure, whereof neither makes the slightest reference to the other. The second, incomparably the richer, treatise makes it clear by its opening words that Pleasure has never

been previously treated of. The two treatises differ in the most essential points. In Book X. Pleasure is separated from ἐνέργεια, so as to be made to appear a mere quality of the latter ; in Book VII. it is defined as ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος. The treatise in Book X. opposes the view that Pleasure is the chief good ; that in Book VII., as might be expected from its whole way of looking at things, endeavours to make it probable that at least one kind of Pleasure is the ἀριστον. This attempt by itself suffices to mark the treatise in Book VII. as ungenuine, since it would impress on the Aristotelian *Ethics* a hedonistic character, which is inconsistent with their other views.'

Rassow agrees with Spengel that the treatise on Pleasure in Book VII. is later than that in Book X., and that the author of the former probably had the latter before him. But he declines to accept the inference of Spengel, that if the treatise on Pleasure in Book VII. be pronounced un-Aristotelian, the whole Book must lie under the same verdict. Rassow says that this does not follow, because the treatise on Pleasure has no necessary connection with the first half of the Book—it is a mere appendage. This may be so ; but Rassow does not explain how it comes to pass that the unknown editor, who,

according to his theory, wrote over Book VII. of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, introducing into it passages out of the *Eudemians*, came also to append to it a spurious and unnecessary treatise on Pleasure. Surely it is far more natural to suppose that the whole Book was written originally for the *Eudemian Ethics*, and having been transferred to the *Nicomacheans*, brought with it this superfluity.

Hassow's sweeping and somewhat dogmatic assertion, that 'the essential kernel of the three Disputed Books bears the mark of genuineness,' seems based on what has been called *Aristotelisches Gefühl*, and which disdains to explain itself. Everyone would admit that the matter of these Books, even if they were not written by Aristotle, was all derived from Aristotle,—possibly copied or paraphrased from three Books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, now lost; or, if such Books were never written, then made up out of unfinished writings of Aristotle himself, or notes from his oral lectures, or out of conclusions arrived at in his other works,—in short, from the *répertoire* of the Peripatetic School, with so much of originality in the way of developing or modifying particular doctrines as Eudemus showed in his *Ethics*. If the 'kernel' of the Books, then, means their matter, this may be at once conceded to be on the whole

Aristotelian, and yet nothing will have been proved as to the authorship of the Books.

It is a question of form. We require an investigation of the subject in detail, and a theory as to what was the skeleton of each of these supposed *Nicomachean* Books, and where the *Eudemian* interpolations were brought in.

Rassow, without being explicit on this point, gives up the latter half of Book V. as a patchywork by an unskilful hand, containing, however, an excellent chapter on Equity, the work of Aristotle himself.<sup>6</sup> He also gives up the latter part of Book VI., as evidently written, not by Aristotle, but by one of his school. He holds apparently to the genuineness of the first half of Book VII., though he would say that it had been worked over and interpolated.

But, finally, supposing Rassow's theory to be accepted, it would give rise to the following difficulty: If Books V., VI., and VII. of the *Nicomachean Ethics* were mutilated, and then made up out of corresponding Books in the *Eudemian Ethics*, how came it to pass that those corresponding *Eudemian* Books went out of existence, and the

<sup>6</sup> Against this something might be said. The account of Equity in *Eth.* v. x. is very feeble compared with

that in *Rhetoric*, i. xiii., which had been written by Aristotle before he wrote his *Ethics*.

patched up *Nicomachean* Books were put into their place? Also we may add: How did it happen that the patched up *Nicomachean* Books fitted so remarkably well into the *Eudemian* treatise and corresponded by divers references with the remaining Books of the same?

Ramsauer's theory is, as we have seen, vaguely stated—namely, that 'when the one treatise, we know not how, went to ruin, its contents somehow were badly transferred to the other.' This must mean one of two things: either that three Books of the *Eudemian Ethics* having become mutilated, the remaining fragments of them were, with a view to their preservation, ingrafted upon the three corresponding *Nicomachean* Books; or, three *Nicomachean* Books having been nearly destroyed, the fragments which remained were ingrafted upon the *Eudemian* Books. But the former hypothesis seems absurd. What inducement would there be to spoil three finished Books of Aristotle's by interpolating them with fragments of his disciple's far inferior writing? The second hypothesis would imply that these three Books were originally written for the *Eudemian* treatises, but afterwards interlarded with fragments of lost *Nicomachean* Books; which theory I could quite accept, but it would be inconsistent

with Ramsauer's other views, for he distinctly pronounces the three Books to be *Nicomachean*.

Ramsauer's theory seems to differ from Rassow's in this: that he considers the fragments of mutilated Books to have been ingrafted upon the text of entire Books. Whereas Rassow thought that *lacunæ* in mutilated Books were made up out of the text of entire Books.

Ramsauer appears to me to be one of those Aristotelian scholars who are as reluctant to admit that the three Disputed Books may have been composed by some hand other than that of Aristotle himself, as some Theologians are to allow that *Deuteronomy* may be a work of later date than some other parts of the *Pentateuch*. He argues,  $\omega\varsigma\theta\acute{e}tiv$  διαφυλάττων, to save the credit of each of the three Books. About Book V., having admitted that it is the most corrupted of all the Books, he proceeds (p. 641): 'Book VI., which seems to decline from the *Nicomachean* fulness to the meagreness of Eudemus, is much less so. And no wonder. People will less meddle with a book whose parts can be counted on the fingers, than with one in which a difficult matter had to be copiously, and as far as possible artistically, set forth.' But just the opposite might have been argued: it might have been said

that the psychology of the Moral Faculties is a more 'difficult' subject than Justice, and that people would be more likely to try to improve a meagre treatise than one which was copious and artistic.

We have seen that Ramsauer attributes a *Eudemian* character to Book VI. He admits that in this Book Νοῦς and the other Intellectual Excellencies are treated in a manner similar to that in which we find subjects treated in the *Eudemian Ethics*—namely, they are taken up and curtly defined and then suddenly dropt.<sup>7</sup> And yet, in spite of this, Ramsauer says (p. 368): 'Those who attribute Book VI. to Eudemus should reflect whether the Eudemianisms in the Book, which have led to ascribing it to Eudemus, may not conversely have been borrowed by the disciple from this very Book (the work of his master) and made use of elsewhere.' On which we may remark, that while it is easy to believe that Eudemus might have borrowed particular *formulae* (like ὅρος, see below, page 61) from this Book, if he had it before him, it is difficult to suppose that he can have moulded his whole style on the worst written Book of an Aristotelian treatise.

<sup>7</sup> This same characteristic, it must be noticed, appears in Book V. Corrective Justice (c. iv.), the theory of Exchange (c. v.), and Equity (c. x.)

are all dropt in the same abrupt manner, without their respective bearing on the main question of the Book being sufficiently worked out.

Ramsauer wavers as to the authorship of Book VI. He says (p. 369): ‘It seems to me that the forces (*copias*) by which this Book is to be won for Aristotle or for Eudemus are about equal—neither of them sufficient to carry the day.’ But he himself always treats the Book as if it had been won for Aristotle.

With regard to Book VII. he remarks (p. 425), that in no part of the *Magna Moralia* has the author of that compilation so fully reproduced the matter of either the *Nicomachean* or the *Eudemian Ethics* as in his account of *εὐχράτεια* (cf. *Mag. Mor.* II. iv.—vi. with *Eth. Nic.* VII. i.—xi.). And he infers from this that at the time when the *Magna Moralia* was written there was only one Aristotelian treatise on that subject in existence.

Of course this may only mean that the composition of the *Magna Moralia* was posterior to that literary convulsion in which, according to the theory of Ramsauer, three Books of either the *Nicomachean* or the *Eudemian* treatise were mutilated, and their fragments interpolated into the corresponding Books of the other treatise. But it is at least an equally probable hypothesis that there never was more than one treatise, in literary form, on the subject of *εὐχράτεια*, and that this (as the treatise on Pleasure,

appended to it, would suggest) was written or made up for the *Eudemian Ethics*,—Aristotle never having completed this part of his Ethical system.

In order to explain the presence of a double treatise on Pleasure in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Ramsauer (pp. 643-4) resorts to an hypothesis of desperate ingenuity. He supposes that Aristotle, intending to give a literary unity to his *Ethics*, wrote his theory of the Chief Good and of Virtue, Books I.-VI., X. vi.-ix., thus completing the treatise all but an intermediate space; and that he afterwards filled up this space (1) by composing a treatise on Continence and one on Pleasure, which together formed Book VII.; (2) by composing a treatise on Friendship, which was suffered to run out to disproportionate length (Books VIII. and IX.), and in the course of which Aristotle arrived at conclusions (IX. ix. 9) distinguishing the consciousness of an *ἐνέργεια* from the *ἐνέργεια* itself, which conclusions were inconsistent with his already written treatise on Pleasure, and necessitated its being rewritten. This Aristotle accordingly did (*Eth. Nic.* X. i.-v.), without, however, cancelling the former treatise on the same subject.

Unfortunately for this hypothesis, it does not seem to be supported by internal evidence. I agree with

Ramsauer in believing that Aristotle wrote the first part and the concluding part of his *Ethics*, thus giving the complete literary framework of his system and leaving an intermediate space to be filled in. But it is clear that the concluding part cannot have commenced with the sixth chapter of Book X., *Εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ηδονᾶς*, because these words imply that Books VIII. and IX. and Book X. i.-v. had been written previously. Therefore I consider that the space left to be filled up corresponded with what is now occupied by Books V., VI., VII., and that, as Spengel supposed, the treatise on Pleasure in Book VII. was written later than that in Book X., and was indeed part of the *Eudemian* paraphrase.

Again, if the treatise on Pleasure in Book X. had been written expressly to bring out the distinction between Pleasure and the *ἐνέργεια*, which it accompanies, this point would surely have been made more prominent than it is, and not dismissed, as it is, in a parenthetical and half-disdainful way,<sup>8</sup> quite at the end of the treatise.

<sup>8</sup> See *Eth. x. v. 6-7*, where the main proposition is that the Pleasure resulting from an *ἐνέργεια* is more closely connected with that *ἐνέργεια* than the Desire which has preceded

it; and Aristotle adds, ‘Nay, the connection of Pleasure with *ἐνέργεια* is so close as to have given rise to a doubt whether they are not identical. But surely Pleasure is not identical

Having pointed out the difficulties which seem to me to beset the theories of recent German critics as to the authorship of the three Disputed Books, I now turn to the scholarlike monograph of Mr. Cook, Wilson, *On the Structure of the Seventh Book of the Nicomachean Ethics*, chapters i. x. Mr. Wilson, following up Torstrik's suggestion that the present order of the context in *De Anima*, Book III., had come from some sort of combination of two parallel versions, minutely examines Book VII. of the *Ethics*, and finds in it traces of not only two, but sometimes three, parallel versions. Some of the pieces of this mosaic, Mr. Wilson thinks, may be attributed to Aristotle; others bear traces of Eudemianism; while others seem to belong to a post-Eudemian writer, possibly a disciple of Eudemus. Mr. Wilson, without expressly saying so, seems to point to the conclusion that the earlier chapters of Book VII. were certainly not written in their present form by Aristotle for the *Nicomachean Ethics*, nor were they written by Eudemus for his paraphrase; but that they were put together out of divers versions by some Peripatetic later than Eudemus.<sup>9</sup>

with Reasoning, nor with Perception; it would be absurd to say so. But from their being inseparable some think that they are identical.' Ac-

cording to Ramsauer, the whole treatise was written for the sake of bringing in this sentence.

<sup>9</sup> In one argument Mr. Wilson is

The question as to the composite character of various parts of the 'Works of Aristotle' has yet to be further worked out, and more light may be elicited in the process. In the meanwhile, taking into consideration all the peculiarities of these three Disputed Books, I am still inclined to figure to myself that Eudemus, having paraphrased the seven completed Books of Aristotle's *Ethics*, found that he had a middle space to fill up, and no longer a finished treatise of Aristotle's to copy.

Instead of this, his materials would now consist of posthumous fragments, and the notes of the Peripatetic School. The repetitions in the text which he produced may have partly been caused by carelessness, partly by a reverential wish not to lose any of the *ipsissima verba magistri*, whenever they had been recorded. We see the same kind of literary irregularity in the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, which, as tradition says, were posthumously edited by Eudemus. In writing the three Disputed Books, I should imagine that Eudemus was partly editing and preserving

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inconsistent with this view. For he suggests (p. 38, note) that *Eth. Eud.* ii. xi. was intended for a reconstruction of and improvement upon *Eth. Nic.* vi. xii. 7-10, which would prove that *Eth. Nic.* vi. could not be attributed to Eudemus. But at the same

time it would prove that Books VI. and VII. (for they must surely go together) were composed earlier than the *Eudemian Ethics*. But I confess that, on comparing the two passages, I do not derive from them the same impression as Mr. Wilson has done.

Aristotle's doctrine on Justice,<sup>10</sup> the Moral Standard, and perhaps Incontinence, partly completing his own treatise, as the close connection of these Books with it seems to show.

Nothing in the recent discussions seems to me to shake the hypothesis that the Three Books, whatever may otherwise have been their literary history, originally belonged in their present form to the *Eudemian*, and not the *Nicomachean* treatise. Therefore I have not thought it necessary to alter what I formerly wrote on this subject. I would only beg that when I speak of 'Eudemus' with reference to these Books, I may be understood to mean 'Eudemus, whether in his own language paraphrasing or improving upon the ideas of Aristotle, or (as may frequently have been the case) availing himself of the exact words of his Master, from whatever source derived.'

<sup>10</sup> Book V., which has hitherto been unanimously pronounced to be *Nicomachean*, i.e. written by Aristotle, seems to me to owe this character partly to its representing Aristotle's theory of Justice, *as far as he had gone in the subject*, partly to its containing several fragments of Aristotle's writing. For instance, the opening of the Book down to c. i. § 14 appears to me to be essentially *Eudemian*, whereas from § 15 to the end

of the chapter comes in a piece written in the best manner of Aristotle. A good deal of chapters iv. and v. probably consists of Aristotle's exact words, whether written by himself or taken down from his lectures. I do not go further into the question, but I consider the setting of the whole Book to be *Eudemian*, whatever nuggets of Aristotle it may contain.

Out of all the discussions one conclusion seems to emerge—namely, that, to use the words of Ramsauer about the Disputed Books, '*In hac Ethices Aristotelicæ parte pro duplii disputatione ne unam quidem habemus satis sanam atque integrum.*' And this is what I have always ventured to maintain—that we could not be certain that we possessed in its entirety Aristotle's theory of Justice or of the Moral Standard.

EDINBURGH : October, 1884.



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## ESSAY I.

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*On the Nicomachean Ethics, in relation to the other Ethical Writings included among the Works of Aristotle.*

THE question of the genuineness and of the literary character of each of the several works which have come down to us under the name of Aristotle, has been mooted and discussed with increasing earnestness during the last half-century. By the diligence of modern critics, for the most part Germans, the whole field of Classical, Patristic, Alexandrian, Byzantine, Arabian, Jewish, and Scholastic literature has been searched, and every fragment, reference, allusion, or mention, however incidental, everything in short bearing even remotely on the question, has been carefully collected and brought to light. Of all this labour we may say, in brief, that the general outcome and result has been to show: *first*, that external authorities are seldom in themselves decisive, but require to be checked in comparison with each other, and to be weighed against internal evidence; *secondly*, that many of the problems which have been started about Aristotle and the Aristotelian writings cannot be resolved with certainty, and must be left in the region of the indeterminate; *thirdly*, that these problems are for the most part comparatively unimportant, as for instance those relating to the character of the ‘lost writings’ of Aristotle, or to the

genuineness of some of the smaller treatises or of particular portions of works otherwise acknowledged to be genuine; *fourthly*, that a general consensus ratifies, and nothing seriously impugns, the belief, that in the leading portions of the great treatises which make up 'our edition' of Aristotle we possess the thought of the philosopher pretty nearly in the form under which it came from his own mind and was given originally either to his own disciples or to the world.

The several ethical treatises which we find included among 'the works of Aristotle' exemplify in a remarkable way the above-stated conclusions, and an examination of them, with the assistance of all available clues whether internal or external, serves to throw an interesting light upon the philosophical history of the Peripatetic School. But, in order to the due conducting of such an examination, it will be necessary beforehand to briefly sum up and set forth the results of such parts of the controversy upon the writings of Aristotle in general as bear upon the special questions, with reference to the ethical treatises, which we shall find before us.

With regard to the personal life of Aristotle, it is enough for present purposes to observe that we know with tolerable certainty two points,—namely, that Aristotle died Ol. 114. 3 (B.C. 322), being about 63 years old, and that for 13 years previous to that date he had held a school in the Lyceum at Athens.<sup>1</sup> Holding to these points, we may for the present leave in abeyance the various questions which have been

<sup>1</sup> See an extract from the Chronology (*Xρονικὰ*) of Apollodorus, given by Diogenes Laertius (v. i. 9). This Apollodorus has been generally considered a trustworthy authority, but of late doubt has been thrown upon his statements regarding Aristotle by

Valentine Rose, who treats all the dates given by him, except those above mentioned, as the mythical filling in of what was really blank (*V. Rose de Aristotelis librorum ordine et auctoritate*, Berlin, 1854.)

mooted about other parts of the life of Aristotle, as for instance whether he passed an irregular or a steady youth; whether he began the study of philosophy early or late; whether he was really a disciple in the school of Plato for twenty years, or for a shorter period, or was only a reader and critic of Plato's writings, and an occasional hearer and personal friend of Plato himself; whether he 'tried his 'prentice hand' in philosophy by writing dialogues<sup>2</sup> in somewhat weak imitation of Plato's manner of writing, and whether the dialogues of this kind which Cicero read and admired were really written by Aristotle, or were all forgeries. These and other questions of the kind might all be answered either one way or the other without affecting our judgment on the ethical treatises which have borne the name of Aristotle.

With regard to the literary career of Aristotle, we may admit that we have no certain information. But the general opinion has been that those of his works which have been preserved were all composed during the last thirteen years of his life, when he was holding his philosophical school in the Lyceum. And, with regard to the great majority of the extant writings of Aristotle, internal evidence is not opposed to this view. For these books may be stated broadly to be quite homogeneous. They belong to *one* period of the philosopher's mind. Though most of them have all the freshness of original speculations and inquiries, still they are expressed in a settled and peculiar terminology, which must have been beforehand gradually formed and adopted by their author during a long life of thought. It is only in minute points that a development of ideas or of modes of expression can be traced by comparing different parts of these works with each other. And another argument for the

<sup>2</sup> On this point a word or two will be said in Appendix B.

same hypothesis is to be found in the unfinished character of so much that bears the name of Aristotle.

If we could fancy that Thucydides, instead of writing the history of the Peloponnesian War alone, had undertaken to narrate a dozen different periods in a dozen totally separate works, and had left these at his death almost all unpublished and in different stages of completion, but all indicating by their several openings the grasp which their writer had attained over each of the periods to be treated, we should conceive of such a result in history as would have been analogous to the actual result in philosophy exhibited by the works of Aristotle. We see here vastness of conception, organic distribution of human knowledge into its various departments, the ground plan laid for the complete exposition of each of these several departments, and then the indications of premature arrest stamped upon many of these great designs. But in one point our imagined parallel would fail. For Aristotle must not be represented as a man of letters, composing books within his own study; rather we must picture him as a teacher, all whose multifarious activity, all whose inquiries and conclusions, original and tentative as they often were, all whose summings up of the results of knowledge and thought, were in relation with the daily life of a school engaged in prosecuting under their master's guidance the same lines of philosophical speculation. To remember that Aristotle, during his great period of productiveness, was not only writing but teaching, and that his school was probably meant to be associated, and actually to some extent took part, in the composition of his works, will be an important element towards estimating the character of his remains. We shall return to this consideration, but in the meantime certain *data* of external evidence have to be examined.

The first of these is the celebrated story of the fate of the writings of Aristotle, given first by Strabo,<sup>3</sup> and afterwards repeated by Plutarch.<sup>4</sup> This story is as follows : The library and MSS. of Aristotle came, at his death, into the possession of Theophrastus (who continued for 35 years chief of the Peripatetic School at Athens), and when Theophrastus died, the whole joint collection containing the original works of both philosophers, and all the books of others they had respectively bought, went by bequest to Neleus, a philosophical friend and pupil of Theophrastus, and were by him carried off to his own home at Scepsis in the Troad. A generation after this occurrence, the kings of Pergamus began collecting books for their royal library, and the heirs of Neleus, in order to save the precious collection which was in their possession, but of which they themselves could make no use, from being seized and carried off to Pergamus, concealed it in a cellar, where it remained, a prey to worms and damp, for nearly 150 years. At the end of that time, the Attalid dynasty at Pergamus was at an end (the last of these kings, Attalus, having died in 133 B.C., bequeathing his kingdom to the Romans). The then possessors of the Aristotelian and Theophrastean libraries, having no longer anything to fear from royal requisitions, brought out the MSS. from their hiding place, and sold them for a large sum to Apellicon of Teos, a wealthy man, resident at Athens, and attached to the Peripatetic sect. The precious rolls were now transferred, about the year 100 B.C., to Athens, after having been lost to the world for 187 years. They were found to be in very bad condition, and Apellicon caused copies of them to be taken, himself filling up on conjecture the gaps which now existed in the worm-eaten text. His conjectures,

<sup>3</sup> Strabo, XIII. i. 418.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, *Vit. Sullæ*, c. 26.

however, were infelicitous, as he was more of a bibliophilist than a philosopher. Soon after his death, Athens was taken by Sylla (86 B.C.), and the library of Apellicon was seized by him and brought to Rome. It was there preserved under the custody of a librarian, and various literary Greeks resident at Rome gained access to it. Tyrannion, the learned friend of Cicero, got permission to arrange the MSS.; and Andronicus of Rhodes, applying himself with earnestness to the task of obtaining a correct text and furnishing a complete edition of the philosophical works of Aristotle, arranged the different treatises and scattered fragments under their proper heads, and getting numerous transcripts made, gave publicity to a generally received text of Aristotle.

The above story comes mainly from Strabo, who gives it in his geographical book as a local fact in connection with the town of Scepsis; he however mentions only Tyrannion as having taken the MSS. in hand. Plutarch repeats the tale in his life of Sylla, and adds the important fact of the recension made by Andronicus. Porphyry, in his life of Plotinus, carries this information still further by stating that Andronicus had ‘divided’ the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus into systems (*πραγματελας*), bringing together under common heads the speculations that properly belonged to the respective subjects.’

These various statements seem in their origin to start from the very fountain head of contemporary authority. For Strabo was a pupil of the learned Tyrannion, in Rome, about the year 70 B.C., or a little later. There must then, beyond

<sup>5</sup> Ο δὲ τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεόφραστου εἰς πραγματελας διεῖλε τὰς σκέλας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταῦτα συναγαγών. Porphyry says that he himself copied this procedure, in editing the works

of Plotinus, and that he thus with regard to them substituted a logical for a chronological arrangement of the writings.

all doubt, be an element of historical truth in the account which he gives of the library of Apellicon, and which he must originally have got from Tyrannion himself. But still the exact accuracy of all which Strabo says on this subject cannot be depended on. In the first place, even Tyrannion only knew the relations of Apellicon to the MSS. which he had bought in Scepsis, or the amount of alteration introduced by Apellicon into them, by a hearsay tradition going back for a period of nearly twenty years. Secondly, Strabo probably wrote his account of all these matters many years later, without any notes of what he had heard in his youth, and his memory may in some points have played him false. Thirdly, it seems a striking instance either of this kind of forgetfulness, or else of a want of thorough knowledge as to what had been done for the Aristotelian text, that Strabo should have omitted all mention of the recension of Andronicus, of which such striking affirmation was afterwards made.

Tyrannion was the friend of Cicero, and it is remarkable that Cicero should never in his works have referred to so curious a literary anecdote as that of the finding of the Aristotelian MSS., and their ultimately being brought to Rome. But Cicero evidently knew very little of Aristotle. He had in the library of his Tuscan Villa<sup>6</sup> some of the works of Aristotle as we at present possess them, possibly copies of the recension of Andronicus, but he had not really studied them. When his friend Trebatius asks him what the *Topics* of Aristotle were about, Cicero advises him 'for his own interest' to study the book for himself, or else consult a certain learned rhetorician. Trebatius, however, is repelled by the obscurity of the writing, and the rhetorician,

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<sup>6</sup> Cicero, *Topics* i. i. *De Finibus*, v. v. (written 45 and 44 B.C.)

when consulted, confesses his total ignorance of Aristotle. Cicero thinks this no wonder, since even the philosophers know hardly anything about him, though they 'ought to have been attracted by the incredible flow and sweetness of the diction.' He then proceeds to give Trebatius a summary of a few pages of the *Topics* of Aristotle, which he had apparently read up for the occasion. Cicero's remark about the 'sweetness' of Aristotle's diction entirely refers to the rhetorical Dialogues which existed in considerable numbers under the name of Aristotle, and which Cicero often quotes. Whether all or any of these were genuine, may be a question ; but at all events they bore only a slight relation to the real philosophy of Aristotle. Cicero referred to by name, and probably possessed, the *Nicomachean Ethics* ;—he doubted whether they were by the father or the son ; but he misquotes them, and has only superficially studied them, for he praises them as making happiness independent of good fortune. But if Cicero was only superficially acquainted with Aristotle's greater works, he at all events possessed copies of some of them ; and if these had been works which, after being lost by a strange destiny for nearly 200 years, had been recently brought to light and for the first time published, Cicero could hardly have failed to make mention of so striking a circumstance.

The reason why Cicero did not tell the tale of the fate of the writings of Aristotle, was, that there was no tale to tell. It is a point of very minor interest that the library of Aristotle, containing, it may be, the original autographs of his works, was bequeathed by Theophrastus to Neleus—(that this was the fact is corroborated by Diogenes Laertius (v. 52), who has preserved the Will of Theophrastus)—and that this collection went to Asia Minor, and was stowed away in a cellar, and was ultimately brought back by Apellicon, and so

gradually got to Rome. All this there is no reason to doubt, but it is of interest for bibliophilists rather than for philosophers. Very different in importance is the assertion that all the great works of Aristotle were, thirty-five years after his death, entirely suppressed and put out of sight, and that the Peripatetic School, and *a fortiori* the rest of the philosophic world, lost all knowledge of them, and that it was by the merest chance that the Aristotelian system of philosophy, by which the history of the Middle Ages and the forms of modern thought have been so profoundly influenced, were ultimately rescued and brought to light.

But the latter statement is actually the one that Strabo made ; for he added to his story of Aristotle's library in the cellar of Neleus an account of the consequences which ensued to the Peripatetic School ; saying that 'the result was that the earlier Peripatetics, immediately after Theophrastus, being entirely deprived of the works of Aristotle, except a few of the more popular treatises, were debarred from systematic philosophy and were reduced to rhetorical essay-making ; while the later members of the school, after these books had been brought to light, though they knew Aristotle better than their predecessors had done, were still obliged to resort to conjecture as to most points of his system, owing to the multitude of errors which had now crept into the MSS.'<sup>7</sup> And Plutarch, in repeating Strabo's story about the library of Aristotle, reproduces also this corollary to it in an emphasised form, saying expressly that it was from no want of personal zeal or ability, but from the want of the text of

<sup>7</sup> Strabo, *I.c.* συνέβη δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν περιπάτων, τοῖς μὲν πάλιν τοῖς μετὰ Θεόφραστον οὐκ ἔχουσιν διλοι τὰ βιβλία πλὴν διλγον καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἔξωτερικῶν, μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλοσοφεῖν πραγματικῶς ἀλλὰ θέσεις ληκυθίζειν.

τοῖς δ' ὅστερον, ἀφ' οὗ τὰ βιβλία ταῦτα προῆλθεν, θμειών μὲν ἐκείνων φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἀριστοτελίζειν, ἀναγκάζεσθαι μέντοι τὰ πολλὰ εἰκότα λέγειν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν.

Aristotle's writings, that the Peripatetic School had previously declined.

Now, if this statement be literally accepted, the conclusion drawn from it must be that the philosophy of Aristotle underwent extreme risk of total deletion and annihilation. If it be true, as Strabo and Plutarch would imply, that the library purchased by Apellicon contained unique copies of all the works of Aristotle except his Dialogues and popular treatises (which had been previously published), it is clear that the merest chapter of accidents led to the resuscitation, arrangement, and editing of all that we now know as 'the Works of Aristotle.' According to this hypothesis, a few years more of the cellar of Neleus and the work of obliteration would have been completed : Aristotle's philosophy would have been lost, and his Dialogues (genuine or spurious) alone preserved. And thus would have been brought to pass the saying of Lord Bacon : that 'Time like a river, bringing down to us things which are lighter and more inflated, lets what is more weighty and solid sink.' The story of the fate of the writings of Aristotle would thus be a strange eventful tale, full of romantic interest in the history of human thought. In a former edition of the present work the story, viewed under this light, was too hastily accepted and set forth. But the publication by Zeller of the third edition of his *Philosophie der Griechen* (1879) and his exhaustive review of all attainable facts relating to Aristotelian literature during the last two centuries and a half before our era, show that such a fancy is untenable, and that the philosophy of Aristotle was exposed to no such peril as we have supposed ; for while the original MSS. of his great works were mouldering at Scepsis, copies of them all were being used, if not by the Peripatetic School, by philosophers of other sects.

In proof of this point, after citing Chrysippus, Critolaus,

Herillus, Panætius, Antiochus, Posidonius, Stilpo, and Hermarchus, as philosophers who showed an intimate acquaintance with Aristotle, Zeller (II. p. 147-8) goes through the list of Aristotle's works, as we possess them, and finds traces of each in catalogues or references previous to the date of Andronicus. And he winds up by saying, ' Altogether out of the genuine works in our edition of Aristotle there are only those on the *Parts*, the *Generation*, and the *Gait*, of *Animals*, and the minor Anthropological treatises, of which there are not distinct evidences or highly probable indications that they were still used after the removal from Athens of the library of Theophrastus. And even with regard to the works mentioned, there is no reason to doubt that they also were used, only we cannot prove it ; and this is not at all surprising when we consider our imperfect information as to the post-Aristotelian literature.'

Neither Diogenes Laertius nor any of the Greek Commentators on Aristotle makes any allusion to the supposed temporary loss of his writings. Only Boëthius, who was born as late as 470 A.D., speaks of Andronicus as 'exactum diligentemque Aristotelis librorum et judicem et repertorem,' but this phrase may very possibly have been based upon the statements of Plutarch. Strabo and Plutarch, then, stand alone in their account of what happened, and we can now see that while the first part of their story, as to Neleus taking away the library, was probably correct enough; the second part, as to the consequences of this to the Peripatetic School, was a mere deduction grounded not on fact, but on fancy. We know that after the death of Aristotle, his scholars, Theophrastus, Eudemus, Strato, Phanias, and others, were busily engaged in editing his works or writing works of their own on the same lines. And it is in the highest degree improbable that in the thirty-five years, during which Theophrastus presided over the Peripatetics, they should have had

no copies made of the more important treatises ; or that Theophrastus himself, who in his Will (*see Diogenes Laertius, v. 52*) showed great solicitude for the School, bequeathing money for their gardens, their houses, and their museum, should have alienated (as Zeller says) their most indispensable treasure, the writings of their master, unless they had been well provided with copies of those writings. That there was a rapid decline, almost a sudden collapse, of the Peripatetic philosophy soon after the death of Theophrastus, is true enough, but it was a fanciful deduction on the part of Strabo to say that this was a paralysis of the school caused by the loss of the works of Aristotle.

One point to be remarked is that the Academic School, who certainly had not lost the works of Plato, exhibited an equal deterioration. And with regard to the Peripatetics, they showed from the very outset a tendency to abandon what was deepest, most systematic, and most philosophical in the thought of Aristotle, and to go off in various directions of more popular and easy modes of thinking. Thus they followed out Aristotle's inductive impulse into many fields of inquiry, without much reference to a central philosophical point of view. They collected 'problems' with their answers, such as could be given ; and they contributed monographs on special questions. The *Characteres* of Theophrastus himself, Aristotle's first successor, are an instance of observation without philosophy. Some of the School were content with producing compendia of Aristotle's treatises. Others resorted to the rhetorical sermonizing attributed generally to the sect by Cicero and by Strabo. There seems every reason to believe that after the death of Theophrastus the Peripatetic School had comparatively poor and unworthy adherents, while in the meantime all the philosophic ability round the Ægean Sea was throw-

ing itself into following the fresh impulse of either the Stoic or the Epicurean tenets. The later Peripatetics cannot be justified by the theory of Strabo any more than the earlier ones. In the first place, the greater works of Aristotle, as we know them, do not exhibit any decided traces of those *lacunæ* caused by worms and damp which Strabo attributed to the MSS. rescued by Apellicon. In the second place, if the Peripatetics at Athens were unable to restore, or properly understand, the text when brought to light, how was it that Andronicus some fifty years later was able to bring out a lucid and trustworthy recension? Either he must have had other copies of the Aristotelian writings at his command (which the Peripatetic School<sup>7</sup> might equally have obtained) to collate with the MSS. of Apellicon; or else, he was an able man competent to edit a system of philosophy, the other professed adherents of which had lost all hold of it and all power of understanding it.

Andronicus of Rhodes was the tenth Scholarch of the Peripatetics, in succession to Aristotle. Of his life very little is known, so we cannot tell whether he resided and taught at Rome, because that was now the metropolis of the world and offered better chances of employment, even to philosophers, than the Provinces, or whether he followed thither the library of Apellicon, in order to use it for the purposes of his projected edition of Aristotle. At all events there is no doubt that Andronicus, about 50 years B.C., produced at Rome the first collective edition of the works of Aristotle. And there seems equally no doubt that the epoch-making recension of Andronicus is identical with '*our Aristotle*' as Grote called it,<sup>8</sup> in contrast to '*the Aristotle of the Catalogue*' —namely, the catalogue of the Aristotelian writings given by Diogenes Laertius in his *Lives of the Philosophers* (v. i. 12).

<sup>7</sup> *Aristotle*, by George Grote, &c., 1872, vol. i. p. 45.

Of the age of Diogenes Laertius nothing certain is known ; he was at least as late as the end of the second century A.D., and may have been considerably later. But internal examination of his work shows him to have been a mere thoughtless compiler from the works of others, without criticism or sufficient knowledge for his task. His ‘Life of Aristotle’ consists of a farrago of gossiping statements ; of some dates from the Chronology of Apollodorus (which are really valuable) ; of fragments of verse attributed to Aristotle ; of a chapter of *Aristoteliana* or pithy sayings of the philosopher, which have nothing Aristotelian about them ; of the celebrated Catalogue ; and of an attempt at a sketch of the philosophy of Aristotle—full of the most ludicrous misrepresentations. Diogenes says that Aristotle composed an extraordinary number of books, the titles of which he has determined to transcribe, on account of their author’s excellence in every subject. He then gives his Catalogue, enumerating 146 distinct titles of works, divided into about 400 ‘books’ or sections. The ‘Aristotle’ with which we are acquainted consists of about forty works, and these are not only fewer in number than, but also apparently different in kind from, the works specified in the Catalogue. We only know Aristotle as the author of systematic treatises (*πραγματειῶν*) on the great branches of philosophy—logic, physics, metaphysics, politics, ethics, natural history, &c. These are massed together in continuous systems, just as we are told by Porphyry they came forth from the editorial hand of Andronicus. But the ‘Aristotle of the Catalogue’ appears as the author of a great number of smaller works discussing special questions, rather than as the composer of great philosophical systems. Again, a large number of the works in the Catalogue are evidently quite different in form from the writings which we are accustomed to attribute to Aristotle. For

instance, such names as ‘Nerinthus;’ ‘Gryllus, or on Rhetoric;’ ‘Sophist;’ ‘Menexenus;’ ‘Symposium;’ ‘The Lover;’ ‘Alexander, or on Colonies,’ &c., remind us at once of the Dialogues of Plato, and we see that here are enumerated some of those half-rhetorical writings, which—whether they were forgeries, or were really the crude philosophic essays of Aristotle written in popular and dialogic form—were certainly read and admired under the name of Aristotle by some not very discriminating generations of antiquity.

When we ask, what is the origin and authority of the Catalogue of Diogenes? it seems not unwarrantable to believe, with Grote, that this catalogue contains the titles of the books existing under the name of Aristotle in the Alexandrian Library during the third century B.C.; that it was originally made by Callimachus, the chief librarian at Alexandria, or by his pupil Hermippus, between the years 240–210 B.C.; that it found its way into some biography of Aristotle, and was thence mechanically copied by Diogenes, in ignorance or disregard of the edition of Andronicus. We need not go so far as to say, with Valentine Rose, that all the works enumerated in this Catalogue and all the so-called ‘lost works’ of Aristotle were forgeries. Many of them were probably monographs executed during his lifetime by his disciples; others may even have been earlier and more popular philosophical essays by himself; still more probable is it that a large proportion were small works, either epitomizing separate parts of his system, or stating separate ideas belonging to his system in rhetorical and sometimes in dialogic form, which were composed after his death, and which in good faith, or at all events in unconsciousness of fraud, were inscribed with the name of Aristotle by his well-meaning followers. It seems to be indicated by the Catalogue that such as these were

the kind of writings which the Peripatetic School, before Aristotle had been dead for forty years, had come almost exclusively to care for. Thus copies of them were multiplied and became available for the Alexandrian Library; and as they were a class of literature comparatively easy of imitation, a considerable crop of pure forgeries may very likely have grown up and have gone to swell their number. Hence Aristotle's reputation with the ancients as a most voluminous writer,—the author of 400 books!

While there is a great, almost total, discrepancy between the Catalogue of Diogenes and '*our Aristotle*', it would be a mistake to suppose that the Catalogue leaves the impression that none of the Aristotelian philosophy, properly so called, had reached the Library of Alexandria. On the contrary, almost all the existing treatises of Aristotle seem to be there, only with a difference as to form or number of books. For instance, we find mention of nine books of *Prior Analytics* and two of *Posterior Analytics*. Of *Ethics*, five books are mentioned, and these may possibly correspond with what Aristotle first accomplished on the subject, namely, Books I., II., III., IV., and X. of the Nicomachean *Ethics*, the treatise on Friendship (Books VIII. and IX.) having been written later, and Books V., VI., and VII. having been left unfinished, even at his death. In '*Rhetoric*' two books' we perhaps have the first part of Aristotle's existing *Rhetoric*, of which the third book was probably written after an interval. We find two books on *Politics* and nine books of a *Political Discourse*, which may or may not answer to '*our Politics*'. There is a book on *Various Meanings of Words* ( $\pi\epsilon\rho\tau\tau\omega\sigma\alpha\chi\hat{\omega}\delta\lambda\epsilon\gamma\omega\mu\epsilon\nu\omega\nu$ ) answering to *Metaphysics* Book IV. There are several books on *Syllogisms*, *Definitions*, *Commonplaces* ( $\tau\acute{o}\pi\omega\iota$ ), and other logical matters; books on *Pleasure*, the *Voluntary*, *Friendship*, *Justice*, the *Art of Poetry*, &c. On

*Animals* nine books. And Aristotle's now lost *Τεχνῶν συναγωγή*, or *Collection of Systems of Rhetoric*, and *The Constitutions of 158 States*, perhaps referred to *Eth.* X. ix. 23.

Not a single one of the dialogues and exoteric works mentioned in the Catalogue, and often quoted by the ancients, now remains. The specimens of these writings which exist in quotation seem to show that in losing them we have lost what was of comparatively little worth. One question of interest is, what were the causes that produced their complete extinction? And, in answer to this, it seems a highly probable conjecture to attribute that result in the first place to the entire exclusion of the whole class of exoteric writings by Andronicus from his edition of the works of Aristotle. If our edition of Aristotle corresponds with that made by Andronicus, it is clear that these writings were excluded, and it is a remarkable fact that this should have been the case. Plenty of the so-called 'Dialogues of Aristotle' existed in the time of Andronicus and long after him. Cicero, the friend of Tyrannion, speaks of them with enthusiasm and quotes them. And yet Andronicus, when endeavouring to form a complete edition of the works of Aristotle, appears sternly to have excluded them all. If it was the fact that he did so, his motive for doing so must have been one of two things: either his critical judgment led him to set down these writings as forgeries, or else, his philosophic taste condemned such merely rhetorical productions, even if by Aristotle himself, as unsuitable to form part of an edition which was to comprise only systematic treatises. However this may have been, it seems credible that the edition of Andronicus had a great deal to do with the preservation of all the works that were included in it, and with the loss of all those that were not so included. Perhaps copies of the entire recension of Andronicus, stamped with

his authority, were placed not only in the libraries of the Peripatetic schools, but also in great public libraries and in the private collections of rich men. A cohesive permanence would thus be given to this edition as a whole, it would come to be identified with Aristotle, while the outlying and scattered copies of the dialogues and other smaller works inscribed with his name, would be left exposed to diverse and uncertain fate, without sufficient prestige and guarantee to keep them in existence.

Even if the hypothesis be admitted as probable that copies of the great treatises of Aristotle, found in the library of Apellicon, formed the basis of the edition of Andronicus, still it does not follow that Andronicus was confined to the use of the MSS. which had belonged to Theophrastus and which had been for so long shut up at Scepsis. To admit this might lead to the inference that nothing appears in 'our edition' of Aristotle, which was not written within thirty-five years at most after the date of Aristotle's death. Internal considerations are, however, too much opposed to such a view. And it must be remembered that among the contents of the library of Apellicon the 'book-collector' there were not only the Theophrastean MSS., but also, doubtless, a mass of other Peripatetic and miscellaneous writings, got together from various sources. Such of these as were rhetorical, or not in strictly expository form, Andronicus seems to have rejected. But there is reason to believe that he admitted and incorporated with the genuine works others which, though composed long after the death of Aristotle, were yet written in close approximation to his philosophical style and manner. We have, of course, no means of knowing whether Andronicus, by including in his edition such works as that *On the Universe* and the *Great Ethics*, meant to stamp them, under the guarantee of his own critical authority, as

genuine writings of Aristotle,—or whether he admitted these and many other books and portions of books merely as containing Aristotelian thought and as suitable complements of a system which in its exposition had been left incomplete. If we take up the former supposition, we have then to make allowance for a considerable element of conjectural criticism in the procedure of Andronicus, and we must admit that his authority on such questions is not decisive. But the latter seems the most credible of the two alternatives. We know from Porphyry that Andronicus dealt somewhat freely with the Aristotelian writings, rearranging them and bringing together under their proper heads discussions which before existed separately. In several of the important treatises probably no such treatment as this was required. But still we must be prepared to find traces of the editorial hand almost everywhere. For instance, it is a question how far the references from one part of the works to another which appear ever and anon, are to be attributed to the editorship of Andronicus, and to his desire to give solidarity to the system as a whole. And at all events, such works as the *Problems* seem to exhibit decisively signs of having been put together editorially out of partly Aristotelian and partly un-Aristotelian materials. In short, it appears most probable that Andronicus in his edition aimed at giving the system of Aristotle set forth in a clear recension of the genuine systematic writings of Aristotle himself, slightly rearranged and perhaps interpolated with references, but also complemented with some of the more valuable remains of the earlier Peripatetic School.

From these more general considerations we now turn to the ethical treatises which are found placed among the 'Works of Aristotle.' These are four in number: the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the *Eudemian Ethics*, the *Great Ethics*, and

the treatise *On Virtues and Vices*. It may perhaps be most convenient to state at once the literary conclusions which have been arrived at with regard to these several works, and afterwards to show the grounds for them. The conclusions then are, *first*, that the *Nicomachean Ethics* are, as a whole, the genuine and original work of Aristotle himself, though some special parts of them are open to doubt. *Second*, that the *Eudemian Ethics* are the work of Eudemus, the pupil of Aristotle, written either during his master's lifetime or shortly after his death; that they are based entirely on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, being a re-writing of the system contained in the former treatise with some modifications and additions. *Third*, that the *Great Ethics* are the compilation of some considerably later Peripatetic, who had before him the *Ethics* both of Aristotle and of Eudemus, and who gives a sort of abstract of the results of both, but on the whole follows Eudemus more closely than Aristotle. *Fourth*, that the little tract *On Virtues and Vices* is a specimen of those lighter Peripatetic productions, which probably went to make up the bulk of that collection which went under the name of the 'Writings of Aristotle' in the Alexandrian Library.

The first point to be established is one on which general external consent entirely coincides with internal probability—namely, that the *Nicomachean* treatise is to be preferred above the *Eudemian*, as well as above that called the *Great Ethics*. Neither by the Greek scholiasts, nor by Thomas Aquinas, nor by any of the succeeding host of Latin commentators has either of the two latter treatises been deemed worthy of illustration, while the *Nicomachean Ethics* have been incessantly commented on. This tacit distinction between the three works was the only one drawn till the days of Schleiermacher, who mooted the question of their

relation to each other. He at once pronounced that they could not all belong to Aristotle, but by the irregularities which were plain enough in the *Nicomacheans* and *Eudemians* he was unfortunately led to consider the *Great Ethics* to have been the original work and the source of the other two. This conclusion, however, was set aside by the deeper criticism of Spengel,<sup>9</sup> who, by arguments drawn from internal comparison of the three treatises, vindicated for the *Nicomachean Ethics* the place of honour, as having been the direct production of Aristotle, while the other two works he showed to be respectively a copy, and a copy of a copy, of the *Ethics* of Aristotle. The question is not one of a mere difference of style; indeed, the Peripatetic School had been so thoroughly imbued with the peculiar mannerisms of their master that it would be hazardous to pronounce upon grounds of style alone whether any particular paragraph or section of all that appears in our edition of Aristotle came from his pen or not. But in comparing the three Ethical treatises with each other, we consider the organic structure of each work as a whole; we see the radical difference between them in structure and aims, and then there comes to light a number of minor characteristics attaching to each, and reasonably to be connected with what we are led to conceive must have been the original character of each, of the three works in question.

The *Nicomachean Ethics* naturally take their place beside the great philosophical treatises of Aristotle. This work at its outset shows the true Aristotelian *note* in the shape of a proem. The Peripatetic writers in composing their monographs, or their compilations from Aristotle with

<sup>9</sup> Ueber die unter dem Namen des Aristoteles erhaltenen ethischen Schriften (in den Abhandl. der philos. philol.

Klasse der K. Bay. Akad. 1841). Spengel's theory is now universally accepted in Germany.

a foregone conclusion, were accustomed to plunge at once *in medias res*, without preface, and without any general statement of what it was which they were about to discuss, and without any gradual leading up to their subject. But with Aristotle it was different ; we see in him a tendency, more or less carried out in all his undoubted writings, to commence each exposition of a fresh branch of philosophy with the announcement of some pregnant universal principle, appropriate to the speculations which are to follow, and containing the germ of many of them within itself. See, for instance, the first sentence of the *Metaphysics*, ‘All men instinctively desire knowledge ;’ or of the *Later Analytics*, ‘All teaching and learning by way of inference proceed from pre-existent knowledge.’ The same manner appears in the pregnant opening of the *Nicomachean Ethics* : ‘Every art and science, each action and purpose, seems to have some good as its object.’ This universal proposition is the first step in an elaborate argument which resolves everything practical into means or ends and identifies the Chief Good, or Happiness, with the end, or final cause, of life. This all-important conception of the final cause of life is then proposed for consideration, and the question arises—What science is to treat of it ? The answer is given tentatively that it must be treated of by ‘a sort of Politics’ since the end for the individual and for the State are identical. This answer belongs to the Platonic point of view, and shows that ethics had as yet not acquired an independent position as separate from politics. The qualification, however, here introduced by the words ‘a sort of politics,’ shows Aristotle in the act of working his way towards the conception of a separate science of ethics. Having posited his main question and the science which is to treat of it, he now proceeds to discuss to some extent the method to be employed, the

amount of exactness to be expected, the kind of evidence to be adduced—in short, the logic of quasi-political, or ethical, science. And in so doing he follows the course elsewhere practised by him, in commencing his treatises by remarks on the logic of the different sciences; as, for instance, see especially the introduction to his work *On the Parts of Animals*. All then in the commencement of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is systematic, original, and thoroughly Aristotelian in character. By regular and methodical development the ground plan of the whole of the rest of the treatise is prepared in Book I. How that plan was actually filled up we shall come back to consider more particularly hereafter. In the meantime we turn from the great Aristotelian prelude of the *Nicomachean Ethics* to examine in comparison with it the characteristics of the other two Peripatetic systems of ethical philosophy.

The *Eudemian Ethics* commence, without any scientific preface, but rather in the form of a literary essay, with the sentence: ‘In the temple of the God of Delos, some one, to show his own opinion respecting the good, the beautiful, and the sweet,—that these are not predicates of the same subject,—has inscribed the following verses on the vestibule of the shrine of Latona :

‘*Beautiful* ’tis to be just; and *best* of all things to be healthy;  
 ‘Yes, but the *sweetest* for man is to obtain his desires.

‘But we cannot agree with this person; for Happiness is not only the most beautiful and the best, but also the sweetest of all things.’ The Eudemian writer then goes on to say, ‘Some questions are practical, others are merely speculative. The latter must be reserved for their own proper occasion. This is the essential principle of our method. The great question for us at present is, In what *Good Living* consists,

## ESSAY I.

'how it is to be obtained, whether by nature, learning, or chance?' Very evidently in this exordium there is the beginning, not of any original philosophical investigation, but of the exposition of foregone conclusions derived from the *Ethics* of Aristotle. The idea of Happiness, as the chief good for man, and as the leading topic for ethical inquiry, its identification with Good Living, and the predicates to be attached to it,—are here simply taken over, as established results, from Aristotle who had worked them all out separately by argument. We recognise the quotation which is here put so pompously in the forefront, as having occurred in *Eth. Nic.* I. viii. 14. There, however, 'the Delian inscription' is only mentioned in passing as one of the common sayings with which Aristotle compares his definition of the chief good. But here the writer, using the couplet with more circumstance, seems pleased to be able to add particulars about the place where it was inscribed. This kind of amplification is very characteristic of the *Eudemian Ethics*, which often play a useful part in furnishing learned references and more explicit quotations for the *Nicomacheans*. For instance, they give in amplified form the saying of Anaxagoras on Happiness, and of Heraclitus on Anger; and a corrected statement of the doctrine of Socrates on Courage.<sup>10</sup> What was of little moment to Aristotle, carelessly introducing a quotation to illustrate some argument, became of importance to a writer who was reproducing in slightly altered arrangement the contents of an Aristotelian treatise.

For this is in effect the nature of the *Eudemian Ethics*; they are essentially a re-writing of the *Nicomachean* work, so that—

<sup>10</sup> On Anaxagoras cf. *Eth. Nic.* x. ix. 12 with *Eth. Eud.* i. iv. 4. On Heraclitus cf. *Eth. Nic.* ii. iii. 10 with *Eth. Eud.* ii. vii. 9. On Socrates cf.

*Eth. Nic.* iii. viii. 6 with *Eth. Eud.* iii. i. 13; and see notes on *Eth. Nic.* ll. co. *infra*.

## THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS.

Books I. and II. correspond with *Eth. Nic.* I.—III. v.

Book III. corresponds with *Eth. Nic.* III. vi.—IV.

Books IV. V. VI. are word for word identical with *Eth. Nic.* V. VI. VII. (a circumstance to be considered hereafter).  
Book VII. contains in a compressed form *Eth. Nic.* VIII. and IX.

Book VIII. is a mere fragment, of which both the beginning and the end are apparently lost. It contains entirely new matter, namely some difficult questions (*ἀπορίαι*) on the possibility of misusing virtue, and as to the nature of good fortune; and a discussion upon the highest state of human excellence, which is here styled *καλοκάγαθία*, or the union of internal and external well-being.

Books I.—VII. of the *Eudemian* treatise generally coinciding with Books I.—IX. of the *Nicomachean* (or as we may say, the Aristotelian) treatise, and only the last fragmentary *Eudemian* book showing a decided divergence from its prototype,—it remains to be seen (leaving aside for the moment the three books common to both) what internal variations and differences between the two treatises can be pointed out. In the first place, then, the point of view is different; the *Eudemian* writer is not so much an investigator and discoverer, proceeding analytically, as an expositor, synthetically stating conclusions previously arrived at. His subject is Happiness, and he discusses this by means of materials collected from Aristotle's *Ethics*, but in so doing he deserts the Aristotelian, or scientific point of view; he does not regard 'Happiness' as a mere word to be explained by arriving at a conception of the *τελειότατον τέλος* or ultimate final cause of human life,—by which alone life can be explained, just as every other existence must be explained by its final cause. Nor does he remain true to the Aristotelian conception of *εὐεργεία*, by which Happiness or the chief good is to be explained as the

development into actuality of what is potential in man. He indeed uses these formulæ (*Eth. Eud.* I. viii. 17–19, II. i. 2–9), borrowing them from Aristotle, but the conceptions do not influence his work throughout, as they do that of Aristotle. Hence he is not led, like Aristotle, to identify theoretic thought with the highest good for man.

In the second place, the Eudemian writer having separated his subject from the metaphysical and logical grounds on which it had been based by Aristotle, separates it also from that wider view under which it had been placed, as belonging to politics, or the science which treats of man not as isolated, but as by nature the member of a community. Thus, in borrowing from Aristotle the saying that the chief good ‘falls under politics’ he modifies this (*Eth. Eud.* I. viii. 17) by adding ‘and economics and practical thought,’ calling these ‘states of mind,’ and thus showing that he had a quite different conception from that entertained by Aristotle—of politics as the master-science for things practical. In fact, with this writer *πολιτική* appears rather as the art of government, than as a science in the proper sense of the term. With all the borrowed plumes of philosophy which he so often displays, this writer evidently treats of Happiness, not in a strictly philosophical or scientific, but in an empirical, spirit. He represents in fact the first step of that course of decadence which led the Peripatetic School ultimately, as Strabo says, to mere moral essay-making devoid of all philosophy. This writer has indeed taken merely the first step, he is himself far from being devoid of philosophy, only he is not able to keep up to the level of Aristotle. He is a very keen and penetrating man, and the author, as we shall see, of many curious investigations, so that he carries many matters in ethical inquiry farther than they had been carried by Aristotle; yet still he represents the commencement of

decline. The next thing to be remarked about him, which is all in accordance with the preceding, is, that while less philosophical, he is more moral and more religious in tone than Aristotle. An instance of the manifestation of that tone may be found *Eth. Eud.* I. v. 10, where in discussing (after Aristotle) the different lives that men lead, he says ‘the political man, truly so called, aims at noble actions for their own sake.’ This moral connotation given to the term *πολιτικὸς* does not seem to be based on anything Aristotelian. But the most striking feature of the *Eudemian* system occurs in *Eth. Eud.* II. v. 1 as compared with the conclusion of the fragmentary Book VIII. The writer appears dissatisfied with the vagueness of Aristotle’s formula for the mean ‘according to the right law and as the thoughtful man would define.’ He says, ‘this is not explicit enough,’ ‘we require something definitory (*ὅρον*) to which to look.’ And he announces this in the last sentences which have been preserved of his work, ‘Whatever choice and possession of the natural goods, whether bodily goods, or riches, or friends, or whatever else, best promotes the contemplation of God, this is best; and by no nobler standard can goods be judged. But if any choice or possession, either through deficiency or excess, hinders us from serving and contemplating God, it is bad. The same rule holds for the soul, and this is the best standard for the soul, that she should as little as possible be cognisant of her animal half, in its animality. So far then for the standard of perfection, and the object of this world’s goods.’ This elevated passage, which brings religion into contact with human life, and identifies it with morality, enters upon a subject not discussed by Aristotle.

The words ‘serving God’ (*θεραπεύειν τὸν θεὸν*) imply a different conception of the Deity from what we are accustomed to find in Aristotle, and the confection here made

between moral virtue and theological contemplation is opposed to the broad distinction set up by Aristotle between speculation and practical life, and is more like Platonism. The writer elsewhere entertains the conception of the personality of God more unreservedly than Aristotle. See *Eth. Eud. vii. x. 23*, where it is said that 'God is content if he receives sacrifices according to our means.'

It may have been one object in re-writing the *Ethics* of Aristotle—to bring them rather more into harmony with popular religious views; but another object certainly was that the writer might graft on to them additions and improvements of his own. In several points these additions are very evident and we see a distinct advance beyond the theory of Aristotle. The most conspicuous instance of this kind is to be found in all that relates to the moral will, which is evidently a favourite subject with the *Eudemian* writer, and the questions relating to which he had worked out further than the point arrived at in at all events the earlier books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This writer's *forte* is psychological observation, which is quite in accordance with the known tendencies of the Peripatetic School. The study of the phenomena of incontinence, or the wavering of the will, has great attractions for him. Even leaving in abeyance the question of the authorship of what stands as *Eth. Nic. Book VII.*, we find the subject of incontinence constantly brought in throughout the *Eudemian Ethics* in connection with other matters, from which it is kept separate by Aristotle. In *Eth. Eud. ii. xi. 1-6* we find characteristic remarks on the distinction to be made between virtue and continence, and, on the province of the former to give or preserve a conception of the end to be aimed at in action, of the latter, to give or preserve a conception of the means towards that end. In III. i. there is an excellent re-

statement of the doctrine of Courage, with some interesting after thoughts, e.g. ‘If the brave man *does not feel* the danger there is nothing very grand in his enduring it.’ III. ii. improves the discussion on Temperance (1) by indicating two separate meanings of the word ἀκόλαστος, ‘uncorrected’ and ‘incorrigible;’ (2) by connecting the subject with the discussion which appears in *Eth. Nic.* vii., and thus not leaving the ἀκόλαστος of the table of the virtues quite cut off from the ἀκόλαστος of the moral will; (3) by the remark that among the pleasures not leading to intemperance may be reckoned Platonic love ( $\tauὴν διὰ τῆς ὅψεως ἡδονὴν τῶν καλῶν ἄνευ ἐπιθυμίας ἀφροδισίων$ ). III. v. describes Great-souledness (*μεγαλοψυχία*) as a correct judgment about the great and small in all matters, whether of danger, or expense, or what not, so that it implies all the virtues. This is to the effect that independence of character includes all kinds of goodness—a view similar to that contained in Emerson’s essay on Self-reliance. Besides Great-souledness and its two extremes a fourth character is here added,—that of the plain man, who, not having much merit, neither underrates nor overrates the merit which he has. VII. v. 5 introduces a refinement on Aristotle’s doctrine of Friendship. Here it is said that in friendship the opposite qualities to one’s own are sometimes loved for the sake of the mean. In which case men love the opposite *per accidens*, the mean essentially. Book VIII. gives some interesting remarks on Good-luck, which it divides into two kinds: In the one case the man is unconsciously inspired by God, and thus acts on a right intuition; in the other case he blunders into success and succeeds against reason. Finally, however, chance is eliminated, and all choice of the right in us is attributed to God. How, it is asked, can we begin to think or resolve? thought or resolution cannot furnish the beginning to ‘itself,—this must

come from God. The whole of this last book is very religious. We have seen above how the writer describes his culminating quality of *καλοκἀγαθία*, or human perfection, as the sum of internal and external well-being, all tending to the service and contemplation of God.

These are some specimens of the sort of variations from and additions to the *Ethics* of Aristotle, which were introduced by the *Eudemian* writer. With regard to his style and manner, we notice in the first place a very close approximation to the writing of Aristotle. And this is easily explainable; a strongly mannered style like that of Aristotle, in which there was no attempt at elegance of form, and which was full of his own peculiar terminology, was certain to take hold of the minds of his school, and was much more likely to be exactly reproduced by them than a style of lucid beauty, like that of Plato, would have been. For the sake of illustration, if we imagine a set of thinkers and writers to have been trained to think and express themselves after the manner of Mr. Carlyle, it is very easy to believe that the writings of such a school would only have been distinguishable from those of their master by a difference in the intrinsic force and value of the thoughts expressed by them. And so it was with the Peripatetic School. The *Eudemian* writer is more distinguishable from Aristotle by the contents and character of his thoughts, than by his mode of expressing them. He shows indeed a proclivity to indulge in abundance of literary quotations, and he quotes more fully and explicitly than Aristotle; and he is remarkable, throughout his work, for the constant introduction of logical formulæ. The term *ὅρος* to denote definition, differentia, or standard of reference is a peculiar favourite with him. The terms *δῆλον διὰ τῆς ἀπαγωγῆς* to denote an appeal to observation, and the phrase *ἀληθὲς μὲν οὐθὲν δὲ σαφὲς* ('this may be true, but it is not

'explicit') are of frequent recurrence. But these are small marks. The writing is certainly less clear than that of Aristotle; in many places the compression is excessive and goes beyond the compression of Aristotle. And looking at each book, or section of the subject, as a whole, we miss anything like clear plan and lucid arrangement. Aristotle was remarkable for the separate treatment he gave to each particular topic, working out each head, such as Virtue, the Voluntary, Friendship, Pleasure, and Happiness, by itself, almost without reference to the rest. But his follower very naturally brings together results that Aristotle had left separate. This would have been a considerable merit had the writer possessed the power of creating a clear impression. But this he had not, and therefore we cannot wonder that this second-hand and touched-up system of Aristotelian ethics should never have shown any tendency to supersede the original work.

We have hitherto seen the sort of grounds which there are for believing that the *Eudemian Ethics* were at all events not written by Aristotle himself, who, indeed, with all that he had upon his hands, was very unlikely to have rewritten his own treatise in this way. We shall now see that there is a certain amount of external authority, as well as of general probability, in favour of the hypothesis that this work was, as its name would imply, actually written by Eudemus of Rhodes, the chief disciple of Aristotle after Theophrastus. Of the particulars of the life of Eudemus little is known, but Simplicius<sup>11</sup> has preserved an important notice of him in the shape of a passage from the work of Andronicus Rhodius (the great editor) on Aristotle and his writings, which contains a fragment of a letter from Theophrastus to Eudemus,

<sup>11</sup> Brandis, *Scholia in Aristot.*, p. 404<sup>3</sup> b. 9.

in answer to a request for an accurate copy of a MS. of the 5th Book of Aristotle's *Physics*. This MS. was probably required by Eudemus in course of writing his own book on the same subject. Asclepius<sup>12</sup> records that Aristotle himself had committed his *Metaphysics* in an incomplete state to Eudemus, who was dissatisfied with the form of the work, by which its publication was delayed, and it was ultimately completed out of the other works of Aristotle by his survivors. Ammonius<sup>13</sup> says that 'the disciples of Aristotle, Eudemus and Phanias and Theophrastus, in rivalry with their master, wrote *Categories*, and *On Interpretation*, and *Analytics*.' Simplicius<sup>14</sup> on the *Physics* says that 'Eudemus, almost paraphrasing the words of Aristotle, lays it down, &c.' Of the writings of Eudemus the following are mentioned by ancient Greek authorities: *On the Angle*, *A History of Geometry*, *A History of Arithmetic*, *A History of Astrology*, *Analytics*, *On Diction*, *On Physics*, and perhaps a work *On Natural History*.<sup>15</sup> We have abundant traces, then, of Eudemus working both as an editor of Aristotle and as a quasi-original author, partly paraphrasing Aristotle, and partly writing in contravention of Aristotle's views. As to the authorship of the *Eudemian Ethics* the testimony of the ancients is divided. Some authorities, perhaps misled by this work having been placed by Andronicus in his edition of Aristotle, speak of it simply as 'Aristotle's.' Thus Atticus Platonicus<sup>16</sup> (who lived in the 2nd century), *adversus Aristot.*

<sup>12</sup> Brandis, *Scholia in Aristot.*, p. 519, b. 39.

<sup>13</sup> Ib. p. 28, note.

<sup>14</sup> Ib. p. 431, a. On the other hand, Simplicius, on the *Posterior Analytics*, often quotes Eudemus as differing from Aristotle.

<sup>15</sup> The authorities for these works

are given by Fritsche in his edition of *Eth. Eud.* (Ratisbon, 1851), *Prol.* p. xv.

<sup>16</sup> Simplicius (on the *Categories*, fol. 43, b.) in just the same way refers to what 'Aristotle says in the *Eudemian Ethics*'.

spud Eusebius *Præpar. Evang.* xv. 4, says, ‘The treatises of Aristotle on these subjects—the *Eudemians* and *Nicomacheans*, and those entitled the *Great Ethics*—all contain a petty, a mean, and a vulgar conception of virtue.’ Porphyry, in his *Prolegomina*, enumerates the ethical writings of Aristotle as ‘those addressed to Eudemus his disciple, those addressed to Nicomachus his father (the *Great Nicomacheans*), and those addressed to Nicomachus his son (the *Little Nicomacheans*).’ This view, that Ἡθικὰ Εὐδήμεια (or Εὐδήμια) meant *ethics addressed to Eudemus*, has been sometimes followed in later times; thus Casirius, in his *Bibliotheca Arab. Hist.* i. p. 306, mentions ‘ethicorum quæstiones minores Eudemo inscriptæ’; and Samuel Petit thought that this Eudemus was probably not the disciple of Aristotle, but one of the Archons of Athens. Porphyry’s explanation of the name ‘Great Ethics’ as ‘the Ethics addressed to Nicomachus the greater,’ that is, to the father of Aristotle, as opposed to the ethics inscribed to Nicomachus the son, was probably a mere conjecture, based on the assumption that ‘Eudemian’ and ‘Nicomachean’ meant ‘to Eudemus’ and ‘to Nicomachus.’ There is, however, no good instance to justify this interpretation of such adjectives. And it need hardly be said that there is nothing in the books themselves which at all bears out the idea of their having been so addressed or inscribed. Such dedication was alien from the mode of writing which we find in Aristotle. And he would hardly have inscribed to his son a book upon a subject of which he says (*Eth. Nic.* i. iii. 5) that a young man is not a fit student.

On the other hand, Aspasius (On *Eth. Nic.* fol. 141, a.) speaks of Eudemus as an original writer on ethics. He says, ‘Both Eudemus and Theophrastus tell us that unequal, as well as equal, friendships are contracted for the sake of

either pleasure, utility, or virtue.' The reference, so far as Eudemus is concerned, is, to *Eth. Eud.* vii. x. 9. And a notable Scholium discovered by Brandis in the Vatican (see *infra*, note on *Eth. vii. iii. 2*) conjecturally attributes the discussion on Pleasure which follows that on Incontinence to Eudemus, as differing essentially from the doctrine of Aristotle. These are, it must be confessed, meagre testimonies in favour of assigning to Eudemus the *Ethics* which bear his name. But, after all, there is no one else to whom they can with any probability be assigned. To have any external authority whatever in favour of an hypothesis so strongly supported, as this is, by internal evidence, is a great matter, since it is clear that the world in general, during the first centuries of our era, accepted whatever they found in the edition of Andronicus as being the work of Aristotle.

We will now glance at the treatise entitled '*Ηθικὰ Μέγαλα*—*Magna Moralia*, or *Great Ethics*. The exordium of this work does not give a high expectation of what is to follow; the writer says: 'Since we purpose to speak on ethics (*ὑπὲρ ἡθικῶν*), we must first consider of what the moral character (*ἡθος*) is a part. In a word, then, it seems to be a part of naught else but politics. For it is not possible to act in political matters without exhibiting some moral quality, as, for instance, goodness. Now goodness consists in possessing the different virtues. And one ought, if one is to act in political matters, to be good in character. Therefore the scientific consideration of human character (*ἡ περὶ τὰ ἡθη πραγματεία*) would seem to be a part, and in fact the beginning, of politics.' This passage exhibits what may be called the etymological fallacy, for the writer, taking up the etymology of the word *ἡθικά*, goes on to misapply it, and to speak as if *first* the moral character, and *secondly* the scientific consideration of character, were identical with

ethics.<sup>17</sup> Passing this over, we see that the intention is, though feebly executed, to reproduce the Aristotelian idea of the hierarchy of the practical sciences, which Eudemus had endeavoured to modify by giving to ethics a more independent position. But the statement here is both shallow and confused; no real reason is adduced to prove that ethics is a subordinate branch of politics; and we do not find any further carrying out of this idea in subsequent parts of the work.

This writer frequently employs formulæ which would imply a claim to independence of thinking, such as δοκεῖ δέ μοι, &c. At other times he speaks as if representing the Peripatetic School, as, for instance, I. xxxv. 26, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον ὡς ἡμεῖς ἀφορίζομεν. But on examination his work presents uniformly the appearance of a *résumé* of foregone conclusions drawn from both the *Nicomachean* and the *Eudemian Ethics*. The writer, however, appears to have had not only these two treatises before him, but also some of the ethical writings of Theophrastus.<sup>18</sup> At least it seems reasonable to suppose that there was some such source for the not unfrequent novelties which occur ever and anon throughout the work, and which we shall now specify, together with a few other points which strike one as characteristic in reading through the *Great Ethics*. In I. i. 4-11 we find a jejune summary of the previous history of moral science; in I. i. 10, ii. 7-11, an expanded statement of the import of the word τἀγαθόν, which in its arid logical clearness forms a

<sup>17</sup> His argument seems also to confound political matters (*τὰ πολιτικὰ*) with the science of politics (*πολιτική*).

<sup>18</sup> Referred to by Aspasius, see above p. 32, and also by Cicero, *De Finibus*, v. 5. Why these writings,

if, as seems probable, they survived to the time of Andronicus, were not included by him in his edition of the Aristotelian works, we have no means of knowing.

sort of scholium upon Aristotle. In i. iv. 9-11 a restricted moral meaning is put upon the term *ἐνέργεια*, as if implying self-determination and will (*όρμη*). It is said, that a fire will burn if supplied with fuel, but has no power of taking fuel for itself; therefore it has no *ἐνέργεια*, and the same is the case with the nutritive part of the soul. From the same restrictive point of view it is said, i. v. 3, that no one is praised for being wise or philosophic, in short, that the intellectual qualities are not virtues (which is in direct opposition to *Eth. Nic.* i. xiii. 20). i. ix. 8-xi. 5 asserts free will against the doctrine of Socrates, and argues that though you cannot will to be best, you can always will to be better than you otherwise would have been. i. xxi. 12, following Eudemus, lays it down that a man is not courageous unless he *fears* while enduring. i. xxxv. 26 gives a formula slightly different from that found in the two former treatises, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον ως ήμεῖς ἀφορίζομεν, τὸ μετὰ λόγου εἶναι τὴν ὄρμήν πρὸς τὸ καλόν. This shows that the Peripatetic School had by this time adopted the word *όρμη* denoting ‘impulse,’ ‘inclination,’ ‘act of the will,’ and we find this word in constant and characteristic use throughout the *Great Ethics*. ii. iii. 3-20 moots some new difficulties (*ἀπορίαι*) on the nature of Justice and Virtue, namely: Does the just man award his due to every one in society (*τῇ ἐντεύξει*)? This is rather the part of the flatterer. If the unjust man injures others knowingly, he must know the good, and therefore must be thoughtful (*φρόνιμος*), which he is not. Can we be unjust towards a bad man, in depriving him of rule and authority, since he is not fit to possess them? If we cannot be just and brave at the same time, which should we select? Answer, *φρόνησις* will tell you, arbitrating between the *φυσικὰ ὄρματα*. Can we have too much virtue? Answer, virtue is *μεσότης*, we cannot have

too much moderation. The account of pleasure in II. vii. is taken from the treatise in Book VII. of *Eth. Nic.* but improved from the treatise in Book X. Some of the arguments on pleasure are verbal, e.g. worms and beetles are *φαῦλα* (lower creatures); pleasure is a return to one's nature; therefore their pleasure must be a return to *φαῦλη φύσις* and therefore bad. The argument here turns on the word *φαῦλος*, used equivocally. To say that pleasure is a return or restoration (*κατάστασις*) was Aristotle's earlier and less scientific view. II. vii. 21 contains a novel illustration: Those who do not know nectar think wine the sweetest of all things; so also those who have only known sensual pleasure. II. vii. 23 says that it is jealousy •to wish to keep a thing all to oneself, therefore we must not argue against pleasure on account of its being shared by all. The account of good-luck in II. viii. is taken from Eudemus, but is less theological than his view. The author here distinguishes objective from subjective good-luck; making the first an unexpected turn in external things, the latter a blind *όρμη* within the soul to take the course which will turn out best. Arguing against what Eudemus had said, he excludes the idea of Providential interference from good-luck as being beneath the notice of the Deity. In II. ix. he borrows the summing up of the virtues in *καλοκάγαθία* from Eudemus, adding the definition that the *καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς* is he to whom the goods of the world (*τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά*) are really goods and whom they do not corrupt. In II. xv. 3-5 he takes (against Eudemus) a positive view of theology, dismissing as beyond solution the question whether God contemplates Himself.

In all this and in the *Great Ethics* generally we see, with some exceptions, a nearer affinity to the point of view of Eudemus than to that of Aristotle. In detail, that is to say

in the order and manner of treating the different subjects, the writer follows the lead of Eudemus, from whom he draws most of his conclusions, appearing to use Aristotle rather as an authority of appeal and a source from which to correct Eudemus. At the beginning of Book I. indeed he seems about to follow Aristotle, but afterwards he changes and adheres closely to Eudemus. He certainly exercises his own judgment throughout in selecting between these two, and also in drawing from that other third source which it appears probable that he had before him. He is, as we have seen, less religious than Eudemus, but, like Eudemus, he is more practically moral and less philosophical than Aristotle. A striking instance of this is in I. i. 4-8, where he wishes to confine the term *ἐνέργεια* to functions implying moral consciousness and an act of the will. He uses new psychological terms to express the phenomena of volition, and asserts free will more dogmatically than Eudemus had done. These characteristics reflect the position of the Peripatetic School at the time when the work was written. The evidences of decline in philosophy are manifold, but in this respect it must be remembered that the Peripatetic School of this period shared in a general change which was passing over the mind of Greece (see *infra*, Essay VI.). The transition to the modern point of view, in which the moral *ego* was to be made the central consideration, was now taking place. Zeno arrived at Athens not long after the death of Aristotle, and it is not impossible that by the time when the *Great Ethics* were written, even the Peripatetics had to some extent felt the influence of his spirit. In fact, Spengel points out that in the *Great Ethics*, II. xi. 7, we find a distinction which was unknown to Aristotle and first introduced by the Stoics, namely, that between *φιλητὸν* and *φιλητέον*, *βουλητὸν* and

**Βουλητέον, &c.**<sup>19</sup> This leads to the consideration of the time when the work was written, but for even an approximate answer to this question there are no *data*. The general structure and manner of the whole shows that the work is a compendium later than the time of Aristotle, to which small points of usage, such as ὑπὲρ ηθικῶν instead of περὶ ηθικά, bear witness; but, so far as the writing goes, it need not have been much later than Theophrastus. Spengel, however, thinks that the *Great Ethics* stand on the same level of data and manner as the treatise *On the Universe*, which was probably a comparatively late composition. One final remark must be made about the *Great Ethics*, namely, that if they were written more than thirty-five years after the death of Aristotle, that is, after the carrying off of the library of Theophrastus to Asia Minor, copies both of the *Nicomachean* and the *Eudemian* treatise must have been still available to the Peripatetics, else this dry compilation, based on the two, could never have been written.<sup>20</sup>

Besides the three treatises on Ethics, we find also among the 'Works of Aristotle' a little tract *On Virtues and Vices*. Whether this was included by Andronicus in his edition, and

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Stobæus, *Elog. Eth.* II. 7, p. 140. διαφέρει δὲ λέγοντι (i.e. the Stoics) τὸ αἰρετὸν καὶ τὸ αἱρετέον—αἱρετὸν μὲν γὰρ εἴναι ἀγαθὸν τὸ πᾶν, αἱρετέον δὲ ὠφέλιμον πᾶν—δμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ πάντα ἔστιν ὑπομενετὰ καὶ ἐμμενετὰ—τὰ δὲ ὠφέλιμα πάντα ὑπομενετέα καὶ ἐμμενετέα. The above is given on the authority of Spengel, but it does not seem certain that Aristotle may not have been aware of this unimportant distinction. See *Eth.* III. i. 10. νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶν δε αἱρετ., . . . ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποιῶν αἱρετέον, οὐ βέδιον ἀποδοῦναι.

<sup>20</sup> It used to be fancied that in one place (I. v. 4) the *Great Ethics* quoted the *Nicomacheans*. "Οτι δὲ ή ξυδεια καὶ ή ὑπερβολὴ φθείρει, τοῦτ' ίδειν ἔστιν ἐκ τῶν ηθικῶν. Spengel, however, acutely conjectures that the true reading must be ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, which is confirmed by Stobæus, who says, with regard to the Peripatetic ethics, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ξυδειξιν τούτων τοὺς ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων μαρτυρίοις χρώνται. This writer then in the above passage is only paraphrasing, not quoting, *Eth.* Nic. II. ii. 6.

if so, why? we cannot tell. It is a pleasing but decidedly un-Aristotelian production. In it the names of the chief virtues and vices are borrowed from Aristotle's list (*Eth. Nic.* ii. vii.), but they are not explained as mean states and excesses; there is nothing said about their formation; they are regarded externally, and their chief marks are noted in an inductive or observant spirit. The whole tract is in its aims and manner a good deal similar to the *Characters* of Theophrastus, and shows the same tendency of the Peripatetic School to desert philosophy for physiognomical observation.

Plato's division of the soul into reason, spirit, and desire being accepted, it is here said that Thought (*φρόνησις*) is the virtue of the first; Mildness and Courage of the second; Temperance and Continence of the third. Other virtues are then enumerated without reference to this classification. It is said that of various kinds of Justice the first is towards the gods, the next towards demons, the next towards fatherland and parents, the next towards the dead. The Liberal man is described as clean in his garments and his house, given to collect curiosities and to keep animals which have something peculiar or remarkable about them. Small-souledness (*μικροψυχία*) is well characterised as easily elated, as well as easily depressed; as petty, complaining, despondent, and abject. Virtue in general is said to create a good disposition of the soul, which feels quiet and orderly emotions, is in harmony with itself, and is the type of a well-ordered State. Such are the most noticeable features of this little essay, which gives a specimen of the aftermath of Aristotelian ethics, not necessarily later than the time of Theophrastus.

From these inferior Peripatetic works we may now turn back to examine the structure of that great treatise, which is our immediate concern, and which comes to us entitled *Nicomachean Ethics*, or *Ethics of Nicomachus*. Of Nicomachus

himself scarcely anything is known. Eusebius (*Præp. Evang.* xv. 2) quotes the following notice from Aristocles<sup>21</sup> the Peripatetic: 'After the death of Pythias, the daughter of Hermeias, Aristotle married Herpyllis of Stageira, by whom was born to him a son—Nicomachus. This son is said, when left an orphan, to have been brought up by Theophrastus, and while still a youth to have died in war.' The tradition, however, of the early death of Nicomachus, 'in war,' is not consistent with the notice of him by Suidas (*sub voce*), which speaks of him as a philosopher, the scholar of Theophrastus, and the author of six books of Ethics, and of a commentary on his father's physical philosophy. These 'six books of Ethics' may in all probability be a confused reference to our *Nicomachean* treatise. In Diogenes Laertius also the title of this work seems to have caused a confusion with regard to the authorship. See *Diog. Laert.* VIII. viii. 2. 'Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle, says that he (Eudoxus) considered Pleasure to be the chief good,' where the reference is to the mention of Eudoxus, *Eth. Nic.* x. ii. 1. Cicero (*De Finibus*, v. 5) says, 'Let us hold fast to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus, whose scientific treatise on morals is said indeed to have been the work of Aristotle, but I do not see why the son should not have been a match for the father.'<sup>22</sup> This passage is very valuable, not for the opinion of Cicero, which

<sup>21</sup> This Aristocles is reputed to have been the teacher of Alexander Aphrodisias, in which case he lived at the beginning of the third century A.D. Among other works he appears to have written a History of Philosophy. But his authority for facts about Aristotle and his son must be considered very slight.

<sup>22</sup> 'Quare teneamus Aristotalem et ejus filium Nicomachum; cuius ac-

curate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristotelis; sed non video cur non potuerit patri similis esse filius.' This judgment of Cicero's is not based on critical examination, for he here is referring to the *Nicomachean Ethics* for a doctrine not to be found in them, so that it is probable he only knew the character of the work by hearsay.

is worthless, but for the evidence which it affords that during or just after the process of recension by Andronicus, Cicero had heard the Ethics 'of Nicomachus' talked of by name, and also attributed to Aristotle. This one fact seems sufficient to dispel the notion which was apparently started at a far later, and less well-informed period (see above, page 33) that the *Nicomachean Ethics* were 'addressed to Nicomachus.' In this matter we may safely go back to the belief entertained in the age, and we may even say in the circle, of Tyrannion and Andronicus, that the title of the work indicated that it was written by Nicomachus, but that it was really by Aristotle. We may safely adopt this belief of a particular period of antiquity, because it is so thoroughly borne out by internal evidence. None among all the works of Aristotle is more definitely marked with all the signs of genuineness than the greater part of this treatise. We have here all the qualities of an original work, the merits and faults of a fresh inquiry; style, manner, the philosophy, the relation to Plato, all bespeak for this book the actual composition of Aristotle himself, except in certain disputed portions. The question then arises, why it was entitled *Ethics of Nicomachus*, to which only a conjectural answer can be offered. The simplest explanation is that this was originally a mere name of contradistinction. The *Ethics of Eudemus* were probably so called because they were actually written by Eudemus, either during the lifetime of Aristotle, or soon after his death. The *Great Ethics* may have been so entitled from the vanity of their author,<sup>22</sup> who fancied that he had achieved a combination which united all the merits of the other two treatises. The genuine work of Aristotle may have been placed by Theo-

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<sup>22</sup> In the list of Diogenes we find | tics' (*ἀναλυτικῶν ποτέρων μεγάλων* a', B').  
enumerated, 'Great Posterior Analy-

phrastus in the hands of Nicomachus for such amount of editing and arrangement as may have been required for a probably not altogether finished and complete treatise; and then to distinguish it from the *Eudemian Ethics*, perhaps by this time already written, the name of the son who edited the book may have been used to designate it, while the name of the father, who had written it, was superseded. In short, it may not improbably have been the exigencies of the Peripatetic school-library, and the necessity of distinguishing by some external mark first two and afterwards three rolls on the same subject, and not much differing in size, that led to the particular naming of the three treatises. This, however, is mere conjecture. We shall now endeavour to see what traces of an editorial hand the *Nicomachean* treatise exhibits.

Reading straight on with this object in view, we arrive at the end of Book IV. without having our suspicions aroused or our attention arrested by any breaks in the composition. All might, speaking generally, be considered to have been written consecutively by the same hand. But in the last chapter of Book IV. we come to a check. This chapter ought to have treated of the two virtuous feelings, Modesty and Indignation. But the latter of these is left out, and the discussion on the former is unfinished. What is apparently an ingenious editorial interpolation of two lines and a half serves here to wind up Book IV. and to connect it with Books V. and VII. After the statement that Modesty cannot be considered, strictly speaking, a virtue, it is here added: 'Neither is Continence a virtue, but a sort of mixed quality. We shall treat of it subsequently; at present let us speak of Justice.' And then Book V. opens with the sentence: 'But about Justice and Injustice we must consider with what sort of actions they are concerned, and what sort of a

mean state is Justice, and between what extremes the Just is a mean.'

The three books, V., VI., VII., which follow are common to both the *Nicomachean* and the *Eudemian* treatise, and their authorship is a question to be discussed presently; but looking at the composition of the three books externally there is nothing *prima facie* to prevent us believing that they were written consecutively, though it is true that a piece either of mal-arrangement or of unskilful editorship shows itself in the last chapter of Book V., which appears to be superfluous.

Book VII. ends with a piece of editorial joining: 'We have treated of Continence and Incontinence, Pleasure and Pain; it remains for us to speak of Friendship.' Book VIII. begins: 'Next in order after the foregoing would come the investigation of Friendship.' And then Books VIII. and IX. are consecutively written down to the last line of the latter book, which looks as if it had been interpolated by the editor: 'On Friendship, then, we have said our say; the next point to discuss will be Pleasure.' For Book X., which is consecutive and complete in itself, ignores the previous ending and commences with the words: 'Perhaps it follows next to treat of Pleasure.'

These collisions, or repetitions, where the last sentence of one book is ignored or repeated by the first sentence of the succeeding book, are not only in themselves highly inartistic, but they are not in the manner of Aristotle.<sup>24</sup> In

<sup>24</sup> No instance of this sort of thing occurs all through the *Organon*, the *Physics*, the treatise *On the Heavens*, that *On the Soul*, that *On the Generation of Animals*, or the *History of Animals*,—that is to say, all through the more finished of Aristotle's com-

positions. In the *Metaphysics*, which are known to have been left incomplete, there is a repetition in the beginning of Book VI. of the words at the end of Book V. In the *Politics* (also unfinished) the beginning of Book II. repeats to some extent the

the *Eudemian Ethics* the same sort of collision occurs between Books I. and II., Books III. and IV., and Books VI. and VII. But in none of these cases is the awkwardness quite so glaring as in the transition between Books VII.—VIII., IX.—X. of the *Nicomacheans*. It seems, however, allowable to conjecture that Eudemus first set the example of this mode of writing, according to which each book or section of a treatise takes, as it were, a fresh start, and recapitulates in its opening sentence the point in the discussion which had been arrived at. This looks very like a reminiscence of oral lectures. Supposing a book to coincide in matter and in length with an oral lecture on the same subject, it is easy to suppose the lecturer concluding his address for the day by saying: 'I have now given you my views on Friendship, the next subject in our course will be Pleasure;' and then the following day he would quite naturally open his lecture with the words, 'The next subject in our course is Pleasure.' And it is comprehensible that the disciples of Aristotle, accustomed to oral endings and beginnings of this kind, should have inappropriately applied them to the divisions of literary composition. Eudemus having exhibited this practice, Nicomachus (or the unknown editor, whoever he was) appears to have adopted it with the view of giving unity to the different parts of the treatise put together by him, or arranged, or revised.

If these joinings at the ends respectively of Book IV., Book VII., and Book IX. be considered to be editorial interpolations, they would appear to indicate that the *Nicomacheans*

end of Book I. And in the *Rhetoric*, the third book of which seems incomplete, the opening of that third book repeats a long sentence from the end of Book II. We cannot say that in either of these cases the writing had

received the last hand of Aristotle. He probably, in each case, began the latter book in forgetfulness of the end of the former one, and never revised the writing as a whole.

*chean Ethics* are made up of four separate portions, written at different times from each other, and yet having all a common scope and a reference to a common ground plan previously sketched out for a system of morals in which each portion was (more or less roughly) adapted to find its place. At one time, indeed, there was a theory—but this has been now abandoned—that the work was resolvable into small isolated tracts, whose names appear in the Catalogue of Diogenes, and which had been amalgamated by an editor into the treatise as we now possess it. Such names as the following suggested this hypothesis: Περὶ δικαιοσύνης δ'. περὶ ἡδονῆς α'. περὶ τἀγαθοῦ γ'. περὶ φίλας α'. ἡθικῶν ε'. περὶ ἡδονῆς α' (repeated). περὶ ἔκουσίου α'. Θέσεις φιλικὰ β'. περὶ δικαίων β'. Some colour was given to the notion that these separate works, or *opuscula*, were the materials out of which the *Nicomachean Ethics* were afterwards put together, by the peculiar separate treatment which Aristotle gave to the Voluntary, Friendship, and Pleasure, when dealing with these subjects in the course of his system. But the impression of organic unity which the work leaves upon the mind, dispels the idea that the parts can have been, in the way suggested, prior to the whole. We see that the plan of the whole was present to the author's mind at starting, and was carried out to the end, and that all the parts were worked out in subordination to this general plan. Of the works mentioned in the Catalogue we know nothing certain, but we have endeavoured (above, page 15) to form a probable conception of their nature. And it seems, on the whole, doubtful whether any of them exactly correspond with any part of the writings which have come down to us under the name of Aristotle.

We give up, then, the attempt to resolve the *Nicomachean Ethics* into a *congeries* of minor works. But, at the same

time, we may allow that there are internal reasons for believing that the work, though conceived as a whole, was not executed all together at one time. We have already seen traces of an editor putting together four separate portions : let us now examine these. The first portion (Books I.-IV.) starts the question, What is the End-in-itself or Practical chief good ? gets an answer involving the term Virtue ; then by the analytical process is led on to a theory of the function and nature of Virtue ; then, as its definition brings in a term indicating deliberate action of the Will, this is analytically followed up, and a little treatise on the Voluntary in its various forms (probably written for the place which it occupies) is introduced, and then the law of Virtue, as a state of balance, is exemplified in application to all the separate virtues, recognised as such by the Greeks. Thus far we see Aristotle to have written ; if he wrote further, his MS. at this point was mutilated, and something was lost. Or, he may, from some cause, have put aside his writing at this point, while, in the meantime, he took up the working out of his ethical system from another starting place. This first portion (Books I.-IV.) remained, at all events, analytically consecutive, and almost complete in itself—with the exception that in four places it postponed certain matters for future inquiry ; namely, i. v. 7 defers the consideration of the philosophic life in respect of its capacity for producing happiness ; i. vii. 7 promises a renewed discussion on the question within what limits a man's independent happiness is affected by social relationships ; ii. vii. 16 indicates that a separate disquisition is to be expected on Justice, divided into two species ; ii. ii. 2 promises an account of the Right Law as given by the Intellect (*όρθος λόγος*) and its relation to the different virtues.

The unfinished last few lines of Book IV. are eked out by

an editorial allusion, and then follow Books V., VI., and VII., of which we may say at once that they were either written at a later period, and in a different vein, by Aristotle; or else they were the work of Eudemus, in whose *Ethics, verbatim*, they reappear.

Leaving this question, for the moment, in abeyance, we proceed to the third portion of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, namely, the treatise on Friendship contained in Books VIII. and IX. The only evidence for this having been composed quite separately—that is to say, that Book X., commencing with the treatise on Pleasure, was not a consecutive part of the same composition—is found in that little line which finishes Book IX., and which makes the beginning of Book X. read so awkwardly (see above, p. 44). But this by itself would not be sufficient to establish such an hypothesis, for the editor might have introduced this, out of mere false taste, into a perfectly consecutive writing of Aristotle's, through unwillingness to see a Book concluded<sup>25</sup> with a fragment of poetical quotation, thus: ‘Whence the saying,

“Good you will learn from the good.”’

And it seems not unlikely that the same editor introduced a similarly unnecessary tag to wind up Book VIII. (see viii. xiv. 4 and note). There is, however, an appearance of separateness about the treatise on Friendship, for in three places (viii. ix. 1, viii. xiii. 1, ix. iii. 1) it uses the phrase *ἐν ἀρχῇ*, ‘at the outset,’ in reference to the earlier chapters of Book VIII., which shows that Aristotle in these passages only carried back his mind to the beginning of the present piece of writing. Again, when he commences by describing

<sup>25</sup> That Aristotle was not averse to such endings we see from the conclusion of Book XI. of the *Metaphysics*,

<p>τὰ δὲ οὐτα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς.</p>	<p>οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἰς κοίρανος ἴστω.</p>
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Friendship as 'a sort of virtue, or implying virtue,' he ignores altogether that more superficial quality which he had mentioned in his list of the virtues (*Eth. Nic.* ii. vii. 13) under the name—Friendship. This would suggest that Aristotle had taken up the present subject at some little interval after writing his first ethical book, and indeed, while writing these pages, seems to have had his mind very much concentrated upon an effort to solve the problems which occur in the *Lysis* of Plato, and to the solutions of which he brought his own analytic method and philosophical forms. At the same time, while writing this treatise to some extent in a separate way, he evidently wrote it to form part of his ethical system. The very first words of Book VIII. show this, for he says, 'After this, it would follow to treat of Friendship, for it is a sort of virtue, or implies virtue.' And besides general expressions of the author's purpose to confine himself to an ethical point of view (see viii. i. 7, ix. ii. 2), we find two direct references to the earlier books of the *Ethics* (compare ix. ix. 5 with *Eth. Nic.* i. viii. 13, and ix. iv. 2 with iii. iv. 5).

A reference forward to Book X., which occurs in ix. ix. 8, cannot be with absolute certainty pronounced to be an interpolation. And there is a reference back from x. ix. 1 to these books. Book IX. is written in Aristotle's best manner and in the same tone as Book X. So, on the whole, it seems likely that the awkward joining between Books IX. and X. does not indicate a break in the MS., but is merely the result of editorial officiousness in dealing with a continuous piece.

If so, the *Nicomachean Ethics* are resolved not into four, but into three portions—namely, the earlier books, the disputed middle books, and the three concluding books taken as a whole. Book X. rounds off the treatise; it answers in the

most decisive way the question started at the commencement of Book I., and Aristotle then says (x. ix. 1), that, ‘having sufficiently treated in outline of Happiness, the Virtues, Friendship, and Pleasure, his design might be considered to have been completed,’ but that for the realisation of all which he has indicated social institutions, both private and public, will be required; and he thus ends his *Ethics* with a transition to the *Politics*.

That Aristotle, in summing up what he thought might be considered a complete ethical system, should have specified the leading topics of Books I.-IV. and VIII.-X. of his treatise, and should have omitted any mention of the subjects dealt with in Books V.-VII., seems a strong argument to prove that, at all events when he was writing Book X., he had not written the disputed middle books. Another argument in the same direction is, that while the three concluding books of the *Ethics* refer abundantly to Books I.-IV., they never make a single reference to Books V.-VII., though there was much opportunity for their doing so. For instance, it seems peculiar that in all which is said about Justice in Book VIII., there should be no allusion to the discussions of Book V., and that contemplation (*θεωρία*) should be treated of in Book X., without any recapitulation of what was said of the nature of Philosophic Wisdom (*σοφία*) in Book VI. That the treatise on Pleasure could have been written as it stands at the beginning of Book X., if Aristotle had previously written that other treatise on the same subject for what was to form Book VII. of the same work, is utterly impossible.

These observations are the first which strike us with reference to that middle portion of the *Nicomachean Ethics* which we have hitherto left unconsidered. Aristotle had not written it, at the time when he wrote what were to be

the concluding paragraphs of his treatise.' Yet while he wrote these, he cannot have considered his work, from a literary point of view, to have been finished. For he had given promises in the earlier part of it, which were as yet unfulfilled. We have seen how (*Eth.* II. vii. 16) he had promised a separate discussion 'on the two kinds of Justice, and in what sense each of these might be considered to be a mean state.' Now we might conjecture what actually occurred to have been this: Aristotle went on writing about the different virtues until he came to the place where it would have been natural to fulfil his promise and discuss the nature of Justice. But here the thought entered his mind to what an extent Justice was externally determined, that is to say, was dependent on social and political conceptions. He perhaps felt, like Plato, that to treat of Justice was to treat of Society. At all events, it is easy to understand that he resolved to defer the special consideration of Justice, till he could give his mind to it in connection with the more purely political part of the investigations before him. For he does not separate ethics from politics, but calls ethics from the outset 'a sort of politics.' Laying aside, then, his discussion of the Virtues before he had completed it by a discussion on Justice, he went on with his ethical system at a point where he could see his way beforehand, and proceeded to analyse Friendship, and afterwards Pleasure, and the Supreme Good, as identified with Contemplation. When these matters were worked out, he probably still deferred the ethical investigation of Justice, and went on, after an interval, to the composition of his *Politics*. In the meantime he had thrown out, in Book VIII., many thoughts and suggestions on Justice and Political Constitutions, which were afterwards matured in the *Politics*.

The *Politics* of Aristotle have come down to us as quite

an unfinished work, and the question then arises, Did he ever go back to finish his *Ethics* by supplying the middle part? We may fairly conjecture that he had not only settled in his own mind pretty much what this middle part should consist of, but had also orally imparted this to his school, to whom he may even have entrusted to some extent the working out of his views. But the question is, Did Aristotle himself ever fill up by his own writing the *lacuna* which he had left in his *Ethics*? Some think that this point is settled at once by apparent references to *Eth. Nic.* v. vi. vii. to be found in the *Politics* and *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. The passages are :

(1) *Pol.* II. ii. 4. Διόπερ τὸ ἵσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον.

(2) *Pol.* III. ix. 3. Ὡστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ δίκαιον τίσιν, καὶ διήρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς.

(3) *Pol.* III. xii. 1. δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν ἵσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ μέχρι γέ τινος ὁμολογοῦσι τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, ἐν οἷς διώρισται περὶ τῶν ἡθικῶν· τὸ γὰρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ δεῖν τοῖς ἵσοις ἵσον εἶναι φασιν.

(4) *Metaphys.* I. i. 17. Εἴρηται μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς τὶς διαφορὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὁμογενῶν· οὐ δ' ἔνεκα νῦν ποιούμεθα τὸν λόγον, τοῦτ' ἐστίν. κ.τ.λ.

At first sight these four passages might seem to furnish powerful evidence in favour of the disputed books having been written by Aristotle himself, but a closer examination of them greatly diminishes the force of their testimony. No. (1) is supposed to refer to *Eth. Nic.* v. v. 6, but it does not even agree with it. For while *Pol.* II. ii. 4 says that 'equal retaliation preserves the State,' *Eth. Nic.* v. v. 6 says that 'Retaliation is a bond of union provided that it be on

principles *not of equality*, but of proportion.' In fact the remarks on Retaliation in the *Ethics* have all the appearance of being a development and improvement of those in the *Politics*. And the same impression is produced by comparing No. (2) with *Eth. Nic.* v. iii. 4, which it is supposed to quote. The latter passage discusses the law of Distribution in States (though a purely political question) with additional refinements beyond what we find in the *Politics*. But if internal evidence of this kind leads us to think that Book V. (as it stands) of the *Ethics* was written later than the *Politics* and was partly based on them, what becomes of these supposed references in the *Politics* to that Book? In a question of the kind, internal evidence resting on the character of the thought in one treatise as compared with that in another treatise must always prevail over evidence consisting in a few isolated words, which might most naturally have been interpolated. And against this as a canon of Aristotelian criticism it is of no use to point to a *consensus* of MSS. For it must be remembered that the works of Aristotle not only shared with other ancient writings all the risks of corruption from the vagaries of successive copyists, from the Christian era till the invention of printing,—but also had in many cases previously gone through two distinct processes of editing, first by the disciples of Aristotle, soon after his death, and secondly by Andronicus of Rhodes about 50 B.C. Appeal to MSS. therefore, unless we could get MSS. of the fourth century B.C., can never, in such a question, be final. Applying these considerations to the passages before us, we do not hesitate to pronounce a belief that the words 'as has before been said in the *Ethics*' in Nos. (1) and (2) are, in each case, the interpolated addition of either an editor or a copyist. Looking to passage No. (3) we find that it contains no reference to any

particular part of the *Ethics*, but only an assertion that, with regard to justice, people in general<sup>26</sup> agree to a certain extent with those theories which have been formed by philosophers upon ethical subjects.

Passage No. (4) undoubtedly refers either to *Eth. Nic.* Book VI., or else—supposing that book to have been written by Eudemus—to some lost book which bore the same relation to that book which the *Nicomachean Ethics* generally bear to the *Eudemian*. The passage refers to a comparison between Wisdom, Art, and Science, as having been made ‘in the *Ethics*,’ but this does not necessarily identify Book VI. as we now have it. The words might equally well apply to the original section of the *Ethics*, now lost, of which Book VI. was a sort of paraphrase. We are left to internal evidence in deciding which of the two cases seems the more probable. The passage itself even if written by Aristotle would only prove that something answering to Book VI. had been composed by him for his *Ethics*. But there is another hypothesis possible with regard to this passage, which we cannot forbear suggesting, even though we should be charged with temerity for so doing. It is this: We have seen above (page 32) that a tradition is recorded by Asclepius to the effect that Eudemus had the MS. of the *Metaphysics* entrusted to him, and that he was dissatisfied with the form of the work, and kept it back, and finally edited it, after the death of Aristotle, completing parts of it by introducing extracts from other of Aristotle’s writings. This tradition suggests the idea of considerable liberty of editorship; and if this was the case, it seems not impossible that Eudemus

<sup>26</sup> This passage might be compared with *Eth. Nic.* i. iv. 2, where it is said that ‘refined thinkers and the many are both agreed in giving the name of Happiness to the highest of prac-

tical goods.’ ‘Ονόματι μὲν οὖν σχέδον ὅπερ τῶν πλείστων δημολογεῖται· τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν.

may have introduced the whole of this passage from Εἰρηται μὲν οὖν down to ποιητικῶν μᾶλλον, in express reference to his own account of *σοφία* (written originally for his own *Ethics*, but afterwards incorporated also with the *Ethics* of Aristotle), and with the object of reconciling the differences between that account and the description of *σοφία* to be given in the *Metaphysics*, and of indicating that the point of view in the two accounts was different, since in the *Metaphysics* the term *σοφία* was to be taken in a restricted sense, merely as the science of causes.<sup>27</sup> The passage contains the words, ‘the reason for our at present treating of the subject is, &c.,’ and these are naturally thought to be the words of Aristotle, speaking in his own person. But they may, quite possibly, have been the words of Eudemus, speaking in the person of the Peripatetic School. The work of that school seems to have been a good deal co-operative, and the results of it to have been treated as common property.

(5) There is yet another passage in the *Politics* (iv. xi. 3) which is thought by some to guarantee the Aristotelian genuineness of the most disputed part in the Disputed Books,—the treatise on Pleasure at the end of *Eth. Nic.* Book VII. It runs thus: Εἰ γὰρ καλῶς ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς εἴρηται τὸ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον εἶναι τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον, μεσότητα δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν, τὸν μέσον ἀναγκαῖον βίον εἶναι βέλτιστον. This place is triumphantly claimed as referring to *Eth. Nic.* vii. xii. 3, and vii. xiii. 2, since in no other part of the Nicomachean *Ethics* does the word ἀνεμπόδιστος occur. The word itself indeed does not occur—yet still a further examination of the passage above quoted will show that it does not necessarily refer to *Eth. Nic.* Book VII. and does not relieve us from the task of trying the whole case by internal evi-

<sup>27</sup> See note on *Eth.* vi. vii. 3. \*

dence. The premiss of the argument in the *Politics* consists in a summary of conclusions drawn from Books I., II., and X. of *Eth. Nic.* By a comparison of the way in which Aristotle elsewhere in the *Politics* uses the results arrived at in his *Ethics*, we learn with what a free hand, and in what a large manner he deals with them, often summing up in a word or two, and stating in a better way, conclusions which he had before laboriously attained. The same has been done here, and by the word ἀνεμπόδιστος he sums up all that he had said about Happiness being τέλειος, and all the subsidiary discussions about the βίος τέλειος, and the necessity for favourable circumstances, because the want of these (*Eth. Nic.* I. x. 12) ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς ἐνέργειαις. (See also *Eth. Nic.* I. viii. 15.) In one word he here expresses all this, and says that 'the Happy Life is an unimpeded life in accordance with virtue.' He is not referring at all to Book VII., but is stating with a new formula the conclusions of Book I. On the other hand, the writer of the Disputed Books, who is throughout much influenced by the *Politics* of Aristotle, seizes on this new word, ἀνεμπόδιστος, and uses it in the places mentioned, giving ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος as his definition of Pleasure.

This seems a far more probable account of the relation between *Pol.* iv. xi. 3 and *Eth. Nic.* vii. xii. 3, xiii. 2 than it would be to suppose that the former passage was written in reference to the latter ones, which were only concerned with Pleasure, and not with 'the Happy Life' at all.

It appears, then, so far as we have seen, that there is not sufficient external evidence in the shape of undoubted references to Books V., VI., VII. of *Eth. Nic.* made by Aristotle himself in other parts of his writings, to establish their genuineness. Let us endeavour to see what can be gathered as to this point from an examination of the books themselves. They are found in both the *Nicomachean* and the *Eudemian*

treatise. The question is, to which treatise they originally belonged. And the first thing that strikes us is, that if these Disputed Books be read as iv., v., vi. of the *Eudemian Ethics*, there is nothing in them which interferes with the continuity of that work; the books appear as if in their natural place. On the other hand, if read as v., vi., vii. of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, that treatise is at once marred by many irregularities: *first*, by the appearance of two separate discussions on Pleasure, quite irrespective of each other; *secondly*, by a system of forced joinings of which the result is, that Aristotle is made to say (vii. xiv. 9), ‘Having treated of Pleasure, we may now treat of Friendship;’ and a few pages later (ix. xii. 4), ‘Having treated of Friendship, it follows for us to treat of Pleasure;’ *thirdly*, by a strange ignoring in Books VIII.–X. of matters discussed in Books V. and VI., to which it would have seemed natural to refer.

We next proceed to note the references backwards made in these three books, and an examination of these shows that they correspond more closely with places in the earlier books of the *Eudemian Ethics*, than to similar places in the earlier books of the *Nicomachean* treatise (compare *Eth. Nic.*<sup>28</sup> v. i. 2 with *Eth. Eud.* iii. v. 1–3; *Eth. Nic.* v. viii. 3 with *Eth. Eud.* ii. viii. 10, and ii. ix. 1; *Eth. Nic.* vi. i. 1 with *Eth. Eud.* ii. v. 1; *Eth. Nic.* vi. i. 4 with *Eth. Eud.* ii. iv. 1; *Eth. Nic.* vi. viii. 1 with *Eth. Eud.* i. viii. 18; *Eth. Nic.* vi. xii. 10 with *Eth. Eud.* ii. xi. 4; *Eth. Nic.* vii. iv. 2 and vii. vii. 1 with *Eth. Eud.* iii. ii. 6; *Eth. Nic.* vii. xi. 1 with *Eth. Eud.* i. v. 11; *Eth. Nic.* vii. xi. 2 with *Eth. Eud.* ii. iv. 2–4; *Eth. Nic.* vii. xiv. 1 with *Eth. Eud.* i. v. 11).

<sup>28</sup> The words *Eth. Nic.* are used here and subsequently, merely for the sake of convenience, to indicate those books which now stand as v., vi., vii.,

in the *Nicomachean* treatise, not as giving an opinion that they originally so stood; for, of course, the contrary conclusion is being pointed at.

We have seen above (page 47) that Aristotle promised (*Eth. Nic.* II. vii. 16) to treat ‘of the two kinds of Justice, and in what sense each of these is a mean state,’ and (II. ii. 2) to treat ‘of the Right Law, and its relation to the different virtues.’ These, however, are general promises, and are only to a certain extent fulfilled in Books V. and VI. Much more particular promises are to be found in the *Eudemian Ethics*. See II. x. 19, where after speaking of the legal distinction between voluntary and deliberate acts, the writer says, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἔροῦμεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐπισκέψει, and this promise is exactly carried out in *Eth. Nic.* v. viii. 6–12. Again, in *Eth. Eud.* II. v. 8 it is said, τίς δ' ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πρὸς τίνα δεῖ ὅρον ἀποβλέποντας λέγειν τὸ μέσον, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον, which minutely and verbally corresponds with *Eth. Nic.* vi. i. 1–3. Again, *Eth. Eud.* I. viii. 17, 18 gives a very precise anticipation of *Eth. Nic.* vi. viii. 1–4; the words are, “Ωστε τοῦτ’ ἀν εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος τῶν ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτῶν. Τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κυρίαν πασῶν. Αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶ πολιτικὴ καὶ οἰκονομικὴ καὶ φρόνησις. Διαφέρουσι γὰρ αὗται αἱ ἔξεις πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας τῷ τοιαῦται εἶναι πρὸς δ’ ἀλλήλας εἰ τι διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον λεκτέον. *Eth. Eud.* III. vii. 10, by the words ἐστι γὰρ, ὡσπερ λεχθῆσται ὕστερον, ἐκάστη πως ἀρετὴ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἡ λλως μετὰ φρουρήσεως, anticipates that doctrine about the raw material of virtue being completed by conjunction with Thought, which is given in *Eth. Nic.* vi. xiii., but of which no trace appears in the earlier *Nicomachean* books. In II. xi. 1 the Eudemian writer after starting the question whether it is the province of Virtue to keep the Will straight, or the Reason straight, says that the latter is the province of Continence. “Ἐστι δ’ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἔτερον. Λεκτέον δ’ ὕστερον περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ ὅσοις γε δοκεῖ τὸν λόγον ὁρθὸν παρέχειν ἡ ἀρετή, τοῦτο αἴτιον.

He says that people confound Continence with Virtue, and that he must show the distinction between them. The discussion is taken up again in *Eth. Nic.* vii. i. 4. That Virtue keeps straight the Will and the conception of the End to be aimed at, is a characteristic Eudemian doctrine, which reappears in *Eth. Nic.* vi. xii. 8, but this is a refinement in psychology not to be met with in Aristotle's undoubted ethical books. There is no promise of a discussion upon Continence or Incontinence in *Eth. Nic.* i. iv. The interpolated words (iv. ix. 8) Οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδὲ ή ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλά τις μικτή· δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον are apparently an editorial attempt to weld together Aristotle's original conclusions with subsequent Peripatetic developments. On the other hand, *Eth. Eud.* iii. ii. 3 gives valuable indication of the ambiguity of the term *ἀκολασία* (which has a different meaning in the table of the Virtues and in *Eth. Nic.* vii.), and then iii. ii. 15 promises a more exact discussion on the class of pleasures with which Intemperance is concerned: 'Ακριβέστερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ γένους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἔσται διαιρετέον ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὕστερον περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας. This is fulfilled in *Eth. Nic.* vii. iv. Finally, there is in *Eth. Eud.* i. v. 11 a passage which refers us forward to the treatise on Pleasure at the end of *Eth. Nic.* vii., and at the same time sketches out the intermediate subjects to be treated of. After discussing the Three Lives (political, philosophical, and voluntary), the writer says, Τούτων δ' ή μὲν περὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἡδονή, καὶ τὶς καὶ πολὰ τις γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνων, οὐκ ἄδηλον, ὥστ' οὐ τίνες εἰσὶ δεῖ ζητεῖν αὐτὰς (i.e. bodily pleasures) ἀλλ' εἰ συντείνουσί τι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἡ μή, καὶ πῶς συντείνουσι, καὶ πότερον, εἰ δεῖ προσάπτειν τῷ ζῆν καλὰς ἡδονάς τινας, ταύτας δεῖ προσάπτειν, ἡ τούτων μὲν ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν, ἔτεραι δ' εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ δι' ἃς εὐλόγιας οἴνονται

τὸν εὐδαιμονα ξῆν ἡδέως καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀλύπως. Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ὑστερον ἐπισκεπτέον, περὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως πρῶτον θεωρήσωμεν. The question here started is one not touched upon in the undoubtedly Aristotelian books, namely: Assuming that there are higher pleasures, and that pleasure of the highest kind is identical with Happiness and the chief good, is there no place left in a moral system for the lower, or bodily, pleasures,—are not these to be admitted as contributaries to Happiness, or are they to be stigmatised as absolutely evil? This question is taken up, and to some extent answered, in *Eth. Nic.* vii. xiv.

The Disputed Books are not afterwards alluded to in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but their contents are not without recognition in subsequent books of the *Eudemian* treatise. For instance, see *Eth. Eud.* vii. x. 10, where proportion in Friendship is illustrated by the joining of the diagonal of a square. This illustration was worked out with some detail in *Eth. Nic.* v. v. 8; it is here cursorily mentioned, the understanding of what is meant being assumed: 'Ο δὲ ὑπερεχόμενος τούναντίον στρέφει τὸ ἀνάλογον, καὶ κατὰ διάμετρον συζεύγησιν. And the same chapter, § 26, asks, Πώς γὰρ κοινωνήσει γεωργῷ σκυτοτόμος, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἴσασθήσεται τὰ ἔργα; which takes us back to the discussions on value and price in *Eth. Nic.* v. v. *Eth. Eud.* viii. iii. It says, Καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς δὲ εἴρηται ποῖόν τι καὶ πῶς ἀγαθόν, καὶ ὅτι τά τε ἀπλῶς ἡδέα καὶ καλά, καὶ τά τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἡδέα. This is a reference to *Eth. Nic.* vii. xii., beginning "Οτι δὲ οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον."

The system of references backward and forward, above quoted, seems to show a very close connection between the Disputed Books and the other books of the *Eudemian Ethics*. But, beside this, there is also a remarkable coincidence between the style and manner of these Books, and that which

we find consistently employed by the *Eudemian* writer. We have already (above, page 24) remarked on his peculiarly explicit mode of introducing literary quotations, and this peculiarity is found in the Disputed Books. (See *Eth. Nic.* v. ix. 1, ‘As Euripides strangely wrote;’ v. ix. 7, ‘As Homer says that Glaucus gave to Diomede;’ vi. ii. 6, ‘Wherefore rightly Agathon;’ vi. iv. 5, ‘As also Agathon says;’ vi. vii. 2, ‘As Homer says in the Margites;’ vi. ix. 1, ‘Wherefore Euripides;’ vii. i. 1, ‘As Homer has described Priam saying of Hector;’ vii. vi. 3, ‘As Homer says of Aphrodite;’ vii. x. 3, ‘As Anaxandrides jested;’ vii. x. 4, ‘As Evenus also says.’ Throughout these Books there are only three verses given without their author’s name; one is mentioned as ‘a proverb,’ v. i. 15; one is called ‘the principle of Rhadamanthus,’ v. v. 1; one alone is given without name or note, vii. xiii. 5. Even where there is no quotation this literary explicitness sometimes exhibits itself, as in vii. ii. 7, ‘Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes of Sophocles;’ and vii. vii. 6, ‘The Philoctetes of Theodectes when bitten by the snake, or Cercyon in the Alope of Carcinus.’ On the other hand, in the seven undoubted ethical books of Aristotle there are altogether sixteen places where verses are quoted, of these twelve are without any indication of authorship or source; in two places the name of Homer is mentioned; in one the name of Hesiod, and one couplet is given as ‘the Delian inscription.’) Taken by itself this would be not worth mentioning, but when taken with a number of other things which all testify in the same direction, it may be allowed consideration among the mass of cumulative evidence.

But far more important than this is the agreement of philosophical phraseology between the Disputed Books and the *Eudemian Ethics*, of which a striking instance is to be found in the use of the word *ōpos*, to express a ‘standard,’

'definition,' or 'differentiating mark.' This formula does not once occur in the undoubted ethical books of Aristotle, but apparently some time after he had written these he began to write his *Politics*, and in the meantime he had found out its convenience for the discussions which he had in hand; so, accordingly, in the *Politics* ὅρος, in this logical sense, very frequently occurs.<sup>29</sup>

The *Eudemian Ethics* were clearly written subsequently to the *Politics* of Aristotle, and the writer of them takes up the formula as being by this time in vogue in the Peripatetic School. We have seen how in *Eth. Eud.* II. v. 8 he starts the question πρὸς τίνα δεῖ ὄρον ἀποβλέποντας λέγειν τὸ μέσον, 'to what ultimate standard we ought to look in fixing the mean.' And we have seen, too, how in the last remaining paragraph of the work (*Eth. Eud.* VIII. xii.) the phrase occurs: καὶ οὗτος ὁ ὄρος κάλλιστος . . . Τίς μὲν οὖν ὄρος καλοκἀγαθός, καὶ τίς ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν ἀπλῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἐστω εἰρημένον. The word ὄρος, then, in the sense of 'ultimate standard' had taken an important place in the *Eudemian* philosophy. But in the Disputed Books it is also noticeable. (See VI. i. 1, τίς ἐστὶν ὄρος τῶν μεσοτήτων. VI. i. 3, τίς τ' ἐστὶν ὁ ὄρθος λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὄρος. VII. xiii. 4, πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ὄρος αὐτῆς.)

The doctrine of the Practical Syllogism (see Essay IV.) does not appear in *Eth. Nic.* I.-IV., VIII.-X., but in Aristotle's treatise *On the Soul*, written probably later, the syllogistic form is used to express the process gone through by the mind in forming a practical resolution (see *De An.* III. xi. 4). This application of the syllogism was worked out a good

<sup>29</sup> See *Pol.* II. vi. 9: Ἀλλὰ βελτίων δρος τὸ σωφρόνως καὶ ἐλευθέρως. II. vii. 16: Καὶ οὖν ἄριστος δρος τὸ μὴ λύσιτελεῖν τοὺς κρείττους. IV. viii. 7:

ἄριστοκρατίας μὲν γὰρ δρος ἀρετή, δλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, δῆμου δὲ ἐλευθερία. And so on in about sixteen similar places.

deal among the Peripatetics, as may be inferred from the treatise *On the Motion of Animals*, placed among Aristotle's works, but probably not genuine. The *Eudemian* writer had evidently become familiarised with the application of the syllogism to the theory of moral action, and had perhaps himself helped to develop the doctrine. At all events, he makes considerable use of it. See *Eth. Eud.* II. xi. 4 : ὥσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαὶ, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις. Ἐπειδὴ δεῖ τόδε ὑγιαίνειν, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ ὑπάρξαι, εἰ ἔσται ἐκεῖνο, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, εἰ ἔστι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὄρθαι, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ εἶναι. The Practical Syllogism appears in the Disputed Books, and, indeed, it is used as the great analytical instrument for resolving the phenomena of Incontinence in Book VII. But it is worthy of notice how strikingly similar some of the phrases used in these Books are to the passage above quoted from the *Eudemian Ethics*. See *Eth. Nic.* VII. iii. 9 : ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπερανθὲν ἔνθα μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχήν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθύς (where *ποιητικαῖς* is used in the same peculiar way as above) ; VII. viii. 4 : ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἡ μὲν φθείρει, ἡ δὲ σώζει, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὖν ἔνεκα ἀρχή, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις.

There is another minor formula in the use of which the Disputed Books show an agreement with the *Eudemian Ethics*, but not with the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in which it does not appear; namely, the formula τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά. This occurs, as before quoted, in the winding up of the last remaining part of the *Eudemian* work, τίς ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔστω εἰρημένον. It is introduced in *Eth. Nic.* v. i. 9, where the 'goods of fortune' are specified, 'which are always good absolutely, but not always so<sup>30</sup> to the indi-

<sup>30</sup> It is added that 'men pray for these and seek after them, but they should not; they should pray that the absolute goods may be goods to them'

vidual.' In v. v. 18 τὸ ἀπλῶς ὡφέλιμον is mentioned. In v. vi. 6 the just ruler, οὐ νέμει πλέον τοῦ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῷ. In v. ix. 17 Justice is said to exist among those οἱς μέτεστι τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν. In vii. vi. 1, τὰ ἀπλῶς ἡδέα are mentioned (cf. *Eth. Eud.* viii. iii. 1, above quoted), and in v. i. 10, vii. xiii. 1, we find a mention of τὰ ἀπλῶς κακά. It is observable that even in the *Politics* of Aristotle this formula does not appear to exist.

That the Disputed Books contain a later development of several points in ethical and psychological philosophy than can be found in other parts of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and that in this respect they perfectly agree with the *Eudemian Ethics* will be shown in detail in the notes to the Books themselves. And it will be shown also that they exhibit in common with the latter a certain indistinctness of exposition and certain departures from the Aristotelian point of view. Perhaps enough has been said for the present to justify the conclusion to which we come that Books V., VI., VII. of the *Nicomachean Ethics* were written by the author of the Eudemian treatise as an integral part of that work, from which they were taken and transferred *verbatim* into the *Ethics* of Aristotle,<sup>31</sup> either to fill up a gap caused by the loss of corresponding Aristotelian books, or else to supplement or complete a work which Aristotle himself had never finished. Which of the two alternatives is more credible, there are hardly grounds sufficient to enable us to pronounce. In either case we must assume that Aristotle had, in his oral teaching, led the way to almost all the conclusions contained

individually, and that they should choose what is good for themselves.' This is in the same style with *Eth. Eud.* vii. xii. 17: τὸ ζητεῖν καὶ εὑρεῖν πολλοὺς φίλους. But to say what men 'ought to pray for' is not

after the manner of Aristotle.

<sup>31</sup> We do not undertake to say whether this transference was made by Nicomachus, or some other early editor, or long afterwards by Andronicus.

in the books in question. The appearance which we find in Books V. and VI. of direct borrowing from other works of Aristotle's, such as the *Politics* and the *Organon*, would rather favour the supposition that the compiler of these books had not before him any written exposition of this part of Aristotle's ethical system.

With regard to previous opinions upon the subject of the Disputed Books, it may be mentioned that Casaubon threw out the suggestion that the treatise on Pleasure in Book VII. was written by Eudemus. This suggestion means that all the rest of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is by Aristotle, but that this treatise on Pleasure has been imported into its present place. This is, in short, an attempt to save the credit of the *Nicomachean* work by removing from it an obvious excrescence. But the hypothesis is untenable, for though we can understand Book VII. as a whole being for some reason or other imported from the *Eudemian Ethics*, and bringing with it a superfluous disquisition,<sup>32</sup> it is impossible to believe that any of Aristotle's editors would have brought into his ethical work this superfluous disquisition out of the writings of a disciple—by itself, to confuse and spoil the rest.

Some have entertained the view that this treatise on Pleasure may have been an earlier essay by Aristotle himself, found among his MSS., and introduced, in order to preserve it, into its present place. But close examination of the treatise shows that it is not earlier, but later, than the treatise on the same subject in Book X., on which it is based in the same way as other parts of the *Eudemian Ethics* are

<sup>32</sup> It is, however, surprising that the editor, whoever he was, in transferring Book VII. should not have stopped short at the end of the discussion on Incontinence. By going mechanically to work and transferring

the Book bodily, he marred the symmetry of the *Nicomachean* work, but at the same time furnished an important piece of evidence towards deciding the authorship of the Disputed Books.

based on Aristotle's writing. It chiefly follows Book X., but also to some slight extent it tries to improve upon the conclusions of Aristotle.

Fritzsche, the learned editor of the *Eudemian Ethics*, while conceding that VI. and VII. of the Disputed Books were the work of Eudemus, maintains that Book V. is the writing of Aristotle, with the exception of the last chapter, which he considers to be a fragment from a corresponding book on Justice by Eudemus, now lost. This theory would imply a system of mutual accommodation,—it would imply that the *Eudemian Ethics* had lost a book on Justice, which was supplied out of the *Nicomacheans*, and that the latter treatise had lost, or wanted, a book on the Intellect in relation to morals, and a book on Continence and Incontinence, both which books were supplied out of the *Eudemians*. This seems a rather too elaborate hypothesis, but we cannot altogether deny its possibility. The genuineness, or otherwise, of *Eth. Nic.* v. must be considered on the reasons which can be urged either for or against it. Fritzsche's arguments are a little far-fetched. In the first place he goes to the *Great Ethics*, which are allowed to follow the *Eudemian* treatise very closely, and looking at the string of difficult questions on Justice (*Mag. Mor.* II. iii. 3–30) which we have already mentioned (page 36), he asks—Whence can these difficulties have been derived?—and concludes that they must have originally been started in the *Eudemian* Book on Justice, now lost. This reasoning, however, seems very unsatisfactory; for the difficulties referred to are not exclusively connected with Justice, some of them are general questions of casuistry: again, the writer of the *Great Ethics* does not introduce them while discussing the subject of Justice, but after his discussion upon the Intellectual Virtues; and furthermore we have above seen reason to believe that this writer had a

third source besides the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics* from which he drew his matter (see page 35), and from which he may, very likely, have drawn the special matter in question. This first argument then may surely be discarded. Fritzsche in the second place points to the last existing chapter of *Eth. Eud.* (viii. iii. 1), where mention is made of 'that culmination of the Virtues' ήν ἐκαλούμενη δή καλοκαγαθίαν. No prior place in the *Eudemian* treatise answers to this, and so he at once concludes that the passage referred to must have existed in the (supposed) lost book on Justice. But there is no obvious connection between *καλοκαγαθία* and Justice; on the other hand there are doubtless several *lucumae* in the *Eudemian Ethics*,<sup>33</sup> even the beginning of Book VIII. is wanting, and the passage referred to may very well have existed there. If Book VIII. was originally of the same length as the other *Eudemian* books, a considerable number of chapters at its commencement must have dropped out, and it seems extremely probable that some of these were devoted to the consideration of a Virtue which was the result of all the other Virtues, and which the writer called *καλοκαγαθία*. Fritzsche's third argument is derived from Book V. itself (ii. 11) where there occurs a promise of a subsequent discussion on the question whether the moral education of the individual belongs to Politics or not (*περὶ δὲ τῆς καθ' ἐκαστον παιδείας, καθ' ήν ἀπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι, πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ή ἐτέρας, ὅστερον διοριστέον· οὐ γὰρ ἵσως ταῦτὸν ἀνδρὶ τ' ἀγαθῷ εἰναι καὶ πολίτη, παντί*). This, says Fritzsche, is fulfilled in *Eth. Nic.* x. ix. 9 sqq. and *Pol.* iii. iv. and iii. xviii., which proves that the above passage was written by Aristotle and not by Eudemus. When, however, we examine

<sup>33</sup> As, for instance, *Eth. Eud.* iii. 3 refers back to something lost from the preliminary catalogue of the Virtues:

διεγράψαμεν δὲ πρότερον πῶς τὴν ἀκολασίαν ὄνομαζοντες μεταφέρομεν.

the places referred to we do not find that they answer to the promise given, and so far from establishing that the passage in question was written by Aristotle, they induce a contrary conclusion. In *Eth. Nic.* x. ix. 9 sqq. Aristotle lays it down as strongly as possible that all education must be dictated by the State ; he admits that there must be a special treatment of individuals, in education as in medicine, but in each case he considers that the special treatment is only the skilful application of general laws belonging to the general science, whether of Medicine or of Politics. There is not a word about the moral education of the individual standing apart from Politics and belonging to some separate science. This in fact was the *Eudemian* view, which, as we have seen (page 26), tried to separate Ethics from the more general science of Politics. Aristotle afterwards, *Pol.* viii. i. 3, decisively pronounces that education should all be public, under State control, and reduced to one standard. In the passages of the *Politics* to which Fritzsche refers us we find—not a fulfilment of the above promise, but rather the source which suggested to the *Eudemian* writer to attempt a refinement upon Aristotle. In *Pol.* iii. iv., iii. xviii. the question is started whether the virtue of the Man and of the Citizen is identical. It is answered that States vary, but in the Best City the same education and habits produce the good man and the citizen with constitutional qualities. The writer of *Eth. Nic.* Book V. gets a suggestion from this discussion and promises to investigate, as a part of his ethical treatise, whether the moral education of the individual does not belong to a sphere separate from Politics. The *Eudemian Ethics* were mutilated or unfinished ; the part answering to the latter half of *Eth. Nic.* x. is lost, or was never written ; so we cannot tell whether this promise was ever fulfilled in the *Eudemian* treatise,—it certainly never was in the *Nico-*

*machean.* Fritzsche is doubtless right in saying that the last chapter in Book V. is out of its proper place, but there is nothing to show that it is written by a different hand from the rest of the book. Nor have we thus far seen anything to invalidate the opinion that the three Disputed Books must go together and that they originally formed part of the *Eudemian Ethics*.

Those, therefore, who hold that these books were written by Aristotle, must be prepared also to maintain that Aristotle wrote the whole of the *Eudemian* treatise: that is to say, that at a time when he had several great works, unfinished, on his hands, such as certainly the *Politics*, the *Metaphysics*, and the *Poetic*; and was engaged in carrying on the most multifarious researches in natural history and other sciences of observation; and had promised works<sup>34</sup> *On the Physiology of Plants*, and *On Disease and Health so far as belongs to Physical Philosophy*, which had never been executed, he set himself to re-write his own work on Morals, serving up his old materials again in a sort of paraphrase. One peculiarity of this would be that Aristotle, if he did this thing, made the statement of his ethical system so much worse, instead of better, than it was originally. In the *Politics* he frequently re-states conclusions arrived at in the *Nicomachean Ethics*; whenever he does so we are struck by the breadth, the freedom, and the firmness of his handling. But in the *Eudemian* treatise the opposite qualities are discernible; the writer of this treatise, even when stating Aristotle's conclusions without variation, seems to cloud them over, so that we require to go back to Aristotle to get a clear impression. And when

<sup>34</sup> See *De Sensu*, iv. 14. *De Gen.*  
*An.* i. ii. 1. *De Long.* *Vit.* i. 4, vi. 8.  
In *Hist. An.* v. i. 4, δύσκερ εἰρηται δύ-

τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῇ περὶ τῶν φυτῶν, is probably a mis-reading for εἰρητας.

he treats, as in the Disputed Books, of subjects otherwise unexpounded, we do not feel that we know exactly what the views of Aristotle on these subjects really were. This argument against the *Eudemian Ethics* having been written by Aristotle, based on their obvious inferiority in point of execution, is not answered, as some appear to think, by pointing to the *Laws* of Plato, which are now accepted as a genuine re-writing of the *Republic*, though far inferior to that work in dramatic force, and in philosophic power. The cases are not parallel ; for the *Laws* are considered to have been a senile production, written when Plato was between eighty and ninety years of age, whereas Aristotle did not live to be more than sixty-three years old, and the works on which he was apparently engaged at the very end of his life are in his most vigorous and best manner. The *Eudemian Ethics* are unequal to these later writings in power and clearness, and they are unlike them not only in style, but also in matter, for the theology of the *Eudemian Ethics* is clearly different from that of *Metaphysics*, Book XI. But there is not only ground for believing that Aristotle did not write the *Eudemian Ethics*, but also much reason to believe that Eudemus did. We have positive testimony (above, page 32) that Eudemus wrote paraphrases of the works of Aristotle ; we see that it was the custom of the Peripatetic School to do this, and that a second paraphrase called the *Great Ethics* was constructed on the top of the *Eudemians* ; even those who defend the genuineness of the Disputed Books will hardly go the length of saying that this third treatise was also written by Aristotle. And furthermore, all the variations and divergences from Aristotle's views as before expressed by him, which occur in the *Eudemian Ethics*, in theology, in psychology, in a tendency to physical explanations of moral phenomena, and at the same time in a tendency towards a peculiarly practical

morality, are such as are in accordance with the direction known to have been followed by the Peripatetic School, and therefore would have been natural for Eudemus to exhibit. These are the considerations which have to be met by those who still think that Books V., VI., and VII. of the *Nicomachean Ethics* are the genuine work of Aristotle.

It would be tedious to sum up or repeat the conclusions arrived at in the foregoing pages. As we said at first, many questions must be left undeterminate or with a merely conjectural answer. We have before us in *Eth. Nic.* I.—IV., VIII.—X., an unfinished, or mutilated, treatise, which so far as we possess it came straight from the hand of Aristotle. What is wanting in this treatise is supplied from other works on the same subject written by members of the Peripatetic School. These works claim, with slight variations, to express the ideas of Aristotle himself, and for this reason probably they were included among the writings of Aristotle. Without considering these works to be entitled, on the ground of genuineness, to the position which they thus hold, we may be glad that they have been preserved. On the one hand they furnish a general conception of Aristotle's views on several particular points; on the other hand they testify to a system of co-operation among the Peripatetic scholars, which Aristotle probably encouraged during his lifetime, and which the school continued to practise after his death.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>35</sup> In justification of some of the opinions and conjectures put forward in the foregoing Essay, we will subjoin here a few particulars as to the order and sequence of some of Aristotle's extant writings, so far as can be determined from internal evidence. This internal evidence does not consist merely in references from one book to another (for these are not always re-

liable—in some cases they are almost certainly interpolated), but still more in comparison of the thought in different books and the various degrees of maturity exhibited by the same conception occurring in different books. For instance, in the first chapter of the *Prior Analytics*, the *Topics* are referred to; therefore, either the *Topics* were written first, or else this

reference is spurious. But—the doctrine of the syllogism is worked out with far more precision in the *Analytics* than in the *Topics*, therefore the former hypothesis must be accepted. A similar combination of verbal and real internal evidence is used by Mr. Poste (in *Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, with a Translation and Notes*, London, 1866, p. 204 sq.) to show that the *Topics*, with the exception of the eighth book, were first written of all the extant works of Aristotle; next the *Analytics* (*Prior* and *Posterior*); next the eighth book of the *Topics*; next the *Rhetoric*, Books I. and II.; and then the *Sophistical Refutations*.—After this Aristotle appears to have gone on to write his *Ethics* (which later obtained the name of *Nicomachean*); and then the *Politics*; and next the treatise *On Poetry*; from which he went back to add on the third book to his *Rhetoric*. Now, this sequence, if it be accepted, greatly strengthens the hypothesis which was submitted above (p. 51), that Aristotle when he came in the course of his *Ethics* to the consideration of Justice, deferred this till a more convenient season. We can now see how he did what was similar on other occasions;—how, for some reason or other, he left the eighth book of the

*Topics* unwritten till he had finished the *Analytics*; how he went on to compose his *Rhetoric* before writing the *Sophistical Refutations*, which properly belong to the *Topics*; how he deferred writing the third book of his *Rhetoric* (on Style), and went on to his *Ethics*; how from the *Ethics* he proceeded to the *Politics*, but broke off writing them in the middle of his treatise on Education, in order to write a treatise on *Poetry*, which was a cognate subject; how the treatise on *Poetry* was left a mere fragment, while Aristotle went back to write his book on Style for the completion of his *Rhetoric*. All this shows a certain mode of procedure in writing. There is no reason to believe that the *Politics* or the *Art of Poetry* was ever completed. In the meantime Aristotle went on to the series of his Physical works, two of which (*On the Physiology of Plants* and *On Disease and Health so far as belongs to Physical Philosophy*) were promised by him, but, so far as we know, never executed. Other works, such as the *Meteorologics*, do not appear to have received the last hand. And to the list of Aristotle's unfinished productions we are inclined to add the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

## ESSAY II.

### *On the History of Moral Philosophy in Greece previous to Aristotle.*

IN the *Ethics* of Aristotle there are but few direct allusions to moral theories of other philosophers. Plato's theory of the idea of good, viewed in its relation to Ethics (I. vi.) ; Socrates' definition of Courage (III. viii. 6) ; Eudoxus' theory of Pleasure (x. ii. 1) ; and Solon's paradox (I. x.), are perhaps the only ones which are by name commented on.<sup>1</sup> There are constant impersonal allusions to various opinions (the λεγόμενα on the subject in hand) ; some of these Aristotle attributes to 'the few,' that is, the philosophers ; others he speaks of as stamped with the consent of 'the many and of ancient times' (I. viii. 7). But there is no connected history of ethical opinions or ethical systems to be found in this work. The reason for this is partly to be found in the fact that Aristotle appears to have only grown gradually into the habit (if so we may call it) of prefacing each science or branch of philosophy with a history of what had been accomplished previously towards the solution of its problems. Thus in the *Organon* there is no history of previous logic, only a brief remark in conclusion that nothing had

<sup>1</sup> In the *Eudemian* books we find references (vi. xiii. 3) to Socrates' definition of Virtue; (vii. ii. 1) to his opinion on Incontinence; and (v. v. 1) to the Pythagorean definition of Justice.

been done before Aristotle to explain the syllogistic process. In the *Rhetoric*, it is merely said generally that previous writers had too exclusively devoted themselves to treating of appeals to the passions. After these works the *Ethics* were probably written. Then came the *Politics*, which contain an important review of some previous leading systems of political philosophy, but not exactly a history of these. The *Physical Discourse* and treatise *On the Soul* each commence with a collective statement of the opinions of previous philosophers; and Book I. of the *Metaphysics* (probably Aristotle's latest work) consists of a history of metaphysical philosophy from Thales to Plato, in which it is endeavoured to be shown how each system was occasioned by its predecessor.

When Aristotle commenced his *Ethics* he had apparently not accustomed himself to taking that sweeping historical point of view, which more and more became characteristic of him. Else a sketch of the development of moral ideas in Greece, analogous to his sketch of the development of metaphysics, might have been essayed by him, and would have been of the highest interest. But there was another cause to prevent this, namely, the fact that morals had never yet been clearly separated from politics. Aristotle himself calls his ethical system 'a sort of politics,' and it was only by writing his own *Ethics* that he, tentatively and yet surely, established the limits separating the one science from the other. With this tentative attitude, he was not likely to attempt following out the thread of previous moral theory, as separate from the concrete of politics, duty to the State, and the like. And, at all events, he did not do so.

But the Peripatetic School gradually laid hold of the distinct nature of ethics, and the author of the *Great Ethics* prefixes to his book the following brief outline of the

previous progress of the science. ‘The first to attempt this subject was Pythagoras. His method was faulty, for he made virtue a number, justice a cube, &c. To him succeeded Socrates, who effected a great advance, but who erred in calling virtue a science, and in thus ignoring the distinction between the moral nature (*πάθος καὶ ηθός*) and the intellect. Afterwards came Plato, who made the right psychological distinctions, but who mixed up and confused ethical discussions with ontological inquiries as to the nature of the chief good.’ In a shadowy way this passage represents the truth; for it is true that in the pre-Socratic philosophy, of which the Pythagorean system may stand as a type, ethical ideas had no distinctness, they were confused with physical or mathematical notions. Also the faults in the ethical systems of Socrates and Plato are here rightly stated. But it is a confusion to speak of Pythagoras as a moral philosopher, in the same sense that Socrates and Plato were so, or to speak of Socrates succeeding Pythagoras in the same way that Plato succeeded Socrates. And even were the account more accurate, every one will acknowledge that it is too barren to be in itself very useful.

In the following pages, then, we shall endeavour to carry considerations of this kind a little further, and to indicate, to some extent, the steps by which pre-Aristotelian moral theory developed itself in Greece. To do this is indeed necessary, since the views of Aristotle himself, as of any other philosopher, can only be rightly understood in relation to their antecedents.

Moral philosophy is a comparatively late product of national life. It presupposes the long, gradual, silent formation of Morals, which are the concrete of the nation’s practical habits and ideas of life. Morals, like language, are anonymous in their origin (*οὐδεὶς οἶδεν τίς ὅτου φάνη*);

except in the case of one or two legislators, who by their laws may to some extent have moulded the life of the nation, or in the case of the founders of religions, who by the force of their intuitions may have expounded some new and organising principles of action,—no individual names are connected with the building-up of morality. Moral philosophy does not create; it only explains, and perhaps criticises, moral ideas. Moral philosophy itself dawns gradually into existence out of reflection upon the generally accepted morality. In its first form it is the ordinary morality codified and formulated. Afterwards, it becomes more critical, and finally it may react upon and change morality itself.

Renouncing any attempt to trace a succession of systems of moral philosophy (which indeed did not exist), until we come to the limited period of development between Socrates and Aristotle, let us take a broader view of the subject, and divide morality into three eras; first, the era of popular or unconscious morals; second, the transitional, sceptical, or sophistic era; third, the conscious or philosophic era. These different stages appear to succeed each other in the national and equally in the individual mind. The simplicity and trust of childhood is succeeded by the unsettled and undirected force of youth, and the wisdom of matured life. First, we believe because others do so; then, in order to obtain personal convictions, we pass through a stage of doubt; then we believe the more deeply but in a somewhat different way from what we did at the outset. On these three distinct periods or aspects of thought about moral subjects, much might be said. The first thing to remark is, that they are not only successive to each other if you regard the mind of the most cultivated and advanced thinkers of successive epochs, but also they are contemporaneous and in

juxtaposition to each other, if you regard the different degrees of cultivation and advancement among persons of the same epoch. In Plato's *Republic* we find the three points of view represented by different persons in the dialogue. The question, What is justice? being started, an answer to it is first given from the point of view of popular morality in the persons of Cephalus and of his son Polemarchus, who define it to be, in the words of Simonides, 'paying to every one what you owe them.' To this definition captious difficulties are started,—difficulties which the popular morality, owing to its unphilosophical tenure of all conceptions, is quite unable to meet. Then comes an answer from the sophistical point of view, in the person of Thrasymachus, that 'justice' is the advantage of the stronger.' This having been overthrown, partly by an able sophistical skirmish, partly by the assertion of a deeper moral conviction,—the field is left open for a philosophical answer to the question. And this accordingly occupies the remainder of Plato's *Republic*, the different sides of the answer being represented by different personages; Glaucon and Adeimantus personifying the practical understanding which is only gradually brought into harmony with philosophy, Socrates the higher reason and the most purely philosophical conception. Almost all the dialogues of Plato, which touch on moral questions, may be said to illustrate the collision between the above-mentioned different periods or points of view, though none so fully as the *Republic*. Some dialogues, which are merely tentative, as the *Euthyphro*, *Lysis*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, &c., content themselves with showing the unsatisfactoriness of the popular conceptions; common definitions are overthrown; the difficulty of the subject is exposed; a deeper method is suggested; but the question is left at last without an answer. In others,

as in the *Hippias Major*, *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, and *Euthydemus*, various aspects of the sophistical point of view are exposed (on which we shall find much material for discussion hereafter); in all the dialogues a glimpse, at all events, of true philosophy is suggested; in a few only, as in the *Philebus*, is there anything like a proportion of constructive to the destructive dialectic.

Plato's wonderful dramatic pictures hold up a mirror to the different phases of error and truth in the human mind, so that we turn to his dialogues as to real life. But all reasonings on morality must exhibit the distinction existing between the popular, the sophistic, and the philosophical points of view. This distinction will be found marked in the *Ethics* of Aristotle, only Aristotle is less hostile than Plato to the popular conceptions, and rather considers them as the exponents of a true instinct with which his own theories must be brought into harmony. Also, being more concerned with the attainment and enunciation of truth than with recording its *genesis*, he does not dwell on the relation of the sophistical spirit to morality. He touches on certain sceptical and arbitrary opinions concerning morals which may be considered as the remnants of sophistry. But among these we must not reckon philosophical opinions with which he disagrees, since philosophy may be mistaken and yet be philosophy, if its spirit be pure.

Without laying too much stress on our three divisions, we may at all events regard them as convenient chronological heads. And let us now proceed to make some remarks on the characteristics of the first period of Grecian Ethics.

I. It has been said that 'before Socrates there was no morality in Greece, but only propriety of conduct.'<sup>2</sup> This

<sup>2</sup> Hegel, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, II. 43: 'Die Athener vor Socrates waren sittliche, nicht moralische Menschen.'

sentence conveys the same meaning as the argument in Plato's *Phædo* (p. 68 D), that 'without philosophy there is no morality, for the popular courage is a sort of fear, and the popular temperance a sort of intemperance.' It rightly asserts that the highest kind of goodness is inseparable from wisdom, from a distinct consciousness of the meaning of acts—from a sense of the absoluteness of right in itself. 'Morality' according to this view only exists when the individual can say, 'I am a law to myself, the edicts of the State and of society are valid to me because they are *my* edicts—because they are pronounced by the voice of reason and of right that is in me.' It, however, puts perhaps too great a restriction upon the term 'morality,' as if nothing but the highest moral goodness were 'morality' at all. It seems absurd to characterise as mere 'propriety of conduct' the acts of generosity, patriotism, endurance, and devotion, which were done, and the blameless lives that were led, long before there was any philosophy of right and wrong. Indeed there is something that seems *more* attractive about instinctive acts of nobleness, than about a reasoned goodness. To some the innocent obedience of the child appears more lovely than the virtue of the man. Still instinct is inferior to reason, the child is less than the man; and if God makes us what we are in childhood, we must re-make ourselves in maturer age; and it is the law of our nature that what was at first only potential in us, and only dimly felt as an instinct, should become realised by us and present to our consciousness. The very word 'conscience,' on which right so much depends, is only another term to express 'consciousness,' and a man differs from a machine in this, that the one has a law in itself,—is moved, as Aristotle would say, *κατὰ λόγον*; the other is moved *μετὰ λόγου*, has the law both in and for himself.

Without entering into speculations on the origin of society, we may safely assert that, as far as historical evidence goes, the broad distinctions between crime and virtue seem always to have been marked. National temperament, organisation, climate, and a certain latent national idea that has to be gradually developed—these go some way to mould the general human instincts of right and wrong, and these produce whatever is special in the national life and customs and code of laws (for occasion calls forth legislation, and so a code of laws grows up) ; and thus men live and do well or ill, and obtain praise or blame, are punished and rewarded. But as yet there is no *rationale* of all this. It is an age of action rather than of reflection—of poetry rather than analysis. To this succeeds a time when the first generalisations about life, in the shape of proverbs and maxims, begin to spring up. These are wise, but they do not constitute philosophy. They seldom rise above the level of prudential considerations, or empirical remarks on life, but they serve the requirements of those for whom they are made. Later, however, poetry and proverbs cease to satisfy the minds of thinkers ; the thoroughly awakened intellect now calls in question the old saws and maxims, the authority of the poets, and even the validity of the institutions of society itself. After this has come to pass, the age of unconscious morality, for cultivated men at least, has ceased for ever. In the quickly ripening mind of Greece, the different stages of the progress we have described succeed each other in distinct and rapid succession. In Christendom, from a variety of causes, it was impossible that the phenomenon should be re-enacted with the same simplicity.

To give an adequate account of morality in Greece, before the birth of moral philosophy, would be nothing less than giving as far as possible an entire picture of Hellenic

life. Customs, institutions, and laws, whether local or universal; recorded actions of States or individuals; remains of song or oratory; sentiments of writers; and the works of art,—would all have to be put in evidence. One would have, in short, to do for the Grecian States from the beginning of history what Mr. Lecky<sup>3</sup> has done for the Roman Empire. But to do this is not necessary for a comprehension of Aristotle, and it is not our present purpose,—which is only to show how moral philosophy in Greece took its rise out of the general morality. Still, we have to remember that Aristotle *takes for granted* the general Hellenic morality, and that this is always in the background of all that he says. We have therefore to take account of it, and if possible do its justice.

It has been well said<sup>4</sup> that ‘to suppose that the Greeks were not a highly moralised race is perhaps the strangest misconception to which religious prejudice has ever given rise. If their morality was æsthetic and not theocratic, it was none the less on that account humane and real.’ ‘As a necessary condition of artistic freedom, the soul of man in Greece was implicit with God or nature in what may be called an animal unity. Mankind, as sinless and simple as any other race that lives and dies upon the globe, formed a part of the natural order of the world. The sensual impulses, like the intellectual and moral, were then held void of crime and harmless. Health and good taste controlled the physical appetites of man, just as the appetites of animals are regulated by an unerring instinct. In the same way a standard of moderation determined moral virtue and intellectual excellence. But beyond this merely protective check

<sup>3</sup> *History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne*, by W. E. H. Lecky. (London, 1868.)

<sup>4</sup> *Studies of the Greek Poets*, by John Addington Symonds (London, 1873), pp. 417–419.

upon the passions, a noble sense of the beautiful, as that which is balanced and restrained within limits, prevented the Greeks of the best period from diverging into Asiatic extravagance of pleasure. Licence was reckoned barbarous, and the barbarians were slaves by nature, *φύσει δοῦλοι*: Hellenes, born to be free men, took pride in temperance. Their *σωφροσύνη*, co-extensive as a protective virtue with the whole of their *τὸ καλόν*, was essentially Greek—the quality beloved by Phœbus, in whom was no dark place or any flaw.' To these remarks we may add that the Greeks did not leave Temperance to stand alone as the guide of life, but to Temperance they added Courage, and to Courage Justice, and to Justice Wisdom. Under Courage was summed up much of what we call 'duty,' i.e. duty to the State, a feeling which pervaded Hellenic life. The death of the heroes of Thermopylæ was a typical instance of duty under the name of Courage. Justice again was the Greek summary of 'duty to one's neighbour,' afterwards supplemented by the conception of Equity, in which a fine and tender charity was inherent (see note on *Eth.* v. x. 1). And Wisdom, even according to popular notions, implied calmness and elevation of soul (see *Eth.* i. iv. 3). It is obvious that such a code as this could only arise among an essentially moral and noble people.

But a popular morality arising out of noble instincts, whatever be its substantial merits, must still have the defect that it can give no account of itself, and that, if asked for such an account, it tends to base itself on inadequate grounds. This displeases the philosophers, and hence in the dialogues of Plato we find a disparaging picture of the popular morality of Greece. The following are the chief characteristics attributed to it: (1) It is shown to be based upon the authority of texts and maxims, and these maxims

appear to be merely prudential. (2) It is shown to be apt to connect itself with a superstitious and unworthy idea of religion, such as was set forth in the mysteries, and which constituted the trade of juggling hierophants.

With regard to the former point, nothing is more marked than the unbounded reverence of the Greeks for the old national literature. Homer, Hesiod, and the Gnomic poets, constituted the educational course. Add to these the saws of the Seven Wise Men and a set of aphorisms of the same calibre, which sprang up in the sixth century, and we have before us one of the main sources of Greek views of life. It was perhaps in the age of the Pisistratidæ that the formation and promulgation of this system of texts took place most actively. In the little dialogue called *Hipparchus*, attributed to Plato, but of uncertain authorship, we find an episode (from which the dialogue is named) recounting a fact, if not literally, at all events symbolically true. It relates that Hipparchus, the wisest of the sons of Pisistratus, wishing to educate the citizens, introduced the poems of Homer, and made Rhapsodes recite them at the Panathenæa. Also, that he kept Simonides near him, and sent to fetch Anacreon of Teos. Also, that he set up obelisks along the streets and the roads, carved with sentences of wisdom, selected from various sources, or invented by himself, some of which even rivalled the 'Know thyself,' and other famous inscriptions at Delphi.

It is obvious how much the various influences here specified worked on the Athenian mind. The mouths of the people were full of these maxims, and when Socrates asked for the definition of any moral term, he was answered by a quotation from Simonides, Hesiod, or Homer. The same tendency was not confined to Athens, but was doubtless, with modifications, prevalent throughout Greece. With regard

to the worth of the authorities above specified, a few words may be said, taking each separately. The morality in Homer is what you would expect. It is concrete, not abstract; it expresses the conception of a heroic life rather than a philosophical theory. It is mixed up with a religion which really consists in a celebration of the beauty of the world, and in a deification of the strong, bright, and brilliant qualities of human nature. It is a morality uninfluenced by a regard to a future life. It clings with intense enjoyment and love to the present world, and the state after death looms in the distance as a cold and repugnant shadow. And yet it would often hold death preferable to disgrace. The distinction between a noble and an ignoble nature is strongly marked in Homer, and yet the sense of right and wrong about particular actions seems very fluctuating. A sensuous conception of happiness and the chief good is often apparent, and there is great indistinctness about all psychological terms and conceptions. Life and mind, breath and soul, thought and sensation, seem blended or confused together. Plato's opinion of Homer was a reaction against the popular enthusiasm, and we must take Plato's expressions not as an absolute verdict, but as relative to the unthinking reverence of his countrymen. He speaks as if irritated at the wide influence exercised by a book in which there was so little philosophy.

If we consider Homer in his true light, as the product and exponent, rather than as the producer of the national modes of thought, Plato's criticisms will then appear merely as directed against the earliest and most instinctive conceptions of morality, as a protest against perpetuating these and treating them as if they were adequate for a more advanced age. Socrates says (*Repub.* p. 606 E), ' You will find the praisers of Homer maintaining that this poet has educated all Greece, and that with a view to the direction and cultivation

of human nature he is worthy to be taken up and learnt by heart ; that in short one should frame one's whole life according to this poet. To these gentlemen,' continues Socrates, ' you should pay all respect, and concede to them that Homer was a great poet and first of the tragic writers (*ποιητικώτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν*) ; but you should hold to the conviction that poetry is only to be admitted into a State in the shape of hymns to the gods and encomia on the good.' The point of view from which this is said is evidently that, in comparison with the vast importance of a philosophic morality, everything else is to be considered of little value and to be set aside. The faults that Plato finds with Homer in detail are, that he recommends justice by the inducements of temporal rewards (*Repub.* pp. 363 A, 612 B), thus turning morality into prudence ; that he makes God the source of evil as well as of good (*Repub.* p. 379 C) ; that he makes God changeable (p. 381 D) ; that he represents the gods as capable of being bribed with offerings (p. 364 D) ; that he gives a gloomy picture of the soul after death, describing the future world in a way which is calculated to depress the mind and fill it with unmanly forebodings (p. 387) ; that he represents his heroes as yielding to excessive and ungoverned emotion, and that even his gods give way to immoderate laughter (pp. 388-9) ; and that instances of intemperance, both in language, and in the indulgence of the appetites, often form a part of his narrative (p. 390). In the *Ethics* of Aristotle the poems of Homer are frequently referred to for the sake of illustration as being a perfectly well-known literature. Thus the warning of Calypso—or, as it should have been, Circe (*Eth.* II. ix. 3) ; the dangerous charms of Helen (II. ix. 6) ; and the procedure of the Homeric Kings (III. iii. 18) ; are used as figures to illustrate moral or psychological truths. Again, instances of any particular

phenomenon are hence cited ; as for example, Diomede<sup>5</sup> and Hector are cited as an instance of political courage (III. viii. 2). In other places Aristotle<sup>6</sup> appeals to the words of Homer, in the same way that he does to the popular language, namely, as containing a latent philosophy in itself, and as bearing witness to the conclusions of philosophy. Thus Homer's calling Agamemnon 'shepherd of the people' (VIII. xi. 1), and his physical descriptions of courage (III. viii. 10), are appealed to as containing, or testifying to, philosophical truths.

Turning from Homer to Hesiod, we discover at once a certain change or difference in spirit, and in the views that are taken of human life. In the *Works and Days* those that fought at Troy are represented as 'a race of demi-gods and beatified heroes,' dwelling in the 'happy isles' free from care or sorrow ; whereas with Homer, these personages are merely illustrious mortals, subject to the same passions and sufferings as their descendants, and condemned at their death to the same dismal after life of Hades, so gloomily depicted in the *Odyssey*.<sup>7</sup> Not only does this difference point to a development in the Grecian mythology, indicating the matured growth of the popular hero-worship ; it also shows a feeling which characterises other parts of Hesiod, a sense that a bright period is lost, and 'that there had passed away a glory from the earth.'

The poet is no longer carried out of himself in thinking of the deeds of Achilles and Hector. He laments that he has fallen on evil days, that he lives in the last and worst of the Five Ages of the World.<sup>8</sup> He finds 'all things full of

<sup>5</sup> So in the *Eudemian* book (v. ix. 7) Glaucon and Diomede are referred to.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. also the *Eudemian* books, vi. vii. 2, viii. i. 1, and viii. vi. 3.

<sup>7</sup> Mure's *Literature of Greece*, Vol. II. p. 402.

<sup>8</sup> V. 172 sqq.  
μηκέτ' ἔπειτο ὄφειλον ἐγὼ πέμπτοιοι μετεῖναι

labour.' He is conscious of a Fall of Man, and accounts for this by two inconsistent episodes, the one<sup>9</sup> representing mankind, through the fatal gift of Pandora, blighted at the very outset; the other<sup>10</sup> describing a gradual decadence from the primeval Golden Age. Once the gods dwelt upon earth, but now even Honour that does no wrong, and Retribution that suffers no wrong (*Αἰδῶς καὶ Νέμεσις*), the last of the Immortals, have gone and left us.<sup>11</sup> Mixed up with this sad and gloomy view of the state of the world, we find indications of a religious belief which is in some respects more elevated than the theology of Homer. Hesiod represents the messengers of Zeus, thirty thousand dæmons, as always pervading the earth, and watching on deeds of justice and injustice.<sup>12</sup> A belief in the moral government of God is here indicated, though it is expressed in a polytheistic manner, and there is a want of confidence and trust in the divine benevolence. The gods are only just, and not benign. Hesiod's book of the *Works and Days* is apparently a cento, containing the elements of at least two separate poems, the one an address to the poet's brother Perses, with an appeal against his injustice; the other perhaps by a different hand, containing maxims of agriculture, and an account of the operations at different seasons. Into this part different sententious rules of conduct are interwoven, which may be rather national and Boeotian than belonging to any one

ἀνδράσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρόσθε θαυμῖν, οὐ  
ἔπειτα γενέσθαι  
νῦν γὰρ δὴ γένος ἐστὶ σιδήρεον· οὐδέ  
ποτ' ἡμαρ  
παύσονται καμάτου καὶ διζύος, οὐδὲ τι  
νύκτωρ.

φθειρόμενοι· χαλεπᾶς δὲ θεοὶ δάσουσι  
μερίμνας.

<sup>9</sup> Vv. 48–105.

<sup>10</sup> Vv. 108–171.

<sup>11</sup> Vv. 195–199.

<sup>12</sup> V. 250 sq.

τρὶς γὰρ μύριοι εἰσὶν ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυ-  
βοτείρη  
ἀθάνατοι Ζηνὸς, φύλακες θυητῶν ἀνθρώ-  
πων·

οἱ δὲ φυλάσσονται τε δίκας καὶ πγέτλια  
ἔργα  
ἡέρα ἐσσάμενοι, πάντη φοιτῶντες ἐπ'  
αλαν.

particular author. The morality of Hesiod, whatever its origin, contains a fine practical view of life. It enjoins justice, energy, and, above all, temperance and simplicity of living. Nothing can be finer than the saying<sup>13</sup> quoted by Plato (cf. *Repub.* p. 466 C; *Laws*, p. 690 E), ‘How much is the half greater than the whole! how great a blessing is there in mallows and asphodelus!’ Plato finds fault with Hesiod that his is a merely prudential Ethics, or eudæmonism, that he recommends justice by the promise of temporal advantage (*Repub.* p. 363 A). Many of his maxims are indeed not above the level of a yeoman’s morality, consisting in advice about the treatment of neighbours, servants, &c. One of these Aristotle alludes to (*Eth.* ix. i. 6). It is the recommendation that, even between friends, wages should be stipulated and the bargain kept. Of a different stamp, however, is that passage of Hesiod, which has been so repeatedly quoted.<sup>14</sup> It contains the same figure to represent virtue and vice, which was afterwards consecrated in the mouth of Christ: ‘The road to Vice may easily be travelled by crowds, for it is smooth, and She dwells close at hand. But the path of Virtue is steep and difficult, and the gods have ordained that only by toil can She be reached.’ And this truth is rendered still deeper, by the addition, that ‘He is best who acts on his own convictions, while he is second-best who acts in obedience to the counsel of others.’ Aristotle cites this latter saying (*Eth.* i. iv. 7), which contains more than, in all probability, its author was conscious of. He

<sup>13</sup> V. 40 sq.

υῆπιοι, οὐδὲ ισασιν διηφ τλέου θμισυ παντός,  
οὐδὲ δσον ἐν μαλάχργε καὶ ἀσφοδέλῳ  
μεγ' ονειρο.

<sup>14</sup> Xen. *Memorab.* ii. i. 20. Plato, *Repub.* p. 364 C. *Laws*, p. 718 E. *Protagoras*, p. 340 D, &c.

also quotes from Hesiod another most acute remark,<sup>15</sup> which is to the effect that society is constructed upon a basis of competition,—that a principle of strife which makes ‘potter foe to potter’ (*Eth.* viii. i. 6), produces all honourable enterprises. It may truly be said that if Hesiod was no moral philosopher, he was a very great moralist.

Passing on now to the ‘Seven Wise Men,’ the heroes of the sixth century B.C., who are separated from Hesiod by we cannot tell how wide a chronological interval, we do not find any great advance made beyond him in their moral point of view, but rather a following out of the same direction. We find still a prudential Ethics dealing in a disjointed, but often a forcible and pregnant manner, with the various parts of life. Of the ‘Seven,’ it was well said by Dicæarchus (ap. Diog. Laert. i. 40) that ‘they were neither speculators nor philosophers (*οὐτε σοφοὺς οὔτε φιλοσόφους*, N.B. *σοφοὺς* is here used in a restricted and Aristotelian sense), but men of insight, with a turn for legislation (*συνετούς δέ τινας καὶ νομοθετικούς*).’ They belonged to an era of political change, which was calculated to teach experience and to call forth worldly wisdom, the era of the overthrow of hereditary monarchs in Greece. All the sages were either tyrants, or legislators, or the advisers of those in power. The number seven is of later date, and probably a mere attempt at completeness. There is no agreement as to the list, but the names most generally specified are Thales, Solon, Periander, Cleobulus,

<sup>15</sup> V. 11 sqq.  
οὐκ ἄρα μοῦγον ἔην ἐρίδων γένος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν  
εἰοι δέω. τὴν μὲν κεν ἐπαινήσειε νοήσας,

ἢ δὲ ἐπιμωμητή, κ.τ.λ.  
. . . ἀγαθὴ δὲ ἔρις ήδε βροτοῖσι  
καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει, καὶ τέκτονι  
τέκτων.

Chilon, Bias, Pittacus. Of these Thales ought to be exempted from the criticism of Dicaearchus, for though many adages are attributed to him, he was no mere politician, but a deep thinker, and the first speculative philosopher of Greece. What was most distinctive in Thales does not belong to the level of thought which we are now considering. Of the rest of the Sages it was said by Anaximenes (ap. Diog. Laert. *l.c.*), that they 'all tried their hand at poetry.' This is characteristic of a period antecedent to the formation of anything like a prose style. Of the poems of Solon, considerable passages are preserved to us; they consist of elegies, in which the political circumstances of Solon's lifetime are recorded, and into which sufficient general reflections on human nature are interwoven to entitle him to be called a Gnomic poet. Solon's views of life, as far as they appear in his poetry, are characterised by a manliness which contrasts them with the soft Lydian effeminacy of Mimnermus, to one of whose sentiments Solon made answer. Mimnermus having expressed a wish for a painless life and a death at the age of sixty, Solon answers: 'Bear me no ill will for having thought on this subject better than you—alter the words and sing, "May the fate of death reach me in my *eightieth* year."' In one passage of his works Solon divides human life into periods of seven years, and assigns to each its proper physical and mental occupations (*Frag.* 14); in another the multifarious pursuits of men are described, and their inability to command success, because fate brings good and ill to mortals, and man cannot escape from the destiny allotted to him by the gods (*Fr.* 5). Let us now compare these two last sentiments with that saying which is always connected with the name of Solon, and which was thought worthy of a careful examination by

Aristotle (*Eth.* i. x. xi.), the saying, that ‘One must look to the end,’ or that ‘No one can be called happy while he lives.’ The story of Solon’s conversation with Crœsus, as given by Herodotus, is in all probability totally without historical foundation. It has the aspect of a rhetorical *ἐπιδειξις* dressed up by some Sophist to illustrate the *gnome* of Solon. However, the beauty of the story as related by Herodotus, no one can deny. The *gnome* itself in its present form has this merit, that it is perhaps the first attempt to regard life as a whole. It denies the name of happiness to the pleasure or prosperity of a moment. But its fault is, as Aristotle points out, that it makes happiness purely to consist in external fortune, it implies too little faith in, and too little regard for, the internal consciousness, which after all is far the most essential element of happiness. Moreover, there is a sort of superstition manifested in this view, and in the above-quoted verses of Solon. It represents the Deity as ‘envious’ of human happiness. This view is elsewhere reprobated by Aristotle (*Metaphys.* i. ii. 13); it was a view, perhaps, natural in a period of political change and personal vicissitude, previous to the development of any philosophy which could read the permanent behind the changeable.<sup>16</sup>

The remainder of the ‘Seven’ hardly need a mention in detail. The sayings attributed to them are too little connected to merit a criticism from a scientific point of view. ‘The uncertainty of human things, the brevity of life, the

<sup>16</sup> Mr Symonds attributes an un-Greek origin to this and other ideas. He says (*Studies of the Greek Poets*, p. 417): ‘The blood-justice of the Eumenides, the asceticism of Pythagoras, the purificatory rites of Empedocles and Epimenides, the fetichistic

belief in a jealous God, and the doctrine of hereditary guilt in Theognis, Herodotus, and Solon, are fragments of primitive or Asiatic superstition unharmonised with the serene element of the Hellenic spirit.’

unhappiness of the poor, the blessing of friendship, the sanctity of an oath, the force of necessity, the power of time, such are the most ordinary subjects of their gnomes, when they do not reduce themselves to the simple rules of prudence.<sup>17</sup> However, some of the utterances of this era of proverbial philosophy stand conspicuous among the rest, containing a depth of meaning of which their authors could have been only half conscious. This meaning was drawn out and developed by later philosophers. The Μηδὲν ἄγαν of Solon and the Μέτρον ἀριστον of Cleobulus passed almost into something new in the μετριότης of Plato; and the Γνῶθι σεαυτὸν (of uncertain authorship), which was inscribed on the front of the temple at Delphi, became in the hands of Socrates the foundation of philosophy. In the *Ethics* of Aristotle, proverbs of this epoch, as, for instance, πολλὰς δὴ φιλάσ απροσηγορία διέλυσεν (viii. v. 1), ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, κ.τ.λ. (ii. vi. 14), κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, κ.τ.λ. (i. viii. 14), are occasionally quoted, without any author's name.<sup>18</sup>

Two more poets may be mentioned who will serve to complete our specimens of the sixth century thought on moral subjects. These are Theognis and Simonides. They both were great authorities, as is evinced by their being so frequently cited in the writings of the ancients. They both have this in common that their verse betrays a constant reflectiveness on human life. But the tone is to some extent different. Theognis draws a darker picture than Simonides. Theognis exhibits traces of a harassed and unfortunate life, and the pressure of circumstances. Simonides, who lived through the Persian wars, writes in a more

<sup>17</sup> Renouvier, *Manuel de Phil. Anc.*

i. p. 127.

<sup>18</sup> Eudemus (v. i. 16) attributes the saying, 'Office shows the man,' to Bias.

manly strain, as if inspired by the times and the glorious deeds of his countrymen, which he celebrated in his poetry. Theognis appears to have lived during the latter half of the sixth century. His writings are chiefly autobiographical, and consist of reflections caused by the political events of his life and of his native city Megara. He seems to have belonged to the aristocratic party and to have suffered exile, losing all his property and barely escaping with his life. His feelings of indignation are constantly expressed in his poems—in which perhaps the greatest peculiarity is, that in them the terms *ἀγαθοί* and *εὐθλοί* are used to designate his own party, the nobles, while the commons are called *κακοί* and *δειλοί*. It must not be supposed that these terms had hitherto no ethical meaning, though of course scientific ethical definitions had as yet never been attempted. But the words *εὐθλός* and *κακός* occur in Hesiod in quite as distinctive a sense, as the terms ‘good man,’ and ‘bad man,’ are used in general now. It is the extreme of political partisanship expressing itself in a *naïve* and unconscious manner which causes Theognis to identify goodness with the aristocratic classes, and badness with the commonalty of his city. We find in his writings a strange intermixture and confusion of political and ethical thoughts. In the celebrated passage which dwells on the influence of associates, he begins by saying, ‘You should eat and drink with those who have great power’ (i.e. the nobles), ‘for from the good you will learn what is good, but by mixing with the bad you will lose what reason you have.’ Here an undeniable moral axiom is made to assume a political aspect, which indeed impairs its force. Plato, in the *Meno*,<sup>19</sup> quotes

<sup>19</sup> Οἰσθα δὲ οὗτοι οὐ μόνον σοὶ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς πολιτικοῖς τοῦτο δοκεῖ τοτὲ μὲν εἶναι διδακτόν, τοτὲ δὲ οὐ,

ἀλλὰ καὶ Θέογνιν τὸν ποιητὴν οἰσθ' οὗτοι ταῦτα λέγεις; Μ. Ἐν πολοῖς ἐπεσύν; Σ. Ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγένοις, οὐ λέγεται

this passage and shows that it is contradicted by another passage of Theognis, which declares education to be of no effect. Theognis appears to have felt at different times with equal force the two points of view about education. At one time education appears to be everything, at another time, nothing.

All the expressions of Theognis, as indeed of the other Gnostic poets, seem characterised by perfect naturalness, if such a word might be used. They contain no attempt to reduce life to a theory; they flow from the heart of the individual according as he feels joy or sorrow. They exhibit no striving to be above circumstances,—rather the full, unrestrained wail of one who bitterly feels the might of circumstances. They do not seek to be logical; on the contrary, they are full of inconsistencies. In one place Theognis says (173–182), ‘if one is poor it is better to die than live; one should cast oneself from some high cliff into the sea.’ In another place (315–318), ‘Many of the bad are rich, and the good poor, yet one would not exchange one’s virtue for riches.’ In the views of Theognis, as we saw before in those of Solon, there may be traced a superstitious feeling of the resistless power, and at the same time

καὶ παρὰ τοῖσιν πίνε καὶ ἔσθιε καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν

Ἵε καὶ ἀνδαγε τοῖς ὡν μεγάλῃ δύναμις.

ἔσθλῶν μὲν γάρ ἄπ’ ἔσθλα διδάξεαι, ήν δὲ κακοῖσιν συμμίσγης, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἔντα ν’ ον.

οἰσθ’ ὅτι ἐν τούτοις μὲν ὡς διδακτοῦ οὐσης τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει; Μ. Φαίνεται γε. Σ. Έν κἄλλοις δέ γε ὀλίγον μεταβάσ, εἰ δ’ ἡν ποιητόν, φησι, καὶ ἔνθετον ἀνδρὶ υόμα λέγει πεις ὅτι

πολλοὺς δὲ μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον

οἱ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο ποιεῦν καὶ οὗ ποτ’ δὲ ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἔγεντο κακός, πειθόμενος μύθοισι σανφροσιν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκων

οὐ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρ’ ἐγαθόν.

ἐννοεῖς ὅτι αὐτὸς αὐτῷ πάλιν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τάνατον λέγει; 95 C usq.  
Both of these passages of Theognis are alluded to by Aristotle in the *Ethics* (ix. ix. 7, x. ix. 3).

the arbitrary will of the gods. As to the standard of duty in his poems, such a conception must needs be held to have been very wavering in him who could write (363 sq.), ‘Flatter your enemy, and when you have got him into your power, wreak your vengeance, and do not spare him.’ It is obvious that the elegiac form adopted by Theognis gave an air of universality to maxims which were only suitable to his own troubled times, and his own angry spirit. To accept the cynicism and the complaints of Byron as if of universal applicability, would be almost a parallel to what actually took place in Greece, when the verses of Theognis were quoted as an authority in morals. That this could ever have been the case, shows how great was the want of a more fixed standard, and almost justifies the sweeping attacks made by Plato upon the poets.

In the verses of Simonides of Ceos there is, as we have said, a more healthy spirit. His life (B.C. 556–467) was prosperous, and was spent in different courts, especially those of Hipparchus at Athens, of the Aleuads and Scopads in Thessaly, of Hiero at Syracuse. If Theognis be compared to Byron among the moderns, Simonides may, in some respects, be compared to Goethe, though Goethe exhibits no parallel to his spirited and even impassioned songs on the heroic incidents of the war. But the courtly demeanour of Simonides, to which he seems to have somewhat sacrificed his independence, his worldly wisdom, his moderation of views, his realistic tendencies with regard to life, and his efforts for a calm and unruffled enjoyment, remind one a little of the great German. Beyond heroism in war, Simonides does not appear to have held any exalted notions of the possibilities of virtue. There is a very interesting discussion in the *Protagoras* of Plato (pp. 339–346), on the meaning of some strophes in one of the Epinician

odes of Simonides. This discussion has the effect of exhibiting the critical ability of Socrates as superior to that of Protagoras. The import of the passage criticised appears to be, that, ‘while absolute perfection ( $\tauετράγωνον \deltaνευ ψόγου γενέσθαι$ ) is well-nigh impossible, yet Simonides will not accept the saying of Pittacus, “it is hard to be good,” —for misfortune makes a man bad and prosperity good; good is mixed with evil, and Simonides will be satisfied if a man be not utterly evil and useless;—he will give up vain and impracticable hopes, and praise and love all who do not voluntarily commit base actions.’ These expressions are very characteristic of Simonides. We may remark in them (1) the criticism upon Pittacus, which shows the advance of reflective morality; (2) the point of view taken, namely, a sort of worldly moderation. Simonides complains that Pittacus has set up too high an ideal of virtue, and then proclaimed the difficulty of attaining it. Simonides proposes to substitute a more practical standard.

In thus discussing one of the gnomes of the Seven Sages, Simonides approaches in some degree to the mode of thought of the Sophists, but in later times he was taken as the representative of the old school, in contradistinction to ‘young Athens,’ with its sophistical ideas. Thus in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes (1355–1362), Strepsiades calls for one of the *Scolia* of Simonides, while his son treats them with contempt. A sort of sententious wisdom appears to have been aimed at by this courtly poet; a specimen of this is given in the *Republic* of Plato (p. 331 E), where justice is defined, according to Simonides, to consist in ‘paying one’s debts.’ It is easy to show this definition inadequate, and yet it was a beginning. The quickly developing mind of Greece could not long remain in that stage to which Simonides had attained; it was imperatively necessary that it should break

away, and by force of questioning, obtain a more scientific view. We might say of the aphoristic morality of the poets and sages of the sixth century B.C. what Aristotle says of the early philosophers, namely, that 'without being skilled boxers, they sometimes give a good blow' (*Metaphysics*, I. iv. 4).

During the fifth century B.C. poetry in Greece continued to represent, or contribute to, the popular beliefs in morals, while as yet moral philosophy was not. The great poetical figures of this time were of course Pindar (522-443 B.C.), and the Attic Tragedians, who succeeded each other at brief intervals, since Aeschylus gained his first prize in 484 B.C., Sophocles his first in 468 B.C., Euripides his first in 441 B.C. Of Pindar, Mr. Symonds well says : 'The whole of his poetry is impregnated with a lively sense of the divine in the world. Accepting the religious traditions of his ancestors with simple faith, he adds more of spiritual severity and of mystical morality than we find in Homer. Yet he is not superstitious or credulous. He can afford to criticise the myths like Xenophanes and Plato, refusing to believe that a blessed god could be a glutton.'<sup>20</sup> In Pindar indeed we see the fine flower of Hellenic religion, free from subservience to creeds and ceremonies, capable of extracting sublime morality from mythical legends, and adding to the old joyousness of the Homeric faith a deeper and more awful perception of superhuman mysteries. The philosophical scepticism which in Greece, after the age of Pericles, corroded both the fabric of mythology and the indistinct doctrines of theological monotheism, had not yet begun to act. Pindar held indeed to the Hellenic religion, but he vivified and elevated it by the introduction of an element drawn

<sup>20</sup> The reference here is to *Olymp.* I.

## ESSAY II.

from Orphic or Pythagorean sources. His pictures of the rewards and punishments beyond the grave form a great advance upon the creed of both Homer and Hesiod. The Hades of Homer was a gloomy negation, and the ‘happy isles’ of Hesiod were peopled by the heroes of Troy. But Pindar connects the torments or blessings of the soul in a future state with its moral actions upon earth ; and (introducing the Oriental conception of Metempsychosis) he opens Paradise to those souls which during three successive lives have kept themselves pure from crime. It can hardly be doubted that the lyric strains of Pindar, embodying this doctrine, did much to influence the thought of Plato and to produce his sublime conceptions (set forth in *Phaedo*, *Gorgias*, and *Republic*) of a future life of the soul dependent on the moral purity and the philosophic wisdom attained by it in this world. And if so, Pindar has played an important part in the history of Eschatology<sup>21</sup> in Europe. His views of the present life are distinguished by a certain God-fearing sobriety. While celebrating the wealth, the strenuous effort, and the good fortune (*δλβος*, *ἀρετή*, *εὐτυχία*) of the Victors of the games, he does not fail to admonish them of the

<sup>21</sup> The following is Mr. Symonds' prose translation of Pindar *Olymp.* ii. : ‘Among the dead, sinful souls at once pay penalty, and the crimes done in this realm of Zeus are judged beneath the earth by one who gives sentence under dire necessity. But the good, enjoying perpetual sunlight equally by night and day, receive a life more free from woe than this of ours; they trouble not the earth with strength of hand, nor the water of the sea for scanty sustenance; but, with the honoured of the gods, all they who delighted in the keeping of their oath pass a tearless age; the others suffer

woe on which no eye can bear to look. Those who have thrice endured on either side the grave to keep their spirits wholly free from crime journey on the road of Zeus to the tower of Cronos: where round the islands blow breezes ocean-borne; and flowers of gold burn—some on the land from radiant trees, and others the wave feeds; with necklaces whereof they twine their heads and brows, in the just decrees of Rhadamanthus, whose father Cronos has for a perpetual colleague, he who is spouse of Rhea throned above all gods.’

fleeting character of life and prosperity, and to preach moderation and continence (*εὐκοσμία, σωφροσύνη, μηδὲν ἄγαν*). He chooses for himself a middle status in society and deprecates the lot of kings (*Pyth.* xi. 50). The following is his conception of a *summum bonum* upon earth (*Pyth.* x. 22) : ‘That man is happy and song-worthy by the skilled, who, victorious by might of hand or vigour of foot, achieves the greatest prizes with daring and with strength ; and who in lifetime sees his son, while yet a boy, crowned happily with Pythian wreaths. The brazen heaven, it is true, is inaccessible to him ; but whatsoever joys we race of mortals touch, he reaches to the farthest voyage.’

The Attic Dramatists are the exponents of the spirit of the Athenian people quickened by the sense of their triumphant delivery from the great national peril of the Persian invasions. They represent successively the rapidly succeeding phases of the Athenian mind. Their great theme, the fundamental idea of their tragedies, as indeed of the Greek legends on which they were based, was Nemesis—Retribution either for crime committed, or for insolent prosperity and pride of life.

Mr. Symonds (*Studies of the Greek Poets*, pp. 190–205) has well analysed the different forms of this idea as it appears in Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. In Æschylus Retribution (*δράσαντι παθεῖν τριγέρων μῦθος*) is the revelation of an offended Deity ; in Sophocles it is rather the exhibition of a moral law : our attention is drawn to the human character of the guilty man, and we see how he brings terrible consequences on himself. ‘In Euripides it degenerates into something more akin to a sense of vicissitudes ; it becomes more sentimental—less a religious or moral principle than a phenomenon inspiring fear and pity.’ A similar progress with regard to all moral questions may be traced in the

dramatists : in *Aeschylus* morality is identified with religion ; in *Sophocles* it is a noble intuitive sense of right and wrong ; in *Euripides* it is a casuistical and sophisticated reasoning upon all moral questions. *Euripides* does not belong to the unconscious period of morals ; the influence of law-courts, rhetoricians, and sophists upon the Athenian mind has been too rapidly disintegrating to admit of this. Even in *Sophocles* we see the beginnings of casuistry in the collision brought out in the *Antigone* between a decree of the State and the eternal sense of right and wrong (*οὐ γάρ τι νῦν τε κἀχθὲς ἀλλ' ἀεὶ πότε ζῆ ταῦτα*) in the human mind. But this collision is not worked out by *Sophocles*, as it would have been by *Euripides*, in a sophistical spirit, so as to produce scepticism in the validity of both the conflicting authorities. The impression which is left is rather that that most tragical position of all has been produced, where both parties are justifiable and are in the right. But, doubtless, the *Antigone* of *Sophocles* was partly a result of, and partly a contribution to, these discussions of the opposition between Law and Nature which played so conspicuous a part in the sophistical period of Hellenic thought.

Besides adherence to proverbs and saws from the poets, there was another element specified by Plato in his picture of the popular morality of Greece, which we have hitherto left unnoticed, namely, the tendency to accept unworthy conceptions of religion, such as would essentially interfere with the purity and absoluteness of any ideas of right and wrong. Not only was there prevalent a belief in the envyousness and *Nemesis* of the Deity, such as forms the constant theme of the reflections of *Herodotus* ; not only was there a superstitious hankering after signs and oracles, which tended to disturb the manly calmness of the mind ; not only was there a mean and anthropomorphic conception of God, which

reduced religion to hero-worship, and really stood quite beside, and distinct from, all morality; but also there was a direct tampering with morality itself on the part of certain religious hierophants. These were the professors of mysteries, respecting whom Adeimantus is made to say in the *Republic* of Plato (p. 364 B sq.), ‘The most astonishing theories of all are those which you shall hear about the gods and about virtue—that the gods themselves have actually allotted to many good men misfortunes and an evil life, and to the bad a directly opposite lot. On the other hand, seers and jugglers come to the doors of the rich, and persuade them that they have a power given them by the gods of expiating by offerings and charms all offences, whether committed by a man’s self or his ancestors, and this quite pleasantly—merely by holding a feast; and if any one wants to be revenged on an enemy, they will, for a trifling cost, do the fellow a harm (they say) whether he be a good man or a bad man—by forcing the gods with their incantations and spells to serve them. They cite the poets as authorities for their assertions, to prove that the path of vice is easy, and that of virtue rugged and difficult. They prove from Homer that the gods are not inexorable, but may be turned by the prayers and offerings of men. And they adduce a whole swarm of the books of Musæus and Orpheus, the kinsmen (as they say) of Selene and of the Muses, according to which they perform their rites, and persuade not only individuals, but whole States, that actually by means of feastings and pleasure, expiations and releases may be provided both for the living and also for the dead, which will free men from all the penalties of the future life; but that for any one not using their rites a most horrible fate remains.’

Of the Orphic mysteries here alluded to, and of the other mysteries in general, it will not be necessary for our present

purpose to say much. They appear to have originally possessed an Oriental character, and to have been in themselves not without a deep meaning. They were a protest against Grecian anthropomorphism. They seem to have contained the assertion of two deep ideas, the immortality of the soul, and the impurity of sin, which required expiation. That they had become debased before becoming popular, we learn from this account of Plato. A perverted religion that offered 'masses for the soul,' and a preference to the rich over the poor—joined with the traditional, unreflecting, and prudential morality that was rife in Greece—produced a state of feeling that made Plato say in the person of Adeimantus—'The only hope is, either if a person have a sort of inspiration of natural goodness, or obtain a scientific apprehension of the absolute difference between right and wrong.' (*πλὴν εἴ τις θεῖα φύσει δυσχεραίνων τὸ ἀδικεῖν ή ἐπιστήμην λαβὼν ἀπέχεται αὐτοῦ.* *Repub.* p. 366 C.)

The relation of the *Ethics* of Aristotle to the popular morality was, as we have said, rather different from that of Plato. Aristotle considers the opinion of the many worth consideration, as well as that of the philosophers. He constantly appeals to common language in support of his theories, and common tenets he thinks worthy of either refutation or establishment. There are certain points of view with regard to morals, which are not exactly philosophical in Plato's sense of the word, but which have a sort of philosophical character, while, at the same time, they were common property; and these are made use of by Aristotle. Such are especially the lists and divisions of good, which seem to have been much discussed in Greece; as, for instance, the threefold division into goods of the mind, the body, and external (*Eth.* i. viii. 2); again, the division into the admirable (*τιμὰ*) and the praiseworthy (*Eth.* i. xii. 1). One list of goods, not mentioned by

Aristotle, pretended to give them in their order of excellence, thus,—wisdom, health, beauty, wealth. The conception of a chief good seems to have been vaguely present before people's minds, and this no doubt determined primarily the form of the question of Aristotle's *Ethics*. This was the natural question for a Greek system of Ethics; both Plato and Aristotle tell us how wavering and inconsistent were the answers that common minds were able to give to it, when in an utterly unsystematic way it was presented to them (*Repub.* p. 505 B; *Ethics*, I. iv. 2).

Before taking leave of this period of unphilosophic morals, we must ask—How fared the philosophers in it? The author of the *Magna Moralia*, as we have seen, attributed to Pythagoras certain mathematical formulæ for expressing ethical conceptions. That the Pythagoreans adopted these we know from other sources, but at how late a date it seems difficult to say,<sup>22</sup>—perhaps not before the time of Philolaus. Of the other philosophers it may be said generally that ethical subjects did not form part of their philosophy, they made no attempt to systematise the phenomena of human society and human action. And yet they had deep thoughts on life and stood apart from other men. This standing apart was indeed their characteristic attitude. Philosophic isolation was the

<sup>22</sup> A quantity of spurious Pythagorean fragments have come down to us. Patricius, in his *Discussiones Peripateticae* (Vol. II. Book VII.), quotes these to prove that Aristotle plagiarised from the Pythagoreans. If the fragments were genuine, they would indeed prove wholesale plagiarism. But they are plainly mere translations of Aristotle into Doric Greek. The following is attributed to Archytas. οὐδὲν ἔτερόν ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' ἡ χρᾶσις ἀρετᾶς ἐν εὐτυχίᾳ. Able as the

work of Patricius is, it labours under the disadvantages of his era, criticism having as yet hardly an existence. As a specimen of his judgment—he calls it 'a lie' on the part of Aristotle to attribute the authorship of the Ideas to Plato, since this doctrine had been known before Plato, to the Pythagoreans, Orpheus, the Chaldeans, and the Egyptians! His authorities are such works as *Iamblichus*, *Psellos*, &c.

chief result of their reflections upon the world. The same thing, as M. Renouvier says, expresses itself in the symbolic tears of Heraclitus and the symbolic laughter of Democritus —a doctrine of despair and of contempt. A deep feeling pervades the utterances of Heraclitus, but it is a feeling of the insignificance of man. ‘The wisest man,’ he says, ‘is to Zeus as an ape is to man.’ In the ceaseless eddy of the creation and destruction of worlds, which he pictured to himself, individual life must have seemed as the motes in the sunbeam. He was called *οὐχολοιδόρος*, from his philosophic exclusiveness. Democritus, though a pre-Socratic philosopher, yet lived into and was influenced by the thought of the Sophistic era. He seems to have considered the human will as something apart in the world, and thus while subjecting the atoms to the power of necessity, he is reported to have said, ‘Man is only a half-slave of necessity.’ The chief good he considered to be *Ἄταραξία* or an unruffled serenity of mind. In a similar spirit Anaxagoras affirmed that ‘he considered happiness something different from what most men supposed, and that they would be astonished to hear his conception of it’ (cf. *Eth.* x. viii. 11), meaning that it consisted not in material advantages, but in wisdom and philosophy. The moral doctrines of these early philosophers come before us in general in the form of aphorisms, they seem to belong rather to the personal character of the men than to the result of their systems.

II. The unconscious period of morality in Greece was succeeded by an interval of sceptical thought upon moral subjects. This was the era (commencing about 450 B.C.) in connection with which the word ‘sophistical’ was first used; it was, in short, the era of the famous ‘Sophists’ of the fifth and fourth centuries. Who and what were these ‘Sophists’ (whose name became a byword, and was converted into an

adjective with so invidious a connotation) is a question of much interest in itself; and the interest has been increased since Grote, thirty-four years ago, in the 67th chapter of his *History of Greece*, undertook to vindicate the Sophists from the aspersions which had up to that date rested upon them, and to show that the word 'sophistical' in its modern sense is a fossilised injustice, being merely the expression of Plato's prejudice against a respectable set of men. Grote's bold paradox naturally excited opposition in various quarters, and the first edition of the present Essay (1857) contained a sort of protest against it. Time and reflection and the remarks of various scholars who have taken part in the controversy, would seem to necessitate the modification of that protest,—not to the extent of acknowledging that 'the main substance of Grote's conclusions' is 'as clear and certain<sup>23</sup> as anything of the kind can possibly be,'—but to the extent of acknowledging that Grote has done valuable service in mootting his views, supported as they are by his usual rich learning and his strong manly sense. The 'main substance of Grote's conclusions' would surely be this: that Plato was unjust in attributing 'sophistry' to the Greek Sophists. This plea, as urged in favour of the Sophists and against Plato, we are still unable to accept. Grote's other and, as we should call them, secondary conclusions, e.g. that the Sophists were not a sect but a profession; that among their ranks honourable men were included; that, as the educators of youth, they did much to promote the civilisation of Greece and the development of certain arts and sciences; and that many of the German commentators and historians of philosophy have been too hasty and sweeping in their condemnation of them,—we willingly accept as capable of absolute demonstration. But

<sup>23</sup> This is the opinion of Mr. H. Sidgwick, expressed in the *Journal of Philology*, vol. iv. p. 288.

the question is whether Grote, after justly exposing and refuting certain ill-considered statements of modern writers, has not gone too far, in his zeal of advocacy, in attempting to completely turn the tables on some of the greatest of the ancients. If there was no sophistry (in the now accepted sense of the word) properly chargeable on the Sophists, then one of the chief lessons which Plato thought that he had to teach the world—a lesson which, if it be a true one, is applicable not only to the popular teachers of the fifth century in Greece, but also to the analogous teachers of all ages—would fall to the ground as unmeaning. What we have to do is to see what Plato and Aristotle and others of the ancients really said, and to endeavour to interpret and criticise their sayings rightly.

The question begins with the history of a word. At first the word *σοφιστής* was used in an intermediate sense to denote any one ‘who by *profession* practised or exhibited some kind of wisdom or cleverness;’ thus it was applicable to philosopher, artist, musician, and even poet.<sup>24</sup> Aeschylus makes Hermes apply the term with sarcasm to Prometheus (*P.V.* 944), but the sneer consists in addressing Prometheus as *σὲ τὸν σοφιστὴν*—‘you the craftsman’—when in so helpless a situation. In the same play, v. 62, it occurs without any such irony:

ίνα  
μάθη σοφιστής ὡν Διὸς νωθέστερος,

—‘duller in his art than Zeus.’ In one of the fragments of Aeschylus *σοφιστής* is applied to Orpheus, denoting ‘musician,’ or ‘master.’

Herodotus (i. 29) mentions that Solon ἀλλοι τε οἱ πάντες

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Diogenes Laertius, i. 12: Οἱ δὲ σοφοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ ἐκαλοῦντο. Καὶ οὐ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ σοφισταὶ.

Καθὰ καὶ Κρατῖνος ἐν Ἀρχιλόγῳ τοὺς περὶ Ὁμηρού καὶ Ἡσίοδον ἐπαινῶν οὗτος καλεῖ.

ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος σοφισταί, οἱ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ἐτύγχανον ἔόντες, visited Sardis when at the zenith of its prosperity. This probably means 'all others who at that time in Greece were noted for or professed any kind of intellectual ability,' — 'all the wits of Greece.' Philosophers, artists, poets, and statesmen, might equally be included. In II. 49, he speaks of *οἱ ἐπιγενόμενοι τούτῳ* (Melampus) *σοφισταῖ*, and in IV. 95, he calls Pythagoras 'Ἑλλήνων οὐ τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῳ σοφιστῇ,' —in both passages the term merely means 'philosopher.'

In the *Clouds* of Aristophanes (acted 423 B.C.), the word *σοφιστὴς* appears for the first time in an invidious sense, and the invidiousness consists in an association attached to it partly of over-subtle, vapourish, speculation, partly of charlatany. Thus (v. 331) the clouds are said to be 'the main-tainers of many such professors'<sup>25</sup>—soothsayers from Thurium, quacksalvers, idle fellows with long hair and rings to their finger-tips,—where it is clear that the term 'Sophist,' though now bearing a shade of contempt, has not yet reached the limited Platonic sense of 'paid instructor in rhetoric and philosophy.' In v. 361, Socrates and Prodicus are spoken of as the chief amongst the crew of 'transcendental Sophists (*τῶν νῦν μετέωροσοφιστῶν*).' In v. 1111 sq. we see expressed a popular opinion of the Sophist, as a pale and attenuated student (*σοφιστὴν—ώχρὸν—καὶ κακοδαίμονα*). And in v. 1306 sq. the term is applied to Strepsiades, in the sense of 'trickster,' in allusion to his cheating of his creditors. In Aristophanes, then, the word 'Sophist' is still indeterminate; it has become uncomplimentary, but only as conveying the popular feeling about the profession of out-of-the-way accomplishments, just

<sup>25</sup> οὐ γάρ μά Δί' οἰσθ' δτιὴ πλείστους αὗται βόσκουσι σοφιστάς,  
θουριομάντεις, ἱατροτέχνας, σφρα-  
γιδονυχαργοκομῆτας.

These splendid impostors must have been the Cagliostros of Greece.

as the term ‘professor’ is sometimes used in a slightly sneering way in modern times. Aristophanes has evidently no consciousness of any particular class of Sophists who were the philosophical antagonists of Socrates. He couples Socrates and Prodicus together as among the most ‘speculative sophists’ of the day. He speaks quite *ab extra*, knowing nothing of the interior of philosophical circles, and only represents a general popular suspicion of all philosophers or ‘professors,’ not troubling himself to make distinctions between them.

Thucydides writing at the end of the fifth century B.C. uses the word *σοφισταὶ* in a sense nearer to that of Plato than Aristophanes had done, to denote those professional orators who made displays of rhetoric (*ἐπιδείξεις*)• before a set audience.<sup>26</sup>

By Xenophon (born about 431 B.C.) the word is used both in its indeterminate and in its limited sense. In *Memorabilia*, iv. ii. 1, he speaks of *γράμματα πολλὰ ποιητῶν τε καὶ σοφιστῶν τῶν εὐδοκιμωτάτων* (‘the most famous sages’), in the same sense in which (*Ib.* i. vi. 14) he speaks of *τοὺς θησαύρους τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες*. In *Cyropaedia* he speaks of a ‘sophist’ to whom he attributes the most elevated and noble character. Cyrus is represented in the fiction as asking Tigranes, son of the chief of Armenia, what had become of ‘the sophist,’ with whom on former occasions he had seen him associating? ‘He is no more,’ said Tigranes, ‘for my father here put him to death.’ ‘What crime,’ asked Cyrus, ‘did he find him committing?’ ‘He said that he corrupted me,’ answered Tigranes; ‘and yet, Cyrus, so noble and excellent a man was he, that when he was going to die, he sent for me

<sup>26</sup> *Bell. Pelop.* iii. 38: ἀπλῶς τε θεαταῖς ἐοικότες καθημένοις μᾶλλον ἡ ἀκοῆς ἡδονῇ ἡσσώμενοι καὶ σοφιστῶν περὶ πόλεως βουλευομένοις.

and told me not to bear my father the least ill-will for putting him to death, because he was not doing it out of malice, but out of ignorance, and whatever faults men commit through ignorance ought to be considered involuntary.' Whether 'sophist' here is to be taken in the limited sense of paid instructor, or merely in the more general sense of 'philosopher,' this remarkable passage shows that at the time when Xenophon wrote his *Cyropaedia*, he knew nothing of an absolute antagonism and contrast between Socrates and 'the Sophists,' else he would not have drawn a picture of 'a sophist' suffering the same fate as Socrates, martyr of the same ignorant prejudice, and expressing sentiments worthy of the most noble mood of Socrates. In *Mem.* i. vi. 1, Xenophon speaks of 'Αντιφῶντα τὸν σοφιστήν. It is uncertain whether Antiphon of Rhamnus, the master of Thucydides, is here meant. Whoever is the person alluded to, he is described as taunting Socrates on his bare feet and scant clothing—the same in winter as in summer—on his spare diet and on the general wretchedness of his mode of life. 'If Philosophy,' he proceeded, 'be your mistress, you get from Her a worse maintenance than any slave would put up with from his master. It is all because you will not take money—money that cheers the recipient, and enables him to live in a more pleasant and gentlemanlike way. You act as if your instructions had no value, else why should you give them for nothing?' Socrates replies that there are two things, which to sell is prostitution—namely, personal beauty and wisdom. 'Those who sell their wisdom for money to any that will buy, men call "Sophists," or, as it were, a sort of male *demi-monde* ;<sup>27</sup> whereas whoso, by imparting knowledge to another whom he sees well qualified to learn, binds that

<sup>27</sup> Τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν σοφιστὰς ἀσπερ πόρνους ἀποκαλοῦ-  
ἀργυρίους τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας, σιν, κ.τ.λ., § 13.

'other to himself as a friend, does what is befitting to a good citizen and a gentleman.' Here the name 'sophist' is used in its distinctly limited sense to denote a teacher who takes pay, and it is also implied that, on this very account, the name is considered to convey a certain amount of reproach with it.

At the end of Xenophon's treatise on Hunting (*Cynegeticus*, c. xiii.), there appears a moral peroration, in which the writer preaches a sermon on the excellence of the practice of hunting as preparing a man to serve his country. Then he goes on to the worth of toilsome pursuits in general, and though Virtue is toilsome, says that mankind would not shun the pursuit of Her if they could only see in bodily form how beautiful She is. This train of thought reminds him of 'the so-called Sophists' of his time. He says, 'They pretend to teach virtue, but their teaching is a mere pretence.'<sup>28</sup> He has never seen any one made a good man by the teaching of a Sophist. He says, 'Many beside me find fault with the Sophists, and not with the philosophers, because the former are subtle in words and not in thoughts.'<sup>29</sup> 'They seek only reputation and gain, and do not, like the philosophers, teach with a disinterested spirit.'<sup>30</sup>

This passage, if it could be accepted as independent

<sup>28</sup> Θαυμάζω δὲ τῶν σοφιστῶν καλουμένων δτι φασὶ μὲν ἐπ' ἀρετὴν ἄγειν οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς νέους, ἔγουσι δὲ τούναντίον· οὐτε γὰρ ἄνδρα που ἑωράκαμεν δητιοὶ οἱ γῦνοι σοφισταὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησαν, οὐτε γράμματα παρέχονται ἐξ δν χρή ἀγαθὸδς γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ματαίων πολλὰ αὐτοῖς γέγραπται ἀφ' δν τοῖς νέοις αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ κεναὶ, ἀρετὴ δὲ οὐκ ἔν.

<sup>29</sup> Ψέγουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τοὺς νῦν σοφιστὰς καὶ οὐ τόδις φιλοσόφους, δτι δν τοῖς δυόμασι σοφίζονται καὶ οὐκ

ἐν τοῖς νοήμασιν.

<sup>30</sup> Οἱ σοφισταὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ ἔξαπατῷ λέγουσι καὶ γράφουσιν ἐπὶ τῷ ἔαπτῷ κέρδει καλούδενα οὐδὲν ἀφελοῦσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ σοφὸς αὐτῶν ἐγένετο οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρκεῖ ἔκδοστῷ σοφιστῇ κληθῆναι, δέστιν δνείδος παρά γε τοῖς, εὐ φρονοῦσι. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν σοφιστῶν παραγγέλματα παραινῶ φυλάττεσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐνθυμήματα μὴ ἀτιμάζειν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ σοφισταὶ πλουσίοις καὶ νέοις θηρῶνται, οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι πᾶσι κοινοὶ καὶ φίλοι.

testimony, would go far to prove that the strongest terms of censure ever used by either Plato or Aristotle, were only a reflection of the general opinion of enlightened men in Greece, when contrasting 'Sophists' with 'philosophers.' But the passage is out of harmony with that quoted above from the *Cyropaedia*; and again it is like an afterthought unnecessarily appended to the treatise *On Hunting*. We know that Xenophon, who was not born much before Plato, lived to a great age; and it seems reasonable to conjecture that, at some time or other—after reading Plato's *Sophistes*, in which the sophist is defined as one who hunts after rich young men—he added on this frigid peroration to his lively and technical discourse on hunting. If so, it is merely a coarse echo of Plato, just as the *Symposium* of Xenophon looks like a poor copy of Plato's *Symposium*. All that can be said, in that case, is that Xenophon, who is not in the least a discriminating or trustworthy authority on philosophical matters, endorses the charge, by whomsoever made, against the Sophists (as a recognised class of teachers)—that their ethical teaching was hollow and rhetorical, and their whole spirit mercenary and self-seeking. And he appears also to indicate that enlightened public opinion was in the same direction.

The next testimony we have to cite is that of Isocrates, who was born 436 B.C., and was thus seven years older than Plato. He seems to have been to some extent the pupil of Socrates, but he maintained himself afterwards by keeping a school of rhetoric, which was attended by the most distinguished pupils. His direction was entirely practical, as is evinced by frequent passages of his works, in which he expresses contempt or dislike of the speculative spirit. On the one hand he uses the term 'Sophist' in its received meaning of professional teacher, and on the other hand he is in the

habit of employing it loosely and vaguely to apply to *literati* or philosophers in general. Isocrates was totally incapable of appreciating the philosophic spirit, and from his point of view, which regarded practical success as alone worth having, he ignored altogether any distinction between the philosopher and the Sophist. His aversion to speculation vents itself in a confused and indiscriminate carping at the literary profession and the philosophers. His oration *κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν*, which is fragmentary, contains an attack on ‘those who undertake to teach.’ He ridicules the magnitude of their promises,—their imposture in offering to impart to youths virtue and the art of attaining happiness; and the absurdity of their demanding, in return for those inestimable advantages, the paltry sum of three or four minæ. This class of teachers he calls the disputants (*οἱ περὶ τὰς ἔριδας διατριβούτες*); from them he passes on to censure those that offer to impart political discourses, being all the while themselves incompetent, and speaking as if such discourses had no relation to particular occasions, but could, like the art of writing, be acquired once for all. The reproaches he makes use of are some of them identical with those to be found in the dialogues of Plato, as, for instance, that the Sophists cannot trust those very pupils to whom they are undertaking to teach justice. He laughs at their affecting to despise wealth, and says that their mean condition, and adherence to mere verbal distinctions, has made many prefer to remain unscientific, as despising such a kind of exercise.

What Isocrates upholds, however, in contrast to this is not a deeper philosophy, but a more polished rhetoric, and he names mental qualifications for it, which are precisely such as Plato thought most undesirable. *Ταῦτα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς, καὶ δοξαστικῆς, ἔργου εἶναι.* In another passage (*Philippus*, § 12), Isocrates uses

the term Sophist with what seems to be an undeniable allusion to Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*. Speaking of the futility of abstract political speculations, he says, ἀλλ' ὄμοιως οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων ἀκυροὶ τυγχάνουσιν ὅντες τοῖς νόμοις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν γεγραμμέναις. In his oration, *De Permutatione* (§ 235), he says that Solon, through his attention to rhetoric, 'came to be called one of the Seven Sophists, and took the appellation now dis- honoured and censured by you,' and in § 313, he affirms that Solon was the first of the Athenians to be called a Sophist.<sup>31</sup> This last statement is at variance with that of Plato, who makes Protagoras to have been the first who accepted the appellation 'Sophist.' The discrepancy depends on the ambiguity and change of meaning in the term. Solon may have been the first Athenian who was called Sophist, in the old sense of the word, i.e. philosopher.<sup>32</sup> Protagoras was the first who adopted the name in its later sense, i.e. professional teacher of philosophy.

We see, then, that the word 'Sophist,' having first had a merely general signification, denoting 'philosopher,' 'man of letters,' 'artist,' &c., acquired a special meaning after the middle of the fifth century, as the designation of a particular class of teachers. And then men began to talk of 'the Sophists,'—referring to this class. But the word retained both its significations, even in the pages of the same author. The word in its earlier sense might be applied in a neutral, or in a sneering, way. Thus Xenophón describes 'a Sophist,' who was a most exalted character; and on the other hand,

<sup>31</sup> Οὕκουν ἐπί γε τῶν προγόνων οὔτως εἰχεν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς καλουμένους Σοφιστὰς ἔθαψαμασον καὶ τοὺς συνδύτας αὐτοῖς ἐζήλουν. Σόλωνα μὲν γάρ, τὸν πρώτον τῶν πολιτῶν λαβόντα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ταῦτην προστάτην ἡξίωσαν τῆς πόλεως

εἶναι.

<sup>32</sup> The allusion here may be merely to that passage of Herodotus (i. 29) quoted above, where it was said that 'Solon and all the other sophists of the day' came to Sardis.

Isocrates sneers at ‘the *Republics* and *Laws* composed by Sophists,’ thus applying the name in a general but uncomplimentary sense to Plato himself. But it may safely be said that for 150 years after 450 B.C. it is rare to find the word ‘Sophist’ used without some shade of disparagement. Aristophanes satirises philosophers generally under this name; Thucydides opposes Sophists, as deliverers of rhetorical discourses, to statesmen in earnest about some question; Xenophon perhaps copies Plato, but also as a soldier and a gentleman he expresses his contempt for a class of paid teachers, who had nothing but verbiage to impart; Isocrates speaks of the class with the bitterness of a rival teacher. If the ‘Sophists’ of the fifth century made money out of their contemporaries, they seem, on the other hand, to have been hardly used by them (whether deservedly or not) in respect of reputation. We have hitherto looked at ‘the Sophists’ from their external side, as they appeared to contemporary writers. Passing on now to Plato, we shall first be able to gain much additional information from him as to this same external side of the Grecian Sophists; afterwards we shall learn from him to appreciate the inner essence of that spirit which he calls  $\eta\ \sigmaοφιστική$ , and which may undoubtedly be looked upon as an actual phase of human thought, by no means confined to the age of Socrates.

It has been a common mistake to understand, under the name of ‘the Sophists,’ certain particular individuals, Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias, Polus, Thrasymachus, and one or two others, who figure in the Dialogues of Plato. Enough has been said to show that in earlier writers the name is never used to indicate a sect in philosophy, and it is equally true that in Plato it is the name of a profession, not of a sect; nor is it ever restricted by him to the above-mentioned individuals, who are merely eminent members of

what was indeed a very wide-spread profession. In the *Meno*, p. 91 E, Socrates is made to speak as if Protagoras was not by any means even the first of the Sophists, *καὶ οὐ μόνον Πρωταγόρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι, οἱ μὲν πρότερον γεγονότες ἐκείνου, οἱ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες.* And by a still more remarkable mode of speaking, in the *Ethics* of Aristotle ix. i. 5-7, Protagoras appears to be in a sort of way contrasted with the Sophists.<sup>33</sup> It is true that Plato represents Protagoras to have been the first to assume openly the name of Sophist (cf. *Protag.* p. 317), but he also gives a humorous picture in the same dialogue, p. 314 D, of the crowds of Sophists flocking to the house of Callias, so that the porter, mistaking Socrates and Hippocrates for members of the profession, would scarcely open the door to them.<sup>34</sup> Within the house they find a conclave of persons, 'most of them foreigners whom Protagoras, like another Orpheus, had drawn after him from their own cities'—amongst others, 'Antimenes the Mendæan, the most famous of the pupils of Protagoras, who was learning with professional objects, meaning to be a Sophist' (*ἐπὶ τέχνῃ μανθάνει, ὡς σοφιστὴς ἐσόμενος*). Protagoras takes great merit to himself for openly declaring his art, for he confesses 'that a certain amount of envy attaches to it; that, going about drawing away youths from their kindred and connections under the promise of making them better if they associated with him—he was likely to be assailed with hostility; old as he is, however, no

<sup>33</sup> 'Ο γὰρ προϊέμενος ἔοικ' ἐπιτρέπειν ἐκείνῳ. "Οπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν· ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἀδήποτε, τε-ιῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν δύον δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσού-τον.—Οἱ δὲ προλαβόντες τὸ ἀργύριον, εἴτα μηδὲν ποιοῦντες ὥν ἔφασαν, διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, εἰκότως

ἐν ἐγκλήμασι γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτε-λοῦσιν ἢ ὀμολόγησαν. Τοῦτο δ' ίσως ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταὶ ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μηθένα διανοιαὶ ἀργύριον ὥν ἐπίστανται.

<sup>34</sup> "Εα, ἔφη, σοφισταὶ τινες· οὐ σχο-λὴ αὐτῷ.—'Αλλ' ὁ 'γαθέ, ἔφη, οὔτε παρὰ Καλλίαν ἤκομεν οὔτε σοφισταὶ ἐσμεν, ἀλλὰ θάρρει.

harm has ever come to him on account of his candour' (pp. 316, 317).

It is interesting to trace in Plato the indications of general opinion about the Sophists. In spite of their great success he represents them to have been held in dislike and suspicion by persons of honour, who at the same time made no pretensions to philosophy. This feeling is instinctively expressed by the young Hippocrates (*Protag.* p. 312 A), who being asked whether he is going to Protagoras in order himself to become a Sophist, confesses that he should consider this a great disgrace.<sup>35</sup> By Callicles, in the *Gorgias* (p. 519 E), a sweeping contempt is expressed for 'those who profess to teach virtue;' Socrates asks, 'Is it not absurd in them to find fault with the conduct of those whom they have undertaken to make virtuous?' Callicles replies, 'Of course it is; but why should you speak about a set of men who are absolutely worthless?' Socrates answers, 'Because I find the procedure of the Sophist and the Rhetorician identically the same.' In the *Meno* the question being, Is virtue teachable? Socrates argues that if it be so, there must be teachers of it, and inquires of Anytus, 'To whom shall we send Meno to learn virtue from? Whether to the Sophists?' Anytus repudiates the idea, since 'these corrupt all who come near them.'<sup>36</sup> Socrates, in reply to this,

<sup>35</sup> Σὺ δέ, ήν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἀν αἰσχύναο εἰς τὸν "Ελληνας αὐτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων; Νή τὸν Δία, ὁ Ζάρκρατες, εἴπερ γε ἡ διαινοῦμαι χρὴ λέγειν. This expression is too strong to be explained away, as Grote proposes, by saying that it is only analogous to an English boy's being unwilling to have it thought that, when grown up, he was going to be a schoolmaster.

<sup>36</sup> P. 91 B. σκόπει παρὰ τίνας ἀν τέμπουτες αὐτὸν δρθῶς πέμποιμεν. Η δῆλον δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον, θτὶ παρὰ τούτους τὸν ὑπισχνουμένους ἀρετῆς διδασκάλους εἶναι καὶ ἀποφήναντας αὐτὸν κοινοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ μανθάνειν, μισθὸν τούτους ταξιμένους τε καὶ πραττομένους; AN. Καὶ τίνας λέγεις τούτους, ὁ Ζάρκρατες; ΞΩ. Οἰσθα δῆκους καὶ σὺ θτὶ οὗτοί εἰσιν οἵοις οἱ ἀνθρώποι καλοῦσι σοφιστὰς.

urges, ‘ How is it possible this should be true of the Sophists ; —a cobbler who professed to mend shoes but made them worse, would be found out in less than thirty days, how then could Protagoras have remained undetected and maintained so great a reputation and made so great a fortune, deceiving the whole of Greece for more than forty years ? At all events, must we not concede that if they do harm to others, they do so unconsciously, and are like men insane ? ’ To this Anytus answers, ‘ that *they* are insane who give money to the Sophists, and still more so the States who allow them to practise their art.’ Socrates says, ‘ Some one of the Sophists must have wronged you, Anytus, or you would not be so bitter.’ Anytus says, ‘ No, I never had anything to do with them.’ Socrates asks, ‘ How then can you know what they are like ? ’ Anytus says, ‘ Oh, I know well enough what they are like without having had anything to do with them.’ Socrates implies that Anytus is speaking not from knowledge but prejudice. He dismisses the subject by adding, ‘ After all, there is perhaps something in what you say’ (*καὶ ἵσως τι λέγεις*, *Meno*, p. 92 D).

In this discussion it is observable that the abuse of the Sophists is put into the mouth of Anytus (the accuser of Socrates), who may be looked at as the representative of conservative feeling in Athens. Full justice is done in the dialogue (*Meno*, p. 90 A) to the eminence of his position, his wealth, and political influence. But afterwards, dramatically, his arbitrary, narrow, and unfair turn of mind comes out. Evidently we cannot say that in the *Meno* Plato calumniates the Sophists, or vilifies them as opponents and

AN. Ἡράκλεις, εὐφήμει, ὁ Σώκρατες.  
μηδένα τῶν συγγενῶν, μήτε οἰκείων  
μήτε φίλων, μήτε ἀστῶν μήτε ξένων,  
τοιαύτη μανία λάβθοι, ὥστε παρὰ τού-

τους ἐλθόντα λαβηθῆναι, ἐπεὶ οὐτοί γε  
φανερά ἔστι λάβη τε καὶ διαφορὰ τῶν  
συγγενομένων.

rivals of Socrates. Rather he makes it appear that there is something hasty and inconsidered in the popular feeling against them (which is a true, but blundering instinct), and that the philosopher must consider their claims, their tendencies, and the phenomena of their success from a deeper point of view.

To a similar purport Socrates is made to speak in the *Republic* (p. 492 A), where he says to Adeimantus, ‘Perhaps you think with the multitude that youths are corrupted by Sophists, and do not perceive that Society is itself the greatest Sophist, educating and moulding young and old. What Sophist or private instructor could withstand the powerful voice of the world? Don’t you see that the so-called Sophists do nothing else but follow public opinion? They teach nothing else but the popular dogmas. They are like the keepers of a wild beast, who, when they have studied his moods and learned to understand his noises, call this a system and a philosophy.’ The common accusation had been that the Sophists unsettled young men’s opinions, and turned them away from the established beliefs. Socrates implies, ‘I am willing to exonerate them from this. Rather I have to complain that the Sophists are too unsophisticated, that they are too much merely echoes of the popular voice; that they have “*plus que personne l’esprit que tout le monde a.*”’

Viewed externally the Sophists presented the appearance of a set of teachers, such as first appeared in Greece towards the middle of the fifth century B.C. (Protagoras was born about B.C. 480, and began to practise his art in his thirtieth year, but there were others before him). They were for the most part itinerant teachers, going from city to city. They would make displays of their rhetoric (*επιδειξις*), and then invite the youths of their audience to come and receive

instruction with a view to becoming able men in the State (*δεινοί, habiles hommes, &c.*). Their instructions were various, rhetoric and dialectic, ethics, music, and physical science. Some, such as Hippias, professed a pantological knowledge; others, as Gorgias, confined themselves to rhetoric. Their profits no doubt varied with their success; some must have been ill-paid and wretched, as is represented by Aristophanes and Isocrates. The leading members of the profession seem to have made large sums of money. On this point, however, Isocrates is at direct issue with Plato. Socrates says in the *Meno*, p. 91 D, that 'he knew of Protagoras gaining greater wealth by his profession than Phidias and ten other sculptors put together.' And in the *Hippias Major* (pp. 282, 283) Prodicus is said to have made immense sums;<sup>37</sup> Hippias is made to boast that 'when quite a young man he made in Sicily, in a short space of time, more than 150 minæ (600l.), and that in one little village, Inycus, he made more than 20 minæ' (80l.). He adds, however, 'that he supposes he has made more than any two Sophists put together.' In contradiction to this picture, Isocrates gives a much more limited account of the pecuniary success of the Sophists. He says (*De Permutatione*, 155, 156), 'Not one of the so-called Sophists will be found to have amassed much money. Some of them lived in small, others in very moderate circumstances. Gorgias of Leontium made the most on record. He lived in Thessaly, where people were very rich; attained a great age; was long given up to his business; had no settled habitation in any State; paid no taxes nor contribution; had no wife nor children, and so was free from this the most continual tax of all—and with these advantages beyond others for acquiring a fortune, he only left

<sup>37</sup> Τοῖς νέοις συνῶν χρήματα ἔλαβε θαυμαστὰ θσα. Cf. Xen. *Symp.* I. 5, iv. 62.

behind him at the last 1,000 staters' (125*l.*?). This oration was written in the eighty-second year of Isocrates' life, and probably much later than the above-mentioned Dialogues of Plato; the fame of the achievements of the Sophists was therefore less fresh. Isocrates, being himself a paid teacher, was complaining of the difficulty of making enough, he was therefore not likely to take a sanguine view of success in this department; also, it is credible that the Sophists did, as is usually the case with persons whose gains are irregular, not save much or leave much behind them. Hence we need not find a great difficulty in the discrepancy of the two statements. Plato represents popular rumours and external surprise at the success of a new profession; Isocrates, taking the other side, goes into details and shows that in the long run there was nothing so very wonderful effected after all.

With regard to the reproach against the Sophists, that their teaching for money at all was something discreditable—an argument has been raised, that this is really no reproach, as the practice of so many respectable men among the moderns may serve to testify. But we should endeavour to put ourselves into the position of the ancients, and the following considerations may help us to do so. (1) The practice of the Sophists was an innovation, and jarred on men's feelings. There was something that to the natural prejudices of the mind seemed more beautiful in the old simple times, when wisdom, if imparted, was given as a gift. As soon as the Sophists began their career, the fine and free spirit of the old philosopher seemed gone. When Hippias boasts of his gains, Socrates ironically replies, 'Dear me, how much wiser men of the present day are than those of old time. You seem to be just the reverse of Anaxagoras. For he is said to have had a fortune left him and to have lost it all, such a poor Sophist was he (*οὐτως αὐτὸν ἀνόητα σοφλ-*

*ξεσθαι),* and other such stories are told of the ancients.' (*Hipp. Major*, p. 283 A.) (2) With the Sophists systematic education began for the first time. Undoubtedly this was a necessity. But it is equally true that about the administration of systematic education there is something that appears at first sight slavish and mechanical. The Greeks had not yet learned those principles according to which a sense of duty will dignify the meanest tasks. They tested things too exclusively in reference to the standard of the fine and the noble (*καλόν*). (3) But it was not simply the office of the paid schoolmaster that was disliked in the Sophist. We do not find that the teachers of gymnastics or of harp-playing were held in disrepute. Those who kept schools for boys were looked down upon, it is true,<sup>38</sup> but were not identified with the Sophists. The latter taught not boys, but youths; again, they taught not the necessary rudiments, but something more pretentious—wisdom, philosophy, political skill, virtue, and the conduct of life. To make a market of the highest subjects and of divine philosophy seemed to men like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, little less than a sort of simony.<sup>39</sup> There was a charlatanism in the offer to teach these things to all comers, which was from different causes equally offensive to ordinary men and to the philosophers. Men like Anytus and Aristophanes complained that the Sophists corrupted youth by teaching them subtleties and unsettling their opinions. In this complaint there was a part of the truth. The philosophers added the other side, by complain-

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Demosthenes *de Coronā*  
313.

<sup>39</sup> The severity of this principle appears not to have been long maintained in the post-Socratic, or at all events the post-Aristotelian schools. Aristippus, whose worldly spirit puts

him into a sort of revolt against Socrates, his master, taught as a Sophist (*Diog. Laert.* ii. 62), and appears to have lived upon his gains. Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, according to Quintilian, mercedes acceptaverunt.

ing that the Sophists were shallow and rhetorical, that they flattered popular prejudices instead of displacing them. The Sophists were vilipended by the philosophers not merely as paid teachers, but as paid charlatans.<sup>40</sup>

The most characteristic and prominent creation of the early Sophistic era was, in one word, rhetoric. But as rhetoricians, the Sophists were themselves the creatures of their times. Circumstances were ripe in the Greek States for the development of this new direction of the human mind, and it came. Cicero (*Brutus*, c. 12) quoting from Aristotle's lost work, the *Συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν*, tells us that Rhetoric took its rise in Sicily, 'when after the expulsion of the tyrants (i.e. Thrasybulus, B.C. 467), many lawsuits arose with regard to the claims of citizens now returning from banishment and who had been dispossessed of their property. The incessant litigation which this led to, caused Corax and Tisias to draw up systems of the art of speaking; (for before this time there had been careful speaking and even written speeches, but no fixed method or *rationale*). Hence also Protagoras came to write his commonplaces of oratory and Gorgias his encomia.' Everywhere in Greece circumstances were analogous to those in Sicily. Personal freedom gave rise to the contests of the law courts. Nothing was more necessary than that a citizen should be able to defend his own cause. The demand for instruction in rhetoric, and for the development of all its arts, means, and appliances, was met everywhere by the Sophists.

Hence the impression they produced on the national speech and thought was almost unspeakably great. To trace the technical changes and advances in the various systems from Corax to Isocrates belongs to the history of rhetoric.

<sup>40</sup> Καὶ δὲ σοφιστῆς χρηματιστῆς διπλὸς φαινομένης συφίας, ἀλλ' οὐκ οὐσίας. Aristotle, *Soph. Elench.* ii. 6.

It will suffice for the present purpose to make a few remarks on the Sophistical rhetoric in its relation to life and modes of thought. Two separate tendencies seem to have manifested themselves from the very outset among the masters of composition. On the one hand, the Sicilian school, represented by Gorgias of Leontium, Polus of Agrigentum, and their follower, Alcidamas of Elæa, in Asia Minor, aimed at *εὐέπεια*, ‘fine speaking.’ On the other hand, the Greek school, led by Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias, devoted themselves more especially to *օρθοέπεια*, ‘correct speaking.’ From these opposite but concurrent tendencies arose that which may be called ‘style’ in Greece, and which did not exist before the middle of the fifth century.

The achievements of Protagoras and the ‘Greek’ rhetoricians seem to have amounted to no less than the foundation of grammar, etymology, philology, the distinction of terms, prosody, and literary criticism. In judging of the so-called verbal quibbles of the Sophists, we have to transport ourselves to a time anterior to the commonest abstractions of grammar and logic. Protagoras was the first to introduce that thinking upon words which was one manifestation of the subjective tendencies of the day. His work, entitled *Ὀρθοέπεια* (which is mentioned by Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 267 C), most probably contained a variety of speculations, as well philological as grammatical. And even his *Ἀληθεία* appears from Plato’s *Cratylus* (p. 391 C) to have touched upon etymological questions. From Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, III. v., we learn that Protagoras was the first to classify the genders of nouns; calling them *ἄρρενα*, *θῆλεα*, and *σκεύη*. From *Soph. Elench.* xiv. § 1, we learn that he considered the terminations *-ις* and *-ηξ* ought to be appropriated to the masculine gender, so that to say *μῆνιν οὐλομένην* would be a solecism. In the *Clouds* of Aristophanes (v. 668–692),

Socrates is ludicrously introduced as following out these ideas, and wishing to alter the termination of *κάρδοπος* and *ἀλεκτρυών* to suit the feminine gender. Another of the grammatical performances of Protagoras was the classification of the *λόγος* or ‘form of speech,’ into question, answer, command, and prayer (Diogenes Laert. ix. 53), a classification which seems to have had some affinity with that of the moods of verbs. The allusions in the *Clouds* to the art of metres, versification, and rhythms, seem to imply the practice of similar studies in the school of Protagoras. Lastly, his speculations in etymology and language seem to have been made in support of his philosophical doctrine of ‘knowing and being,—πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος (cf. Plato’s *Cratylus*, l.c.).

Prodicus, who is said to have been the master of Socrates (cf. *Protogoras*, p. 341 A, *Hippias Major*, p. 282 C), was famous for his distinctions between words of cognate signification and apparently synonymous. He is reported to have said ‘that a right use of words is the beginning of knowledge’ (*πρῶτον γὰρ, ὡς φησι Πρόδικος, περὶ ὀνομάτων ὁρθότητος μαθεῖν δεῖ*, *Euthydem.* p. 277 E). In Plato’s *Protogoras*, p. 337, a speech is put into his mouth, which exhibits an amusing caricature of his style. Every sentence contains a verbal refinement, and is thrown back on itself, in order to furnish out some antithetical distinction in language. ‘We must be impartial, but not indifferent listeners (*κοινοὺς μὲν εἰναι, ἵσους δὲ μή*). The speakers should dispute, not wrangle (*ἀμφισβητεῖν μὲν, ἐρίζειν δὲ μή*). So they will gain our esteem, rather than our applause (*εὐδοκιμοῦτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε*), and we shall feel rather joy than pleasure (*εὐφραινοίμεθα, οὐχ ἡδοίμεθα*).’

In themselves, many of the distinctions drawn by Prodicus were probably of little value—many were overstrained,

and even false; cf. *Charmides*, p. 163, where a distinction is given which is said to be after the manner of Prodicus: it is between *ποίησις* and *πρᾶξις*—*πρᾶξις* is defined to be *ποίησις τῶν ἀγαθῶν*. But we must acknowledge the merit of this first attempt at separating the different shades of language, and fixing a nomenclature. The powerful influence of this example (not always a healthy one) may be traced in the style of Thucydides. And its full development was attained in the accurate terminology of Aristotle.

The short speech assigned to Hippias in the *Protagoras* of Plato (p. 337), and that in *Hipp. Maj.* p. 282, being obvious caricatures, give us still a conception of his manner. He appears to have united some of the splendour of the Sicilian school to the self-conscious and introverted writing of the Greek rhetoricians. This combination gives the sentences attributed to him a shadowy resemblance to the style of Thucydides, as, for instance, the following: *ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχρὸν τὴν μὲν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων εἰδέναι, σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο νῦν συνεληλυθότας τῆς τε Ἑλλάδος εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως εἰς τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ὀλβιώτατον οἰκον τόνδε, μηδὲν τούτου τοῦ ἀξιώματος ἄξιον ἀποφήνασθαι* (*Protag.* 337 D). Of course here the pomp of the words covers vapidly of thought, but one can see the outward husk and hollow shell of style.

The influence of Gorgias upon the writers of Greece probably exceeded that of any other Sophist. After his first essays in speculation, he appears to have renounced philosophy, and to have proclaimed himself a teacher of rhetoric. He was chosen by his countrymen, the Leontines, to come as ambassador to Athens in the year 427 B.C., asking aid against Syracuse. Thucydides (III. 86), with his usual reserve on all matters the least extraneous, makes no men-

tion of his name. Diodorus (xii. 53) has the following remarks on this event: ‘At the head of the envoys was Gorgias the rhetorician, a man who far surpassed all his contemporaries in oratorical skill; he also was the first inventor of the art of rhetoric. He amazed the Athenians, quick-witted and fond of oratory as they were (*δύτας εὐφυεῖς καὶ φιλολόγους*), by the strangeness (*τῷ ξενίζοντι*) of his language, by his extraordinary *ἀντίθετα*, and *ἰσόκωλα*, and *πάρισα*, and *όμοιοτέλευτα*, and other figures of the same kind, which at that time from the novelty of their style were deemed worthy of adoption, but are now looked upon as affected and ridiculous when used in such nauseous superabundance.’ The speeches of Gorgias were thus most elaborately constructed, and, in addition to their almost metrical character, bordered upon poetry also in their use of metaphors and of compound words. Aristotle comments upon the fault of writing prose as if it were poetry, and he severely says that this was done by the first prose writers because they observed how great was the success of poets in covering by their diction the emptiness of their thoughts.<sup>41</sup> Aristotle in another place quotes from Gorgias and from Alcidamas, his follower, several instances of what he calls ‘frigidity’ (*ψυχρότης*, *Rhet.* iii. iii. 1), produced by pompous or poetical words and compounds. He also mentions two of the rhetorical tricks of Gorgias. One was that Gorgias boasted he could never be at a loss in speaking, ‘for if he is speaking of Achilles, he praises Peleus,’ i.e. he will go off from his subject into something collateral (*Rhet.* iii. xvii. 2). The other device was one full of shrewdness: he said, ‘You should silence your adversary’s earnestness

<sup>41</sup> *Rhet.* iii. i. 9. ‘Ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγοντες εὐθῆ διὰ τὴν λαβὴν ἀδόκουν πορίσασθαι τὴν δόξαν, διὰ τοῦτο

ποιητικὴ πρώτη ἐγέρετο λέξις, οἷον ἡ Γοργίου.

with jest, and his jest with earnest.<sup>42</sup> Among the imitators of Gorgias were Agathon and Isocrates. The speech of Agathon in the *Symposium* of Plato is an example of the extreme of the flowery style. Socrates remarks at its conclusion, that he has been almost petrified by the speaking Gorgias (i.e. Gorgon's) head which Agathon has presented to him. The influence of Gorgias may also be extensively detected in the antitheses (often forced), the balance of sentences, and the occasionally poetical diction of Thucydides.

Rhetoric, viewed historically, considered as a thinking about words and the possibilities of language, was by no means, as we have seen, coeval with the origin of States and of human thought. It was a somewhat late product of civilisation. But it was a path which there was an inherent necessity for opening and exploring. From this point of view, thanks are due to the more eminent Sophists for their contributions towards the formation of Grecian prose style, for developing the idea of the *period*, and bringing under the domain of art that which before was left uncultivated. If in their own writing ornament was overdone, they may be considered in this, as in other things, to occupy a transition place, and to have served as pioneers to others.

But there is yet another aspect in which rhetoric must be regarded, and that is, not merely as an affair of words and sentences, but as a direction and phase of thought itself. It consists in attention to form, producing neglect of matter—in striving for the brilliant and the plausible, instead of for the true—in decking out stale thoughts with a fresh outer garment of words—in enforcing a conclusion without

<sup>42</sup> *Rhet.* πι. xviii. 7. Καὶ δεῖν ἔφη | τὸν ἐμοῦνον γέλωτι, τὸν δὲ γέλωτα  
Γοργὸς τὴν μὲν σκουδὴν διαφθείρειν | σπουδῆν.

having tested the premisses. This takes up the arts of the lawyer into the philosopher's or the teacher's chair; it covers its ignorance with a cloak of verbosity; it will never confess there is anything it does not know. This most truly keeps the key of knowledge, and will neither enter in itself nor let other men come in. It speaks things which it does not feel; its utterances come from the fancy, and not from the heart; its pictures are not taken from nature; its metaphors are unnecessary; its pathos is hollow. If language be looked on as not separate from thought, but identical with it, then is rhetoric false thought, as opposed to true. There are, no doubt, various degrees and stages of rhetorical falsehood. The lightest kind is that which consists in some slight exaggeration in a word or an expression. This often takes place in cases where a speaker or writer fully and sincerely believes the general import of what he is asserting; but in setting forth the separate parts he allows himself to quit the stern simplicity of what he actually feels. Again, when a foregone conclusion has lost its freshness, rhetoric is called in in the hope of enlivening it. The most flagrant rhetorical falsity would, of course, consist in the advocacy of propositions which the speaker not only did not believe (in the sense of not feeling or realising them), but absolutely disbelieved. As men are not fiends, this is extremely rare. Rhetoric usually juggles the mind of the speaker as well as of his audience. It takes off the attention of both from examining the truth. It is, for the most part, well-meaning, and is much rather a defender than an impugner of the common orthodox opinions. Hence it was that Plato defined rhetoric to be a trick of flattering the populace. Hence, also, he said that the Sophists studied the humours of society, as one might study the temper of a wild beast. In the practice of the Sophists, Plato saw Rhe-

toric and Sophistry<sup>43</sup> identical. Sophistry consisted in substituting rhetoric for philosophy, words for thoughts (*ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι σοφίζονται καὶ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς νοήμασι*, Xen. *Cyneget. l.c.*). With Plato, philosophy was a higher kind of poetry, in which reason and imagination both found their scope. With the Sophists, it was an harangue (*ἐπιδειξίς*) upon any given subject, with figures and periods to catch applause. Aristotle, indeed, was enabled afterwards to look at rhetoric in a mere abstract way, as the art of composition, and so to separate the Rhetorician from the Sophist, since it was not necessary that Rhetoric should be used in a Sophistical spirit. But Plato always regards Rhetoric as a false impulse in human thought; he always considers it in the concrete, and never as a mere instrument to be used and abused. And that the rhetorical spirit is a reality, attaching itself above all to the highest subjects, to philosophy and religion, and, like the 'bloom of decay,' luxuriantly overgrowing them,—this the experience of all ages and of every thinking man can testify.

But hollow rhetoric is not the only feature of Sophistry, either according to modern acceptation, or in the pictures drawn by Plato. An even more prominent association connected with it is—fallacious reasoning. From the original meaning of the word *σοφίζεσθαι*, 'to devise cleverly,'—'sophism' naturally stands for a trick in language or thought, and Sophistry becomes identical with paralogism used for a dishonest purpose. But this is not merely an association derived from etymology. Plato and Aristotle both directly accuse the Greek 'Sophists,' or professional teachers, of the practice of consciously using fallacious arguments to suit their own purposes. It has of late been ingeniously dis-

<sup>43</sup> Cf. *Gorgias*, p. 520 A. *ταῦτα, ἐ μακρι, ξεστὶ σοφιστῆς καὶ βήτωρ.*

covered and pointed out<sup>44</sup> that at a particular point a change comes over the spirit of Plato's treatment of Sophists, that the dialogues in which the Sophists are mentioned fall into two groups, 'and that in each of these the being called Sophist exhibits a strongly marked character, so different from that of his homonym in the other group, that if they had not been called by the same name, no reader would have dreamt of identifying them.'

The earlier group of dialogues consists of *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, and *Republic*, in which the great characteristics attributed to the leading Sophists, who are introduced as *dramatis personæ* (*Protagoras*, Polus, Hippias, Gorgias, Thrasymachus), are—their wordiness, their habit of declaiming and making long speeches, their ignorance of the art of argumentation, their inability to discuss a subject by means of short questions and answers. These personages, widely differing in many important points, both of doctrine and attitude, are represented as having one thing in common, which may be represented positively as a rhetorical and declamatory tendency, and negatively as an incapacity for close reasoning. In *Meno*, in which the Sophists are mentioned and half-defended against Anytus, Socrates alludes to the Eristics (p. 75 D) as if a distinct class from the Sophists and by no means identical with them. But when we come to the second group of dialogues, consisting of *Euthydemus*, *Sophistes*, and *Theatetus*, a great change is observable, for the Sophists are now represented as the practitioners of perverse dialectic, as putting captious questions to people and inveigling them into contradictions by means of verbal quibbles, as professors of the art of *εριστική*. In *Euthydemus* two Sophists are represented as practising this art on an

<sup>44</sup> By Mr. H. Sidgwick in the *Journal of Philology*, vol. iv. p. 294 sqq.

ingenuous youth, who is rescued from their clutches by Socrates. In *Sophistes* the Sophist, with his short questions and answers, is expressly contrasted with both the statesman and the Rhetorician. In *Theætetus* (p. 154 E) the adverb *σοφιστικῶς*<sup>45</sup> is used summarily to designate the method of captious Eristic, which has no regard to truth, but only to victory, as opposed to honest Dialectic, whose object is the discovery of truth.

There appears, then, to have been a strongly marked change of front in Plato's attack on the Sophists. The only difficulty in explaining this arises from the doubt whether *Euthydemus* was not one of the earlier dialogues of Plato (as indeed it is generally supposed to have been). Mr. Sidgwick, however, thinks that from the nature of its contents it may be placed in chronological juxtaposition with *Sophistes*.

However this may be, the difference in view between *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, and *Republic*, on the one hand, and *Euthydemus* and *Sophistes*, on the other hand, seems to point to an historical change that occurred in the characteristics of the Greek Sophists. While the early and greater Sophists were mainly rhetoricians and declaimers, the later Sophists, those of the fourth century B.C., were mainly eristics, or perverse dialecticians. Mr. Sidgwick is of opinion that this arose from the example of the Socratic mode of disputation—that Socrates, by showing his triumphant *elenchus*, or refutation of opinions and conclusions which he considered unsound, is responsible for the *sophistici elenchi*, or fallacies, those unfair arguments which Aristotle tells us were used with the view of astounding the listener, in order that out of this triumph reputation, and out of reputation

<sup>45</sup> ξυνελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην, ἀλλήλων τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκροβομεν.

gain, might accrue ;<sup>46</sup> in short, that Socrates was the father of Eristic in all its forms. This is an interesting suggestion, and a certain amount of acceptance must be accorded to it. Doubtless in the half-century which succeeded the death of Socrates a very great impulse was given in Athens to the practice of Dialectic, and thence of Eristic. This appears in the post-Socratic philosophical schools ; in the captious arguments invented by the Megarians ; in the Platonic Dialogues themselves, which are composed throughout on a dialectical, often on an eristical, basis. But still more this tendency must have manifested itself in Athenian society, as we learn from the *Topics* of Aristotle, which work was written in order to give rules for the intellectual game of Dialectic, as practised at Athens.<sup>47</sup> Socrates may have given the start to this sort of thing ; but it just suited the lively and intellectual Athenians, and we may conceive of them at this period as a society possessed by an insatiate appetite for discussion and controversy, whether with a view to truth or to mere victory over an opponent. The Sophists were always rather the creatures than the creators of their age ; and as in the fifth century they followed the impulse of the times, and became rhetoricians, and in some cases made contributions to Rhetoric and its subsidiary arts, so in the fourth century they appear merrily swimming with the tide of Dialectic, and drawing profit to themselves out of it,—working out the possibilities of Eristic, and inventing their own fallacious refutations to match the *elenchus* of Socrates. Their procedure was caricatured by Plato in the *Euthydemus*, but Aristotle gravely assures us as a matter of fact

<sup>46</sup> *Soph. El.* xi. 5. Όι μὲν οὖν τῆς νίκης αὐτῆς χάριν τοιοῦτοι ἐριστικοὶ ἀνθρώποι καὶ φιλέριδες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ δὲ δόξης χάριν τῆς εἰς χρηματισμὸν

σοφιστικοί.

<sup>47</sup> See Grote's *Aristotle*, vol. i. p. 386.

that the kind of fallacies therein represented were habitually employed by the Sophists.<sup>48</sup> As collected and analysed by Aristotle, these *Sophistical Refutations* may claim the honour of having well-nigh exhausted the possibilities of error in human reasoning. Modern logicians have hardly been able to add any new fallacies to the list.

Aristotle says that 'Plato gave no bad definition of Sophistry in making it to be concerned with the non-existent. For the arguments of almost all the Sophists may be said to be concerned with the accidental (i.e. that which has no absolute existence); as, for instance, their question whether Coriscus, the musician, is the same as plain Coriscus; whether, by becoming musical, one absolutely comes into being,' &c. (*Metaphys.* v. ii. 4). Plato had said (*Sophist*, p. 254 A), that 'while the philosopher is ever devoted to the idea of the absolutely existent, and thus lives in a region which is dark from excess of light, the Sophist, on the other hand, takes refuge in the murky region of the non-existent.' This 'non-existent' was, as Aristotle explained it, the sphere of the accidental, the conditional, the relative, as contrasted with absolute being. Elsewhere we find that it was a trick of the Sophists to avail themselves of a traditional piece of dialectic 'older than Protagoras,' and to argue that to speak falsely was impossible, for that would be no less than uttering the non-existent, whereas the non-existent has no existence in any sense whatever, and therefore to conceive or utter it is impossible (*Euthydem.* pp. 284–286). Plato maintains against this argument, and against the doctrines of the Eleatics, that in some sense 'not-being' has an existence. We see then that to set the

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<sup>48</sup> *Soph. Elench.* i. 8. "Οτι μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτης ἐφίενται δυνάμεως οὐς καλοῦ-  
έστι τι τοιοῦτον λόγων γένος, καὶ ὅτι μὲν σοφιστάς, δῆλον.

relative meaning of a word against its absolute signification, to play off the accidental against the essential, formed a main part of the ‘Eristic’ art.

The view here taken, then, is that while it is true that Eristic was only fully developed by the post-Socratic Sophists, it was not derived by them at first hand from Socrates himself, but came to them through the active dialectic tendencies now spread throughout society, which tendencies they, as professors of the art of disputation, restless in intellect and without earnestness about consequences, appear certainly to have perverted. The birth and prevalence of fancy no doubt gave birth to a sounder logic, which was necessary as a counteraction to the Sophists, and which their clever manipulation of language suggested. Thus, historically, their vicious practice was advantageous, though this can hardly be reckoned to them as a merit. Independently of the valuable distinction drawn by Mr. Sidgwick between the characteristics of the first and second generation of Sophists, we may still ask whether a certain bias towards fallacy did not exhibit itself even in the first and most eminent members of this profession. Mr. Sidgwick argues justly that Protagoras can hardly have been, as Diogenes Laertius suggests, the inventor of Eristic, else Plato would never have represented him as a perfect child in anything like close dialectic argument. But on the other hand, when we read of the boast of Protagoras (*τὸ Πρωταγόρου ἐπάγγελμα*) that ‘he could make the worse cause the better,’ which Aristotle says that men were indignant at, and when we read of the devices of Gorgias (mentioned above, p. 126), we can hardly exonerate the rhetoric even of these worthies from being too facile in the direction of net unconscious fallacy.

Grote repeatedly, and rightly, argues that the Sophists were not a philosophical sect, and had no common philo-

sophical doctrines. Yet the two most eminent among those who first consented to espouse the profession and to accept the name of Sophists, had been beforehand not inconsiderable philosophers, and as such had each their respective connection with previous schools of philosophy. Thus Sophistry may be said to have had a philosophical pedigree of its own. As represented in the persons of the two most eminent Sophists, it sprang almost simultaneously from the north and the south. Also it may be said to have derived its origin more or less immediately from two directly opposite schools of previous thinkers. Protagoras of Abdera starts from the principle of Heraclitus that all is becoming ; Gorgias of Leontium took up the Eleatic principle of absolute unity. Both Protagoras and Gorgias may be considered to have held their character as philosophers in some measure distinct from their professional character as rhetoricians and teachers, and yet the results of their philosophising coloured their teaching. The philosophy of the two can never be said to have amalgamated, and yet it exhibits a common element. An accurate statement of the doctrine of Protagoras appears in the *Theætetus* of Plato, which is intended to refute it, but which at the same time treats its author with all respect. We see at once that it was a profound doctrine, and of the greatest importance as a 'moment' in philosophy. Heraclitus had said that all is motion, or becoming,—Protagoras analyses this becoming into its two sides, the active and the passive, in other words the objective and subjective. Nothing exists absolutely, things attain an existence by coming in contact with and acting on an organ of sensation, that is, a subject. Thus all existence is merely relative, and depends in each case on a relation to the individual percipient ; and therefore 'man is the measure of all things, of the existent that they exist, and of things non-existent that they

do not exist.' This proposition on the one hand contains the germ of all philosophy, on the other hand it renders philosophy impossible by reducing all knowledge and existence to mere sensation. It contains the germ of all philosophy by asserting that all knowledge, and therefore all existence, as far as we can conceive it, consists in the relation between an object and a subject, that every object implies a subject and every subject an object. This cannot be gainsaid, and it is in short one of the main purposes of philosophy to lift men out of their common unreflecting belief in the *absolute* existence of external objects into so much idealism as this. But the principle of Protagoras falls short in its misconception and too great limiting of the subjective side of existence. Objects exist only in relation to a subject, but not necessarily in relation to individual perceptions. If individual perception is the measure of all things, the same object will be capable of contradictory qualities at the same moment according as it *appears* different to different individuals; a thing can then be and not be at the same time; the distinction between true and false will be done away; even denial (*ἀντιλέγειν*) must cease. Protagoras acknowledged these results; he said, 'What appears true to a person is true to him. I cannot call it false, I can only endeavour to make his perceptions, not truer but better, i.e. such as are more expedient for him to entertain.'

Man is indeed the measure of all things, not the individual man with his changeable and erring perceptions, but the universal reason of man, manifesting itself more or less distinctly in the deepest intuitions of those who are pure and wise, and who attain most 'nearly to the truth. The principle of Protagoras, by calling attention to the subjective side of knowledge, led the way to what has been called 'critical' philosophy, to a critic of cognition itself; and this

was a great advance upon former systems, which regarded knowledge and existence too much as if absolutely objective. But Protagoras himself rested in sensationalism, and becoming from his own system sceptical about truth altogether, he seems to have returned (as above mentioned) to mere principles of expediency. His sensational theory and his scepticism about knowledge are not to be regarded as Sophistical, in the Platonic sense of the word. But with this sceptical foundation to all theories, to commence teaching virtue ; to have thus reduced virtue to a matter of expediency for daily life—to have combined such acute penetration with so little moral or scientific earnestness—after exploding philosophy to have fallen back upon popular and prudential Ethics—this indeed was to exhibit many of the essential features of that Sophistry against which Plato directed all his strength. We see traces of the same spirit—of acute and active intellect combined with a certain trifling and unreality upon the gravest subjects—in the well-known sentence of Protagoras on the gods : ‘Respecting the gods, I neither know whether they exist or do not exist ; for there is much that hinders this knowledge, namely, the obscurity of the subject, and the shortness of human life.’<sup>49</sup> This scepticism, as far as we can conjecture its tendency, does not consist in denying the Grecian Polytheism in order to substitute in its place some deeper conception. It cannot, therefore, be considered parallel to the philosophical contempt of Xenophanes and others for the fables of Paganism. Protagoras despairs of a theology, and proclaims his despair, and falls back upon practical success.

The celebrated thesis of Gorgias, which formed the sub-

<sup>49</sup> Diog. Laert. ix. 51, Sext. Emp. *adv. Math.* ix. 56.

ject of his book ‘On Nature, or the Non-existent,’ and of which a sketch is preserved in the Peripatetic treatise, called Aristotle’s, *De Xenophane, Zenone, et Gorgiā*, and also in Sextus Empiricus (*ad Math.* vi. 65), is one of the most startling utterances of antiquity. It consists of three propositions. (1) Nothing exists. (2) If it does exist, it cannot be known. (3) If it can be known, it cannot be communicated.<sup>50</sup> The extravagant character of this position was denounced by Isocrates in the opening of his *Helen*. He is speaking of the inveterate habit of defending paradoxes which had so long prevailed, and he asks, ‘Who is so behind-hand (*οὐφιμαθής*) as not to know that Protagoras and the Sophists of that time left us compositions of the kind I have named, and even more vexatious? for how could anyone surpass the audacity of Gorgias, who dared to say that nothing of existing things exists?’ Isocrates adds to the name of Gorgias, those of Zeno and Melissus; he had before specified as ridiculous paradoxes the theses that ‘it is impossible to speak falsehood’—that ‘it is impossible to deny’—that ‘all virtue is one’—that ‘virtue is a science.’ Elsewhere (*De Permutat.* § 268), he mentions as the ‘theories of the old Sophists,’ that ‘the number of existences was, according to Empedocles, four; according to Ion, three; according to Alcmaeon, two; according to Parmenides and Melissus, one; according to Gorgias, absolutely none.’ We see then that the point of view which Isocrates takes is that of so-called common sense and practical life—that he declines to enter upon philosophical questions at all. He regards the absolute Nihilism of Gorgias as belonging to the same sphere of thought, only a more flagrant development of it, as the doctrine, ‘all virtue is a science.’ It is always easy to set

<sup>50</sup> Οὐκ εἶναι φῆστιν οὐδέν· εἰ δὲ ἔστιν, στόν, ἀλλ' οὐ δηλωτὸν ἀλλοις. Arist. Ξενωστον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστι καὶ γνω-

*De Xenophane, &c. c. v.*

aside philosophical views as repugnant to common sense, as mere subtleties and useless paradoxes. But if we enter on philosophy at all, we must accept the dialectic of the reason. The difficulties into which it may lead us must not be rejected as subtleties, but acknowledged, and if possible reconciled with the views of common sense.

Philosophy, before Gorgias, had been occupied with an abstract conception of Being, whether as One or Many. The dialectic of the Eleatics had been directed to establish, against all testimony of the senses, that the only existence possible is one immutable Being. On the other hand, the Ionics maintained the plurality of existences; and Heraclitus especially held the exact contrary to the Eleatic view, that there was no permanence or unity, but all was plurality and becoming. The dialectic of Gorgias coming in here explodes all philosophy by a demonstration that 'nothing exists.' This part of his position he appears to have maintained by bringing Eleatic arguments against the Ionic hypothesis, and Ionic arguments against the Eleatic hypothesis.<sup>51</sup> 'If there is existence (*εἰ δὲ ἔστι*), it must be either Not-being or Being. It cannot be Not-being, else Being will be identical with Not-being. It cannot be Being, for then it must be either One or Many, either created or uncreated. It cannot be One, for One implies divisibility, i.e. plurality. It cannot be Many, for the Many is based upon the unit of which it is only the repetition, and is so essentially One. Again, it cannot be created, for it must either be created out of the existent or the non-existent. It cannot be the former, else it would have existed already. It cannot be the latter, for

<sup>51</sup> Καὶ δτι μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, συνθετις τὰ ἔτεροι εἰρημένα, δσοι περὶ τῶν ὑπτων λέγοντες, τάνατία, ὡς δοκοῦσιν, ἀποφαίνονται αὐτοῖς· οἱ μὲν, δτι θν καὶ οὐ

πολλὰ· οἱ δὲ αδ', δτι πολλὰ καὶ οὐχ ἔν· καὶ οἱ μὲν δτι ἀγένητα οἱ δὲ ὡς γενόμενα ἐπιδεικνύντες, ταῦτα συλλογίζεται κατ' ἀμφοτέρων. Arist. *De Xen.* &c. l.c.

nothing can come from the non-existent. Nor can it be Uncreate, for that implies its being Infinite, and the Infinite can have no existence in space.' These arguments are not to be looked at as a mere wanton sporting with words. Rather they contain a very penetrating insight into some of the difficulties which beset the most abstract view of existence. The same difficulties have been felt by other philosophers; thus, in the *Parmenides* of Plato, great obstacles have been set forth to considering existence either as One or as Many. And Kant represents it as one of the antinomies of the reason, that the world can neither be conceived of as without a beginning, nor as having had a beginning. No blame can possibly attach to Gorgias for these speculations, nor for the conclusions to which they led. Plato himself, in the *Parmenides* (p. 135 D), urges and exhorts the young philosopher to follow out this sort of dialectic. ' You should exercise yourself while yet young,' says Parmenides to Socrates, ' in that which the world calls waste of time ( $\tauῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας$ ), else truth will escape you.' What, then, is this method? It consists in the following out of contrary hypotheses, the one and the many, the like and the unlike, motion, rest, creation, destruction; not only supposing the existence of each of these separate ideas, but afterwards also their non-existence; follow out the consequences in each case, and see what comes of the antinomy. All praise, then, is due to Gorgias, from Plato's point of view, for his stringent dialectic. To the popular mind, such reasonings appear absurd or repugnant. But the philosopher is only stimulated by them to seek for a higher ground of vision, whence these seeming contradictions and difficulties may be seen to be reconciled. We can only regret that we do not possess the entire work of Gorgias, in order to know more accurately

its exact purpose; whether his arguments were meant to have a universal validity, or whether they were only relative to the Ionic and Eleatic philosophies. The latter would seem to be actually the case, whatever was meant by the author himself; for the destructive arguments of Gorgias, while they are of force against previous philosophy, do not touch the universe of Plato, in which there was a synthesis of the one and the many, of being and not-being.

The two remaining theses of Gorgias—that being if existent could not be known, and if known could not be communicated—contain the strongest form of that subjective idealism afterwards repeated by Kant. They place an impassable gulf between things in themselves and the human mind. We can never know things in themselves; all we know is our thought, and the thought is not the thing. Still less could we communicate them to others, for by what organs could we communicate things in themselves? How by speech could we convey even the visible? In this part of the dialectic of Gorgias we trace an affinity to the doctrines of Protagoras. They each exhibit a tendency to a disbelief in the possibility of attaining truth. The scepticism, however, does not constitute Sophistry. It was not peculiar to the Sophists, but is a characteristic universally of the close of the Pre-Socratic era of philosophy. Aristotle speaks against it very strongly, but he does not call it Sophistry, he attributes it to several great names (*Metaphys.* III. c. iv.-v.). After arguing against the saying of Protagoras, he mentions that Democritus said ‘there is no truth, or it is beyond our finding’ ( $\Delta\eta\mu\acute{o}k\rho i\acute{t}\acute{o}s \gamma\acute{e} \phi\eta\sigma\iota\acute{u} \dot{\eta}t\acute{o}i o\acute{u}\theta\acute{e}n \acute{e}l\nu a\acute{i} \acute{a}l\eta\theta\acute{e}i\acute{s} \dot{\eta} \dot{\eta}\mu\acute{i}n \gamma\acute{e} \acute{a}d\eta\lambda\acute{o}v$ ); that Empedocles said ‘thought changes according as men change;’ that Parmenides said in the same way, ‘thought depends on our physical state;’ that Anaxagoras said ‘things are according as men conceive them.’ Aristotle

remarks, ‘It is surely an evil case, if those who have attained truth most, as loving it best, and seeking it most ardently, hold these opinions. It is enough to make one despair of attempting philosophy. It makes the search after truth a mere wild-goose chase. The cause of these opinions is that men, while speculating on existence, have considered the sensible world to be the only real existence. And this latter is full of what is uncertain and merely conditional’ (*Metaphys.* III. v. 15, 16). Sophistry then is not constituted by any theories of cognition or existence. It consists in a certain spirit, in a particular purpose with which philosophy, or the pretence of philosophy, is followed. ‘Sophistry and dialectic,’ says Aristotle, ‘are conversant with the same matter as philosophy, but philosophy differs from both the others; from the one in the manner of its procedure, the other in the purpose which guides its life. Dialectic is tentative about those subjects on which philosophy is conclusive, and Sophistry is a pretence, and not a reality.’<sup>52</sup>

No other members of the Sophistic profession, so far as we know, dealt with metaphysical questions. They were rhetoricians, grammarians, teachers of mathematics and of what was then known of physical science, teachers of music, teachers of virtue and of politics, and of the art of success in citizen-life, dialecticians, disputants, and experimenters in logic. But it was one of Plato’s chief grounds of complaint against them that, while they were by their professional procedure brought into contact with so many of the higher subjects,—they were not philosophers.

We now come to that which is, for our present purpose,

<sup>52</sup> Περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸν γένος στρέφεται ἡ σοφιστικὴ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῆς μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, τῆς δὲ τοῦ βίου τῇ

προαιρέσει. Ἐστι δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ περὶ ὃν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριστική, ἡ δὲ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη, οὐσα δ’ οὕ. *Metaphys.* III. ii. 20.

the most important question with regard to the Sophists,— What was their influence upon ethical thought ? In the first place, then, they obviously must have affected moral ideas in Greece simply by talking very much about them. Socrates is commonly spoken of as the first moral philosopher, and in the pages of Xenophon we find him constantly dis- coursing on moral topics. But as in nature, so in the pro- gress of the human mind, nothing is done *per saltum*; that which is great and conspicuous in any line is often called ‘the first,’ while its precursors are left out of sight, but without those precursors it would not have come into existence. This was in all probability the case with regard to the ethical philosophy of Socrates ; it was suggested by, and to some extent may be considered to have arisen out of, the manifold lecturings and disputations of the Sophists. We do not gather from Xenophon that there was any marked antagonism or polemic between the real Socrates and the whole profession of the Sophists of his day. It is only the dramatic Socrates of Plato’s fancy that is used as the vehicle of Plato’s own disapprobation of certain tendencies which he considered to have been manifested by the profession. But the historical Socrates is represented by Xenophon as adopting and using a discourse of Prodicus ; and great as may be the differences which to the philosophic eye reveal themselves between the essential spirit of Socrates and that of the Sophists, to the uncritical eyes of most of his contemporaries Socrates doubtless appeared undistinguishable from the other professional talkers on virtue, except by the one circumstance that he did not accept fees. Thus it was only natural that Aristophanes should, uncritically, include Socrates in what was with him a very wide class of persons, and should couple Socrates and Prodicus together as chief ‘in, wisdom and gnomic thought, of the transcendental Sophists of the day.’

The historical Socrates had really much in common with the Sophists; he is the leading figure in a new era of conscious morality which they had gradually inaugurated.

The very first characteristic that is predicated of the Sophists by Xenophon, Isocrates, and Plato is, that they 'undertook to teach virtue.' To this rule, however, Gorgias was an exception. Meno, in Plato's dialogue, praises him 'because he was never heard to make any pretence of the kind, but used to ridicule those who made it,—he himself thought that men ought to be made clever in speaking.' Socrates on this asks Meno, 'What, don't you then really think that the Sophists can teach virtue?' to which Meno replies, 'I know not what to say, Socrates, for I feel like most men on this question. Sometimes I think that they can teach it, and sometimes that they cannot.' (*Meno.* p. 95 C.) A nearer definition of what this 'teaching virtue' meant is put into the mouth of Protagoras, who boasts (*Plato, Protag.* p. 318 E) that 'he will not mock those who come to him by teaching them mere specialities against their will, as the other Sophists do, such as dialectic, astronomy, geometry, and music. They shall learn from him nothing except what they came to be taught. His teaching will be, good counsel, both about a man's own affairs, how best to govern his own family, and also about the affairs of the State, how most ably to administer and to speak about State matters.' Socrates says, 'You appear to me to mean the art of Politics, and to undertake to make men good citizens.' 'This is just what I undertake,' says Protagoras. To attempt to discover in this proposal anything insidious or subversive of morality would be quite absurd. Protagoras is represented by Plato throughout the dialogue as exhibiting an elevated standard of moral feelings. Thus he repudiates with contempt the doctrine that injustice can ever be good sense (p. 333 C), and from

grounds of cautious morality he declines to admit that the pleasant is identical with the good (p. 351 D). There is little reason to doubt that Protagoras may have conveyed to those who sought his instructions much prudent advice, and many shrewd maxims on the conduct of life and on the art of dealing with men in public and private relations. Of the hortatory morality of the Sophist, we have further means of forming a judgment from the celebrated composition (*Σύγγραμμα*) of Prodicus, commonly called ‘The Choice of Hercules.’ It is preserved for us by Xenophon (*Memorab.* ii. i. 21–34), who represents it as being quoted by Socrates with a view of enforcing the advantages of temperance and virtue. It was the most popular of the declamations of Prodicus (*ὅπερ δὴ καὶ πλειστοῖς ἐπιδείκνυται*), and has since constantly found a place in books of elegant extracts and moral lessons. It would be easy to criticise and find fault with this fable. It does not adequately represent the real trial and difficulty of life. If, at the period of transition from boyhood to youth (*ἐπεὶ ἐκ παιδῶν εἰς ἥβην ὡρμῶτο*), one might go forth to a place of retirement (*ἐξελθόντα εἰς ἡσυχίαν καθῆσθαι*), and there see presented Vice and Virtue, the one meretricious in dress and form, the other beautiful, and dignified, and noble; and if, when Vice had opened her alluring offers, Virtue immediately exposed their hollowness, substituting her own far higher and greater promises of good; and if, there and then, one might choose *once for all* between the two, who is there that would hesitate a moment to accept the guidance of Virtue? It may be said almost universally that all youths aspire after what is good. If it depended on a choice made *once for all* at the opening of life, all men would be virtuous. But man’s moral life consists in a struggle in detail; and this the figure of Prodicus fails to represent.

Again, parables of this kind never adequately represent, in all its complexity, the moral truth which they are intended to convey. The ‘Choice of Hercules’ would make it appear as if the allurements of vice were exterior to us, as if ‘Hercules’ had merely to select, to the best of his judgment, between two external objects offered to him. But this leaves out of consideration the enemy within the camp, the *εὐθύρατον αὐτὸν* mentioned by Aristotle (*Eth.* iii. i. 11), the fact that temptation is in ourselves, and consists in our own nature, which does not leave us free to make cool judgments and to act upon them. All such psychological refinements had, however to be developed later.

Several parts of the exhortation which Prodicus puts into the mouth of Virtue are full of merit; a noble perseverance and manliness of character are inculcated; and in the denunciation of vice the following fine sentence occurs: ‘You never hear that which is the sweetest sound of all, self-approbation; and that which is the fairest of all sights you never see, a good deed done by yourself!’ There is something rather rhetorical in the complexion of this discourse, even as it is given by the Socrates of Xenophon, and he concludes it by saying, ‘Prodicus dressed up his thoughts in far more splendid language than I have used at present.’ But against the moral orthodoxy of the piece not a word can be said, and we may safely assert, that had all the discourses of the Sophists been of this character, they would not have fallen into such general bad repute as teachers.

Plato never represents the Sophists as teaching lax morality to their disciples. He does not make sophistry to consist in the holding wicked opinions; on the contrary, he represents it as only too orthodox in general, but capable occasionally of giving utterance to immoral paradoxes for the sake of vanity. Sophistry rather tampers and trifles with

the moral convictions than directly attacks them. It is easy to see how this came about. Greece was now full of men professing to 'teach virtue.' They were ingenious, accomplished, rivals to each other, above all things desirous of attracting attention. Their talk was on a trite subject, on which it was necessary to say something new. The procedure of the Sophists was twofold, either it was rhetorical or dialectical. They either (1) tricked out the praises of justice and virtue with citations from the old poets, with ornaments of language, and with allegories and personifications. Of this latter kind of discourse we have a specimen in the 'Choice of Hercules,' and again we have the sketch or skeleton of a moral declamation which Hippias, in Plato's dialogue (*Hipp. Major*, p. 286), says he has delivered with great success, and is about to deliver again. The framework is simple enough. Neoptolemus, after the fall of Troy, is supposed to have asked Nestor's advice for his future conduct. Nestor replies by suggesting many noble maxims. 'Tis a fine piece,' says Hippias complacently, 'well arranged, especially in the matter of the language.' Such like compositions of the Sophists form a sort of parallel to the popular preaching of the present day. Or else (2) they gave an idea of their own power and subtlety, by skirmishes of language, by opening up new points of view with regard to common every-day duties, and making the old notions appear strangely inverted. All the while that they thus argued, no doubt they professed to be maintaining a mere logomachy. But to an intellectual people like the Greeks there would be something irresistibly fascinating in this new mental exercitation. Aristophanes represents the conservative abhorrence which this new spirit awakened. He depicts in a caricature a new kind of education in which everything is sophisticated, that is, tampered with by the intellect. A

sort of casuistry must have been fostered throughout Greece by various concurrent causes ; by the drama, which represented, as for instance in the *Antigone*, a conflict of opposing duties ; by the law courts, in which it was constantly endeavoured to ‘make the worse side seem the better ;’ and lastly, as we have seen, by the Sophists, who, in discoursing on the duties of the citizen, did not refrain from showing that there was a point of view from which ‘the law’ appeared a mere convention, while ‘natural right’ might be distinguished from it.

To be able to view a conception from opposite points of sight ; to see the unsatisfactoriness of common notions ; to feel the difficulties which attach to all grave questions—these are the first stages preparatory to obtaining a wise, settled, and philosophical conviction. Thus far the dialectic of the Sophists and that of Socrates coincide. But the Sophists went no further than these first steps ; the positive side of their teaching consisted in returning to the common views for the sake of expediency. That there is danger incurred by the dialectical process, in its first negative and destructive stages, no one has felt more strongly than Plato. He wishes, in his *Republic*, that dialectic, as a part of education, may be deferred till after thirty, because ‘so much mischief attaches to it,’ because ‘it is infected with lawlessness.’ ‘As a supposititious child having grown up to youth, reverencing those whom he thought to be his parents, when he finds out he is no child of theirs, ceases his respect for them and gives himself up to his riotous companions ; so it is with the young mind under the influence of dialectic. There are certain dogmas relating to what is just and right, in which we have been brought up from childhood—obeying and reverencing them. Other opinions recommending pleasure and licence we resist, out of respect for the old hereditary maxims. Well,

then, a question comes before a man ; he is asked, what is the right ? He gives some such answer as he has been taught, but is straightway refuted. He tries again and is again refuted. And when this has happened pretty often, he is reduced to the opinion, that nothing is more right than wrong ; and in the same way it happens about the just and the good and all that he before held in reverence. On this, naturally enough, he abandons his allegiance to the old principles and takes up with those that he before resisted, and so from a good citizen he becomes lawless' (*Repub.* pp. 537, 538). It is obvious that the process of dialectic here described consists in nothing more than starting the difficulties, in other words, stating the question of morals. Plato does not here attribute antinomian conclusions to the teachers of dialectic ; he speaks of the disciple himself drawing these, from a sort of impatience, having become dissatisfied with his old moral ideas, and not waiting to substitute deeper ones.

Throughout his dialogues Plato does not attribute lax or paradoxical sentiments to the greater Sophists ; he puts these in the mouths of their pupils, such as Callicles, the pupil of Gorgias, or of the inferior and less dignified Sophists, as Thrasymachus. Sophistry consists for the most part in outward conformity, with a scepticism at the core ; hence it tends to break out and result occasionally in paradoxical morality, which it is far from holding consistently as a system. We shall have quite failed to appreciate the true nature of Sophistry, if we miss perceiving that the most sophistical thing about it is its chameleon-like character. One of the most celebrated 'points of view' of the Sophists was the opposition between nature and convention.. Aristotle speaks of this opposition in a way which represents it to have been in use among them merely as a mode of arguing, not as a

definite opinion about morals. He says (*Sophist. Elench.* xii. 6), ‘The topic most in vogue for reducing your adversary to admit paradoxes is that which Callicles is described in the *Gorgias* as making use of, and which was a universal mode of arguing with the ancients,—namely, the opposition of “nature” and “convention;” for these are maintained to be contraries, and thus justice is right according to convention, but not according to nature. Hence they say, when a man is speaking with reference to nature, you should meet him with conventional considerations; when he means “conventionally,” you should twist round the point of view to “naturally.” In both ways you make him utter paradoxes. Now by “naturally” they meant the true, by “conventionally” what seems true to the many.’ Who was the first author of this opposition is uncertain. Turning from the Sophists to the philosophers, we find the saying attributed to Archelaus (Diog. Laert. II. 16), ‘That the just and the base exist not by nature, but by convention.’<sup>53</sup> This Archelaus was the last of the Ionic philosophers, said to be the disciple of Anaxagoras and the master of Socrates. ‘He was called the Physical Philosopher,’ says Diogenes, ‘because Physics ended with him, Socrates having introduced Ethics. But he, too, seems to have handled Ethics. For he philosophised on laws, and on the right and the just; and Socrates succeeding him, because he carried out these investigations, got the credit of having started them.’ About the same period Democritus is recorded to have held that ‘the institutions of society are human creations, while the void and the atoms exist by nature.’<sup>54</sup> He also said, that the perceptions of sweet and bitter, warm and cold, were *νόμῳ*, that is, what we

<sup>53</sup> Καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φέσει, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ.

<sup>54</sup> Ποιητὰ δὲ νόμιμα εἶναι. Φύσει δὲ θεομα καὶ κενόν. Diog. Laert. IX. 45.

should call 'subjective.' These reflections indicate the first dawn of Ethics. They show that philosophy has now come to recognise a new sphere; beyond and distinct from the eternal laws of being there is the phenomenon of human society, with its ideas and institutions. The first glance at these sees in them only the variable as contrasted with the permanent, mere convention as opposed to nature. Ethics at its outset by no means commences with questions about the individual. It separates 'society' from 'nature,' as its first distinction. This was because in Greece the man was so much merged into the citizen; even Aristotle says 'the State is prior to the individual; the individual has no meaning except as a member of the State. It is a subsequent step to separate the individual from society: first sophistically, for the sake of introducing an arbitrary theory of morals; at last, philosophically, to show that right is only valid when acknowledged by the individual consciousness, but at the same time that the broad distinctions of right and wrong are more objective and permanent than anything else, more absolutely to be believed in than even the logic of the intellect.

Looking at the Sophists rather as the promulgators than as the inventors of this opposition between *φύσις* and *νόμος*, we see it applied in the person of Callicles, their supposed pupil (*Gorgias*, pp. 483, 484), to support crude, paradoxical, and anti-social doctrines; to maintain that nature's right is might, while society's right (which is unnatural, and forced upon us for the benefit of the weak) is justice and obedience to the laws. It is a carrying out of exactly the same point of view, to say, as Thrasymachus is made to do in the *Republic* of Plato (p. 338 C), that justice is 'the advantage of the stronger.' This position is there treated as a mere piece of 'Eristic.' It is met by arguments that are themselves

partly captious and sophistical. These applications of the principle are of course dramatic and imaginary in Plato's pages, but we may fairly conceive them analogous to what was occasionally heard uttered in Athenian society. Another ethical topic with which the Sophists would be sure to deal was the question, What is the chief good? We have before observed that this was a leading idea in the early stages of Grecian morals. In the discourses of the Sophists various accounts would be given of the matter. Sometimes, as in the fable of Prodicus, happiness, or the chief good, would be represented as inseparable from virtue; at other times a rash and unscrupulous Sophist, like Polus in the *Gorgias* of Plato (p. 471), would be found to assert that the most enviable lot consists in arbitrary power, like that of a tyrant, to follow all one's passions and inclinations. This assertion of arbitrary freedom for the individual, though, of course, not consistently maintained by the Sophists, was yet one of the characteristics of their era.

We have already incidentally referred to several of Aristotle's views of the Sophists and Sophistry. He does not, any more than Plato, speak of definite doctrines belonging to the Sophists, as if they were a school of philosophers with their own metaphysical or ethical creed. He speaks repeatedly of their *practice*, of their method, of certain tricks in argument commonly used by them; he says (*Eth.* x. ix. 20) that in their teaching they put Rhetoric on a level with Politics; (*Rhet.* i. i. 14) that the Sophist differs from the Rhetorician in the purpose or aim ( $\tau\eta\pi\rhooaiρέσει$ ) with which he uses the artifices of Rhetoric; (*Soph. El.* xxxiii. 11) that Sophistry is the near neighbour of Dialectic; (*ib.* xi. 5) that it differs from Eristic pure and simple in employing fallacy for the purposes of gain. These utterances, which in different forms are often repeated,

have all the air of being based on or confirmed by independent observation. Aristotle in all that he says about the sophistical spirit no doubt accepts, analyses, and reduces to method much that is to be found in the Platonic Dialogues. But it would be against historical evidence to consider Aristotle's statements on this subject to have been a mere blind repetition of certain calumnies or hostile caricatures.

On the whole, then, we must conclude that Grote's defence of the Sophists is good against the too sweeping denunciations of them which have often been expressed in modern times, and which exaggerate and misrepresent the subtle and discriminating pictures drawn by Plato,—but is not good against Plato himself, when we read his words aright. Grote has made too much of the fact that the word 'Sophist' had a twofold meaning, and that in its more general and indeterminate sense it was often applied by the ancients, with a shade of sneering, to those who were philosophers and not 'sophists' in the limited sense of being professional teachers; and that it was so applied even to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle themselves. From this it does not follow that there was no distinct class of men who were 'sophists' in the limited sense, or that this class did not exhibit certain common characteristics and a certain common spirit. Again, because several of the profession were respectable and even dignified men, and more like popular preachers than teachers of antinomianism, it does not follow that they did not sin against philosophy, or that they were worthy of the same respect as the philosophers, or that there was nothing in the tendencies of their thought against which Plato was right to warn his countrymen. The spirit which Plato was the first to detect in the professional teachers of Greece, reappears under changed conditions in every cultivated age; it re-

appears in literature and in the pulpit. Wherever men set themselves up as teachers of the highest subjects, and in lieu of being devoted to truth for its own sake exhibit a tinge of worldly self-interest, there is a reappearance of the ‘Sophistic’ spirit.

In the relation of the Sophists to society in general, the question has been raised, Did they impair the morality of Greece? The answer must be a mixed one. Owing to the influence of the Sophists, and also to other causes, thought was less simple in Greece at the end of the fifth century than it had been at the beginning. Between the age of Pisistratus and that of Alcibiades, the fruit of the tree of knowledge had been tasted. Men had passed from an unconscious into a conscious era. All that double-sidedness with regard to questions, which is found throughout the pages of Thucydides, and which could not possibly have been written a hundred years before, is a specimen of the results of the Sophistical era. The age had now become probably both better and worse. It was capable of greater good and of greater evil. A character like that of Socrates is far nobler than any that a simple stage of society is capable of producing. The political decline of the Grecian States alone prevented the full development of what must be regarded as a higher civilisation. The era of the Sophists, then, must be looked upon as a transition period in thought—as a necessary, though in itself unhappy, step in the progress of the human mind. The subjective side of knowledge and thought was now opened. Philosophy fell into abeyance for a while, under the scepticism of Protagoras and Gorgias, but only to find a new method in Socrates and Plato. Ethics had never yet existed as a science. Popular moralising and obedience to their laws, was all the Greeks had attained to. But now discussions on virtue, on the laws, on justice, on happiness, were heard in every corner; at times

rhetorical declamation ; and at times subtle difficulties or paradoxical theories. If physical philosophy begins in wonder, Ethics may be said to have begun in scepticism. The dialectical overthrow of popular moral notions, begun by the Sophists and characteristic of their times, merged into the deeper philosophy and constructive method of Socrates.

III. The personality of Socrates (to whom we now turn) has perhaps made a stronger impression upon the world than that of any other of the ancients, and yet, as soon as we wish to inquire accurately about him, we find something that is indeterminate and difficult to appreciate about his doctrines. Socrates, having contributed the greatest impulse that has ever been known to philosophy, was himself immediately absorbed in the spreading circles of the schools which he had caused. Cynic, Cyrenaic, and Platonic doctrines stand out each more definitely in themselves than the philosophy of Socrates. The causes of this are obvious, for the fact that he wrote no philosophical treatises gave rise to a twofold set of results. (1) On the one hand, his philosophy, being in the form of conversations with all comers, restricted itself for the most part to a method—to a way of dealing with questions—to an insight into the difficulties of a subject—to a conception of what was attainable, and what ought to be sought for in knowledge. It was therefore free from dogmatism, but also wanting in systematic result. Taking even the conversations of Socrates, as they are given by Xenophon, we can find in them certain inconsistencies of view. (2) From the absence of any actual works of Socrates, we are left to the accounts of others. And here we are met with the well-known discrepancy between the pictures drawn of him by his different followers, a discrepancy which can never be reconciled nor exactly estimated. We can never know exactly how far Xenophon has told us too little, and Plato too much.

However, by a cautious and inductive mode of examination we may succeed in establishing a few points at all events about Socrates, and in discerning where the doubt lies about others. There seems to be no reason whatever against receiving in their integrity the graphic personal traits which Plato has recorded of his master. The description of him, which is put into the mouth of Alcibiades at the end of the *Symposium*, seems to have in view the exhibition, in the concrete, of those highest philosophic qualities which had before been exhibited in the abstract. Plato does not shrink from portraying the living irony which there was in the appearance of Socrates, his strange and grotesque exterior covering, like the images of Silenus, a figure of pure gold within. Other peculiarities of the man have a still deeper significance, being more essentially connected with his mental qualities. Not only did he excite attention by a robustness and versatility of constitution which could bear all extremes, but also by another still more strange idiosyncrasy ; he seems to have been liable to fall into fits of abstraction, almost amounting to trances. During the siege of Potidæa, while on service in the Athenian camp, he is recorded to have stood fixed in one attitude a whole night through, and when the sun rose to have roused himself and saluted it, and so returned to his tent. It has been observed that the peculiar nervous constitution which could give rise to this tendency, and which seems to have an affinity to the clairvoyance of Swedenborg and others among the moderns, was probably connected with that which Socrates felt to be unusual in himself, that which he called  $\tauὸ\ δαιμόνιον$ , 'the supernatural,' an instinctive power of presentiment which warned and deterred him from certain actions, apparently both by considerations of personal well-being, and the probable issue of things, and also by moral intuitions as to right and wrong.

This ‘supernatural’ element in Socrates (which he seems to have believed to have been shared, in exceedingly rare instances, by others) cannot be resolved into the voice of conscience, nor reason, nor into the association of a strong religious feeling with moral and rational intuitions, nor again into anything merely physical and mesmeric, but it was probably a combination, in greater or less degrees, of all. There are other parts of the personal character of Socrates which are also parts of his philosophical method; for his was no mere abstract system, that could be conveyed in a book, but a living play of sense and reason; the philosopher could not be separated from the man. Of this Xenophon gives us no idea. But in Plato’s representation of the irony of Socrates we have surely not only a dramatic and imaginative creation, but rather a marvellous reproduction (perhaps artistically enhanced) of the actual truth. To this Aristotle bears witness, in stating as a simple fact that ‘Irony often consists in disclaiming qualities that are held in esteem, and this sort of thing Socrates used to do’ (*Eth.* iv. vii. 14). The irony of Socrates, like any other living characteristic of a man, presents many aspects from which it may be viewed. It has (1) a relative significance, being used to encounter, and tacitly to rebuke, rash speaking, and every kind of presumption. It was thus relative to a Sophistical and Rhetorical period, but has also a universal adaptability under similar circumstances. (2) It indicates a certain moral attitude as being suitable to philosophy, showing that in weakness there is strength. (3) It is a part of good-breeding, which by deference holds its own. (4) It is a point of style, a means of avoiding dogmatism. (5) It is an artifice of controversy, inducing an adversary to expose his weakness, maintaining a negative and critical position. (6) It is full of humour; and this humour consists in an intellectual way of dealing

with things, in a contrast between the conscious strength of the wise man and the humility of his pretensions, in a teacher coming to be taught, and the learner *naïvely* undertaking to teach. Such are some of the most striking features in the mien and bearing of Socrates, not only one of the wisest, but also one of the strangest beings that the world has ever seen ; who moved about among men that knew him not. One man alone, Plato, knew him, and has handed down to us the idea of his life. When now we come to his doctrines, Plato, as is acknowledged, ceases to be a trustworthy guide. The sublime developments of philosophy made by the disciple are with a sort of pious reverence put into the mouth of the master. We are driven then to criticism, in order to assign to Socrates, as far as possible in their naked form, his own attainments.

The statements of Aristotle would seem to furnish a basis for an estimate of the Socratic doctrine ; but even these cannot be received without a scrutiny, for Aristotle was so imbued with the writings of Plato, that he seems at times to regard the conversations depicted in them as something that actually had taken place. He speaks of the Platonic Socrates as of an actual person. A remarkable instance of this occurs in his *Politics* (II. vi. 6), where, having criticised the *Republic* of Plato, he proceeds to criticise the *Laws* also, and says, ‘Now, all the discourses of Socrates exhibit genius, grace, originality, and depth of research ; but to be always right is, perhaps, more than can be expected.’<sup>55</sup> ‘The discourses of Socrates’ here stand for the dialogues of Plato, which is the more peculiar in the present case, since in the *Laws* of Plato, the dialogue under discussion, Socrates does not appear at all as an interlocutor. In other places, however, we may judge

<sup>55</sup> Τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες | καὶ τὸ καινοτόμον καὶ τὸ συγητικόν,  
οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι καὶ τὸ κομψὸν | καλῶς δὲ πάντα τοις χαλεπόν.

from Aristotle's manner of speaking that he refers to the real Socrates (see note on *Eth.* vi. xiii. 5), and not to the Socrates of literature. The most important passages of this kind are where he draws a distinction between Socrates and Plato, and states their relation to each other; cf. *Metaphys.* i. vi. 2, xii. iv. 3-5. The second of these passages contains a repetition and an expansion of the former; it may, therefore, be quoted alone. Aristotle is relating the history of the doctrine of Ideas. He tells us how it sprang from a belief in the Heraclitean principle of the flux of sensible things, and the necessity of some other and permanent existences, if thought and knowledge were to be considered possible. He proceeds, that Socrates now entered on the discussion of the ethical virtues, and was the first to attempt a universal definition of them—definition, except in the immature essays of Democritus and the Pythagoreans, having had no existence previously. ‘Socrates was quite right in seeking a definite, determinate conception of these virtues (*εὐλόγως ἔζητει τὸ τι ἔστι*), for his object was to obtain a demonstrative reasoning (*συλλογίζεσθαι*), and such reasonings must commence with a determinate conception. The force of dialectic did not yet exist, by means of which, even without a determinate conception (*χωρὶς τοῦ τι ἔστι*), it is possible to consider contraries, and to inquire whether or not there be the same science of things contrary to one another. There are two things that we may fairly attribute to Socrates, his inductive discourses (*τούς τ' ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους*) and his universal definitions. These universals, however, Socrates did not make transcendental and self-existent (*χωριστά*), no more did he his definitions. But the Platonists made them transcendental, and then called such existences Ideas.’

This interesting passage assigns to Socrates, first, his subjects of inquiry, namely, the ethical virtues; second, his

philosophical method, which was to fix a determinate conception or universal definition of these, by means of inductive discourses, by an appeal to experience and analogy. His definition was an immense advance on anything which had gone before, and yet it fell far short of the Platonic point of view. The reasoning of Socrates was demonstrative or syllogistic, and therefore one-sided. His conceptions were definitely fixed so as to exclude one another. He knew nothing of that higher dialectic, which, setting aside the first limited and fixed conception of a thing, from which the contrary of that thing is wholly excluded, asks, Is there not the same science of things contrary to each other? Is not a thing inseparable from, and in a way identical with, its contrary? Is not the one also many, and the many one? In another point also the conceptions formed by Socrates differed from the Ideas of Plato—that they had no absolute existence, they had no world of their own apart from the world of time and space. We see, then, the gulf which is set by this account of Aristotle's between the historic Socrates and the Socrates of Plato. The historic Socrates was quite excluded from that sphere of contemplation on which the Platonic philosopher enters (*Repub.* p. 510), where all hypotheses and all sensible objects are left out of sight, and the mind deals with pure Ideas alone. According to Aristotle, Socrates had not attained to the higher dialectic which Plato attributes to him. No doubt, however, Plato discerned in the method which Socrates employed in his conversations,—in his inquiring spirit, in his effort to connect a variety of phenomena with some general law, in his habit of testing this law by appeals to fresh experience and phenomena,—hints and indications of a philosophy which could rise above mere empirical generalisations. The method was not so much to be changed as carried further, it need only pass on in the same direction out of subordinate into higher genera.

Aristotle always says about Socrates that he confined himself to ethical inquiries.<sup>56</sup> This entirely coincides with the saying of Xenophon, that 'he never ceased discussing human affairs, asking, What is piety ? what is impiety ? what is the noble ? what the base ? what is the just ? what the unjust ? what is temperance ? what is madness ? what is a State ? what constitutes the character of a citizen ? what is rule over man ? what makes one able to rule ?' (*Memor.* i. i. 16.) In all this we see the foundation of moral philosophy as a science, and hence Socrates is always called the first moral philosopher. But we have already remarked (see above, pp. 143 and 150) that the way was prepared for Socrates by Archelaus, by the Sophists, and by the entire tendencies of the age. There is another saying about Socrates which is a still greater departure from the exact historical truth, namely, that he divided science into Ethics, Physics, and Logic. It is quite a chronological error to attribute to him this distinct view of the divisions of science. He never separated his method of reasoning from his matter, nor could he ever have made the method of reasoning into a separate science. In Plato even, Logic has no separate existence ; there is only a dialectic which is really metaphysics. And we may go further, and say that in Aristotle Logic has no one name, and does not form a division of philosophy. Again, Socrates probably never used the word Ethics to designate his favourite study. If he had used any distinctive term, he would have said Politics. With regard to Ethics also, we may affirm that in Plato they are not as yet a separate science, and in Aristotle only becoming so. As to Physics, Socrates appears rather to have denied their possibility, than to have established their

<sup>56</sup> Περὶ μὲν τὰ ἡθικὰ πραγματευομένου, περὶ δὲ τῆς δλητὸς φύσεως οὐδέν. *Met.* i. vi. 2.

existence as a branch of philosophy. The above-mentioned division is probably not older than the Stoics.

Pursuing our negative and eliminatory process with regard to the position of Socrates in the history of thought, we may next ask what was his hold upon that tenet which in Plato's Dialogues appears not only closely connected with his moral and philosophical views in general, but also is made to assume the most striking historical significance in connection with his submission to the sentence of death—his belief in the immortality of the soul. But on this point also we can only say that a different kind of impression is left on our minds by the records of the last conversations of Socrates, as severally furnished by Plato and by Xenophon. In Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and *Apologia Socratis*<sup>57</sup> Socrates is asked whether he has prepared his defence. He answers that 'His whole life has been a preparation, for he has never acted unjustly.' It is possible that this answer might have had a double meaning: on the one hand a literal meaning—that his conduct was the best answer to his accusers; on the other hand a religious meaning—that his life had been a *præparatio mortis*; but Xenophon, or his imitator, appears only to have understood the saying in the former and literal sense. When reminded that the judges have often condemned those that were really innocent, Socrates replies that he has twice been stopped by the supernatural sign when thinking of composing a defence—that God seems to intimate to him that it was best for him to die—that if he is condemned he will meet with an easy mode of death—at a time when his faculties are still entire—whereas, if he were to live longer, only old age and infirmities and loss of his powers would await him—that

<sup>57</sup> The genuineness of this work has been doubted, and Zeller pronounces it to be certainly spurious.

But it was at all events some ancient writer's view of Socrates. *Valent quantum.*

he knows good men and bad are differently estimated by posterity after their deaths—and that he leaves his own cause in the hands of posterity, being confident they will give a right verdict between him and his judges. The only sentence recorded by Xenophon (besides the one above mentioned) that admits the possibility of being referred to a future life, is where Socrates is mentioned to have said in reference to Anytus, ‘What a worthless fellow is this, who seems not to know that whichever of us has done best and most profitably for all time (*εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον*), he is the winner.’ In this saying, Plato might have discovered a reference to immortality,<sup>58</sup> but Xenophon takes it to mean merely ‘the long run,’ applying it to the bad way in which the son of Anytus afterwards turned out. If we separate from the speeches recorded by Xenophon the allusion which Socrates makes to his ‘supernatural sign,’ which shows a sort of belief in a religious sanction to the course he was taking;—the rest resolves itself into a very enlightened calculation and balance of gain against loss in submitting to die. The *Phædo* of Plato has elevated this feeling into something holy; it puts out of sight those parts of the calculation which consisted in a desire to escape from the pains of age by a painless death, and in a regard to the opinion of posterity; and it makes prominent and all-absorbing the desire for that

<sup>58</sup> Zeller points out that even in the *Apology* of Plato (which is probably the most historical of all Plato's delineations of Socrates), Socrates expresses himself with doubt and caution on the subject of the immortality of the soul (p. 40 C). At the same time Zeller calls attention to the discourse on immortality put into the mouth of the dying Cyrus in the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon, as probably representing the mind of Socrates,

‘so that we are fain to suppose that he considered the existence of the soul after death to be probable, although he did not pretend to any certain knowledge on the point.’ (See *Socrates and the Socratic Schools, translated from the German of Dr. E. Zeller* by O. J. Reichel, &c. London, 1868.) Zeller's account of Socrates is admirable and exhaustive. The above pages, written many years ago, only aim at giving a suggestive outline.

condition on which the soul is to enter after death. Were it not for Plato, we should have had an entirely different impression of the death of Socrates, an entirely different kind of sublimity would have been attached to it. Instead of the almost Christian enthusiasm and faith which we are accustomed to associate with it, we should only have known of a Stoical resignation and firmness—an act indeed which contains in itself historically the germ of Stoicism. The narrative of Xenophon no doubt misses something which Plato could appreciate, but it at all events enables us to understand how both the Cynic and Cyrenaic morality sprang from the teaching and life of Socrates.

One more point is worth notice in the Xenophontean *Apology* of Socrates. It is the way he answers the charge of corrupting youth. Having protested against the notion of his teaching vice to any, when Melētus further urges, ‘Why, I have known those whom you have persuaded not to obey their parents ;’ Socrates replies, ‘ Yes, about education, for this is a subject they know that I have studied. About health people obey the doctor and not their parents ; in State affairs and war you choose as your leaders those that are skilled in these matters ; is it not absurd, then, if there is free trade in other things, that in the most important interest of all, education, I should not be allowed to have the credit of being better skilled than other men ?’ The fallacy of this reasoning is obvious, for had Socrates claimed to be chosen ‘ Minister of Education ’ by the same persons who voted for the Archons and the Generals, or had he succeeded in persuading the fathers that he was the best possible teacher for their sons, nothing could have been said against it. But the complaint against him was that he constituted youths, who were unfit to judge, the judges of ‘their own education, and thus inverted all the natural ideas

of family life. One can well understand the invidiousness which would be encountered by one undertaking such a position and defending it in the words recorded. Viewing this attitude of Socrates merely from the outside, one can justify, in a manner, the caricature of it drawn by Aristophanes. We see from this point of view how Socrates was a Sophist, and must have exhibited a merely Sophistical appearance to many of his contemporaries. But from another point of view, looking at the internal character and motives of the man, his purity and nobility of mind, his love of truth, his enthusiasm (Schwärmerei, as the Germans would call it), his obedience to some mysterious and irresistible impulse, and his genius akin to madness,—we must call him the born antagonist and utter antipodes of all Sophistry. There is an opposition and a contradiction of terms in all great teachers. While they are the best men of their times, they seem to many wicked, and the corrupters of youth. The flexibility and ardour of youth make the young the most ready disciples of a new and elevated doctrine. But this goes against the principle that the children should honour the parents. Hence a great teacher sets the ‘children against the fathers;’ and the higher morality which he expounds, being freer and more independent of positive laws; being more based on what is right in itself, and on the individual consciousness and apprehension of that right—tends also in weaker natures to assume the form of licence. This is one application of the truth, that new wine cannot safely be put into old bottles.

The positive results that are known to us of the ethical philosophy of Socrates are of course but few. Aristotle's allusions restrict themselves virtually to one point—namely, the theory that ‘Virtue is a science.’ This doctrine is mentioned in its most general form, *Eth.* vi. xiii. 3. Its

application to courage is mentioned, *Eth.* III. viii. 6—that Socrates said courage was a science. And the corollary of the doctrine, that incontinence is impossible, for it is impossible to know what is best and not do it—is stated by the author of *Eth.* VII. ii. 1. These allusions agree equally with the representations of Plato and of Xenophon, we may therefore treat them as historical. It remains to ask what was the occasion, the meaning, and the importance of this saying that ‘Virtue is a science.’ The thought of Socrates was so far from being an abstract theory, it was so intimately connected with life and reality, that we are enabled to conceive how this proposition grew up in his mind, as a result of his age and circumstances. (1) It was connected with a sense of the importance of education. This feeling was no doubt caused in part by the procedure of the Sophists, which had turned the attention of all to general cultivation, and especially to ethical instruction. The question began now to be mooted, whether virtue—e.g. courage, could be taught? (cf. *Xen. Memor.* III. ix. 1.) Socrates appears on this question to have taken entirely the side of the advocates of education. The difficulties which are shown to attach to the subject in the *Meno* of Plato we may consider to be a later development of thought, subsequent even in the mind of Plato to *Protagoras*, *Laches*, &c. We may specify three different stages of opinion as to the question, Can virtue be taught? The Sophists said, ‘Yes,’ from an over-confidence of pretensions, and from not realising the question with sufficient depth. Socrates said ‘Yes,’ giving a new meaning to the assertion; wishing to make action into a kind of art, to make self-knowledge and wisdom predominate over every part of life. Plato said ‘No,’ from a feeling of the deep and spiritual character of the moral impulses. He said, ‘Virtue seems almost to be an inspiration

from heaven sent to those who are destined to receive it.'<sup>59</sup> Aristotle, taking again the human side, would say, ‘Yes,’ implying, however, that the formation of habits was an essential part of teaching, and allowing also for some differences in the natural disposition of men. (2) This doctrine was connected with the inductive and generalising spirit of Socrates, it was an attempt to bring the various virtues, which Gorgias used to enumerate separately (cf. Plato, *Meno*, p. 71, Aristot. *Politics*, I. xiii. 10), under one universal law. Thus the four cardinal virtues, justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom, he reduced all to wisdom. (3) The doctrine had two sides. It on the one hand contained implicitly the theory of ‘habits,’ but was at the same time a sort of empiricism. ‘Courage consists in being accustomed to danger.’ (This is the expression of the doctrine given, Xen. *Memorab.* III. ix. 2, and Aristot. *Eth.* III. viii. 6.) On the other hand, it implied rather self-knowledge, and a consciousness of a law; which is quite above all mere acquaintance with particulars. This is drawn out in the *Laches*, where courage is shown to consist in the knowledge of good and evil; and in the *Republic* it is described as that highest kind of presence of mind, which maintains a hold of right principles even amidst danger. (4) We have said that Socrates wished to make action into a kind of art. It seems to have been a favourite analogy with him to remark that the various craftsmen studied systematically their own crafts; but that *Politics* (which would include the direction of individual life) was not so learned. Out of this analogy, no doubt, sprang the further conclusion that human life must

<sup>59</sup> Θεῖς μοίρᾳ παραγίγγομένη ἀνευ τοῦ, οἷς ἐν παραγίγνηται. *Meno*, p. 99 E. Afterwards (*Repub.* 518. E) he said ‘All the cardinal virtues can be acquired, except Wisdom (*φρόνησις*), which is innate.’

have its own proper function (*ἴρων*, cf. *Repub.* p. 353). Virtue, then, according to the point of view of Socrates, became the science of living. So expressed, the doctrine easily takes a utilitarian and somewhat selfish turn ; as, indeed, it does in the *Protagorus*, where virtue is made the science of the good, but 'the good' is identified with pleasure. Under this aspect the doctrine presents an affinity to Benthamism, and also to the practical views of Goethe, and at the same time enables us to understand how it was possible for the Cyrenaic philosophy to spring out of the school of Socrates.

(5) It lays the foundation for conscious morality, by placing the grounds of right and wrong in the individual reason. It forms the contradiction to the Sophistical saying, 'justice is a convention' (*νόμῳ*), by asserting that 'justice is a science,' that is, something not depending on society and external authority, but existing in and for the mind of the individual. The Peripatetics improved upon this—pointing out that Socrates, instead of identifying virtue with the rational consciousness, should have said it must coincide with the rational consciousness ; in other words, that his formula ignored all distinction between the reason and the will.

This defect in the definition of Socrates exhibits one of the characteristics of early Ethics, namely, that they contain extremely little psychology. At first men are content with the rudest and most elementary mental distinctions ; afterwards greater refinements are introduced. Plato's threefold division of the mind into Desire, Anger, and Reason, was the first scientific attempt of the kind. But even in Plato, the distinction between the moral and the intellectual sides of our nature was hardly established. Partly we shall see that this was a merit, and consciously admitted in order to elevate action into philosophy ; partly, it was a defect proceeding from

the want of a more definite psychology. Socrates identified the Will with the Reason. We can understand this better, if we remember that the practical question of his day always was, not, What is Right? but, What is Good? Socrates argued that every one would act in accordance with his answer to this question; that no man could help doing what he conceived to be good. Hence incontinence was impossible. The argument, however, is a fallacy because it leaves out of sight the ambiguity of the word ‘good.’ Good is either means or end. All men wish for the good as an end; that is, good as a whole, as a universal. All wish for happiness and a good life. But good as a means does not always recommend itself. The necessary particular steps appear irksome or repulsive. Hence, as it is said, *Eth.* vii. iii. 5, a distinction must be drawn with regard to this phrase, ‘knowing the good.’ In one sense a man may know it, in another not. Undoubtedly, if a perfectly clear intellectual conviction of the goodness of the end, and of the necessity of the means, is present to a man, he cannot act otherwise than rightly.

There was another paradox connected with the primary doctrine of Socrates. It was that injustice, if voluntary, is better than if involuntary. This startling proposition appears to gainsay all the instincts of the understanding, and its contradictory is assumed in the *Ethics* (vi. v. 7). But it is stated by Socrates, and supported by arguments (*Xen. Memorab.* iv. ii. 20), and it is again maintained dialectically, though confessed to be a paradox, in Plato’s dialogue called *Hippias Minor*. The key to the paradox is to be found in this, that the proposition asserts, that if it were possible to act with injustice voluntarily, this would be better than if the same act were done involuntarily. But by hypothesis it is impossible for a man really to do wrong knowingly. It

would be a contradiction in terms, since wrong is nothing else than ignorance. Therefore the wise man can only do what is seemingly wrong. His acts are justified to himself and are really right. The effect of this proposition is to enforce the principle that wisdom and knowledge are the first things, and action the second. The same is expressed in the *Republic* of Plato (p. 382 B), where it is asserted that the purest and most unmixed lie is not where the mind knows what is true and the tongue says what is false, but where the mind thinks what is false. *Mutatis mutandis*, we might compare these tendencies in the Socratic teaching to the elevation of Faith over Works in theological controversy.

The dialectical difficulties of morality characteristic of the Sophistical era appear from Xenophon's account to have frequently occupied the attention of Socrates. Thus Aristippus is recorded to have assailed him with the question whether he knew anything good. Whatever he might specify, it would have been easy to show that this was, from some points of view, an evil. Socrates, being aware of the difficulty, evaded the question by declining to answer it directly. He said, 'Do you ask if I know anything good for a fever? or for the ophthalmia? or for hunger? For if you ask me if I know any good, that is good for nothing, I neither know it, nor wish to know it' (*Xen. Memorab.* III. viii. 3). This answer implies the relative character of the term good. The puzzle of Aristippus was meant to consist in playing off the relative against the absolute import of 'good.' Other subtleties Socrates is mentioned to have urged himself, as for instance in the conversation with Euthydemus (*Memorab.* IV. 2), whose intellectual pride he wished to humble, he shows that all the acts (such as deceiving, lying, &c.) which are first specified as acts of injustice, can in particular cases appear to be just. In fact, the unsatisfactoriness of the common conceptions of

justice is suggested here just as it is in the *Republic* of Plato. It is probable that the historic Socrates would really have advanced in the argument on justice as far as the conclusion of the first book of *Republic*. For the development of the later theory he perhaps furnished hints and indications which Plato understood and seized, and buried in his mind. Thence by degrees they grew up into something far different from what Socrates had consciously attained to. The dialectic of Socrates had an element in common with that of the Sophists, namely, it disturbed the popular conceptions on moral subjects. It had this different from them, and which constituted its claim to be not merely a destructive, but also a constructive method—it always implied (1) that there was a higher and truer conception to be discovered by thought and research; (2) it seized upon some permanent and universal ideas amidst the mass of what was fluctuating and relative; (3) it left the impression that the most really moral view must after all be the true one.

The many-sided life of Socrates gave an impulse, as is well known, to a variety of schools of philosophy. It is usual to divide these into the imperfect and the perfect Socratics; the Megarians, who represented only the dialectic element in Socrates, and the Cynics and Cyrenaics, who represented each a different phase of his ethical tradition, being considered as the imperfect Socratics; and Plato being esteemed the full representative and natural development of all sides of his master's thought. Plato is so near to Aristotle, and is such a world in himself, that we may well leave his ethical system in its relation to Aristotle for separate consideration. An account of the Megarian school belongs rather to the history of Metaphysics. The Cynics and Cyrenaics then alone remain to be treated of in the present part of our sketch of the pre-Aristotelian morals.

The Cynical and Cyrenaic philosophies were each, as has been remarked, rather a mode of life than an abstract theory or system. But as every system may be regarded as the development into actuality of some hitherto latent possibility of the intellect, so these modes of life may be regarded each as the natural development of a peculiar direction of the feelings. Nor do they fail to reproduce themselves. That attitude of mind which was exhibited first by Antisthenes and Diogenes has since been over and over again exhibited, with superficial differences, and in various modifications by different individuals. And many a man has essentially in the bias of his mind been a follower of Aristippus. Each of these schools was an exaggeration of a peculiar aspect of the life of Socrates. If we abstract all the Platonic picture of the urbanity, the happy humour, and at the same time the sublime thought of Socrates, and think only of the barefooted old man, indefatigably disputing in the open streets, and setting himself against society, we recognise in him the first of the Cynics. Again, if we think of him to whom all circumstances seemed indifferent, who spoke of virtue as the science of the conduct of life, and seemed at times to identify pleasure with the good, we can understand how Aristippus, the follower of Socrates, was also founder of the Cyrenaic sect. Several points these two opposite schools seem to have had in common. \*(1) They started from a common principle, namely, the assertion of the individual consciousness and will, as being above all outward convention and custom, free and self-responsible. (2) They agreed in disregarding all the sciences, which was a mistaken carrying out of the intentions of Socrates. (3) They stood equally aloof from society, front the cares and duties of a citizen. (4) They seemed both to have upheld the ideal of a wise man, as being the exponent of universal reason, and the only standard of right and wrong. This ideal was no doubt

a shadow of the personality of Socrates. We find a sort of adaptation of it by Aristotle in his *Ethics* (ii. vi. 15), where he makes the *φρόνιμος* to be the criterion of all virtue. The same conception was afterwards taken up and carried out to exaggeration by the Roman Stoicks.

Cynicism implies sneering and snarling at the ways and institutions of society ; it implies discerning the unreality of the shows of the world and angrily despising them ; it implies a sort of embittered wisdom, as if the follies of mankind were an insult to itself.

We may ask, How far did the procedure of the early Cynics justify this implication ? On the whole, very much. The anecdotes of Antisthenes and Diogenes generally describe them as being true ‘Cynics,’ in the modern sense of the word. Their whole life was a protest against society : they lived in the open air ; they slept in the porticos of temples ; they begged ; Diogenes was sold as a slave. They despised the feelings of patriotism : war and its glory they held in repugnance ; ‘Thus freed,’ says M. Renouvier, ‘from all the bonds of ancient society, isolated, and masters of themselves, they lived immovable, and almost divinised in their own pride.’ Their hard and ascetic life set them above all wants. ‘I would rather be mad,’ said Antisthenes, ‘than enjoy pleasure.’ They broke through the distinction of ranks by associating with slaves. And yet under this self-abasement was greater pride than that against which they protested. Socrates is reported to have said, ‘I see the pride of Antisthenes through the holes in his mantle.’ And when Diogenes exclaimed, while soiling with his feet the carpet of Plato, ‘Thus I tread on Plato’s pride,’ ‘Yes,’ said Plato, ‘with greater pride of your own.’ The Cynics aimed at a sort of impeccability ; they were equally to be above error and above the force of circumstances. To the infirmities of age, and even to death

itself, they thought themselves superior; over-doing the example of Socrates, they resorted to a voluntary death when they felt weakness coming on, and such an act they regarded as the last supreme effort of virtue. As their political theory, they appear to have maintained a doctrine of communism. This seems to have been extended even to a community of wives—a point of interest, as throwing light upon the origin of Plato's ideal *Republic*. Such notions may really have been to some extent entertained by Socrates himself. At all events we find them in one branch of his school. A life like that of the ancient Cynics presents to us a mournful picture, for we cannot but deplore the waste of so much force of will, and that individuals should be so self-tormenting. The Cynic lives by antagonism; unless seen and noticed to be eccentric, what he does has no meaning. He can never hope to found an extended school, though he may be joined in his protest by a few disappointed spirits. In the Cynical philosophy there was little that was positive, there was hardly any contribution to Ethical science. But the whole Cynical tone which proclaimed the value of action and the importance of the individual Will was an indication of the practical and moral direction which thought had now taken, and prepared the way for the partial discussion of the problems of the Will in Aristotle, and for their more full consideration among the Stoicks. Crates, the disciple of Diogenes, was the master of Zeno.

Personally, the Cyrenaics were not nearly so interesting as the Cynics. Their position was not to protest against the world, but rather to sit loose upon the world. Aristippus, who passed part of his time at the court of Dionysius, and who lived throughout a gay, serene, and refined life, avowed openly that he resided in a foreign land to avoid the irksome-

ness of mixing in the politics of his native city Cyrene. But the Cyrenaic philosophy was much more of a system than the Cynic. Like the *Ethics* of Aristotle, this system started with the question, What is happiness? only it gave a different answer. Aristotle probably alludes to the philosophy of Aristippus amongst others, saying (*Eth.* i. viii. 6), 'Some think happiness to consist in pleasure.' But it has been observed that he chooses not Aristippus, but Eudoxus, as the representative of the doctrine formally announced, that 'pleasure is the Chief Good' (*Eth.* i. xii. 5, x. ii. 1). This points to the fact that Aristippus did not himself entirely systematise his thoughts. He imparted them to his daughter Arete, by whom they were handed down to her son, the younger Aristippus (hence called *μητροδίδακτος*), and in his hands the doctrines appear first to have been reduced to scientific form. If then we briefly specify the leading characteristics of the Cyrenaic system, as it is recorded by Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, &c., it must be remembered that this is the after growth of the system. But though we cannot tell to what perfection Aristippus himself had brought his doctrines, there are many traces of their influence in the *Ethics* of Aristotle.

Cyrenaic morals began with the principle, taken from Socrates, that happiness must be man's aim. Next they start a question, which is never exactly started in Aristotle, and which remains an unexplained point in his system, namely, 'What is the relation of the parts to the whole, of each successive moment to our entire life?' The Cyrenaics answered decisively, 'We have only to do with the present. Pleasure is *μονόχρονος*,<sup>60</sup> *μερική*, an isolated moment, of this alone we

<sup>60</sup> Here we trace something similar to the doctrine of Aristotle, that 'Pleasure is like a monad, or a point, complete in itself, perfect without relation to time' (*Eth.* x. iv. 4).

have consciousness. Happiness is the sum of a number of these moments. We must exclude desire and hope and fear, which partake of the nature of pain, and confine ourselves to the pleasure of the present moment.'

In this theory it must be confessed that there is considerable affinity to Aristotle's doctrine of the *τέλος*; and some have thought that Aristotle alludes to Aristippus (*Eth.* x. vi. 3-8), where he argues that amusement cannot be considered a *τέλος* (cf. *Politics*, viii. v. 13). In short, the *τέλος* of Aristotle is only distinguished from the *μονόχρονος ἡδονὴ* of Aristippus by the moral earnestness which characterises it. The Cyrenaics further asking, What is Pleasure? answered by making three states of the soul possible; one, a violent motion, or tempest, which is pain; another, a dead calm, which is the painless, or unconscious state; the third, a gentle, equable motion, which is pleasure. Pleasure was no negative state, but a motion. This doctrine seems to be alluded to in the *Philebus* of Plato (p. 53 C),<sup>61</sup> where Socrates, in arguing against the claims of pleasure to be the chief good, returns thanks to a certain refined set of gentlemen for supplying him with an argument, namely, their own definition of pleasure, that it is not a permanent state (*οὐσία*), but a state of progress (*γένεσις*). It is generally thought that the Cyrenaic school are here meant. In the *Eudemian* book (*Eth.* vii. xii. 3), there appears to be another allusion to this same definition, in a way which, without some explanation, it is excessively hard to understand. Eudemus in discussing pleasure, says, 'Some argue that pleasure cannot be a good, because it is a state of becoming' (*γένεσις*). He afterwards denies that pleasure is a *γένεσις*, except in certain

<sup>61</sup> Άρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηδάμεν τινες αὖ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι ὃς δὲ γένεσις ἔστιν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι μηρύειν ἡμῖν, οἰς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν, τὸ παράκαν ἡδονῆς; κομψοὶ γάρ δή

cases. And then he proceeds to explain how it was that pleasure came to be called a *γένεσις*. He says<sup>62</sup> ‘it was from a confusion between the terms *γένεσις* and *ἐνέργεια*—it was thought to be a *γένεσις*, because essentially a good, to express which the term *ἐνέργεια* would have been appropriate.’ At first sight it appears a strange contradiction to say pleasure is thought not to be a good, because it is a *γένεσις*; it is thought to be a *γένεσις*, because it is good. The explanation is, that the two clauses do not refer to the same set of opinions. The former part refers to the Platonists, who argued, as in the *Philebus*, against pleasure, because it was not a permanent state; the latter part refers to the definition of the Cyrenaics, that pleasure is a state of motion, or, as it is here called, a *γένεσις*. It is obvious that the Cyrenaic definition of pleasure, as far as we are aware of it, will not bear a comparison, as a scientific account, with the theory of Aristotle. Aristippus appears to have made the senses the only criterion of pleasure, and pleasure, again, the measure of actions. All actions, in themselves indifferent, were good or bad according to their results, as tending or not tending to pleasure. The Cyrenaics, however, adapting themselves to circumstances, allowed that their wise man would always maintain an outward decorum in obedience to established law and custom.

The selfishness of this system at once condemns it in our eyes. For even acts of generosity and affection, according to such a system, though admitted by it to be excellent, are excellent only on this account, because, by a reflex power, they occasion pleasure to the doer. What

<sup>62</sup> *Eth.* vii. xii. 3. Δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσίς τις εἶναι, ὅτι κυρλας ἀγαθόν· τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἴονται εἶναι, οὐτὶ δὲ τέτερον.

in other systems is only concomitant to good acts is here made the primary motive, by which all morality is debased. The maintainers of such a philosophy are, perhaps, half-conscious to themselves that it never can be generally applicable, that they are maintaining a paradox. Looked into closely, this is seen to be a philosophy of despair. Those who cannot put themselves into harmony with the world, who cannot find a sphere for any noble efforts, nor peace in any round of duties, who have no ties and no objects, may easily, like Horace, ‘slip back into the doctrines of Aristippus.’ The profound joylessness which there is at the core of the Cyrenaic system showed itself openly in the doctrines of Hegesias, the principal successor of Aristippus. Hegesias, regarding happiness as impossible, reduced the highest good for man to a sort of apathy ; thus, at the extremest point, coinciding again with the Cynics. It is instructive to see the various points of view that it is possible to take with regard to life. In the Cyrenaic system we find a bold logical following out of a particular view. In this respect the system is remarkable, for it is the first of its kind. The Sophists had trifled with such views, and not followed them out. In the prominence given to the subject of pleasure, in the Ethical systems both of Plato and Aristotle, we may trace the effects of the Cyrenaic impulse.

## ESSAY III.

### *On the Relation of Aristotle's Ethics to Plato and the Platonists.*

WE have already traced in outline the characteristics of moral philosophy in Greece down to the death of Socrates, and have made brief mention of two of the schools of 'one-sided Socraticists,' as they have been called, the Cynics and Cyrenaics. It remains to resume the thread of the progress of ethical thought in Plato, compared with whom all previous philosophers sink into insignificance. In him all antecedent and contemporary Greek speculation is summed up and takes its start afresh. Especially in relation to any part of the system of Aristotle, a knowledge of Plato is of the greatest importance. To explain the relation of any one of Aristotle's treatises to Plato is almost a sufficient account of all that it contains. If one were asked what books will throw most light upon the *Ethics* of Aristotle, the answer must be undoubtedly, 'the Dialogues of Plato.'

These Dialogues represent the successive phases, during a long life, of a mind pre-eminently above all others rich in philosophic thought and suggestion. In many respects they are totally unlike the works of Aristotle. For, instead of being written all together as the mature result of inquiries long previously made and of conclusions gradually obtained and stored up, they were thrown out from time to time,

beginning with Plato's early youth, just as poems are thrown out to relieve the mind of the poet. And in another respect also they were like poems, for in them form was always considered of coequal importance with matter; not only in style were they consummate masterpieces of writing, but also they had this *note* of poetry—that each part of them was treated as an end in itself and yet was duly subordinated to the whole, and they were thus perfect works of art. Being written from time to time they reflected the gradual growth and alteration of Plato's own mind, as well as the different influences of philosophy to which he was successively subjected. The earlier dialogues, such as *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, &c., exhibit a simple Socratic dialectic, by which the ordinary views of moral subjects are shown to be insufficient, and more adequate definitions are sought for, but not enunciated. Afterwards, as in *Phædrus* and *Republic*, a Pythagorean influence manifests itself; a delight in the symbolism of numbers appears, and the doctrine of the transmigration of souls plays an important part. Then again, as in *Parmenides*, *Theætetus*, and *Sophistes*, a Megarian or Eleatic influence is perceptible, and the most abstract conceptions of Being are discussed. Thus the dialogues contain many varieties of the point of view, and even many inconsistencies. These incongruities, however, such as they were, were veiled and mitigated, *first* by the dramatic form into which everything was thrown, and by which only the views of the speakers for the time being seemed to be guaranteed, and *secondly* by the graceful absence of dogmatism in the Platonic Socrates, the chief personage in most of the dialogues. A common spirit, however, is plainly discernible through the whole; and, for the rest, the Dialogues of Plato show us the progress of a philosophic mind, of an inquiring spirit, of 'a great original genius struggling with unequal conditions of

knowledge.'<sup>1</sup> If we ask, At what point of his fifty years of authorship was Plato most himself? In which of the dialogues can we put our finger on the most essential features of his philosophy?—the answer must be, Nowhere and everywhere. Plato is to be regarded as a dynamical force, rather than as the setter forth of a system; and in modern times we may feel that to imbibe, if possible, his spirit, is of more value than to garner his conclusions. But the reason why we can now afford to be comparatively indifferent to the conclusions of Plato upon particular points,—is, that these conclusions have become incorporated, so far as they were valid, in the thought of Europe. And they became so incorporated through having been gathered up and stated afresh by Aristotle, who was Plato's lineal successor in the history of Philosophy, though not so in the leadership of the Academic School.<sup>2</sup> Plato's rich and manifold contributions

<sup>1</sup> *The Dialogues of Plato translated into English, with Analyses and Introductions*, by B. Jowett, M.A., Master of Balliol College, &c. (Oxford, 1871), Preface, p. ix. Prof. Jowett says of Plato (*ib.*) 'We are not concerned to determine what is the residuum of truth which remains for ourselves. His truth may not be our truth, and nevertheless may have an extraordinary value and interest for us.'

<sup>2</sup> Valentine Rose, *De Aristotelis Librorum Ordine et Auctoritate* (Berlin, 1854), p. 112, impugns as a fiction the statement of Apollodorus (*apud* Diog. Laert. see above, page 2) that Aristotle was the pupil of Plato for twenty years. The grounds of this scepticism are (1) that Aristotle would have been more thoroughly Platonised had the statement been true; (2) that the roundness of the number has a suspicious appearance.

Such reasons are quite insufficient. It is consistent with all known facts to believe that Aristotle was Plato's pupil, but that he gradually asserted the independence of his own mind, and declared a dissent from and a polemic against some of the metaphysical views entertained by Plato's school, and thus was passed over in the election of a Scholarch for the Academy, on Plato's death. This led to Aristotle's leaving Athens for a time, and afterwards setting up in the *περίπατοι*, or covered walks, of the Lyceum his own separate school, which hence got the name of Peripatetic. These details perhaps cannot be proved; but we know one thing for certain,—that almost every page of Aristotle's Logical, Rhetorical, Ethical, Political, and Metaphysical writings bears traces of a relation to some part or other of Plato's Dialogues.

to logic, psychology, metaphysics, ethics, politics, and natural religion (so many of which have become part of the furniture of our every-day thoughts), were too much scattered up and down in his works, too much overlaid by conversational prolixity, too much coloured by poetry or wit, sometimes too subtly or slightly indicated, to be readily available for the world in general, and they thus required a process of codification. Aristotle, with the greatest gifts for the analytic systematising of philosophy that have ever been seen, unconsciously applied himself to the required task. He treated the Platonic Dialogues as quarries out of which he got the materials wherewith to build up in consolidated form all the departments of thought and science so far as they could be conceived by an ancient Greek. He thus codified Plato, and translated him into the prose of dogmatic theory, at the same time that he carried further and completed many of his results and suggestions. It must be confessed that he did all this somewhat ungraciously, seeming to dwell by preference on the differences of view between Plato and himself; and he did it, as we have said, unconsciously—apparently not perceiving how much the substance of his own thought, in all his non-physical inquiries, was derived from Plato and only re-stated and carried out by himself. Aristotle, however, was the natural complement of Plato, as Plato was the complement of Socrates; and it is to a considerable extent through Aristotle that ‘the residuum of truth’ in Plato has already become part of the thought of the world. The attitude and aims of the two writers were, of course, different, for, while Plato was a Dialectician and a Poet, Aristotle aimed especially at being a man of Science,—at collecting all that could be known on each subject, and stating it in the most precise terminology. Each of the two had his own peculiar earnestness: Plato’s was a moral earnestness, he seems never

to have left out of sight the overwhelming importance of everything by which the human soul might be improved or deteriorated ; Aristotle's was a scientific earnestness, showing itself in a desire to sift and examine everything and to state the naked truth, as it appeared to him, regardless of consequences.<sup>3</sup>

Plato as the successor of Socrates appears to have carried forward all the many-sided tendencies of his master. By imagining Socrates still on earth, and in perpetual conversation on the highest subjects, Plato developed the different phases of his own idealistic philosophy. But at present we are only concerned with the ethical portion of this ; the question is, What contribution did Plato make to the growth of moral theory in Greece ? We must conceive him starting with the results at which Socrates had arrived : namely, that in the affairs of human life it is absolutely necessary to obtain universal conceptions ; that, to arrive at these a suitable dialectic, and the refutation of inadequate notions, are requisite ; and that it is the general outcome of all such inquiries to show that 'Virtue is a science.' Now, the course which Plato seems to have followed was, to take up these principles and see how they were to be reconciled with the current ideas of Greek morality. If there be four cardinal virtues, Wisdom, Temperance, Courage, and Justice, how do these stand related to the doctrine that ' Virtue is a science ' ? Is each of them a science, and how ? Or, if virtue is one, how are these sepa-

\* Plato's deep feeling of the importance of morality cannot be properly indicated by a few references, but see Prof. Jowett's Introductions to his Translations of the Dialogues, *passim*. Aristotle's keenness for the hard and precise truth may be illustrated by *Eth.* I. vi. 1, δόξεις δ' ἀν τοις βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς

ἀληθεῖας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν. *Eth.* x. i. 3, where he blames those who from moral good intentions have pronounced Pleasure to be evil. *Politics*, II. viii. 1, where he says of a particular question — οὐχιτινὰς ἀπορίας, τῷ δὲ περὶ ἔκαστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκεῖόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ παρορᾶν μηδέ τι καταλείπειν.

### ESSAY III.

rate names to be accounted for? Again, if Virtue is a science, can it be taught? Furthermore, if Virtue is a science, then does it not follow that Vice is ignorance? From which, as no one can be blamed for errors committed in ignorance, it would result that no man is willingly bad. These are the problems which, arising out of the Socratic principles, Plato had to encounter, and he discusses them directly in *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Meno*, and *Republic*; less directly and incidentally they are touched upon in many of the other dialogues. In order to find an answer to them Plato called in the aid of Psychology, and he was thus the first to propose for ethics a psychological foundation. In *Republic*, in answer to the question, 'What is Justice?' he sets himself to construct an elaborate system of individual ethics,<sup>4</sup> by means of an analogy drawn between the human soul and an ideal city. And the foundation of this analogy is made to consist in a division of the soul into Reason, Anger ( $\thetaυμός$ ), and Desire, answering to the three ranks of the rulers, the soldiers, and the working classes. This psychological division, rudimentary as it may now appear, was an important contribution towards the scientific theory of morals. One immediate result of the division was to lead Plato to distinguish Wisdom from the other cardinal virtues, and to put it into a class by itself. Wisdom, or Thought on moral subjects ( $\phiρόνησις$ ) evidently enters as a guiding principle into all the other virtues; none of them can exist without it. And, on the other hand, this quality, when looked at more closely, is found to be identical with one of the tripartite divisions of the soul; it is Reason itself, an intuitive faculty, not admitting of degrees, possessed by all men, but yet capable of misdirection, obscuration, and

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<sup>4</sup> See *Essays on the Platonic Ethics*, by Thomas Maguire, LL.D., &c. (Dublin, 1870), p. 36. Dr. Maguire in these Essays has well discussed the subject of the present pages.

## THE ETHICS OF PLATO.

eclipse. Hence comes one answer to the question, Is Virtue teachable? The Virtue of Wisdom, or Thought, is not ; the other Virtues are.<sup>5</sup> This conclusion is stated in *Republic* vii. p. 518 C—E, where *φρόνησις* is called ‘the eye of the soul,’ which only requires to be directed aright. ‘And hence,’ it is said,<sup>6</sup> ‘while the other qualities (i.e. Courage, Temperance, and Justice) seem to be akin to the body, being infused by habit and exercise and not originally innate, the virtue of wisdom is part of a divine essence, and has a power which is everlasting, and by this conversion is rendered useful and profitable, and is also capable of becoming hurtful and useless. Did you never observe the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue—how eager he is, how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end ; he is the reverse of blind, but his keen eyesight is taken into the service of evil, and he is dangerous in proportion to his intelligence ?—Very true he said.—But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth ; and they had been severed from the leaden weights, as I may call them, with which they are born into the world, which hang on to sensual pleasures, such as those of eating and drinking, and drag them down and turn the vision of their souls about the things that are below—if, I say, they had been released from them and turned round to the truth, the very same faculty in these very same persons would have seen the other as keenly as they now see that on which their eye is fixed.’ In this passage is also indicated the relation of at least one other of the cardinal virtues, namely Temperance, to the virtue of Wisdom or Thought. ‘Had sensual indulgence,’ says Plato, ‘been checked in many a man when he

<sup>5</sup> See Dr. Maguire’s *Essays*, p. 14.

<sup>6</sup> Prof. Jowett’s Translation, vol. ii. p. 352.

was young, his innate divine power of thought would have turned round to the idea of the Good, instead of fastening itself upon evil.' Thus Temperance conserves Wisdom, and is a necessary condition to it. But Courage, according to Plato, is steadiness not only in the face of danger, but also in the face of pleasure and temptation (*Laws*, p. 633, D, E), therefore this quality also must play a similar part with Temperance in preventing the disturbance and misdirection of Thought. But these qualities, however, while they are means and conditions to the proper functions of Thought, derive all their ethical value from Thought itself, and without it would be mere blind instincts towards the good, or would be the result of worldly and non-moral motives (*Phaedo*, p. 68, d). Thus the three cardinal virtues, Wisdom, Temperance, and Courage, instead of standing apart, as in the popular Greek notion of morality, are found mutually to imply one another, and to grow together into one whole. And this whole may be called Virtue, or, to use the language of Plato's *Republic*, it may be figured as Justice—that quality which in the individual soul is analogous to a perfectly wise 'division of labour' in a State—in other words supreme regularity, good order, and sanity, reigning over all the functions of the individual soul. Such, in the barest outline, was Plato's moral scheme, but, even as thus stated, we can see how much deeper it was than anything which had preceded it in Greece; how, following the Socratic direction, it discarded as inadequate such definitions of Justice as 'giving all men their due,' or of Courage as 'willingness to go forward in battle;' how it looked alone to the internal motive of each quality, and in so doing discovered its necessary relation to all the various parts of the soul, and thus expanded the conception of Virtue as a science into that of Virtue as a harmony of the appetitive and emotional im-

pulses under the direction of Reason or Thought, which they at once obeyed and supported.

But yet, according to Plato, Virtue is always coincident with Knowledge; it implies the choice of the higher pleasures and of that course to which the balance of advantages inclines. To act otherwise than in accordance with the balance of advantages, is to act as Ignorance would prompt. And no one, except in error and through Ignorance, chooses evil in place of good. ‘Ignorance,’ however, does not mean the mere negative absence of knowledge; it means, as explained by Plato in this context, rather something positive —‘the influence of any opinion or impression which is at variance with the ultimate reality’<sup>7</sup>—any disturbing influence which may tend to weaken the force of ulterior interests—‘all sentiments, passions, and emotions which lead us to put out of sight the consideration of our permanent interest.’ With this proviso it is maintained that no wrong action is done except through Ignorance; and, as it is emphatically stated in *Laws*, p. 860 C, ‘All bad men are always involuntarily bad.’ But this is no fatalistic view of life. Unjust men would not have been unjust, as we have already seen, if early good habits had given its proper scope to the innate vision of their souls. And in succeeding pages of *Laws* it is shown that Legal Punishments must take their course with such men, as a reformatory and curative process for themselves, and as a vindication of those whom they have injured. Plato’s theory of Punishment is essentially the corrective theory—that punishment is for the good of the person punished. But in his pictures<sup>8</sup> of the future life, drawn under Pythagorean influences and no doubt partly

<sup>7</sup> See Dr. Maguire’s *Essays*, p. 31, and *Protagoras*, p. 358 sq.

<sup>8</sup> See *Phædo*, pp. 113, 114, *Gorgias* 523–525, and *Republic*, 614–620.

derived from Pindar (see above, page 98), Plato indicates three possibilities for the individual soul—either eternal blessedness for those who have been purified by virtue and philosophy; or, a state of purgatory, to be followed by metempsychosis and a fresh probation on earth; or, for some, final condemnation without further hope of redemption. He conceives that the sentence of eternal punishment would be the fate of those great malefactors of mankind, such as the worst tyrants and other utterly lawless spirits, who should have rendered themselves incurable and incapable of improvement. This belief adds force to the consideration of the great importance of habits in the soul, for it supposes that the immortal soul by evil habits can become degraded past the possibility of improvement. It is then figured that eternal retributive punishment, as a warning to others, would become its lot. Though Plato does not make the details<sup>9</sup> of his Eschatology necessary matters of faith, and by no means wishes (like a modern divine) to order the whole of life in reference to them, yet still the belief in the immortality of the soul was deeply rooted in his mind, and was variously expressed in different parts of his writings. He connected it with the metaphysical priority of Reason to Matter, and also with the grave importance of Morals. He pictured the whole of life as an education, and sometimes spoke of education as a process only begun in this life and to be carried on in a subsequent state of existence (see *Republic*, p. 498 D, E). All this gave greatness and depth, and a human interest valid for all times, to the ethical scheme of Plato.

\* See *Phædo* (p. 114 E). ‘I do not mean to affirm that the description which I have given of the soul and her mansions is exactly true; a man of sense hardly ought to say that. But I do say that, inasmuch as the

soul is shown to be immortal, he may venture to think, not improperly or unworthily that something of the kind is true.’ Prof. Jowett’s Translation, vol. i. p. 465.

The works of Aristotle, that is to say those that we possess, were probably all composed between fourteen and twenty-seven years after the death of Plato. If Plato could have come to life again and seen these works, he would have found philosophy all mapped out and divided into separate branches, and great analytic clearness thus imparted to the whole ; he would have found a settled philosophical terminology employed throughout—in many cases words that he had himself been in the habit of using in an ordinary way, now restricted and limited in their connotation and made technical terms of logic or metaphysics<sup>10</sup>—in other cases new and somewhat uncouth terms that had been introduced by Aristotle ‘for the sake of precision ;’<sup>11</sup> and he would have found manifold suggestions of his own on all the different subjects of philosophy taken up and in many cases made more definite and carried out, so that a concentrated essence of many of his own thoughts, stated in widely different form from his own, would have been presented to his view. If we might go on indulging this fancy, it would be not unnatural to conceive that Plato, with his great candour and breadth of mind, would have acknowledged with admiration the additions to knowledge and thought which in many respects had been made by Aristotle, but that he also would have felt (even setting aside the somewhat captious antagonism to himself which occasionally appeared) that something had been lost, as well as gained, to Philosophy by the rigidly analytic method of his successor.

Taking now the unfinished (or mutilated) *Ethics* of Aristotle, with their Peripatetic complement, Books V., VI., and

<sup>10</sup> As for instance, *συλλογισμός*, which merely meant ‘computation’ with Plato ; *προτίχεια* = a ‘preference ;’ *δύναμις* = ‘power,’ &c.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *Eth.* II. vii. 11, πειρατέον ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνεῖς ἔνεκεν. The result was—terms like *ἐντελέχεια*, or forms like *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*.

VII., we shall find that they abundantly illustrate the conception just given of the relation of Aristotle's works in general to Plato. In order to see at a glance how much of the substance of this treatise is taken from, or suggested by, the Platonic Dialogues, let us synoptically enumerate, and then add a few remarks upon, the following heads: (1) The conception of moral science as a whole—that it is a sort of Politics which is the science of human happiness. (2) The conception of the practical Chief Good—that it is *τέλειον* and *αὐτάρκες* and incapable of improvement or addition. (3) The conception that man has an *ἔργον* or proper function, that man's *ἀρετὴ* perfects this, and that his well-being is inseparable from it. (4) The conception of Psychology as a basis for Morals. (5) The doctrine of *Μεσότης*, which is only a modification of the *Μετριότης* of Plato. (6) The doctrine of *Φρόνησις*, which is an adaptation, with alterations, of the Socratico-Platonic view. (7) The theory of Pleasure, its various kinds, and the transcendency of mental pleasures. (8) The theory of Friendship, which is suggested by questions started, but not answered, in the *Lysis* of Plato. (9) The Agnoiology, or theory of Ignorance, in Book VII.—to explain how men can act against what they know to be best—which appears to have been considerably suggested by Platonic discussions. (10) The practical conclusion of Ethics—that Philosophy is the highest good and the greatest happiness, being an approach to the nature of the Divine Being. On these separate heads we may remark:

(1) Not only is the general point of view—that the individual is inseparable from the State—taken from the *Republic* of Plato, but also the special description of Politics as the science of human happiness appears unmistakably borrowed from the *Euthydemus*. It is interesting to compare the conception of Politics, and its relation to the sciences, which

is expressed in *Eth.* i. ii. 5 6, with the following description (*Euthydem.* p. 291 B): ἐπὶ δὲ δὴ τὴν βασιλικὴν ἔλθόντες τέχνην καὶ διασκοπούμενοι αὐτήν, εἰ αὕτη εἴη ἡ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπεργαζομένη—ἔδοξε γάρ δὴ ήμῶν ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ βασιλικὴ τέχνη ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι—ταῦτη τῷ τέχνῃ ἡ τε στρατηγικὴ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι παραδιδόναι ἀρχειν τῶν ἔργων, ὡν αὐτὰν δημιουργοί εἰσιν, ὡς μόνη ἐπισταμένη χρῆσθαι. σαφῶς οὖν ἐδόκει ήμῶν αὕτη εἶναι, ἦν ἐξητοῦμεν, καὶ ἡ αἰτία τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὸ Αἰσχύλου ἴαμβεῖον μόνη ἐν τῇ πρύμνῃ καθῆσθαι τῆς πόλεως, πάντα κυβερνῶσα καὶ πάντων ἀρχουσα πάντα χρήσιμα ποιεῖν. While, however, accepting this conception of Politics, Aristotle does so in a wavering way—he says that his science will be ‘a sort of Politics’ (*πολιτικὴ τις, Eth.* i. ii. 9); as elsewhere he had spoken as if it were rather a stretch to call the science of moral subjects Politics.<sup>12</sup> He treats Ethics in such a way as virtually to separate them from Politics, a separation which was completed by the Peripatetic School and by the Stoics.

(2) In *Eth.* i. vii. 3–6, Aristotle, in laying down his own conception of the chief good, which is to be the *ἀρχὴ* for Ethics, says that it must be *τέλειον* and *αὐταρκεῖ*. These same qualities are attributed to the chief good in the *Philebus* (p. 20 C), a dialogue to which Aristotle seems often to refer, and from which the present doctrine is probably taken. The words are as follows: τὴν τάγαθοῦ μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλεον ἢ μὴ τέλεον εἶναι; Πάντων δή που τελεώτατον, ὡΣώκρατες. Τι δέ; ἵκανὸν τάγαθόν; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; κ.τ.λ. It is to be observed, however, that Aristotle analyses the term *τέλειον*, and gives it a more philosophical import than Plato had done. Plato probably meant nothing more than ‘the

<sup>12</sup> *Rhet.* i. ii. 7. Τῆς περὶ τὰ ήθη πραγματείας ἦν δίκαιον ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικήν.

perfect.' Aristotle analyses this into 'that which was never a means,' 'that which is in and for itself desirable.' He accepts also from the *Philebus* another doctrine, which is the corollary of the former, namely, that the chief good is incapable of addition. He directly refers to the *Philebus*, *Eth.* x. ii. 3, saying, 'Plato used just such an argument as this to prove that pleasure is not the chief good—for that pleasure, with thought added to it, is better than pleasure separately; whereas, if the compound of the two is better, pleasure cannot be the chief good; for that which is the absolute chief good cannot be made more desirable by any addition to it. And it is obvious that nothing else can be the chief good, which is made better by the addition of any other absolute good.' The reference is to *Philebus*, pp. 20-22. Aristotle implies the same thing, *Eth.* i. vii. 8, by saying that, 'When we call happiness the most desirable of all things, we can only do so on the proviso that we do not rank it with other goods, and place it in the same scale of comparison with them' ( $\mu\eta\ \sigmaυναριθμουμένην$ , see *infra*, note on this passage); 'else we should come to the absurdity of considering it capable of improvement by the addition of other goods to it, which, if we consider it as the ideal good for man, is impossible.'

(3) The whole argument by which, from the analogy of the different trades, of the different animals, and of the separate parts of the body, the existence of an  $\epsilon\rho\gammaον$  or proper function for man is proved (*Eth.* i. vii. 11) comes almost verbatim from the *Republic* (p. 352-3); as also does the account of the connection between the  $\alpha\rho\epsilonτή$  of anything with its proper function, which is given *Eth.* ii. vi. 2. The object selected as an illustration<sup>12</sup> is in each case the same—namely, the eye.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *Repub.* p. 353 B. 'Αρ'  $\delta\nu\ \piοτε\ \sigmaαντο\ \mu\eta\ \xi\chiοντα\ t\heta\ \alpha\beta\tauων\ o\i kελων$   $\xi\muματα\ \tau\delta\ \alpha\beta\tauων\ \xi\rgον\ καλώς\ \alpha\pi\epsilon\rg\alpha\cdot\ \alpha\pi\epsilon\th\eta\cdot\ \kappa.\tau.\lambda.$

(4) The psychology of Aristotle's *Ethics* is based on that of Plato, but it is also a development of it, and contains one essential difference, in the greater prominence, namely, that is given to the will. This, it is true, is virtual rather than expressed, but it lies at the root of the separation of 'practical virtues' from philosophy, and from 'excellences of the reason.' Plato divides the mind into the following elements: τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, τὸ θυμοειδές (*Repub.* p. 440). Aristotle gives a more physical account of the internal principle (see below, Essay V.), and divides the mind into that which possesses reason and that which partakes of reason.<sup>14</sup> This answers at first sight to the division of Plato, since the λόγου μετέχον includes both θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία. But Aristotle pushes the analysis farther, dividing the reason into practical and speculative (which is a great discrepancy from Plato), and not attributing the same separate and important character to θυμὸς as it has in the *Republic*, where it is made to stand for something like the instinct of honour, or the spirited and manly will, which, as Plato says, is generally on the side of the reason in any mental conflict. In Aristotle's discussions upon βούλησις, βούλευσις, &c., we see an attempt to found a psychology of the will, thus supplying what was a deficiency in Plato, but the theory does not appear to be by any means complete.

(5) The principle of Μεσότης, so prominent in Aristotle's theory of moral virtue, is a modification of Plato's principle of Μετριότης or Συμμετρία. As, however, the history of the doctrine of Μεσότης will form part of the subject of the following essay, no more need at present be said upon it.

(6) Aristotle's doctrine of φρόνησις, as far as we can understand it in the Eudemian exposition, which alone remains to

<sup>14</sup> Λόγου ἔχον and λόγου μετέχον. *Eth.* I. xiii.

us, seems to be partly an adoption and partly a correction of a Socratico-Platonic doctrine of similar import. This doctrine, beginning with the form that 'Virtue is Knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*), or 'Thought (*φρόνησις*)', and being afterwards developed by Plato into the form that 'Virtue is, or implies, Philosophy,' is accepted, with two corrections, by Aristotle. He denies the identification of 'Thought' with Virtue, saying instead—Virtue must 'be accompanied by' Thought ; and he distinguishes and divides Thought or Moral Wisdom (*φρόνησις*) from Philosophy (*σοφία*). The former of these corrections was directed more against Socrates than against Plato ; the latter, we shall see, is an important correction of the system of Plato, one that is connected with differences as to the whole view of Ethics. Plato speaks quite decisively of the necessity of *φρόνησις* to make moral action of any worth. In a celebrated passage of *Theaetetus* (p. 176 A), he says, 'We should strive to fly from the evil of the world ; the flight consists in as far as possible being made like to God ; and this "being made like" consists in becoming just and holy with thought accompanying' (*όμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιου καὶ ὅσιου μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι*). In *Phædo* (p. 69 B), he descants upon the worthlessness of moral acts if performed without *φρόνησις*: he says, 'Such virtue is a mere shadow and in reality a slavish quality, with nothing sound or true about it.'<sup>15</sup> But a little further on (p. 79 D) he defines *φρόνησις* to be the contemplation of the absolute.<sup>16</sup> We see then that Plato requires that every act should be accompanied

<sup>15</sup> Χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ διλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων, μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαῦτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ἔντι ἀνδραποδώδῃς τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγίες οὐδὲ ἀληθὲς ἔχουσα.

<sup>16</sup> "Οταν δέ γε αὐτὴ (ἢ ψυχὴ) καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκεῖσε οἶχεται εἰς τὸ

καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὄν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὕσταύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενῆς οὖσα αὐτῷ ἀεὶ μετ' ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, διαταπερ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γένηται καὶ ἐξῆ ἀυτῆ—καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται.

by an absolute consciousness—and this absolute consciousness he does not separate from that which takes place in speculation and philosophy. The Peripatetic account is that a moral consciousness must accompany every act, a sort of wisdom which is the centre to all the moral virtues (*Eth.* vi. xiii. 6), but this kind of consciousness is quite distinct from the philosophic reason, it deals with the contingent and not with the absolute. The doctrine that Temperance preserves Thought (*σώζει τὴν φρόνησιν*, *Eth.* vi. v. 5) and that Thought without Virtuous habits may degenerate into cunning, is taken from *Republic*, p. 518 D, E (quoted above, p. 185).

(7) Of the two treatises on Pleasure contained in the *Ethics* of Aristotle, we may assume (see above, p. 65), that the one which appears in Book VII. is the work of Eudemus. It has then a totally different kind of interest from that in Book X. It illustrates, not so much Aristotle's relation to Plato, as rather the growth of the Peripatetic school. It is in its main outline borrowed from the treatise in Book X., but it also contains some peculiarities belonging to the views of Eudemus, of which the chief are a practical, and at the same time a materialistic tendency. It is antagonistic to the views of 'some' who argued that no pleasure could be a good, because it is a state of becoming (*γένεσις*). This argument is refuted by Aristotle himself in Book X. Eudemus criticises and overthrows other arguments for the same position, not mentioned in Book X. None of these, however, are to be found in *Philebus*, or in any dialogue of Plato. They are, in all probability, to be attributed to the Platonic school. There is a direct mention, in connection with one of the arguments, of the name of Speusippus (*Eth.* vii. xiii. 1). Turning now to Book X., we find the question as to the nature of pleasure opened by the statement of two extreme views on the subject; one, that of the Cynics—that pleasure

was ‘entirely evil’ (*κομιδὴ φαῦλον*)—the other, that of Eudoxus, that pleasure was the chief good. The first view Aristotle sets aside as having rather a moral and practical than a speculative character; and as being, though well-intentioned, at all events an over-statement of the truth. He specifies four arguments of Eudoxus to prove that pleasure is the chief good. (a) All creatures seek it. (b) It is contrary to pain. (c) It is sought for its own sake. (d) Added to any good, it makes that good better. He then mentions the objections (*ἐνστάσεις*) made to each of these four, and shows that none of the objections is valid, except that brought against the last of the arguments. He shows from Plato (see above, p. 192), that the fact that pleasure can be added to other goods *disproves*, instead of proving, its claim to be considered the chief good. Aristotle now mentions other general arguments that have been brought against pleasure—namely, that it is not a quality; that it is indefinite (*ἀόριστον*); that it is a motion, a becoming, or a replenishment (*κίνησις, γένεσις, ἀναπλήρωσις*); again, that there are many disgraceful pleasures. He answers all these objections, and having accepted the Platonic position that pleasure is, at all events, not the chief good, he proceeds to give his own theory of its nature, considering it to be, except in certain cases, a good, and analysing its character more accurately than had hitherto been done. In all this we cannot trace anything like a direct antagonism to the *Philebus* or to any other part of Plato’s works. Far rather, as we shall have an opportunity of seeing more distinctly in the next Essay, Aristotle, while perfectly coinciding with and accepting Plato’s general theory of pleasure, the division of its different kinds, the distinction between bodily pleasures which are preceded by desire and a sense of pain, and the mental pleasures which are free from this; while accepting, that is,

the whole theory in its moral and practical bearing, refines and improves upon it as a speculative question, substituting a more accurate and appropriate definition of pleasure than is to be found in Plato.

(8) We cannot doubt that Aristotle's attention was turned to the consideration of the subject of friendship by the importance that Plato attributed to it, and the interesting part which he makes it play in his system. Both *Lysis* and *Phaedrus* are devoted to the discussion of friendship. In the former dialogue little more is done than starting the difficulties, some of which are taken up and restated in the beginning of Aristotle's treatise (*Eth.* viii. i. 6); 'Whether does friendship arise from similarity, or from dissimilarity? Does it consist in sympathy, or in the harmony of opposites?' In *Phaedrus* a passionate and enthusiastic picture of friendship is given, which renders it not distinguishable from love; its connection with the highest kind of imagination, and with the philosophic spirit, is dwelt upon at length. In Aristotle nothing of this kind is to be discovered. The picture is colder, but at the same time more natural and human. In the ninth chapter of Book IX. a fine philosophic account of the true value of friendship is to be found, on which more will be said in the succeeding Essay. The whole of this subject is treated with depth and also with moral earnestness, which renders it one of the most attractive parts of Aristotle's *Ethics*. We see throughout that on every point of the question the analysis has been pushed farther than Plato carried it.

(9) The position that 'Virtue is a science' and that it is only through ignorance that a man could choose other than the Good, naturally gave importance to the question as to the nature of Ignorance itself, and the problem, How does it happen that knowledge of the Good is sometimes in abey-

ance? These questions which were suggested in *Protagoras* (pp. 358 sqq.) appear to have been worked at in the Peripatetic school, and, with the help of the Practical Syllogism (see Essay IV.), an answer was given to them in the *Eudemian* Book VII. A cognate discussion, far less mature in character, on the voluntariness or involuntariness of Vice, entirely suggested by Plato, appears in Book III. of Aristotle's *Ethics*.

(10) The burden of all the Platonic Dialogues is the same, the excellence of philosophy, and its extreme felicity. Most completely does Aristotle reproduce this feeling when (*Eth.* x. vii.) having, as it were, satisfied the claims of common life by his analysis of the 'practical virtues,' he indulges in his own description of that which is the highest happiness—when he says, 'Philosophy seems to afford wonderful pleasures both in purity and duration' (*Eth.* x. vii. 3), and 'We need not listen to the saying, "Men should think humanly," rather as far as possible one should aspire after what is immortal, and do all things so as to live according to what is highest in oneself' (*Eth.* x. vii. 8). We are reminded generally of the enthusiastic descriptions of philosophy in the *Republic*, the *Phædo*, and the *Symposium* of Plato. One particular passage of the last-named dialogue seems probably to have suggested to Aristotle the saying (*Eth.* x. viii. 13), that 'The philosopher will surely be most under the protection of heaven (*θεοφιλέστατος*), because honouring and cherishing that which is highest and most akin to God—namely, the reason.'

Such are the leading ethical conceptions and topics for which Aristotle's treatise is manifestly indebted to the Dialogues of Plato, and they go far towards furnishing its entire skeleton. But besides these there was many a minor suggestion of Plato's, which has been taken up into this work, as

the notes in subsequent pages will testify. The very metaphors used by Aristotle seem often to have been inherited. That of the 'bowmen' (*Eth.* i. ii. 2) occurs in *Republic*, p. 519 C. That of the 'Aristeia for pleasure' (*Eth.* i. xii. 5) comes from *Philebus*, p. 22 E. The analogy between the political philosopher and an oculist (*Eth.* i. xiii. 7) is from *Charmides*, p. 155 B. The comparison of mental extremes to excesses in gymnastic training (*Eth.* ii. ii. 6) occurs in *Erastae*, p. 134. The metaphor of 'straightening bent wood' (*Eth.* ii. ix. 5) is from *Protagoras*, p. 325 D. The comparison of those who have made their own fortune to poets and mothers, who love their offspring (*Eth.* iv. i. 20, ix. vii. 7), is from *Republic*, p. 330 C. This list of examples might doubtless be increased.

We have now seen the close connection of succession, inheritance, and development between the *Ethics* of Aristotle and the writings of Plato. It remains to point out the diversities of doctrine, as well as of tone and manner, which are also manifest between the moral systems of the two philosophers. At the very outset of his treatise, having started the question, What is the Good for man? Aristotle stops himself with the logical consideration that it will be necessary to inquire first the nature of this universal term—Good—and to state in what sense it is predicated, and what is its relation to the particulars which fall under it,<sup>17</sup> 'although,' as he adds, 'an inquiry of this kind is rendered disagreeable owing to those who are our friends having introduced their doctrine of Ideas.' Adopting, however, a saying which Plato had himself employed in reference to judging of Homer,<sup>18</sup> he

<sup>17</sup> *Eth.* i. vi. 1. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ίσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάνυπτος τῆς τοιαύτης

ζητήσεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἰδη.

<sup>18</sup> *Repub.* x. p. 595 c. ἀλλ' οὐ πρόγε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνήρ.

decides that ‘personal considerations must be sacrificed to the interests of truth ;’ and accordingly he proceeds to detail a set of arguments against the logical or metaphysical validity of the Platonic ‘ Idea of Good.’ We may admit the general necessity for the logic of ethics of this discussion as to the realistic or nominalistic import to be attributed to the term —Good, and we may admit also the courteous terms in which it is introduced. But yet we shall find something unsatisfactory, and requiring explanation, in the arguments themselves which Aristotle proceeds to adduce. In form the controversy appears rather to be with the Platonists, with the rival school in the Academia, than with Plato himself ; but yet so much prominence is given to the ‘ Idea of Good ’ in Plato’s *Republic*, a work which was, beyond doubt, constantly present to the mind of Aristotle when he was writing his *Ethics*, that we cannot but think that the present passage has reference not only to the logic of the Academy generally, but also to the ethical applications of the ‘ Idea of Good ’ made by Plato himself.

The doctrine of ‘ Ideas ’ is much less settled and constant in Plato’s writings than may be ordinarily supposed. In regard to this, as to many other questions, Plato may be said to have had no system, but to have been constantly inquiring. We find that the transcendental existence of the ‘ Ideas,’ that is, their existence apart from the human mind, is only asserted, together with the doctrine of our ‘ recollecting ’ them (*ἀνάμνησις*), in mythical and imaginative passages of *Meno*, *Phædrus*, and *Phædo*; that in later dialogues, as *Republic*, and *Philebus*, they are treated in a more sober spirit; that in *Theætetus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Laws*, the ‘ Ideas ’ are mentioned much as Universals would be spoken of in modern books; lastly, what is most remarkable of all, we find in *Parmenides* a criticism on the doctrine of Ideas,

in which the weak points of the doctrine and the difficulties attendant on it are pointed out. Socrates, who is represented in the dialogue as a promising young man, defends the supposed orthodox view of the Ideas, but he is refuted by the venerable Parmenides, who lectures him on his want of practice in dialectic. And it is a curious fact that the arguments here put by Plato into the mouth of Parmenides are 'nearly if not quite'<sup>19</sup> those used by Aristotle in attacking Plato, or at all events that which he enunciates as the Platonic system. It appears then that Plato, at one period of his life, when deeply plunged in the study of Eleatic philosophy, saw that his own doctrine of Ideas required revision, and in the dialogue of *Parmenides* he at once put out what he had arrived at. These considerations open to us a different view of Plato's relation to the doctrine of Ideas from what we should have gathered from Aristotle in the not unfrequent places<sup>20</sup> in which he criticises this doctrine. Yet, since Plato did at all events sometimes put forward the doctrine in strong and enthusiastic terms, it may be as well to endeavour to trace its general meaning, even if in so doing we incur the same charge that Aristotle has incurred—of turning poetry into prose and making dogmatic that which was never meant to be such.

Aristotle tells us<sup>21</sup> that Plato's doctrine of Ideas rose from a union between the universal definitions of Socrates and the Heraclitean doctrine of the fleeting character of all objects of sense. To put this a little more clearly, the position is as follows: we desire some permanent and certain knowledge. Let us take some object and try to know it, e.g. 'this man.'

<sup>19</sup> See Prof. Jowett's Introduction to *Parmenides* (vol. iii. pp. 227 sqq.), where the arguments are analysed.

iv.—v. *Post Analyt.* i. xi. &c.

<sup>20</sup> *Metaphys.* i. vi. 2, xii. iv. 2, 3, and see above, page 159.

<sup>21</sup> *Metaphys.* i. vi., vi. xiii., xii.

Looking closely into it we find at once that, in ‘this man,’ we are in possession of a conception made up of two elements, a universal and a particular. ‘Man’ is universal, ‘this’ is particular. Now ‘this’ may be infinitely various. It is purely relative, entirely changeable. It baffles all attempts at knowledge. The more we analyse ‘this,’ the more it escapes us, and comes to actually nothing. What constitutes ‘this’ man? Particular time and place, particular qualities, such as form, colour, size, and the like. But time and place, form, colour, and size are all in themselves universals. ‘This’ man is determined by ‘this’ time, place, form, &c. But, again, what is ‘this time’? The particular element in ‘this time’ is equally unknowable and unexpressible with the particular element in ‘this man.’ Hence Heraclitus said, *οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τῶν αἰσθητῶν*. Let us now take the other side, and look at the universal element, ‘man.’ This is something permanent and stable; this constitutes a unity in the midst of plurality; this the mind can rest in contemplating. We give to this universal element the name of form or idea (*εἶδος*, *ἰδέα*), a name borrowed probably from Democritus, who spoke of the ‘forms’ of things being emanations from things themselves, and constituting our knowledge of the things. And now another step has to be taken; we must throw out all distinction between knowledge and existence. Since things exist for us solely through our knowledge of them, and we cannot conceive them existing at all, except as either for our minds or for some other minds, we must give up entirely that dualism which would suppose two terms standing opposite each other, namely, the object and the mind, and we must speak now of one term alone. ‘Nothing exists except what we know. Knowledge and existence are identical, since, as Protagoras said (only in an altered sense), the mind is ‘the measure of

all things ; of existing things that they exist, of non-existent things that they do not exist.' Taking as established the identity of knowledge and existence, we may use one term to express this identity, namely, ' truth' (*ἀληθεία*), which equally implies reality of existence in things, and the right apprehension of them in the mind.

What is it that possesses truth, or reality ? Not particulars, which, as we saw before, are (in so far as they are particulars) unknowable, but the universal, the idea. The universal element, or idea, may hence be said to be the only real existence, while the particulars have only a sort of illusory, or mock existence ; when we look closely into them we find they are mere shadows of reality. Hence Plato, following out this train of thought, said, by a forcible metaphor, that common persons who fancy the particulars to be real existences are like men in a dimly lighted cave, taking the shadows on the wall to be realities. By an equally strong metaphor, which Aristotle speaks of as mere poetry (*Metaphys.* i. ix. 12), Plato called the Ideas archetypes (*παραδείγματα*) of sensible things. In this metaphor several points are expressed. (1) That knowledge is rather prior to experience than derived from it. Experience is the occasion, and not the cause of knowledge. This Plato expressed by saying that all our knowledge is ' reminiscence.' Things in the world are constantly reminding us of, and calling up, the reminiscence of the Ideas which we saw in their pure state, before we were born. (2) That the forms of the mind are permanent, while the material world is fleeting. The mind is always prior to, and greater than, the world. This points, as Plato argued in *Phedo*, to the immortality of the soul. (3) The Eleatics had denied the existence of motion, plurality, change ; in short, the whole sensible creation. Plato does not go so far as this ; though infinitely less real

than the Ideas, he allows that the external world has some share of reality. Metaphorically he says, 'it partakes of the Ideas.' The Ideas are archetypes of things; in other words, in the midst of the unknowable, the fleeting, the chaotic, the movable—there is law, unity, form, order, symmetry, the permanent, and the absolute, existing not materially, but as ideas, dimly seen by the mind, because it is not pure enough; seen more distinctly, according to the purity and elevation of the mind, and always more or less suggested.

We are now brought to that part of Plato's doctrine where he spoke of the 'Idea of good.' Of this he says (*Repub.* p. 509 B), that 'As the sun affords to all visible objects not only the power of being seen, but also growth, increase, and nourishment; so is there afforded to all objects of knowledge by the good not only the being known, but also their very being and existence. The good is not existence, but is above and beyond existence ( $\ddot{\epsilon}\tau\iota \dot{\epsilon}\pi\acute{e}kewa \tau\dot{\eta}s o\acute{u}st\dot{\alpha}s$ ) in dignity and power.' In *Philebus* (p. 65 A), it is said that 'the good cannot be comprehended in one idea alone, but it may be taken in three manifestations; beauty, symmetry, and truth.' We see what a metaphysical world we have now to deal with. It is not the material world immediately, but the world of pure cognitions ( $\tau\dot{\alpha} \gamma\iota\omega\sigma\kappa\acute{o}m\dot{\epsilon}va$ ), that depend on the Good for their existence. Every cognition must have the Idea of good present in it. We cannot conceive anything existing except as being good. Evil, in the shape of disease, crime, pain, &c., Plato, from this point of view, would call the non-existent; it is the negation of existence, the want of existence in some way or other; it is the chaotic, the formless, that which has no universality or absoluteness, that which the mind cannot deal with. The Idea of good in the world of thought Plato compared to the sun in the material world; following out this metaphor, evil would be as the

shadows which are the mere negation of light, and yet they are necessary to relieve the light, for were all light, nothing would be visible ; and so too evil, as the negation of good, may be said to be necessary to its existence. ‘ Good,’ says Plato, ‘ is the cause of existence and knowledge.’ This opens a sublime conception, on the one hand, of a world in which all things are very good ; on the other hand, of a philosophy whose method of the deepest knowledge consists in no mere abstract investigations, nor any mere accumulation of experience, but in apprehending with enthusiasm and joy the all-pervading idea of Good, as it manifests itself under the three forms of beauty, symmetry, and truth. The Idea of Good, Plato would by no means confine to metaphysics, as if it had no application to the other sciences. On the contrary, his great object was to raise Morals and Politics above all mere empiricism into Philosophy properly so called. Hence he says that ‘ States will never prosper till philosophers are kings ;’ again, he says, ‘ The guardian of the State must know with certainty that which all vaguely seek and aspire after —namely, what is the Good ’ (*Repub.* p. 505–6). The Idea of Good, then, according to Plato, is to be a principle influencing human action, and necessarily forming a part of any system of Politics or Morals worthy of being called so.

With this position Aristotle joins issue. After stating the theory in the following words (*Eth.* i. iv. 3), ‘ Some have thought that besides all these manifold goods upon earth, there is some other absolute good, which is the cause to all these of their being good ;’ he proceeds to criticise the tenability of such a conception, and concludes his argument by saying, ‘ But we may dismiss the Idea at present, for if there is any one good, universal and generic, or transcendental (*χωριστόν*) and absolute, it obviously can neither be realised nor possessed by man, whereas something of this latter kind

is what we are inquiring after' (*Eth.* i. vi. 13). He follows up those remarks by saying that 'Perhaps some may think the knowledge of the idea may be useful as a pattern (*παράδειγμα*) by which to judge of relative good.' Against this he argues that 'There is no trace of the arts making any use of such a conception ; the cobbler, the carpenter, the physician, and the general, all pursue their vocations without respect to the Absolute Good, nor is it easy to see how they could be advantaged by apprehending it.'

This criticism is a direct denial of Plato's point of view. Plato, who had expressed himself utterly dissatisfied with the empirical and prudential morality of his countrymen, and who wished to raise morality and Politics (which with him was but morality on an extended scale) into something wise, philosophical, and absolute—made certain requisitions for this. He demanded that a full philosophic consciousness should govern everything. He required that a knowledge of the good-in-itself should be present to the mind. He acknowledges, it is true, that the philosopher, after dealing with sublime speculations, may seem dazzled and confused when he is suddenly confronted with the petty details of life, the quibbles of law courts, &c. But on the other hand he seems to have considered, not only that philosophy was indispensable to morality, but also that the mind, by contemplating the Idea of good, would be conformed to it. This Idea, then, was not merely an object for the abstract reason ; it was an object for the imagination also, and an attraction for the highest kind of desires. It was not only an idea, but also an ideal. Aristotle, in a clearer and more analytic way, regards the Idea as something out of all relation to action (*οὐ πρακτόν*), as a metaphysical conception simply, if, indeed, it could be entertained at all. He then entirely separates it from Ethics. He considers that the guiding principle (*ἀρχή*)

for Ethics must be not this absolute transcendental good, but a practical good, which he envisaged as Happiness, or the end for man. These two views must stand for ever apart, and on each side there seems to be some degree of merit, and some degree of fault. Fine as is Plato's conception of science, it must be confessed that there is some degree of vagueness about it. We need not put ourselves in the position of Plato's contemporaries, those of whom the story is related that 'They went to him expecting to hear about the chief good for man, but they were disappointed, for he put them off with a quantity of remarks about numbers and things they could not understand.' But even taking Plato as 'a philosopher for philosophers,' there seems to be something not quite explained in his system. Infinitely rich as he was in invention and suggestion, we might almost say that he required an Aristotle as his successor to give definiteness to his conceptions. When then we turn to Aristotle, we find the power that is gained by a division of the sciences. We find no longer an effort to attain to that highest point of union for all knowledge and all existence, which is far above the ordinary ken, and which can hardly be viewed otherwise than by occasional glimpses—but rather an effort after clearness and completeness, after the arrangement of all experience under appropriate and separate leading conceptions. It is easy to see what an immense field is at once laid open. Rapid indeed and wonderful were the achievements of a mind like that of Aristotle. But when all is done, one feels also that something has also been lost by this separate treatment of different subjects. One desires again to see Ethics not dissevered from Theology and Metaphysics.

Had Aristotle in the present case contented himself with denying the appropriateness of the 'Idea of Good,' or, in other words, of the *νοητὸν ἀγαθόν*, as an *ἀρχὴ* for moral

and Political science, the reasonableness of such a view must have been admitted. But he goes farther, and undertakes to disprove offhand the tenability, even as part of a metaphysical system, of the ‘ Idea of Good,’ in the sense in which it was held by Plato or by the Platonists. And for this purpose he states his arguments, which are briefly as follows : (1) The Platonists themselves allow that where there is an essential succession ( $\tauὸ\ πρότερον\ καὶ\ τὸ\ ὕστερον$ ) between any two conceptions, these could not be brought under a common Idea. But this succession occurs in different kinds of good. Good in relation, e.g. the useful, is essentially later than good in substance, and therefore cannot fall under the same Idea. (2) If all good were one, it ought to be predicated under only one category, whereas it can be predicated under all. (3) If it were one, it would be treated of by only one science. (4) The Idea is only a repetition of phenomena, for with these it is really identical. (5) Even the most essential and undoubted goods seem incapable of being reduced to one Idea.—Everyone has felt the unsatisfactoriness of these arguments ; they seem captious, verbal, unreal, and not to touch the point at issue. Let us examine them separately. Argument (1) seems to beg the question. It refers to the Platonic doctrine of the ideal numbers (referred to *Metaphys.* XII. vi. 7), which they held to stand in absolute and immutable succession to each other, and to be incapable of being brought themselves under one common Idea. To this Aristotle compares the relation between relative and absolute goods ; he says the one stands in immutable succession to the other, therefore there can be no common idea of them. A Platonist might reply, that this is a mere assumption ; that in the case of the ideal numbers, Unity and Duality, for instance, stand in such essential contradistinction to each other, that they are Ideas themselves, and therefore

there cannot be Ideas of them. But with regard to the goods, all that is relative in them is merely the particular, the non-existent, which the philosophical reason cannot deal with. It is absurd to make the relativity of the relative good an immutable and permanent quality, which is for ever to distinguish it from the good in itself. (2) The second argument is a mere repetition of the first. Aristotle takes certain categories, namely, substance, quality, quantity, relation, time and place, &c. (*καὶ ἔτερα τοιαῦτα*), and shows that there are different modes of the good under these different categories. Now these categories might all be reduced to substance and relation, and then the argument is, ' You have good in substance, and good in different relations : can these be considered the same ? ' (3) The argument of the sciences is a carrying out of the same objection. Aristotle argues that the sciences point to a still greater subdivision of good. For good, in relation to time, for instance—that is, opportunity, may be treated of by strategics, or by medicine ; and so on with good under the other categories ; the sciences still more minutely subdivide it.

Plato might well complain of this subdivision of the sciences being brought as an argument against him, when he had so anxiously urged (*Repub.* p. 534 E) that in dialectic all sciences united, and dialectic was the science of the Idea of Good.

The fourth argument, which appears also in the *Parmenides* of Plato, is one of which Aristotle seems fond—that the Idea (*αὐτοέκαστον*) is a mere repetition of phenomena, exhibiting the same law as the particulars, indistinguishable from them, and therefore perfectly useless. This objection is expressed in the *Metaphysics* (i. ix. 1) by saying that 'The Ideas are as if one was unable to count a few things, and thought it would be easier to count them

when they were more.' It would seem, however, to be a misstatement of Plato's view, for it assumes the reality, the substantive and absolute existence of the particulars, and then speaks of the Idea or the Universal being appended to the end of the row, in order to explain them. Whereas Plato might surely say the particulars disappear out of sight ; on looking into them I find they have no existence, while the universal grows more and more in reality, and absorbs all the attention of the mind. Instead of 'multiplying phenomena,' Plato might say, 'The Idea reduces phenomena to unity.' Aristotle's account represents the universal or absolute existence as if it was gained inductively from a set of particulars, and added to the end of them; whereas Plato's point of view rather is that the Idea is prior to all the particulars ; we do not obtain it inductively, we are reminded of it, but we saw it before we were born, or, in other words, it is innate in the soul and only evoked by experience. Another most captious objection, almost unworthy of the gravity of a philosopher, Aristotle here adds : it is that 'Perhaps the Idea of Good may be said to be distinguished from the number of phenomenal goods by being eternal. But in short this is no difference, the Good is not any more good for this. Length of duration does not constitute a distinction between identical qualities. A white thing is not more white if it lasts long than if it only lasts for a day.' Perhaps this argument need only be stated for its weakness to be seen. Plato would never have consented to this confusion between length of duration (*πολυχρόνιον*) and eternity (*ἀετίον*). It is true that in popular thinking we picture to ourselves the eternal under the form of duration of time, but the philosophical conception of the eternal is the necessary (*causa sui*), the absolute, the unconditional, the uncreate and indestructible (*Eth. iii.*

iii. 3, vi. iii. 2), that which is out of all relation to time. Aristotle's argument, then, consists in setting the popular way of thinking against the philosophical. He represents the Idea to be a copy taken from the particular and made lasting. Whereas Plato meant—that without which we cannot know the particular or conceive it to exist; that which is independent of this or that particular, though the particulars depend on it; that which is independent of yesterday, or to-day, or a thousand years hence.

At this point of the discussion Aristotle seems to have become conscious to himself (*Eth.* i. vi. 8) that the Platonists may complain of his attempting to disprove the unity of good by always setting relative goods in opposition to those that are good in themselves. He proposes then to take certain specimens of things good in themselves, and to make these the test of the theory. The specimens he adduces are 'thought, sight, and some pleasures and honours;' he adds that 'If these be not esteemed good in themselves, nothing else but the pure Idea will remain to be called a good in itself; thus the Idea as a universal or class will lose all its meaning, having no individuals ranked under it.'<sup>22</sup> The question then is, Do these goods, which are sought for their own sake, exhibit the same, or different laws of good? To answer this question would require a very deep and subtle investigation; this Aristotle does not enter upon, but he merely gives a summary assertion that 'The laws exhibited by honour, thought, and pleasure, viewed as goods, are distinct and different from one another.' This appears to be mere dogmatism and a trifling with the question. For we might urge that honour is not properly speaking a good sought for its

<sup>22</sup> Ἡούδ· ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς ἰδέας; ὅστε μάταιον ξύται τὸ εῖδος.

own sake (cf. *Eth.* i. v. 5), and that thought, sight, and pleasure, are all of them *ἐνέργειαι* and therefore do according to the Aristotelian views exhibit the same law of good.

Aristotle winds up his polemic by assuming as concluded, that there is no realistic unity in the good.<sup>23</sup> He asks, ‘What is the account then of this one word good? It cannot surely have risen from a mere chance coincidence in language. It must be either that all goods proceed from one source or tend to one end—or rather that they are analogous to one another.’ He substitutes then arbitrarily, without proof or discussion (for he says these belong to metaphysics), a nominalistic theory for the realism of Plato. His view is apparently, that men inductively from a set of similar particulars formed the universal ‘good,’ and by analogy, where cases were analogous, came to extend the same term to dissimilar particulars. Plato’s view was that by experience of a particular there is awakened in the mind the knowledge of a universal, which existed there prior to the particular, and is the law of the existence of that particular, and that by many different particulars we ‘are reminded’ of this same law or idea, and that hence arises sameness of name<sup>24</sup> by reason of a sameness of law under different relative circumstances and modifications. Realism makes the universal prior to and more real than the particular. Nominalism makes the particulars more real than the universal. Aristotle is by no means consistently a nominalist, though here he avows a sort of nominalism for the time.

There is a tradition of the ancients that Aristotle, as a young man, while his vehicle for philosophising was still the dialogue, commenced a pertinacious attack on the doctrine of

<sup>23</sup> Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινὸν τι συνωνύμων τοῖς εἰδεσιν.—Ar. *Metaphys.* i. vi. 3.

<sup>24</sup> Κατὰ μέθεξιν εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ τῶν

Ideas. Proclus, quoted by Philoponus (ii. 2) speaks of him<sup>25</sup> as 'proclaiming loudly in his dialogues that he was unable to sympathise with this doctrine, even though his opposition to it should be attributed to a factious spirit.' It is thought by some that the various places of his extant and maturer works which attack the Platonists on this subject, contain rather a *résumé* of arguments which had been before stated by Aristotle in his early writings, than the results of fresh logical or metaphysical thought. This theory, if accepted, would explain to some extent the very crude and apparently superficial character of the arguments themselves. That such a procedure should have been adopted in a work like the *Ethics* seems not unlikely, when we consider the way which this work was, apparently, written. It was part of a great task which Aristotle had assigned himself—no less than that of constructing afresh the whole of philosophy (with physical science to follow). Setting himself to this task, Aristotle constructed his *Organon*, and then went on in rapid succession to grapple with Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, the Art of Poetry, and Metaphysics. All his works on these subjects were more or less incomplete, and all must have been composed under a certain pressure. In these circumstances it is easy to fancy their author repeating his earlier arguments on a particular question, in lieu of excogitating the matter anew. But it must be observed that one of the arguments here used is expressed in Aristotle's maturer terminology, for it appeals to the 'categories,' or heads of predication. Anyhow, we cannot escape the conclusion that these arguments misrepresent the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, so far as we know it, and do not contain really valid grounds for its rejection.

<sup>25</sup> Καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις σαφέστατα | τῷ συμπαθεῖν, καν τις αὐτὸν οἴηται διὰ κεκραγός μη δύνασθαι τῷ δόγματι τού· | φιλονεικίαν ἀντιλέγειν.

When we compare the moral system of Aristotle in its general scope with that of Plato, we are at once struck by a remarkable difference. Plato's was a unifying system; he took the four cardinal virtues of Greece and reduced them to one quality under different aspects—to the complete regularity and harmony of all the faculties and impulses of the individual soul, under the guidance of wise and philosophic thought. 'Justice' with him was another word for this harmony; 'Temperance' was the subservience of the passions to the reason. 'Courage' was remembering the general principles of the reason in the hour of danger or temptation. The Reason or thought which was to permeate the moral nature was also, with Plato, the contemplation of the absolute. The tendency of Aristotle is in the opposite direction, that of analytical division and separation. Philosophy and its organ, the scientific reason, he put quite apart from morals. Justice, so far as we can learn from the *Eudemian* book on the subject, he treated, not in a general sense as co-extensive with Virtue, but as a special quality tending to the fulfilment of legal obligations in respect of property. Instead of unifying the virtues he rather multiplied them. In his *Politics*<sup>26</sup> (I. xiii. 10) he approves of the method of Gorgias, in enumerating the virtues in detail, saying that 'People deceive themselves by general definitions, as that virtue consists in a good condition of the soul, or again in uprightness of action (*όρθοπραγεῖν*), or some such thing.' And in the same spirit he says (*Eth. II. vii. 1*) that 'While general theories are of wider application' (*κοινότεροι*, see *infra*, the note on this passage), 'those that go into detail have more reality, since action consists in detail,' &c. Accordingly he proceeds to give a list of virtues which contain an exemplification of his principle of *Μεσότης*. This

<sup>26</sup> The allusion is to the *Meno* of Plato, p. 71.

list does not appear to have been formed on any scientific basis, it does not start afresh with any new psychological classification. It seems first to accept, in a way, the list of cardinal virtues, placing courage and temperance in the front of its ranks, reserving justice as being something peculiar, and dividing wisdom into practical and speculative. It then adds to these, different qualities, some of them sufficiently external, which were held in honour among the Greeks. In this procedure there is something which must be called empirical. Aristotle has two sides, the one speculative and profoundly penetrating and philosophic; the other side tending to the accumulation of details and of experience, regardless of a philosophic point of view, content with a shallow system of classification. His list, when formed, Aristotle seems to have believed in as complete. He had beforehand given the same in his *Rhetoric* (I. ix. 5) with the omission of three of the virtues here mentioned.

We have seen already the separation made by Aristotle between Ethics and Metaphysics. The same of course holds good of Theology, this being with Aristotle but another name for Metaphysics. Practical theology was not a conception that Aristotle could have admitted. His great divergence from Plato on this head may be seen in the fact that while Plato speaks of 'being make like to God, through becoming just and holy, with thought and consciousness of the same' (*loc. cit.*, see above, p. 194), Aristotle, on the contrary, speaks of moral virtue as being impossible of attribution to the gods (*Eth.* x. viii. 7). With regard to Aristotle's opinion on the question of a future life we shall speak in Essay V., but at present we may safely say that Aristotle's ethical system differs from that of Plato in being conceived totally without reference to any such consideration. If we compare the tone in which the two philosophers write, it will appear that

while Aristotle is far more scientific, he is on the other hand wanting in the moral earnestness, the tenderness, and the enthusiasm of Plato. Such ideas as that 'the whole of life is an education' are not present with him. But again, he is more safe than Plato; he is quite opposed to anything unnatural (such as communism, for instance) in life or institutions. He recognises admirably the worth and beauty of moral virtue, without the incessant demand which Plato made, that this should be accompanied by philosophy. And on all questions he endeavours to put himself into harmony with the opinions of the multitude, to which he thinks that a certain validity must be ascribed. On the other hand, Aristotle is less delicate and reverent than Plato in his mode of speaking of human happiness, especially as attained by the philosopher. In Plato there seems often, if not always, present, a sense of the weakness of the individual as contrasted with the eternal and the divine. If Plato requires philosophy to make morality, he also always infuses morality into philosophy; the philosopher in his pictures does not triumph over the world, but rather is glad to seize on 'some tradition' 'like a stray plank,' to prevent his being lost; he feels that his philosophy on earth is but 'knowing in part.' Aristotle, on the contrary, rather over-represents the strength of philosophy. And in his picture of the happiness of the philosopher we cannot but feel that there is over-much elation, and something that requires toning down. In the manner of the writing it is obvious that we miss the art, the grace, the rich and delicate imagination of Plato. Above all, we miss the subtle humour which plays round all the moral phenomena. Aristotle does not show any trace of archness. There are sayings in the *Ethics* which might cause a smile, but they are apparently given unconsciously, in illustration of the point in question. In *Eth. x. v. 8*, to show that the

different creatures have each their different proper pleasures, Aristotle quotes from Heraclitus the saying that 'An ass likes hay better than gold,' without any sense of anything ludicrous in the illustration.<sup>27</sup> The same thing occurs in one of the Eudemian books (vii. vi. 2), where it is mentioned to illustrate the hereditariness of hot temper, that 'A father being kicked out by his son, begged him to stop at the door, for he said *he* had kicked *his* father as far as that.' This is mentioned with perfect gravity among a list of arguments. Aristotle's rich and manifold knowledge of human nature exhibits itself in his *Ethics*. It might be doubted whether Plato would have written the masterly analytical account of the various virtues in Books III. and IV. These are not living dramatic portraits such as Plato would have made; there is nothing personal or dramatic about them; but they are a wonderful catalogue and analysis of very subtle characteristics.

The chief of the school of Plato was Speusippus, nephew to Plato himself, and successor to him in the leadership of the Academy. One of the Pythagoreising opinions of Speusippus is alluded to by Aristotle, *Eth.* i. vi. 7. 'The Pythagorean theory on the subject seems more plausible, which places unity in the rank of the goods; to which theory Speusippus too seems to have given in his adhesion.' The question adverted to is the identity of 'the One' with 'the Good.' The Pythagoreans appear to have placed 'the One' among the various exhibitions of good, whether as causes or manifestations. Among the Platonists, as we are told (*Metaphys.* xiii. iv. 8), there arose a difference, a section of them identifying 'the One' with 'the Good,' the others not considering unity identical with, but an essential element of, goodness.

They saw that if 'the One' be identical with 'the Good,' it must follow that multeity, or, in other words, matter, must be the principle of evil. To avoid making 'the many' identical with evil, they found themselves forced to abandon the identification of 'the One' with 'the Good.' Of this section Speusippus was leader. He seems to have adopted a Pythagorean formula, saying, that 'the One must be ranked among goods.' Aristotle gives a sort of provisional preference to this theory over the system of Plato. Elsewhere, however (*Metaphys.* xi. vii. 10), he attacks and refutes the view of 'the Pythagoreans and Speusippus,' that 'Good is rather a result of existence than the cause of it, as the flower is the result of the plant.'

In morals, Speusippus seems to have continued the arguments begun by Plato, against the Hedonistic theory of Aristippus. In the list of his works given by Diogenes<sup>28</sup> the following are mentioned—περὶ ἡδονῆς α'. 'Αριστιππος α'. His polemic appears to have been one-sided, and his views extreme. One of his arguments on the subject of Pleasure is alluded to by Aristotle, *Eth.* x. ii. 5, and expressly mentioned with his name by Eudemus, vii. xiii. 1. It seems very probable that other arguments against Pleasure, which are refuted by Aristotle and Eudemus, may have occurred in the treatise on Pleasure written by Speusippus. Another Platonist, with exactly opposite views on Pleasure, was Eudoxus. Of him hardly anything is known. He appears to have been an astronomer, and his personal character is highly praised by Aristotle, *Eth.* x. ii. 1.

Out of the school of Plato, Aristotle appears to have had a close personal friend, namely, Xenocrates, who accompanied

<sup>28</sup> Also he seems to have written on Justice, The Citizen, Legislation, and Philosophy.

him to Atarneus, on the death of Plato. He was a voluminous writer, and seems to have endeavoured to carry out the system of Plato on particular points, and to give it a more practical direction. Besides many treatises on dialectic, the Ideas, science, genera and species, divisions, thought, nature, the gods, &c., Diogenes also attributes to him two books on Happiness, two on Virtue, one on the State; one on the Power of the Law, &c. The ancients ascribed to him a high moral tone of thought, saying that he considered virtue as alone valuable in itself. He seems, however, to have allowed the existence of a *δύναμις ὑπηρετική* in external fortune, which is, perhaps, alluded to by Aristotle.<sup>29</sup> His disciples, Polemo and Crantor, appear to have had almost exclusively an ethical direction. We must regret the loss of the writings of these early Academics, for we should, no doubt, find common to them much that is to be found in the system of Aristotle. And yet, so far as we can tell, none of the Platonists appears individually to have been of sufficient importance to have greatly influenced Aristotle either in the way of communication or of antagonism.

*Ετεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν.* -- *Eth.* I. viii. 6.

## ESSAY IV.

### *On the Philosophical Formulae in the Ethics of Aristotle.*

THE advance which Philosophy made under the hands of Aristotle, consisted in its becoming scientific. That is to say, it was divided into separate branches, or departments (*πραγματεῖας*), and each of these was a *μέθοδος*, or orderly setting forth of appropriate principles and the deductions to be made from them ; and the instrument for this exposition was a precise terminology. The Dialogues of Plato almost invariably exhibited philosophy in the process of being worked out in conjunction with unphilosophical personages, so the point of departure in them is the ordinary thought of refined and cultivated, but not scholastic, circles, and the language is as much as possible that of the purest literary Greek. Yet even Plato, owing to the nature of his subjects, could not keep clear of abstract, highly philosophical, and technical terms. In fact he was always tending to create such ; the ‘ Ideas,’ ‘ Dialectic,’ ‘ Thought’ (*φρόνησις*), the ‘ Reason’ and the ‘ Understanding’ (*διάνοια*), ‘ Being’ and ‘ Not being,’ the ‘ One’ and the ‘ Many,’ ‘ Division,’ and other names for logical processes, the names for the constituent parts of the soul, &c., are instances of the kind. But Plato dealt freely with language, as he did with thought, and never bound himself by fixed terms any more than by a fixed system. With

Aristotle the case was different ; his object was to be, as far as possible, exhaustive and final on all the great questions of philosophy, and to express his results in precise and permanent phraseology. Thus, the more general forms of thought which he gradually worked out for himself became with him a language which was never laid aside, and which was applied to all subjects. In comparing any Aristotelian treatise with the works of Plato, one sees in it the accumulation of experience and the carrying out of analysis, but still more, one sees the constant recurrence of these forms of thought, which seem brought in to explain everything. The forms indeed frequently become modified through their application to special branches of inquiry ; they no longer remain mere logical or metaphysical abstractions, but become concrete ideas. We shall find this abundantly exemplified in the *Ethics* ; and it is the object of the present Essay to isolate and examine the formal element of the Aristotelian moral system—to trace the origin and full philosophical meaning of some of the leading terms used, and to follow them out into their ethical application. The formulæ to be discussed are : (1) *Tέλος*, or the End-in-itself, as connected with Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes ; (2) *'Ενέργεια*, or the Actual, which Aristotle so constantly contrasted with the Potential ; (3) *Μεσότης*, or the Law of Quantity, a term with wide philosophical associations ; (4) the Practical Syllogism, a form borrowed from the Aristotelian Logic, and applied by Aristotle himself, and still farther by the Peripatetic school, to explain the phenomena of the human will.

I. Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes arose probably from a combination and modification of conceptions which occur separately in Plato, namely, the contrast of matter and form, of means and end, of production and existence. Every individual object might be said to be the meeting-point of

these oppositions ; it is what it is by reason of the matter out of which it has sprung, the motive cause which gave it birth, the idea or form which it realises, the end or object which it was intended to attain. Thus knowledge of anything implies knowing it from these four points of view, or knowing its four causes. The End or final cause, however, as is natural, rises to an eminence beyond the other conceptions, and though it must always stand opposed to matter, it tends to merge the other two causes into itself. The end of anything, that for the sake of which anything exists, can hardly be separated from the perfection of that thing, from its idea and form ; thus the formal cause or definition becomes absorbed into the final cause (*όριζεται γὰρ ἔκαστον τῷ τέλει*, *Ethk.* III. vii. 6).

In the same way the End mixes itself up with the efficient cause, the desire for the end gives the first impulse of motion, the final cause of anything becomes identical with the good of that thing, so that the end and the good become synonymous terms. And this is not only the case with regard to individual objects, but all nature and the whole world exist for the sake of, and in dependence on, their final cause, which is the Good. This, existing as an object of contemplation and desire, though itself immovable, moves all things.<sup>1</sup> And so the world is rendered finite, for all nature desiring the Good and tending towards an end is harmonised and united.

In this way is the unity of nature conceived by Aristotle, it is a unity of idea. The idea of the Good as final cause pervades the world, and the world is suspended from it. In the same form his ethical philosophy presents itself. Human life and action are rendered finite by being directed to their end or final cause, the good attainable in action. The ques-

<sup>1</sup> Κινεῖ δὲ ὁδε· τὸ δρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ μοητὸν κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενα.—Ἐκ τοι· αὐτης ἀρχῆς ἤργηται δὲ σύρανδος καὶ ἡ φύσις.—*Metaph.* xi. vii. 2-6.

tion of the *Ethics* is, *Tι ἔστι τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος*; And we might say, altering the words quoted from the *Metaphysics* —From this principle, from the End of action, the whole of human life is suspended.

An end or final cause implies intelligence, implies a mind to see and desire it. The appearance of ends and means in nature is a proof of design in the operations of nature, and this Aristotle distinctly recognises (*Nat. Ausec.* II. viii.). When we come to Ethics, What is meant by an End of human action? For whom is this an end? Is it an end fixed by a higher intelligence? In short, is the principle of Aristotle the same as the religious principle, that man is born to work out the purposes of his Maker? To this it must be answered, that Aristotle is indefinite in his physical theory as to the relation of God to the design exhibited in creation. And so, too, he is not explicit, in the *Ethics*, as to God's moral government of the world. On the whole, we may say at present that 'moral government,' in our sense of the words, does not at all form part of Aristotle's system. His point of view rather is, that as physical things strive all, though unconsciously, after the good attainable by them under their several limitations, so man may consciously strive after the good attainable in life. We do not find in the *Ethics* the expression *τέλος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, but *τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος* (I. vii. 8), *τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων τέλος* (X. vi. 1), *τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν* (I. xiii. 5). It is best, therefore, to exclude religious associations (as being un-Aristotelian) from our conception of the ethical *τέλος*, and then we may be free to acknowledge that it is evidently meant to have a definite relation to the nature and constitution of man. Thus Aristotle assumes that the desires of man are so framed as to imply the existence of this *τέλος* (*Eth.* I. ii. 1). And he asserts that man can only realise it in the sphere of his own proper functions (*ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*,

i. vii. 10), and in accordance with the law of his proper nature and its harmonious development (*κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν*, i. vii. 15).

Is man, then, according to this system, to be regarded similarly to one of the flowers of the field, which obeying the law of its organisation springs and blooms and attains its own peculiar perfection? This is no doubt one side, so to speak, of Aristotle's view. But there is also another side. For, while each part of the creation realises its proper end, and, in the language of the Bible, 'is very good,' this end exists not *for* the inanimate or unconscious creatures themselves, it only exists *in* them. But the ethical *τέλος* not only exists *in* man, but also *for* man; not only is the good realised in him, but it is recognised by him as such; it is the end not only of his nature, but also of his desires; it stands before his thoughts and wishes and highest consciousness as the absolutely sufficient, that in which he can rest, that which is in and for itself desirable (*ἀπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν αἴρετὸν ἀεί*, i. vii. 4). The ends of physical things are for other minds to contemplate, they are ends objectively. But ends of moral beings are ends subjectively, realised by and contemplated by those moral beings themselves. The final cause, then, in *Ethics*, is viewed, so to speak, from the inside. Or rather the peculiarity is, that the objective and subjective sides of the conception both have their weight in Aristotle's system, and are run into one another. The *τέλος τῶν πρακτῶν*, or absolute end of action, has two forms, which are not clearly separated; in the first place it is represented subjectively as happiness, and in the second place objectively as the morally beautiful.

It has been said that the ancient Ethical systems were theories of the Chief Good, rather than theories of Duty. And Kant brings against Aristotle the charge that his system

is one of mere eudæmonism. We shall have an opportunity in a future Essay of touching upon the relations of this conception ‘duty’ to the ancient systems. At present it will suffice to show that there is some unfairness in the charge brought by Kant, and that it ignores the true characteristics of Aristotle’s Ethical doctrine. It is unfair to charge Aristotle with mere ‘eudæmonism’ simply on account of his making a definition of ‘happiness’ the leading principle of his *Ethics*. The word ‘happiness’ is only a popular way of statement; Aristotle tells us that it is the popular word for the chief good (*Eth.* i. iv. 2). Again, during his whole discussion on the virtues, and on moral actions, there is no mention of happiness as connected with these, as if good acts were to be done for the sake of happiness. There is only one place, and that is in the discussion on happiness itself, where he speaks of it as ‘The end and prize of virtue.’<sup>2</sup> Elsewhere he speaks of ‘the beautiful’ as being the end of virtue.<sup>3</sup> But again the ‘happiness’ which Aristotle defines as the chief good does not seem immediately, but only inferentially, to imply pleasure. Pleasure (as we shall see hereafter) is rather argued and proved to belong to happiness by a sort of after-thought, and is not with Aristotle a primary part of the conception. Happiness with Aristotle is something different from what we mean by it; so from this point of view, above all, the charge of eudæmonism falls to the ground.

Aristotle’s question is, What is the chief good for man? But this he resolves into another form, What is the *τέλειον τέλος*? What in human life and action is the End-in-itself? How deep is the moral significance of this conception—the absolute end! Can anything small or frivolous, or anything

<sup>2</sup> Τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὄθλον καὶ τέλος.—*Eth.* i. ix. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα, τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς.—*Eth.* iii. vii. 2.

like mere pleasure and enjoyment come up to its requirements, and appear in the deepest depths of the human consciousness to be something beyond which we cannot go—the absolute satisfaction of our nature? Essentially and necessarily, that only can be called a *τέλος* which has in itself a moral worth and goodness. This also Aristotle says ‘has a sweetness and pleasure of its own, but one quite different from that which springs from any other sources. Men rarely attain to it; but desiring the satisfaction it affords, they seize in its place the pleasure derived from amusements, on account of this latter having some sort of resemblance to the satisfaction which the mind feels in moral acts which are of the nature of an end.’<sup>4</sup>

The deep moral pleasure which attaches to noble acts, Aristotle describes as triumphing even over the physical pain and outward horrors which may attend the exercise of courage.<sup>5</sup> And he acknowledges that in many cases this may be the *only* pleasure attending upon virtuous actions.<sup>6</sup>

We see in these passages how the objective and subjective import of the *τέλος* are blended together. The end and the consciousness of the end are not separated. In the pleasure which Aristotle speaks of as attaching to the moral *τέλος* we see something that answers to what we should call ‘the approval of conscience.’ Only to say that Aristotle meant this, would be to mix up things modern and ancient. It is better to keep before us as clearly as possible his point of view, which is, that a good action is an End-in-itself, as being

<sup>4</sup> *Politics*, VIII. v. 12. ‘Ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβάλνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὀλιγάκις γίγνεσθαι. . . . Συμβέβηκε δὲ ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παιδίας τέλος· ἔχει γάρ θσως ἡδονήν τινα καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὴν τυχούσαν· ζητοῦντες δὲ ταύτην, λαμβάνουσιν ἀνταύτην ἐκείνην, διὰ τὸ τέλει τῶν

πράξεων ἔχειν δμοιωμά τι. Cf. *Eth.* x. y. 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Eth.* III. ix. 2. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἀντεῖναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρείαν τέλος ἡδύ.

<sup>6</sup> *Eth.* III. ix. 5. Οὐ δὴ ἐν ἀπόσταις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται.

the perfection<sup>7</sup> of our nature, and that for the sake of which (*οὐ ἔνεκα*) our moral faculties before existed, hence bringing a pleasure and inward satisfaction with it; something in which the mind can rest pleased and acquiescent; something which possesses the qualities of being *καλόν*, *ώρισμένον*, and *ἐνέργεια τελεία*.

We observe how in the separate parts of life, in the development of each of the various faculties, Aristotle considers an end to be attainable; how he attaches a supreme value to particular acts, and idealises the importance of the passing moment; how he attributes to each moment a capability of being converted out of a mere means, and mere link in the chain of life,<sup>8</sup> to be an End-in-itself, something in which life is, as it were, summed up. But if in action, and in an exercise of the moral faculties, an end is attainable, this is, according to the system of Aristotle, only faintly and imperfectly an end, compared with what is attainable in contemplation by the exercise of the philosophic thought.

In both senses of the word *τέλος*, both as perfection and as happiness, Aristotle seems to have placed virtue below philosophy. Philosophy is in the first place the highest human excellence; it is the development of the highest faculty.<sup>8</sup> In the second place, it contains the most absolute satisfaction, it is most entirely desirable for its own sake, and

<sup>7</sup> In another passage (*Eth.* iii. vii. 6), Aristotle seems to use the term *τέλος* in a more purely objective sense to denote perfection. He says, 'The *τέλος* of every individual moral act is the same with that of the formed moral character' (*τέλος δὲ πάσῃς ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν*). The whole passage is a difficult one; it seems to come to this—An individual act can only be said to have attained

perfection when it exhibits the same qualities as the formed moral character—e.g. a brave act is only perfectly brave when it is done as a brave man would do it, consciously for its own sake, or for the sake of the beautiful (*καλοῦ ἔνεκα*), &c.

<sup>8</sup> *Eth.* x. vii. i. Εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὐλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δὲ ἦν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου, κ.τ.λ.

not as a means to anything else.<sup>9</sup> Whereas the practical virtues are all in a sense means to this. Courage is for war, which is for the sake of the fruition of peace ; and in what does this consist ? If the practical side of our nature be summed up in the one faculty Thought (*φρόνησις*), this may be regarded after all as subordinate and instrumental to Philosophy (*σοφία*), the perfection of the speculative side.<sup>10</sup> So too in Politics, the end, or in other words the highest perfection and the highest happiness, being identical for the State and the individual, in what is this constituted ? Not in the busy and restless action of war or diplomacy, not in means and measures to some ulterior result, but in those thoughts and contemplations which find their end and satisfaction in themselves. Philosophy, therefore, and speculation are, according to Aristotle, the end not only of the individual, but also of the State.<sup>11</sup> ‘If it be true to say, that happiness consists in doing well, a life of action must be best both for the State, and for the individual. But we need not, as some do, suppose that a life of action implies relation to others, or that those only are active thoughts which are concerned with the results of action ; but far rather we must consider those speculations and thoughts to be so which have their end in themselves, and which are for their own sake.’

A moment of contemplative thought (*θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια*) is most perfectly and absolutely an end. It is sought for no result but for itself. It is a state of peace, which is the

<sup>9</sup> *Eth.* x. vii. 5. Δόξαι τ' ἀν αὐτῇ μόνῃ δὶ αὐτῇ ἀγαπᾶσθαι.

<sup>10</sup> *Eth.* vi. xiii. 8. 'Εκείνης οὖν ἔνεκα ἀπιτάπτει, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔκείνη.

<sup>11</sup> *Pol.* vii. iii. 7. 'Αλλ' εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εὐπραγίαν θετέον, καὶ κοινῇ πάσης πόλεως ἀν εἴη καὶ καθ' ἔκαστου ἄριστος

βίος δ πρακτικός. 'Αλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἑτέρους, καθάπερ οἱονταί τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς διανοίας εἶναι μόνας ταύτας πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀποβαίνοντων χάριν γυγνομένας ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺν μᾶλλον τὰς αὐτοτέλεις καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἔνεκεν θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις.

crown of all exertion (*ἀσχολούμεθα ἵνα σχολάζωμεν*). It is the realisation of the divine in man, and constitutes the most absolute and all-sufficient happiness,<sup>12</sup> being, as far as possible in human things, independent of external circumstances.<sup>13</sup>

This, then, constitutes the most adequate answer to the great question of Ethics, What is the Chief Good? or *Tί ἐστι τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος*; as far as a separate and individual moment of life is concerned. But a difficulty suggests itself with regard to life viewed as a whole. ‘Philosophic thought,’ says Aristotle, ‘will be absolutely perfect happiness if extended over a whole life. For in happiness there must be no shortcoming.’<sup>14</sup> But, as we shall see more clearly with regard to *ἐνέργεια*, it cannot actually be so extended. What then is the result? If Aristotle accepts the absolute satisfaction and worth of a moment as the end of life, his principle becomes identical with the *μονόχρονος ἡδονή* of the Cyrenaics (see above, p. 175). If, again, he requires an absolute *τέλος* of permanent duration, his theory of human good becomes a mere ideal. Here, then, is a dilemma between the horns of which Aristotle endeavours to steer, on the one hand acknowledging (*Eth. I. vii. 16*), that ‘A single swallow will not make a summer;’ on the other hand urging objections against the saying of Solon (*Eth. I. x.*), that ‘No man can be called happy as long as he lives.’ He says the chief good must be *ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ*, not *a* perfect life, but *in a* perfect life—indicating by this expression that the absolute good, as it exists in and for the consciousness, is independent

<sup>12</sup> *Eth. x. viii. 7.* ‘Η τελεία εὐδαιμονία θεωρητική τίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια.

<sup>13</sup> *Eth. x. vii. 4.* “Η τε λεγομένη αυτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ’ ἀν εἴη.

<sup>14</sup> ‘Η τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἀν εἴη ἀνθρώπου, καθοῦντα μῆκος βίου τελειον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές ἐστι τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. *Eth. x. vii. 7.*

of time and duration; but still, as we belong to a world of time and space, that this inner supreme good must have its setting in an adequate complete sphere of external circumstances. About this word *τελείω* there is an ambiguity of which probably Aristotle, himself, was half conscious; its associations of meaning are twofold, the one popular, conveying the notion of the ‘complete,’ the ‘perfect,’ the other philosophic, implying that which is in itself desirable, that in which the mind finds satisfaction, the absolute. Taking a signification between the two, we may conceive Aristotle to have meant, that the chief good must be an absolute mode of the consciousness, and that this must be attained in a sphere of outward circumstances themselves partaking of the nature of absolute perfection. Aristotle’s conception, then, of the chief good has two sides, the one internal, ideal, out of all relation to time, which speaks of happiness as the absolute good, as that end which is the sum of all means, as that which could not possibly be improved by any addition (*Eth.* i. vii. 8); the other side, which is external and practical, goes quite against the Cyrenaic principle of regarding the present as all in all, and also against the Cynic view which would set the mind above external circumstances (*Eth.* i. v. 6). This part of the theory considers happiness as compounded of various more or less essential elements, and shows how far the more essential parts (*τὰ κύρια τῆς εὐδαιμονίας*) can outbalance the less essential. It requires permanence of duration, but it looks for this in the stability of the formed mental state, which is always tending to reproduce moments of absolute worth.

The End-in-itself renders life a rounded whole, like a work of art, or a product of nature. The knowledge of it is to give definiteness to the aims, ‘So that we shall be now like archers knowing what to shoot at’ (*Eth.* i. ii. 2). In the realisation

of it, we are to feel that there need be no more reaching onwards towards infinity, for all the desires and powers will have found their satisfaction (*Eth.* i. ii. 1). Closely connected, then, is this system with the view that what is finite is good. ‘Life,’ says Aristotle, ‘is a good to the good man, because it is finite’ (*Eth.* ix. ix. 7). At first sight these sayings suggest the idea of a cramped and limited theory of life, as if all were made round and artistic, and no room were left for the aspirations of the soul. It must be remembered, however, that that which is here spoken of as making life finite, is itself the absolutely sufficient—that, above and beyond the outside of which the mind can conceive nothing. And this absolute end is yet further represented as the deepest moments either of the moral consciousness, or of that philosophic reason which is an approach to the nature of the divine being. It must be remembered also that ‘the finite’ ( $\tauὸ\omegaρισμένον$ ) does not mean ‘the restricted,’ as if expressing that in which limits have been put upon the possibilities of good, but rather the good itself. Good and even existence cannot be conceived except under a law, and the finite is with Aristotle an essentially positive idea. Only so much negation enters into it as is necessary to constitute definiteness and form in contradistinction to the chaotic. Truly we cannot in our conceptions pass out of the human mind; that which is absolute and an end for the mind cannot be a mere limited and restricted conception; but rather nothing can be conceived beyond it. Something might be said on the relation of the Ethical *τέλος* to the idea of a future life, but this can be better said hereafter.

II. ‘Actuality’ is perhaps the nearest philosophical representative of the *ἐνέργεια* of Aristotle. It is derived from it through the Latin of the Schoolmen, ‘actus’ being their translation of *ἐνέργεια*, out of which the longer and more abstract

form has grown. The word ‘energy,’ which comes more directly from *ἐνέργεια*, has ceased to convey the philosophical meaning of its original, being restricted to the notion of force and vigour. The employment of the term ‘energy,’ as a translation of *ἐνέργεια*, has been a material hindrance to the proper understanding of Aristotle. This is especially the case with regard to the *Ethics*, where there is an appearance of plausibility, though an utterly fallacious one, in such a translation. To substitute ‘actuality’ in the place of ‘energy’ would certainly have this advantage, that it would point to the metaphysical conception lying at the root of all the various applications of *ἐνέργεια*. But ‘actuality’ is a word with far too little flexibility to be adapted for expressing all these various applications. No conception equally plastic with *ἐνέργεια*, and at all answering to it, can be found in modern thought. And therefore there is no term which will uniformly translate it. Our only course can be, first to endeavour to understand its philosophical meaning as part of Aristotle’s system, and secondly to notice its special applications in a book like the *Ethics*. Any rendering of its import in the various places where it occurs must be rather of the nature of paraphrase than of translation.

‘*Ἐνέργεια* is not more accurately defined by Aristotle, than as the correlative and opposite of *δύναμις*. He implies, that we must rather feel its meaning than seek to define it. ‘Actuality’ may be in various ways opposed to ‘potentiality,’ and ‘the import of the conception depends entirely on their relation to each other.<sup>15</sup> ‘Now *ἐνέργεια* is the existence of a

<sup>15</sup> *Metaphys.* viii. vi. 2. “Εστι δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια τὸ ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα, μὴ οὐτως ὕσπερ λέγομεν δυνάμει. Λέγομεν δὲ δυνάμει, οἷον, ἐν τῷ ἔνδιφτοι Ἐρμῆν καὶ ἐν τῇ δλῃ τὴν ἡμίσειαν, οὗτι ἀφαιρεθείη ἄν, καὶ ἐπιστήμονα καὶ τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα,

ἢ ἀν δυνατὸς γίθεωρῆσαι· τὸ δὲ ἐνέργειᾳ· δῆλον δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ’ ἔκαστα τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ, οὐ βουλόμεθα λέγειν, καὶ οὐ δεῖ παντὸς δροῦ ζητεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνορῆν—ἴτιοι ὡς τὸ οἰκοδομοῦν πρὸς τὸ οἰκοδυμικόν, καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορὸς πρὸς

thing not in the sense of its potentially existing. The term “potentially” we use, for instance, of the statue in the block, and of the half in the whole (since it might be subtracted), and of a person knowing a thing, even when he is not thinking of it, but might do so; whereas *ἐνέργεια* is the opposite. By applying the various instances our meaning will be plain, and one must not seek a definition in each case, but rather grasp the conception of the analogy as a whole—that it is as that which builds to that which has the capacity for building; as the waking to the sleeping; as that which sees to that which has sight, but whose eyes are closed; as the definite form to the shapeless matter; as the complete to the unaccomplished. In this contrast, let the *ἐνέργεια* be set off as forming the one side, and on the other let the potential stand. Things are said to be *ἐνέργειά* not always in like manner (except so far as there is an analogy, that as *this* thing is in *this*, or related to *this*, so is *that* in *that*, or related to *that*), for sometimes it implies motion as opposed to the capacity for motion, and sometimes complete existence opposed to undeveloped matter.'

The word *ἐνέργεια* does not occur in Plato, though the opposition of the ‘virtual’ and the ‘actual’ may be found implicitly contained in<sup>16</sup> some parts of his writings. Perhaps there is no genuine passage<sup>17</sup> now extant of any writer pre-

τὸ καθεῦδον, καὶ τὸ δρῶν πρὸς τὸ μέν  
μὲν, ὅψιν δὲ ἔχον, καὶ τὸ ἀποκεκριμένον  
ἔκ τῆς ὅλης πρὸς τὴν ὅλην, καὶ τὸ  
ἀπειργασμένον πρὸς τὸ ἀνέργαστον.  
Ταύτης δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς θάτερον μέριον  
ἔστω ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀφαρισμένη, θατέρῳ  
δὲ τὸ δυνατόν. Λέγεται δὲ ἐνέργεια οὐ  
πάντα δμοίως, ἀλλ' ἡ τὸ ἀνδλογον, ὡς  
τοῦτο ἐν τούτῳ ἡ πρὸς τοῦτο, τὸ δὲ ἐν  
τῷδε ἡ πρὸς τόδε· τὰ μὲν γάρ ὁσὶ κίνησις  
πρὸς δύναμιν, τὰ δὲ ὡς οὐσία πρὸς τινὰ  
ὅλην.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *Theæstetus*, p. 157 A. Οὕτε γάρ ποιοῦν ἔστι τι, πρὶν ἀν τῷ πάσχοντι ξυνέλθῃ, οὕτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἀν τῷ ποιοῦντι, κ.τ.λ.

<sup>17</sup> For the fragment of Philolaus, apud Stob. *Ecl. Phys.* i. xx. 2, is very suspicious. It is as follows: Διὸ καὶ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν κόσμον ἥμεν ἐνέργειαν ἀδιοῖθ θεῶ τε καὶ γενέσιος κατὰ συνακολουθίαν τὰς μεταβλατικὰς φύσιος.

vious to Aristotle in which it occurs. It is the substantive form of the adjective *ἐνεργῆς* which is to be found in Aristotle's *Topics*, I. xii. 1. But Aristotle, by a false etymology, seems to connect it immediately with the words<sup>18</sup> *ἐν ἔργῳ*. To all appearance the idea of its opposition to *δύναμις* was first suggested by the Megarians, who asserted that 'Nothing could be said to have a capacity for doing any thing, unless it was in the act of doing that thing.'<sup>19</sup> This assertion itself was part of the dialectic of the Megarians, by which they endeavoured to establish the Eleatic principles, and to prove by the subtleties of the reason, against all evidence of the senses, that the world is absolutely one, immovable, and unchangeable. We cannot be exactly certain of the terms employed by the Megarians themselves in expressing the above-quoted position, for Aristotle is never very accurate about the exact form in which he gives the<sup>20</sup> opinions of earlier philosophers. We cannot be sure whether the Megarians said precisely *ὅταν ἐνεργή μόνον δύνασθαι*. But at all events they said something equivalent, and Aristotle taking the suggestion worked out the whole theory of the contrast between *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*, in its almost universal applicability.

At first these terms were connected, apparently, with the idea of<sup>21</sup> motion. But since *δύναμις* has the double meaning of 'possibility of existence' as well as 'capacity of action,'

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *Metaphys.* viii. viii. II. Διὸ καὶ τῶνομα ἐνέργεια λέγεται κατὰ τὸ ἔργον καὶ συντείνει πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν.

<sup>19</sup> *Met.* viii. iii. 1. Εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ φασιν, οἷον οἱ Μεγαρικοί, ὅταν ἐνεργῆ μόνον δύνασθαι, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνεργῆ οὐ δύνασθαι, οἷον τὸν μὴ οἰκοδομοῦντα οὐ δύνασθαι οἰκοδομεῖν.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *Metaph.* xi. ii. 3. Καὶ ὡς Δημόκριτός φησιν, ην δμοῦ πάντα δυνάμει,

ἐνεργείᾳ δ' οὖ. xi. vi. 7. Διὸ ξνιοι ποιοῦσιν ἀεὶ ἐνέργειαν, οἷον Λεύκιππος καὶ Πλάτων. In these passages Aristotle expresses the ideas of his predecessors in his own formulæ.

<sup>21</sup> *Metaph.* viii. iii. 9. Ἐλήλυθε δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια τῶνομα, ἡ τρὸς ἐντελέχειαν συντιθεμένη καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων μάλιστα, δοκεῖ γάρ ἡ ἐνέργεια μάλιστα ἡ κίνησις εἶναι.

there arose the double contrast of action opposed to the capacity for action; actual existence opposed to possible existence or potentiality. To express accurately this latter opposition Aristotle seems to have introduced the term *ἐντελέχεια*, of which the most natural account is, that it is a compound of *ἐν τέλει ἔχειν*, ‘being in the state of perfection,’ an adjective<sup>22</sup> *ἐντελεχής* being constructed on the analogy of *νοούεχής*. But in fact this distinction between *ἐντελέχεια* and *ἐνέργεια* is<sup>23</sup> not maintained. The former word is of comparatively rare occurrence, while we find everywhere throughout Aristotle *ἐνέργεια*, as he says, *πρὸς ἐντελεχειαν συντιθεμένη* ‘mixed up with the idea of complete existence.’ As we saw above, it is contrasted with *δύναμις*, sometimes as implying motion, sometimes as ‘form opposed to matter.’

In Physics *δύναμις* answers to the necessary conditions for the existence of anything before that thing exists. It thus corresponds to *ὕλη*, both to the *πρώτη* *ὕλη*, or matter absolutely devoid of all qualities, which is capable of becoming any definite substance, as, for instance, marble; and also to the *εσχάτη* *ὕλη*, or matter capable of receiving form, as marble the form of the statue. Marble then exists *δυνάμει* in the simple elements before it is marble. The statue exists *δυνάμει* in the marble before it is carved out. All objects of thought exist either purely *δυνάμει*, or purely *ἐνέργειᾳ*, or both *δυνάμει* and *ἐνέργειᾳ*. This division makes an entire chain of all the world. At the one end is matter, the *πρώτη* *ὕλη*, which has a merely potential existence, which is necessary as a condition, but which, having no form and no qual-

<sup>22</sup> *De Gen. et Corr.* II. x. II. Συνεπήκρωσε τὸ δλον δ θεὸς ἐντελεχῆ ποιήσας τὴν γένεσιν.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *Metaph.* VIII. i. 2. 'Ἐπὶ πλέον

γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ δύναμις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῶν μόνον λεγομένων κατὰ κίνησιν. *Eth.* VII. xiv. 8. Οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεως ἔστιν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας.

ties, is totally incapable of being realised by the mind. So it is also with the infinitely small or great ; they exist always as possibilities, but, as is obvious, they never can be actually grasped by the perception. At the other end of the chain is God, *οὐσία ἀτόπιος καὶ ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως*, who cannot be thought of as non-existing,<sup>24</sup> as otherwise than actual, who is the absolute, and the unconditioned. Between these two extremes is the whole row of creatures, which out of potentiality spring into actual being. In this theory we see the affinity between *δύναμις* and matter, *ἐνέργεια* and form. Thus Aristotle's conceptions are made to run into one another. Another affinity readily suggests itself, and that is between *ἐνέργεια* and *τέλος*. The progress from *δύναμις* to *ἐνέργεια* is motion or production (*κίνησις* or *γένεσις*). But this motion or production, aiming at or tending to an end, is in itself imperfect (*ἀτελής*), it is a mere process not in itself and for its own sake desirable. And thus arises a contrast between *κίνησις* and *ἐνέργεια*, for the latter, if it implies motion, is a motion desirable for its own sake, having its end in itself. Viewed relatively, however, *κίνησις* may sometimes be called *ἐνέργεια*. In reference to the capacity of action before existing, the action calls out into actuality that which was before only potential. Thus, for instance, in the process of building a house there is an *ἐνέργεια* of what was before the *δύναμις οἰκοδομική*. Viewed, however, in reference to the house itself, this is a mere process to the end aimed at, a *γένεσις*, or if it be called *ἐνέργεια*, it must strictly speaking be qualified as *ἐνέργειά τις ἀτελής*.<sup>25</sup> In short, just as the term *τέλος* is relatively applied to very subordinate ends, so too

<sup>24</sup> It might be said that the being of God cannot be fully grasped or realised by our minds; but, according to the views of Aristotle, the everlasting

existence of God is an *ἐνέργεια* for His own mind. He is above all, the in and for Himself existing.

<sup>25</sup> *Metaph.* x. ix. ii.

*ἐνέργεια* is relatively applied to what is from another point of view a mere *γένεσις* or *κίνησις*. This we find in *Eth.* i. i. 2, *διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά.*

Having traced some of the leading features of this distinction between *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*, we may now proceed to observe how this form of thought stamped itself upon Ethics. We may ask, How is the category of the actual brought to bear upon moral questions, and how far is it reacted upon by moral associations? At the very outset of Aristotle's theory it appears. As soon as the proposition has been laid down that the chief good for man is only attainable in his proper work, and that this proper work is a peculiar kind of life, *πρακτική τις* (*ζωὴ*) *τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος*, Aristotle proceeds to assume (*θετέον*) that this life must be no mere possession (*καθ' ἔξιν*) of certain powers and latent tendencies, but 'in actuality, for this is the distinctive form of the conception.'<sup>26</sup> He then transforms the qualifying term *κατ'* *ἐνέργειαν* into a substantive idea, and makes it the chief part of his definition of the supreme good.<sup>27</sup> Thus the metaphysical category of *ἐνέργεια*, which comes first into Ethics merely as a form of thought, becomes henceforth material. It is identified with happiness.<sup>28</sup> In short, it becomes an ethical idea.

In this connection (like its cognate *τέλος*.) *ἐνέργεια* becomes at once something mental. It takes a subjective character, as existing now both in and for the mind. Moreover, in an exactly parallel way to the use of *τέλος*, it receives a double application. On the one hand it is applied to express moral action and the development of the moral powers, on the other,

<sup>26</sup> Διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γάρ αὐτῇ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. *Eth.* i. vii. 13.

<sup>27</sup> Εἰ δ' ἔστιν ἔργον ἀνθράκου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον, κ.τ.λ.—εἰ δ' οὕτω

τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίγνεται κατ' ἀρετὴν. *Il.* 14, 15.

<sup>28</sup> *Eth.* i. xiii. 1. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετὴν. Cf. i. x. 2, ix. ix. 5, x. vi. 2.

hand to happiness and the fruition of life. It is in its latter meaning that *ἐνέργεια* is most purely subjective. Taken as a formula to express Aristotle's theory of virtue, we may consider it as applied in its more objective and simpler sense, though even here it is mixed up with psychological associations. We shall see how, under newly invented metaphysical forms, Aristotle accounts for the moral nature of man.

Aristotle divides *δυνάμεις* into physical and mental.<sup>29</sup> Of these mental *δυνάμεις* it is characteristic that they are equally capacities of producing contraries, while the physical are restricted to one side of two contraries. The capacity of heat, for instance, is capable of producing heat alone; whereas the *δύναμις ιατρική*, as being a mental capacity, and connected with the discursive reason, can produce indifferently either health or sickness. From this Aristotle deduces the first step of the doctrine of free-will, namely, that the mind is not bound by any physical necessity. For he argues that, given the requisite active and passive conditions, there is a necessity for a physical *δύναμις* to act or suffer in a particular way; but since the mental *δύναμις* is equally a capacity of contraries, if there were any necessity for its development, it must be necessitated to produce contraries at the same time, which is impossible. Therefore there must be some other influence which controls the mental *δύναμις*, and determines into which side of the two contraries it shall be developed, and this is either desire or reasonable purpose.<sup>30</sup> Connected with this point is another of still greater importance for the ethical theory. Not only in the use and exercise of a moral *δύναμις*

<sup>29</sup> *Metaph.* VIII. ii. 1. 'Ἐπειδὴ δὲ αἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἀρχαὶ τοιαῦται, αἱ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἀμφίχοις καὶ ἐν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἔχονται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ

μὲν ἔσονται βλογοί, αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου. <sup>30</sup> 'Ανάγκη ἡ πάρεστι τι εἶναι τὸ κέριον. Λέγω δὲ τοῦτο δρεῖν η προσέρεσιν. *Metaphys.* VIII. v. 3.

is the individual above the control of mere external or physical circumstances, but also the very acquirement of these *δύναμεις* depends on the individual. For the moral capacities are not inherent, but acquired.

In considering how this can be, we may follow the logical order of the question according to Aristotle, and ask which exists first, the *δύναμις* or the *ἐνέργεια*? The answer is, that as a conception, in point of thought (*λόγῳ*), the *ἐνέργεια* must necessarily be prior; in short, we know nothing of the *δύναμις*, except from our knowledge of the *ἐνέργεια*. In point of time (*χρόνῳ*) the case is different; each individual creature exists first *δυνάμει*, afterwards *ἐνέργειᾳ*. This assertion, however, must be confined to each individual; for, as a necessity of thought, we are led to refer the potential existence of each thing to the actual existence of something before (a flower, for instance, owes its potential existence in the seed to the actual existence of another flower before it); and so the world is eternal, for an *ἐνέργεια* must be supposed as everlastingly pre-existing. But even in the individual there are some things in which the *ἐνέργεια* seems prior to the *δύναμις*; there are things which the individual seems to have no 'power of doing' until he does them; he acquires the power, in fact, by doing them.<sup>31</sup> This phenomenon gives rise to a classification of *δυνάμεις* into the physical, the passive, and the inherent on the one hand, and the mental or acquired on the other.<sup>32</sup> The merely physical capacities of our nature exist indepen-

<sup>31</sup> *Metaphys.* viii. viii. 6. Διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ ἀδύνατον εἶναι οἰκοδόμον εἶναι μὴ οἰκοδομήσαντα μηθέν, η̄ κιθαρίστὴν μηθὲν κιθαρίσαντα· δὲ γὰρ μανθάνων κιθαρίζειν κιθαρίζων μανθάνει κιθαρίζειν, δμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

<sup>32</sup> *Metaphys.* viii. v. 1. Ἀπασῶν δὲ

τῶν δυνάμεων ρύσῶν τῶν μὲν συγγενῶν, οἷον τῶν αἰσθήσεων· τῶν δὲ ἔθει, οἷον τῆς τοῦ αὐλεῖν· τῶν δὲ μαθήσει, οἷον τῆς τῶν τεχνῶν, τὰς μὲν ἀνάγκη πρινεργήσαντας ἔχειν δοσαι ἔθει καὶ λόγῳ· τὰς δὲ μὴ τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν οὐκ ἀνάγκη.

dent of any act or effort on the part of the individual.<sup>33</sup> And so, also, is it with the senses.<sup>34</sup> But the contrary is the case with regard to moral virtue, which does not exist in us as a capacity (*δύναμις*) ; in other words, not as a gift of nature (*φύσει*), previous to moral action.<sup>35</sup> We acquire the capacity for virtue by doing virtuous things. It will be seen at once that a sort of paradox is here involved. ‘How can it be said that we become just by doing just things? If we do just things, we are just already.’ The answer of Aristotle to this difficulty would seem to be as follows :

1. Virtue follows the analogy of the arts, in which the first essays of the learner may by chance, or by the guidance of his master (*ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου*), attain a sort of success and an artistic appearance, but the learner is no artist as yet.

2. These ‘just acts,’ by which we acquire justice, are, on nearer inspection, not really just ; they want the moral qualification of that settled internal character in the heart and mind of the agent, without which no external act is virtuous in the highest sense of the term. They are tendencies towards the acquirement of this character, as the first essays of the artist are towards the acquirement of an art. But they are not to be confounded with those moral acts which flow from the character when developed and fixed.

3. The whole question depends on Aristotle’s theory of the

<sup>33</sup> *Eth.* i. xiii. 11. Τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς (τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι) ἐν ἀπάσι τοῖς τρεφομένοις θείη τις ἡν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις—δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς ὑπνοῖς ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μέριον τούτῳ καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὕτη.

<sup>34</sup> *Eth.* ii. i. 4. Τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ώστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργεῖς ἀκοδίδομεν. This doctrine is

opposed to some of the modern discoveries of psychology, as, for instance, Berkeley’s ‘Theory of Vision.’ It is corrected, however, in some degree by Aristotle’s doctrine of *κοινὴ αἰσθησις*.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.* Τὰς δ’ ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὕσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν.

*ἔξις*, as related to *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*. There can be no such thing, properly speaking, as a *δύναμις τῆς ἀρετῆς*. As we have before seen, a *δύναμις*, except it be merely physical, admits of contraries. And therefore in the case of moral action there can only be an indefinite capacity of acting either in this way or that, either well or ill, which is therefore equally a *δύναμις* of virtue and of vice. The *ἐνέργεια* in this case is determined by no intrinsic law of the *δύναμις*—(*ἀνάγκη ἔτερον τι εἶναι τὸ κύριον*, *Met.* viii. v. 3), but by the desire or the reason of the agent. The *ἐνέργεια*, however, is no longer indefinite; it has, at all events, some sort of definiteness for good or bad. And by the principle of habit (*ἕθος*), which Aristotle seems to assume as an acknowledged law of human nature, the *ἐνέργεια* reacts upon the *δύναμις*, reproducing itself. Thus the *δύναμις* loses its indefiniteness, and passes into a definite tendency; it ceases to be a mere *δύναμις*, and becomes a *ἔξις*, that is to say, a formed and fixed character, capable only of producing a certain class of *ἐνέργειαι*. Briefly then, by the help of a few metaphysical terms, does Aristotle sum up his theory of the moral character. *Kαὶ ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἔξεις γίνονται*. And it is quite consistent with his entire view of these metaphysical categories, that he defines virtue to be not on the one hand a *δύναμις*, else it would be merely physical, nor on the other hand a *πάθος* (which is here equivalent to *ἐνέργεια*), else it would be an isolated emotion—but a sort of *ἔξις*. The *ἔξις*, or moral state, is on the farther side, so to speak, of the *ἐνέργειαι*. It is the sum and result of them. If *ἔξις* be regarded as a sort of developed *δύναμις*, as a capacity acquired indeed and definite, but still only a capacity, it may naturally be contrasted with *ἐνέργεια*. Thus in the above-quoted passage, *Eth.* i. vii. 13, *διπτῶς ταύτης λεγομένης* means *καθ' ἔξιν* and *κατ'*

*ἐνέργειαν*, as we may see by comparing VII. XII. 2, VIII. V. 1. From this point of view Aristotle says, that ‘it is possible for a *ἔξις* to exist, without producing any good. But with regard to an *ἐνέργεια* this is not possible.’ (I. VIII. 9.) On the other hand, however, the *ἔξις* is a fixed tendency to a certain class of actions, and, if external circumstances do not forbid, will certainly produce these. The *ἐνέργεια* not only results in a *ἔξις*, but also follows from it, and the test of the formation of a *ἔξις* is pleasure felt in acts resulting from it. (II. III. 1.) When Aristotle says, that there is nothing human so abiding as the *ἐνέργειαι κατ' ἀρετὴν*—διὰ τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους, he implies, of course, that these *ἐνέργειαι* are bound together by the chain of a *ἔξις*, of which in his own phraseology they are the efficient, the formal, and the final cause. It is observable, that the phrase *ἐνέργειαι τῆς ἀρετῆς* occurs only twice in the ethical treatise. (III. V. 1, X. III. 1.) This is in accordance with the principle that virtue cannot be regarded as a *δύναμις*. Therefore Aristotle seems to regard moral acts not so much as the development of a latent excellence, but rather as the development or action of our nature in accordance with a law (*ἐνέργειαι κατ' ἀρετήν*). Virtue then comes in as a regulative, rather than as a primary idea; it is introduced as subordinate, though essential, to happiness.

When we meet phrases like this just mentioned, we translate them, most probably, into our own formulæ, into words belonging to our own moral and psychological systems. We speak of ‘moral acts,’ or ‘virtuous activities,’ or ‘moral energies.’ Thus we conceive of Aristotle’s doctrine as amounting to this, that ‘good acts produce good habits.’ Practically, no doubt, his theory does come to this; and if our object in studying his theory be *οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις*, no better or more useful principle could be deduced

from it. But in so interpreting him, we really strip Aristotle of all his philosophy. When he spoke of *ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν*, a wide range of metaphysical associations accompanied the expression. He was bringing the mind and moral powers of man into the entire chain of nature, at one end of which was matter, and at the other end God. He had in his thoughts, that a moral *ἐνέργεια* was to the undeveloped capacities as a flower to the seed, as a statue to the block, as the waking to the sleeping, as the finite to the undefined. And he yet farther implied that this *ἐνέργεια* was no mere process or transition to something else, but contained its end in itself, and was desirable for its own sake. The distinctness of modern language, and the separation between the various spheres of modern thought, prevent us from reproducing in any one term all the various associations that attach to this formula of ancient philosophy. As said before, we must rather feel, than endeavour to express them.

Hitherto we have only alluded to those conceptions which *ἐνέργεια*, as a universal category, imported into Ethics. We have now to advert to those which necessarily accrue to it by reason of its introduction into this science. It is clear that a psychical *ἐνέργεια* must be different from the same category exhibited in any external object. Life, the mind, the moral faculties, must have their 'existence in actuality' distinguished from their mere 'potentiality' by some special difference, not common to other existences. What is it that distinguishes vitality from the conditions of life, waking from sleeping, thought from the dormant faculties, moral action from the unevoked moral capacities? In all these contrasts there is no conception that approaches nearer towards summing up the distinction than that of 'consciousness.'

Viewed from without, or objectively, *ἐνέργεια* must mean an existence fully developed in itself, or an activity desirable for its own sake, so that the mind could contemplate it without seeing in it a means or a condition to anything beyond. But when taken subjectively, as being an *ἐνέργεια* of the mind itself, as existing not only *for* the mind but also *in* the mind, it acquires a new aspect and character. Henceforth it is not only the rounded whole, the self-ending activity, the blooming of something perfect, in the contemplation of which the mind could repose; but it is the mind itself called out into actuality. It springs out of the mind and ends in the mind. It is not only life, but the sense of life; not only waking, but the feeling of the powers; not only perception or thought, but a consciousness of one's own faculties as well as of the external object.

This conscious vitality of the life and the mind is not to be considered a permanent condition, but one that arises in us.<sup>36</sup> Oftenest it is like a thrill of joy, a momentary intuition. Were it abiding, if our mind were capable of a perpetual *ἐνέργεια*, we should be as God, who is *ἐνέργεια ἀνευ δυνάμεως*. But that which we attain to for a brief period gives us a glimpse of the divine, and of the life of God.<sup>37</sup> ‘The life of God is of a kind with those highest moods which with us last a brief space, it being impossible that they should be permanent, whereas with Him they are permanent, since His ever-present consciousness is pleasure itself. And it is because they are vivid states of consciousness that waking and perception and thought are the

<sup>36</sup> *Eth.* ix. ix. 5. γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὁ ἀδύνατον) ἐπει ταῦτα καὶ ήδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγρήγορσις αἰσθησις νόησις ήδιστον, ἐλπίδες δὲ καὶ μῆμαι διὰ ταῦτα.

<sup>37</sup> *Metaph.* xi. vii. 6. Διαγωγὴ δὲ ἔστιν οὐα ἀριστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν· οὕτω γάρ δεῖ ἐκεῖνό ἔστιν (ἡμῖν μὲν γάρ

sweetest of all things, and in a secondary degree hope and memory.'

This passage seems of itself an almost sufficient answer to those who would argue that Aristotle did not mean to imply consciousness in his definition of happiness. If our happiness, which is defined as *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς*, gives us a conception of the blessedness of God, which is elsewhere defined as the 'thinking upon thought,' we can hardly escape the conclusion, that it is the deepest and most vivid consciousness in us that constitutes our happiness. The more this idea is followed out, the more completely will it be found applicable to the theory of Aristotle; the more will it justify his philosophy and be justified by it. But here it is necessary to confess, that in using the term 'consciousness' to express the chief import of *ἐνέργεια*, as applied to the mind and to the theory of happiness, we are using a distinct modern term, whereas the ancient one was indistinct; we are making explicit what was only implicit in Aristotle; we are rather applying to him a deduction from his principles than exactly representing them in their purest form. Aristotle never says 'consciousness,' though we see he meant it. But one of the peculiarities of his philosophy was the want of subjective formulæ, and a tendency to confuse the subjective and the objective together. About *ἐνέργεια* itself Aristotle is not consistent; sometimes he treats it purely as objective, separating the consciousness from it; as, for instance, *Eth.* ix. ix. 9, *ἴστι τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν*. 'There is somewhat in us that takes cognisance of the exercise of our powers.' Again x. iv. 8, *τελειοῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ή ἡδονὴ ὡς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος*. 'Pleasure is a sort of superadded perfection, making perfect the exercise of our powers.' But this is at variance with his usual custom; for Happiness is universally defined by him as *ἐνέργεια*, and Endemus, following

this out, defined Pleasure as *ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος*. And if we wish to see the term applied in an undeniably subjective way, we may look to *Eth. ix. vii. 6.* ‘*Ἡδεῖα δ' ἔστι τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἡ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἡ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἡ μνήμη,* where we can hardly help translating, ‘the actual consciousness of the present,’ as contrasted with ‘the hope of the future,’ and ‘the memory of the past.’ In a similar context, *De Memoria*, i. 4, we find *Τοῦ μὲν παρόντος αἰσθησις, κ.τ.λ.*

In saying that the idea of ‘consciousness’ is implied in, and might almost always be taken to represent, Aristotle’s Ethical application of *ἐνέργεια*, we need not overshoot the mark, and speak as if Aristotle made the *Sūmmum Bonum* to consist in self-consciousness, or self-reflection ; that would be giving far too much weight to the subjective side of the conception *ἐνέργεια*. Aristotle’s theory rather comes to this, that the chief good for man is to be found in life itself. Life, according to his philosophy, is no means to anything ulterior ; in the words of Goethe, ‘Life itself is the end of life.’ The very use of the term *ἐνέργεια*, as part of the definition of happiness, shows, as Aristotle tells us, that he regards the chief good as nothing external to man, but as existing in man and for man—existing in the evocation, the vividness, and the fruition of man’s own powers.<sup>38</sup> Let that be called out into ‘actuality,’ which is potential or latent in man, and happiness is the result. Avoiding then any overstrained application of the term ‘consciousness,’ and aiming rather at paraphrase than translation, it may be useful to notice one or two places in which the term *ἐνέργεια* occurs. *Eth. i. x. 2.* “*Αρά γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαιμων τότε ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ; Η τοῦτο γε*

<sup>38</sup> *Eth. i. viii. 3.* “*Ορθῶς δὲ καὶ θτι τέλος, οὗτος γάρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν πρᾶξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ γίνεται καὶ οὐ τῶν ἀκτός.*

*παντελῶς ἄτοπον, ἀλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ;* ‘Is a man *then* happy, after he is dead ? Or is not this altogether absurd, especially for us who call happiness a conscious state ?’ I. x. 9. *Κύριαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας.* ‘Happiness depends (not on fortune, but) on harmonious moods of mind.’ I. x. 15. *Τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαιμονὰ τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργοῦντα, κ.τ.λ.* ‘What hinders us calling him happy whose mind is moving in perfect harmony ?’ VII. xiv. 8. *Διὸ ὁ Θεὸς ἀεὶ μὲν καὶ ἀπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἔστιν ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας.* ‘God is in the fruition of one pure pleasure everlasting. For deep consciousness is possible, not only of motion, but also of repose.’ IX. ix. 5. *Μονώτη μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον καθ' αὐτὸν ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς, μεθ' ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾶσιν.* ‘Now to the solitary individual life is grievous; for it is not easy to maintain a glow of mind by one's self, but in company with some one else, and in relation to others, this is easier.’

The formula we are discussing is applied by Aristotle to express the nature both of Pleasure and of Happiness. By examining separately these two applications of the term, we shall not only gain a clearer conception of the import of *ἐνέργεια* itself, but also we shall be in a better position for seeing what were Aristotle's real views about Happiness. I. The great point that Aristotle insists upon with regard to Pleasure is, that it is not *κίνησις* or *γένεσις*, but *ἐνέργεια* (*Eth. x. iii. 4, 5, x. iv. 2*). What is the meaning of the distinction ? In Aristotle's *Rhetoric*,<sup>39</sup> which contains his earlier and less scientific view, we find Pleasure defined in exactly the terms here repudiated, namely, as ‘a certain

<sup>39</sup> *Rhet. i. xi. 1.* ‘Τροκείσθω δ' ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν ὑπέρχουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ εἴναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησίν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατέστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν τούταντιον.

motion of the vital powers, and a settling down perceptibly and suddenly into one's proper nature, while Pain is the contrary.' This definition corresponds with that given in Plato's *Timaeus*.<sup>40</sup> It seems to have been originally due to the Cyrenaics; for these are said to be referred to by Socrates in the *Philebus* of Plato (p. 53 C) under the name of 'a refined set of men (*κομψοί τινες*), who maintain that pleasure is always a state of becoming (*γένεσις*), and never a state of being (*οὐσία*)' (see above, p. 176). Now in all essential parts of their views on pleasure Aristotle and Plato were quite agreed. Both would have said,<sup>41</sup> pleasure is not the chief good; both would have made a distinction between the bodily pleasures, which are preceded by desire and a sense of pain—and the mental pleasures, which are free from this; both would have asserted the pleasure of the philosopher to be higher than all other pleasures. The difference between them resolves itself into one of formulæ. Plato has no consistent formula to express pleasure, he calls it 'a return to one's natural state,' 'a becoming,' 'a filling up,' 'a transition.' But all these terms are only applicable to the bodily pleasures, preceded by a sense of want. Plato acknowledges that there are pleasures above these, but he seems to have no word to express them. Therefore he may be said to leave the stigma upon pleasure in general, that it is a mere state of transition. Aristotle here steps in with his formula of *ἐνέργεια*, and says, pleasure is not a transition, but a fruition. It is not imperfect, but an End-in-itself. It does not arise from our coming to our natural state, but from our employing it.'<sup>42</sup>

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Plato, *Timaeus*, p. 64 D. Τὸ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίαιον γεγνόμενον ἀθρόον παρ' ἡμῖν πάθος ἀλγεινόν, τὸ δ'

x. iii. 13.

<sup>42</sup> So Eudemus, *Eth.* vii. xii. 3. Οὐ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ χρε-  
μένων.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Plato, *Philebus*, p. 22 E, *Eth.*

Kant<sup>43</sup> defines pleasure to be 'the sense of that which promotes life, pain of that which hinders it. Consequently,' he argues, 'every pleasure must be preceded by pain ; pain is always the first. For what else would ensue upon a continued advancement of vital power, but a speedy death for joy? Moreover, no pleasure can follow immediately upon another ; but, between the one and the other, some pain must have place. It is the slight depressions of vitality, with intervening expansions of it, which together make up a healthy condition, which we erroneously take for a continuously felt state of well-being ; whereas, this condition consists only of pleasurable feelings, following each other by reciprocation, that is, with continually intervening pain. Pain is the stimulus of activity, and in activity we first become conscious of life ; without it an inanimate state would ensue.' In these words the German philosopher seems almost exactly to have coincided with Plato. The 'sense of that which promotes life' answers to *ἀναπλήρωσις*, and Plato appears to have held, with Kant, the reciprocal action of pleasure and pain (cf. *Phædo*, p. 60). Kant's formulæ, like Plato's, are only applicable to the bodily sensations, and do not express pleasures of the mind.

Aristotle in defining Pleasure as *ὁ τελεῖοῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν*, makes it, not 'the sense of what promotes life,' but rather the sense of life itself ; the sense of the vividness of the vital powers ; the sense that any faculty whatsoever has met its proper object. This definition then is equally applicable to the highest functions of the mind, as well as to the bodily organs. Even in the case of pleasure felt upon the supplying of a want, the Aristotelian<sup>44</sup> doctrine with regard to that

<sup>43</sup> Kant's *Anthropology*, p. 169. The above translation is given by Dr. Badham in an Appendix to his

edition of Plato's *Philebus*. London, 1855.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. *Eth.* x. iii. 6. Οὐδὲ ξετινάρα

pleasure was, that it was not identical with the supply, but contemporaneous; that it resulted from the play and action of vital powers not in a state of depression, *while* the depressed organs were receiving sustenance. To account for the fact that Pleasure cannot be long maintained, Aristotle would not have said, like Kant, that we are unable to bear a continuous expansion of the vital powers; but rather, that we are unable to maintain the vivid action of the faculties.<sup>45</sup> Pleasure then, according to Aristotle, proceeds rather from within than from without; it is the sense of existence; and it is so inseparably connected with the idea of life, that we cannot tell whether life is desired for the sake of pleasure, or pleasure for the sake of life.<sup>46</sup>

2. If Happiness be defined as *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς*, and Pleasure as *ἢ τελειοῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν*, what is the relation between them? Perhaps it is unfair to Aristotle to bring the different parts of his (probably unfinished) work thus into collision. Probably he worked out the treatise on Pleasure in Book X. without much regard to the theory of Happiness, but merely availing himself of the formulæ which seemed most applicable. It is only in Book VII. (VIII. 2)—which we have seen reason to consider a later work, and the compilation of Eudemus—that Pleasure and Happiness are brought together on the grounds that they both consist in ‘the free play of conscious life’ (*ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος*). This is a carrying out of Aristotle’s doctrine beyond what we find in Books I. and X. Aristotle

ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ γινομένης  
μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἥδοις' ἄν τις. VII.  
xiv. 7. Λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἡδέα  
τὰ λατρεύοντα· ὅτι γάρ συμβαίνει λα-  
τρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ὑγιοῦς πρά-  
τοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἥδθοκεν εἶναι, i.e.  
that it is the play, in some sort, of  
the undepressed vital functions, while  
those that were depressed are being

recruited.

<sup>45</sup> Eth. x. iv. 9. Πάντα γάρ τὰ ἀν-  
θρώπεια δύναται συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν.

<sup>46</sup> Eth. x. ii. 11. Συνεζεῦχαι μὲν  
γάρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐ  
δέχεσθαι· ἔνεν τε γάρ ἐνεργείας οὐ  
γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνέργειαν τε-  
λειοῖ ἡ ἡδονή.

had prepared the way in these for the identification of Happiness with the highest kind of Pleasure, but had not himself arrived at it. However, we can find no other distinction in his theory between Pleasure and Happiness, than that the latter is something ideal and essentially moral, (*τέλος καὶ τέλειον πάντη πάντως*), and extended over an entire life (*λαβούσα μῆκος βίου τελείου*), and implying the highest human excellence, the exercise of the highest faculties (*ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην ἀρετήν*). We have before alluded to the ideal character of Happiness as a whole. This is shown especially by the fact, that while on the one hand Aristotle says that Happiness (*ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς*) must occupy a whole life, on the other hand he speaks of brevity of duration as necessarily attaching to every human *ἐνέργεια*. A *δύναμις*, he argues, is not only a *δύναμις* of being, but also a *δύναμις* of not-being. This contradiction always infects our *ἐνέργειαι*, and, like a law of gravitation, this negative side is always tending to bring them to a stop. The heavenly bodies, being divine and eternal, move perpetually and unweariedly,<sup>47</sup> for in them this law of contradiction does not exist. But to mortal creatures it is impossible to long maintain an *ἐνέργεια* —that vividness of the faculties, on which joy and pleasure depend. Happiness then, as a permanent condition, is something ideal; Aristotle figures it as the whole of life summed up into a vivid moment of consciousness; or again, as the aggregate of such moments with the intervals omitted; or again, that these moments are its essential part (*τὸ κύριον μέρος τῆς εὐδαιμονίας*), constituting the most blessed state of the internal life (*ζωὴ μακαριωτάτη*), while the framework

<sup>47</sup> *Metaph.* viii. viii. 18. Διὸ δεὶ μνεῖ τοῦτο θρῶντα· οὐ γὰρ περὶ τὴν ἐνέργειν ἥλιος καὶ ἀστρα καὶ θλος δ δύναμιν τῆς ἀντιφάσεως αὐτοῖς, οἷον οὐρανός, καὶ οὐ φοβερὸν μή ποτε στῆ, δ τοῖς φθαρτοῖς, ή κίνησις. φοβοῦνται οἱ περὶ φύσεως. Οὐδὲ κά-

for these will be the *Bios aἰρετώτατος*, or most favourable external career (*Eth.* ix. ix. 9). In what then do these moments consist? Chiefly in the sense of life and personality; in the higher kind of consciousness, which is above the mere physical sense of life. This is either coupled with a sense of the good and noble, as in the consciousness of good deeds done (*Eth.* ix. vii. 4); or it is awakened by friendship, by the sense of love and admiration for the goodness of a friend, who is, as it were, one's self and yet not one's self (*Eth.* ix. 10); or finally it exists to the highest degree in the evocation of the reason, which is not only each man's proper self (*Eth.* ix. iv. 4, x. vii. 9), as forming the deepest ground of his consciousness, but is also something divine, and more than mortal in us.<sup>48</sup>

III. Turning now to the consideration of *Μεσότης*, we shall see that it is only one application of this formula, to use it in reference to moral subjects; that it is indeed a most widely applicable philosophical idea, and has a definite history and development previous to Aristotle. It would seem not to require a very advanced state of philosophy in order for men to discover the maxim, that 'moderation is best,' that 'excess is to be avoided.' Thus as far back as Hesiod we find the praise of *μέτρια ἔργα*. The era of the Seven Sages produced the gnome, afterwards inscribed on the temple of Delphi, *Μηδὲν ἄγαν*. And one of the few sayings of Phocylides which remain is *Πολλὰ μέσοισιν ἀριστα, μέσος θέλω σὺ πόλει εἶναι*. Now all that is contained in these popular and prudential sayings is of course also contained in the principle of *Μεσότης*, which is so conspicuous in the *Ethics* of Aristotle. But Aristotle's principle contains something

<sup>48</sup> The Peripatetics seem to have refined upon Aristotle's use of *ένεργεια*, and to have tried to give it a re-

stricted ethical sense as implying self-determination and will. See above, p. 36.

more—it is not a mere application of the doctrine of moderation to the subject-matter of the various separate virtues. We see traces of a more profound source of the idea in this reference to the verse ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί. For here we are taken back to associations of the Pythagorean philosophy, and to the principle that evil is of the nature of the infinite and good of the finite.<sup>49</sup>

To say that what is infinite is evil, that what is finite is good, may seem an entire contradiction to our own ways of thinking. We speak of ‘man’s finite nature,’ or of ‘the infinite nature of God,’ from a contrary point of view. But by ‘finite’ in such sentences we mean to express limitations of power, of goodness, of knowledge, each limitation implying an inferiority as compared with a nature in which such limitation does not exist. But the Pythagoreans were not dealing with this train of thought, when they said ‘the finite is good.’ They were expressing what was in the first place a truth of number, but afterwards was applied as a universal symbol; they were speaking of goodness in reference to their own minds. The ‘finite’ in number is the calculable, that<sup>50</sup> which the mind can grasp and handle; the ‘infinite’ is the incalculable, that which baffles the mind, that which refuses to reduce itself to law, and hence remains unknowable. The ‘infinite’ in this sense remained an object of aversion to the Pythagoreans, and hence in drawing out their double row of goods and evils, they placed ‘the even’ on the side of the bad, ‘the odd’ on the side of the good. This itself might seem paradoxical, until we learn that with even numbers they

<sup>49</sup> *Eth.* II. vi. 14. Τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἰκάζουν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πενερασμένου.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Philolaus, apud Stob. *Ecl. Phys.* i. xxi. 7. Καὶ πάντα γα μὰν τὰ

γιγνωσκόμενα ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντι, οὐ γὰρ οἶδόν τε οὐδὲν οὔτε νοηθῆμεν οὔτε γνωσθῆμεν ἄνευ τούτων. Whether this fragment be genuine or not, it expresses the doctrine.

associated the idea of infinite subdivision, and that even numbers added together fail to produce squares; while the series of the odd numbers if added together produce a series of squares; and the square, by reason of its completeness and of the law which it exhibits, is evidently of the nature of the finite. The opposition of the finite and the infinite took root in Greek philosophy, and above all in the system of Plato. Unity and plurality, form and matter, genus and individuals, idea and phenomena, are all different modifications of this same opposition. The Pythagoreans themselves appear to have expressed or symbolised matter under the term  $\tau\ddot{o}\ \check{\alpha}\pi\varepsilon\iota\rho\nu$ , and Plato<sup>51</sup> seems to have yet more distinctly conceived of this characteristic of matter or space, saying that it was an ‘undefined duad,’ that is, that it contained in itself an infinity in two directions, the infinitely small and the infinitely great.

Assuming, therefore, that the principle of the finite, or the limit ( $\pi\varepsilon\pi\rho\alpha\sigma\mu\acute{e}n\omega\nu$  or  $\pi\varepsilon\rho\alpha s$ ), may be considered as identical with that of form or law, we may now proceed to notice what appears to be the transition from the idea of fixed law or form ( $\varepsilon\acute{e}dos$ ), to that of proportion or the mean ( $\mu\varepsilon\sigma\acute{o}t\eta s$ ), that is, to law or form become relative. It is to be found in the *Philebus* of Plato, pp. 23—27. Socrates there divides all existence into four classes: first, the infinite ( $\check{\alpha}\pi\varepsilon\iota\rho\nu$ ); second, the limit ( $\pi\varepsilon\rho\alpha s$ ); third, things created and compounded out of the mixture of these two ( $\acute{e}k\ \tau\acute{o}\acute{u}t\omega n\ \mu\acute{i}k\tau\acute{h}\nu\ kai\ \gamma\acute{e}g\acute{e}n\eta m\acute{e}n\eta n\ o\acute{u}s\acute{a}\nu$ ); fourth, the cause of this mixture and of the creation of things. The infinite is that class of things admitting of degrees, more or less, hotter and colder, quicker and slower, and the like, where no fixed notion of quantity has as yet come in. The limit is this fixed notion of quan-

tity, as, for instance, the equal or the double. The third or mixed class exhibits the law of the *πέρας* introduced into the *ἄπειρον*. Of this Socrates adduces beautiful manifestations. Thus in the human body the infinite is the tendency to extremes, to disorder, to disease, but the introduction of the limit here produces a balance of the constitution and health. In sounds you have the infinite degrees of deep and high, quick and slow; but the limit gives rise to modulation, and harmony, and all that is delightful in music. In climate and temperature, where the limit has been introduced, excessive heats and violent storms subside, and the mild and genial seasons in their order follow. In the human mind, 'the goddess of the limit' checks into submission the wild and wanton passions, and gives rise to all that is good.

Both in things physical and moral these two opposites, the finite and the infinite, are thus made to play into one another, and to be the joint causes of beauty and excellence. Out of their union an entire set of ideas and terms seems to spring up, symmetry, proportion, balance, harmony, moderation, and the like. And this train of associations seems to have been constantly present to the mind of Plato. It suited the essentially Greek character of his philosophy to dwell upon the goodness of beauty, and the beauty of goodness, on the morality of art, and the artistic nature of morality; so that words like *μετριότης* and *συμμετρία* become naturally appropriated to express excellence in life and action.<sup>52</sup>

This Platonic principle, then, Aristotle seems to have taken up and adopted, slightly changing the formula, however,

<sup>52</sup> Cf. *Republic*, p. 400 E. Ἐστι δὲ γένος που πλήρης μὲν γραφικὴ αὐτῶν καὶ πῦσα ἡ τοιαύτη δημιουργία, πλήρης δὲ ὑφαστικὴ καὶ ποικιλία καὶ οἰκοδομή καὶ πῦσα ἡ τῶν ἄλλων σκευών ἐργασία, ἔτι δὲ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων φύσις καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων

φυτῶν· ἐν πῦσι γὰρ τούτοις ἐνεστιν εὐσχημοσύνη ἢ ἀσχημοσύνη. καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀσχημοσύνη καὶ ἀβρύθυμα καὶ ἀναρμοστία κακολογίας καὶ κακοηθείας ἀδελφά, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου, σώφρονός τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἥθους, ἀδελφά τε καὶ μιμήματα.

and speaking of *μεσότης* instead of *μετριότης*. The reason for this change may have been, that the formula became thus more exact and more capable of a close analytic application to a variety of instances, and at the same time gave scope for expressing that which is with Aristotle the complement of the theory, namely the doctrine of extremes and their relation to the mean. Aristotle does not ignore the physical and artistic meanings of the principle. On the contrary, the whole bearing of his use of the term *μεσότης* is to show that moral virtue is only another expression of the same law which we see in nature and the arts. Life has been defined to be 'multeity in unity,' in other words, it is the law of the *πέρας* exhibited in the *ἀπειρον*. The first argument made use of by Aristotle to show that virtuous action consists in a balance between extremes is drawn from the analogy of physical life; 'For about immaterial things,' he says, 'we must use material analogies.' 'Excess and deficiency equally destroy the health and strength, while what is proportionate (*τὰ σύμμετρα*) preserves and augments them' (*Eth.* ii. ii. 6). Again, he points out that all art aims at the mean, and the finest works of art are those which seem to have realised a subtle grace which the least addition to any part or diminution from it would overset (*Eth.* ii. vi. 9). 'And moral virtue,' he adds, 'is finer than the finest art.' But it is by a mathematical expression of the formula, by reducing it to an absolutely quantitative conception, that Aristotle's use of *Μεσότης* is chiefly distinguished. He says, that all quantity, whether space or number (*ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ*), admits of the terms more, less, and equal. On making these terms relative, you have excess, deficiency, and the mean. The mean, then, is in geometrical proportion what the equal is in arithmetical progression. The middle term arithmetically is that which is equidistant from the terms on each

side of it. Geometrically, the mean is not an absolute mean, but a relative mean, that is, if applied to action, it expresses the consideration of persons and of circumstances (*Eth.* ii. vi. 4, 5). This opposition of the mean to the too much and too little becomes henceforward a formula of almost universal application. It is no mere negative principle, not the mere avoiding of extremes, but rather the realisation of a law. When Aristotle says that the *μεσότης* must be *ώρισμένη λόγῳ*, he means that our action must correspond to the standard which exists in the rightly ordered mind. What is subjectively the *λόγος*, law or standard, that is objectively the *μεσότης* or balance. ‘Each of our senses,’ says Aristotle, ‘is a sort of balance (*μεσότης*) between extremes in the objects of sensation, and this it is which gives us the power of judging.’<sup>53</sup>

Thus again he says of plants, that they have no perceptions, ‘because they have no standard’ (*διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν μεσότητα, De An.* ii. xii. 4). Again, he defines pleasure and pain to consist in ‘the consciousness, by means of the discriminating faculty (*τῆς αἰσθητικῆς μεσότητι*) of the senses, of coming in contact with good or evil.’<sup>54</sup> Each of the senses then is, or contains, a sort of standard of its proper object. And it is clear that Aristotle attributes to us a similar critical faculty in regard of morals. He says, that ‘It is peculiar to man, as compared with the other animals, that he has a sense of good and bad, just and unjust.’<sup>55</sup> He seems to have regarded this ‘moral sense’ as analogous to the musical ear,

<sup>53</sup> *De Anima*, ii. xi. 17. ‘Οὐ τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἶον μεσότητός τινος οὖσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά. Τὸ γάρ μέσον κριτικόν.

<sup>54</sup> Καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς

τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, δὲ τοιαῦτα.—*De An.* iii. vii. 2.

<sup>55</sup> *Pol.* i. ii. 12. Τοῦτο γάρ πρὸς τὰλλα ὅπα τοῖς ἀνθράκοις ἔδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθησιν ἔχειν.

which in some degree is almost natural to all men, but again exists in very different degrees in different men, and also may be more or less cultivated. Thus (*Eth.* ix. ix. 6) he speaks of the good man being ‘ pleased at good actions, as the musical man is at beautiful tunes.’ And in *Eth.* x. iii. 10 he says that ‘ It will be impossible to feel the pleasure of a just man if one is not just, as it will be to feel the pleasure of a musical man if one is not musical.’ In the *Ethics*, its proper objective sense is preserved to *Μεσότης*, which accordingly means a ‘balance,’ and not the ‘standard’ for determining that balance, which is expressed by the term *λόγος*. A moment’s consideration of this point will give an answer to the somewhat superficial question, Why does not Aristotle make the intellectual virtues mean states? In the original form of the principle of *Μεσότης* we have seen that it consisted in the introduction of the law of the *πέρας* into the *ἀπειρον*. The passions and desires are the infinite; moral virtue consists in introducing limit (*πέρας*) into them—in bringing them under law (*λόγῳ ὁρίζειν*)—in making them exhibit balance, proportion, harmony (*μεσότητα*), which is the realisation of the law. On the other hand, reason is ‘right law’ (*ὁρθὸς λόγος*), i.e. is another name for the law itself. It is the standard, and therefore does not require to be regulated by the standard. The intellectual virtues are not *μεσότητες*, because they are *λόγοι*.

The worth and “validity of Aristotle’s principle of the mean has been much canvassed and questioned. Kant has been very severe on Aristotle for making ‘a merely quantitative difference between vice and virtue.’ Some have thought the theory practically true, but scientifically untenable; others, on the contrary, that scientifically and abstractedly it is true, but that practically it gives an unworthy picture of morality, that it fails to represent the

absolute and awful difference between right and wrong. Aristotle himself seems to have anticipated this last objection, by remarking<sup>56</sup> that ‘It is only according to the most abstract and metaphysical conception that virtue is a mean between vices, whereas from a moral point of view it is an extreme (i.e. utterly and extremely removed from them).’ Aristotle acknowledges that the formula of the mean does not adequately express the *good* of virtue; that when thinking of virtue under the category of good, and regarding it as an object for the moral feelings and desires, as an object to be striven after, we should rather seek some other formula to express its nature. In the same way it might be said in accordance with modern views, that ‘the mean’ does not adequately express the *right* of virtue in relation to the will and conscience.

The objections to Aristotle’s theory arise from a partial misconception of what the term *Μεσότης* really conveys. Kant for ‘the mean’ substitutes ‘law.’ But we have already traced the identity or correlation of *Λόγος* and *Μεσότης*, and we have seen that *Μεσότης* really implies and expresses exactly what is meant by ‘law’—properly so called. The only advantage which the term ‘law’ can have over *Μεσότης*, as an ethical principle, comes to it unfairly. For there is a sort of ambiguity between the two meanings of the word law; on the one hand it may denote a general principle, or harmony, or idea in nature; on the other hand, an authoritative command of the State. In applying the word to morals the associations of both meanings are blended together, and ‘the law of right’ accordingly expresses not only something harmonious, the attainment of an idea in action, but

<sup>56</sup> *Eth.* II. vi. 17. Κατὰ μὲν τὴν | λέγοντα μεσότης ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τῇ ἦν εἶναι | δὲ τὸ δικιστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης.

also there is a sort of association of authority conveyed, of the 'must,' of something binding on the will.

Supposing, then, we take the word 'law' or 'idea' as being the real representative of *Mετόρης*, it may still be asked whether a quantitative term be a fit and worthy expression for so deep a moral conception. The Pythagoreans would not have understood this objection. They thought numbers the most sublime and the only true expression for all that was good in the physical and moral world. They would have used in reference to number the exact counterpart of Wordsworth's praise of Duty—'And the most ancient heavens by thee are fresh and strong.' They would have delighted to say that virtue is a square and vice an uneven-sided figure. When we look to the arts, following the analogy that Aristotle pointed out, we see clearly how the whole of beauty seems from one point of view to depend on the more and the less. It does not derogate from a beautiful form, that more or less would spoil it. We still think of beauty as something positive, and that more or less would be the negations of this. By degrees, however, we come to figure to ourselves beauty rather as repelling the more and the less, than as being caused by them. The capacity for more and less is matter, the *ἀπειρον*, the *ἀόριστος δυάς* of Plato. The idea coming in stamps itself upon this, we now have the harmonious and the beautiful, and all extremes and quantitative possibilities vanish out of sight. Matter is totally forgotten in our contemplation of form. So it is also with morals. We might fix our view upon the negative side of virtue, look at it in contrast to the extremes, and say it is constituted virtue by being a 'little more than vice and a little less than vice.' But this would be to establish a positive idea out of the negation of its negations.

To look at anything in its elements makes it appear

inferior to what it seems as a whole. Resolve the statue or the building into stone and the laws of proportion, and no worthy causes of the former beautiful result seem now left behind. So, also, resolve a virtuous act into the passions and some quantitative law, and it seems to be rather destroyed than analysed ; though, after all, what was there else that it could be resolved into ? An act of bravery seems beautiful and noble ; when we reduce this to a balance between the instincts of fear and self-confidence, the glory of it is gone. This is because the form is everything, and the matter nothing ; and yet the form, without the matter as its exponent, has no existence. It is, no doubt, true that the beauty of that brave act would have been destroyed had the boldness of it been pushed into folly ; and equally so had it been controlled into caution. The act, as it was done, exhibits the law of life, ‘ multeity in unity ; ’ or, in other words, the law of beauty. This is, then, what the term *Μεσότης* is capable of expressing ; it is the law of beauty. If virtue is harmony, grace, and beauty in action, *Μεσότης* perfectly expresses this.

That beauty constituted virtue, was an eminently Greek idea. If we run through Aristotle’s list of the virtues, we find them all embodying this idea. The law of the *Μεσότης*, as exhibited in bravery, temperance, liberality, and magnanimity, constitutes a noble, free, and brilliant type of manhood. Extend it also, as Aristotle does, to certain qualifications of temper, speech, and manners, and you have before you the portrait of a graceful Grecian gentleman. The question now is, are there other virtues which exhibit some other law than this law of beauty, and to which, therefore, the *Μεσότης* would be inapplicable ? Let us take as instances, truth, humility, charity, forgiveness of injuries, and ask what is the case with these. ‘ Truth ’ is treated of in a remarkable way

by Aristotle; under this name he describes a certain straightforwardness of manner, which he places as the mean between boastfulness and over-modesty. That deeper kind of truth which, as he says, is concerned with justice and injustice, he omits to treat of. When we come to the Peripatetic theory of justice—taking this as an individual virtue—we find it imperfectly developed. Now, truth itself seems expressible under the law of the *Μεσότης*; it is a balance of reticence with candour, suitable to times and seasons. But the impulse to truth—the duty of not deceiving—the relation of the will to this virtue, seems something quite beyond the formula of the Mean.

So, also, with the other virtues specified; humility, charity, and forgiveness of injuries being Christian qualities, are not described by Aristotle; but if we ask if they are ‘mean states,’ we find that they are all beautiful; and, in so far as that, they all exhibit a certain grace and balance of the human feelings. There is a point at which each might be overstepped; humility must not be grovelling, nor charity weak; and forgiveness must at times give place to indignation. But there seems in them something which is also their chief characteristic, and which is beyond and different from this quality of the mean. Perhaps this might be expressed in all of them as ‘self-abnegation.’ Now, here, we get a different point of view from which to regard the virtues; and that is, the relation of Self, of the individual Will, of the moral Subject to the objective in the sphere of action. This point of view Aristotle’s principle does not touch. *Μεσότης* expresses the objective law of beauty in action, and, as correlative with it, the critical moral faculty in our minds, but the law of right in action as something binding on the moral subject it leaves unexpressed. To some extent this want is supplied by Aristotle’s doctrine of the *τέλος*, which raises a

beautiful action into something absolutely desirable, and makes it the end of our being.

But still the theory of 'Duty' cannot be said to exist in Aristotle, and all that relates to the moral will is with him only in its infancy. *Μεσότης*, we have seen, expresses the beauty of good acts, but leaves something in the goodness of them unexpressed. In conclusion, we must remember that 'Αρετή with Aristotle did not mean quite the same as 'virtue' with us; he meant the excellence, or perfection of man, just as he spoke elsewhere of the 'Αρετή of a horse. It is no wonder then that with his Greek views he resolved this into a sort of moral beauty.

IV. Aristotle prided himself,<sup>57</sup> not unnaturally, on having been the first to work out the laws of the Syllogism; later on in his literary career he appears to have seen that the syllogistic formula might be useful for expressing other psychological phenomena, besides those involved in arriving at a deductive conclusion. Accordingly in his treatise *On the Soul* (III. xi.) he applies it to explain the process of arriving at a resolution or determination to act. He says that this process is only possible in the animals which possess the power of calculation (*ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς*); that it implies a power of combining two or more impressions into one (*δύναται ἐν ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν*); that this syllogistic conviction (*τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ δόξαν*) contains on the one hand perception and it may be desire, and on the other hand a univeral element—wish for the generally good (*θεόλησις*, see note on *Eth.* III. iv. 1), or a general intellectual conception of the reason (*ἡ καθόλου ὑπόληψις καὶ λόγος*); that sometimes the wish for the generally good conquers the particular

<sup>57</sup> Cf. *Sophist.* *Elench.* xxxiii. 18. | *τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι παντελῶς οὐδὲν εἴχομεν ἄλλο λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ή τριβῇ ζητοῦντες πολὺν χρόνον ἐποιοῦμεν.*

desire of the moment, and sometimes the contrary takes place (*νικᾷ δ' ἐνίστε [ἢ ὅρεξις] καὶ κινεῖ τὴν βούλησιν· δτε δ' ἔκεινη ταύτην*) ; and that, though the general proposition, or major premiss, asserts that ‘ such or such a person ought to do such or such an act’—it is the minor premiss ‘ I am such or such a person and this in the present moment is such or such an act’ which sets the faculties in motion (*ἥδη αὕτη κινεῖ ἡ δόξα, οὐχ ἡ καθόλου*).<sup>58</sup> This passage, which was probably written long after the discussions on Wish and Deliberation in the third book of the *Ethics*, comes in, as it were incidentally, in treating of the ascending series of souls throughout nature. The suggestion which it contains of explaining the psychology of the human will by means of the formula of the syllogism does not appear to have been pursued further by Aristotle in his extant writings, but it was evidently taken up by the Peripatetic school, and we find it made much use of (1) in the *Eudemian Ethics*, and (2) in the treatise *On the Motion of Animals*, which is placed among the works of Aristotle, but is now generally attributed to a later follower of his school.<sup>59</sup> For a clear exposition of the doctrine of the Practical Syllogism, as held by the Peripatetics, let us refer at once to the summary account of it which is given in the last-mentioned treatise.

The Practical Syllogism depends on this principle, that ‘ No creature moves or acts, except with a view to some end.’<sup>60</sup> What therefore the law of the so-called ‘ sufficient reason ’ is

<sup>58</sup> See note on *Eth.* vi. xii. 10, where the latter part of the above passage is quoted.

<sup>59</sup> See Valentine Rose, *De Arist. Lib. Ord. et Auct.* pp. 162–174. Rose shows that this little treatise contains medical doctrines belonging to a school of medicine later than

Aristotle; and it has all the marks of being an able cento and compendium of various parts of Aristotle’s physical and physiological works.

<sup>60</sup> Πάντα τὰ ζῷα καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται ἔνεκα τίνος, διστε τοῦτο τὸτιν αὐτοῖς τέσσες τῆς κινήσεως πέρας, τὸ δὲ ἔνεκα.—*De Mot. An.* vi. 2.

to a proposition of the understanding, that the law of the final cause is to an act of the will. ‘Under what conditions of thought is it,’<sup>61</sup> asks the writer, ‘that a person at one time acts, at another time does not act; at one time is put in motion, at another time not? It seems to be much the same case as with people thinking and reasoning about abstract matter, only *there* the ultimate thing to be obtained is an abstract proposition, for as soon as one has perceived the two premisses, one perceives the conclusion. But here the conclusion that arises from the two premisses is the action; as, for instance, when one has perceived, that Every man ought to walk, and I am a man, he walks immediately. Or again, that No man ought now to walk, and I am a man, he stops still immediately. Both these courses he adopts, provided he be neither hindered nor compelled. . . . That the action is the conclusion, is plain; but the premisses of the practical syllogism are of two kinds, specifying either that something is good, or again, how it is possible.’<sup>62</sup> This then may shortly be said to be the form of the practical syllogism:

either (1) Major Premiss. Such and such an action is universally good.

Minor Premiss. This will be an action of the kind.

Conclusion. Performance of the action.

<sup>61</sup> *De Mot. An.* vii. 1. Πῶς δὲ νοῶν δὲ μὲν πράττει δὲ δ' οὐ πράττει, καὶ κινεῖται, δὲ δ' οὐ κινεῖται; “Εοικε παραπλησίως συμβαίνειν καὶ περὶ τῶν δικινήτων διανοουμένοις καὶ συλλογιζούμενοις. Ἀλλ' ἔκει μὲν θεώρημα τὸ τέλος (ὅταν γὰρ τὰς δύο προτάσεις νοήσῃ, τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐνθέσεις καὶ συνέθηκεν), ἐνταῦθα δ' ἐκ τῶν δύο προτάσεων τὸ συμπέρασμα γίγνεται ἡ πρᾶξις, οἷον ὅταν νοήσῃ δτι παντὶ βαδιστέον

ἀνθρώπῳ, αὐτὸς δ' ἀνθρωπός, βαδίζει εὐθέως, ἀν δ' οὐτι οὐδενὶ βαδιστέον νῦν ἀνθρώπῳ, αὐτὸς δ' ἀνθρωπός, εὐθὺς ἡρεμεῖ· καὶ ταῦτα ἄμφω πράττει, ἀν μή τι κωλύῃ ἡ ἀναγκάζη.

<sup>62</sup> *De Mot. An.* vii. 4. “Οτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πρᾶξις τὸ συμπέρασμα, φανερόν· αἱ δὲ προτάσεις αἱ ποιητικαὶ διὰ δύο εἰδῶν γίνονται, διά τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ διὰ τοῦ δύνατοῦ.

or (2) Major Premiss. Such and such an end is desirable.

Minor. This step will conduce to the end.

Conclusion. Taking of the step.

In other words, every action implies a sense of a general principle, and the applying of that principle to a particular case; or again, it implies desire for some end, coupled with perception of the means necessary for attaining the end. These two different ways of stating the practical syllogism are in reality coincident; for assuming that all action is for some end, the major premiss may be said always to contain the statement of an end.<sup>63</sup> And again, any particular act, which is the application of a moral principle, may be said to be the means necessary to the realisation of the principle. ‘Temperance is good,’ may be called either a general principle, or an expression of a desire for the habit of temperance. ‘To abstain now will be temperate,’ is an application of the principle, or again, it is the absolutely necessary means towards the attainment of the habit. For ‘it is absurd,’ as Aristotle tells us, ‘when one acts unjustly to talk of not wishing to be unjust, or when one acts intemperately of not wishing to be intemperate.’<sup>64</sup>

The distinction between end and means, which plays so important a part throughout the moral system of Aristotle, comes out, as might be expected, very prominently in Book III., where what must be called a sort of elementary psychology of the Will is given. But no application is there made of the scheme of the syllogism. Indeed a mathematical formula seems used, in Book III., where a logical formula is

<sup>63</sup> *Eth.* vi. xii. 10. ‘Οι γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες εἰσιν, ἐκεῖδη τοιύνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ δριστόν.

<sup>64</sup> *Eth.* iii. v. 13. ‘Ἐτι δὲ ἀλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι η τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον.

in Book VI.; for in the former, the process of deliberation is compared to the analysis of a diagram (*Eth.* iii. iii. ii); in the latter, error of deliberation is spoken of as a false syllogism, where the right end is attained by a wrong means, that is, by a false middle term.<sup>65</sup>

It is to Books VI. and VII. that we must look to see the use made of the practical syllogism. It is applied, first, to the explanation of the nature of Thought (*φρόνησις*), which is shown to contain a universal and a particular element.<sup>66</sup>

2. To show the intuitive character of moral judgments and knowledge.<sup>67</sup> 3. To prove the necessary and inseparable connection of wisdom and virtue.<sup>68</sup> 4. In answer to the question, how is it possible to know the good, and yet act contrary to one's knowledge? In short, how is incontinence possible? This phenomenon is explained in two ways; either the incontinent man does not apply a minor premiss to his universal principle, and so the principle remains dormant, and his knowledge of the good remains merely implicit; or, again, desire constructs a sort of syllogism of its own, inconsistent with, though not directly contradictory to, the arguments of the moral reason.<sup>69</sup> Incontinence therefore implies knowing the good, and at the same time not knowing it. It would be impossible to act contrary to a complete syllogism which applied the knowledge of the good to a case in point; for the necessary conclusion to such a syllo-

<sup>65</sup> *Eth.* vi. ix. 5. 'Αλλ' ἔστι καὶ τούτου φευδέει συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν, καὶ δὲ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δὲ οὐδὲ οὐδὲ, ἀλλὰ φευδῆ τὸν μέσον δρον εἶναι.

<sup>66</sup> *Eth.* vi. viii. 7. Οὐδὲ ἔστιν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἔκαστα γνωρίζειν, κ.τ.λ. vi. viii. 7. "Ετι ἡ ἀμαρτία η περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλεύσασθαι η περὶ τὸ καθ' ἔκαστον· η γὰρ δτι πάντα τὰ βα-

ρνσταθμα ὅδατα φαῦλα, η δτι τοδὶ βαρύσταθμον.

<sup>67</sup> *Eth.* vi. xi. 4. Καὶ δ νοῦς τῶν ἔσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφότερα, κ.τ.λ.

<sup>68</sup> *Eth.* vi. xii. 10. "Εστι δ' η φρόνησις . . . ἀρχds.

<sup>69</sup> *Eth.* vii. iii. 6. "Ετι ἐπει . . . οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ, vii. iii. 9, 10. "Ετι καὶ ὅδε . . . κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

gism would be good action. But there is broken knowledge and temporary moral obliviousness in the mind of the incontinent man, and the practical syllogism gives a formula for expressing this.

The foregoing references serve to show, that in itself this formula is only a way of stating certain psychological facts. The question whether people do really go through a syllogism in or before every action, is much like the question whether we always reason in syllogisms. Most reasonings seem to be from particular to particular, that is to say, by analogy; and yet some sort of universal conception, if it be only the sense of the uniformity of nature, lies at the bottom of all inference. And so too in action, most acts seem prompted by the instinct of the moment, and yet some general idea, as for instance, the desire of the creature for its proper good, might be said to lie behind this instinct. This theory acknowledges<sup>70</sup> that the mind constantly passes over one of the premisses of the practical syllogism, as being obvious; that we act often instantaneously, without hesitation, just because we see an object of desire before us. Thus it is merely a way of putting it, to say that we act by a syllogism. But granting the formula, it becomes immediately a powerful analytic instrument. It seems to suggest and clear the way for a set of ulterior questions, in which important results would be involved. For now that action has been as it were caught, put to death, and dissected, and so reduced to

<sup>70</sup> *De Mot. An.* vii. 4, 5. "Οποκερ δὲ τῶν ἐρωτώντων ξνια, οὗτοι τὴν ἔτέραν πρότασιν τὴν δήλην οὐδέ· ἡ διάνοια ἐφιστᾶσα σκοκεῖ οὐδέν· οἷον εἰ τὸ βαθίζειν ἀγαθὸν ἀνθράκῳ, δτι αὐτὸς ἀνθρώπος, οὐκ ἐνδιατρίβει. Διδ καὶ δοα μὴ λογισάμενοι πράττομεν, ταχὺ πράττομεν. "Οταν γὰρ ἐνεργήσῃ ἡ τῷ αί-

σθήσει πρὸς τὸ οὖν ἔνεκα ἡ τῷ φαντασίᾳ ἡ τῷ νῷ, οὖν δρέγεται, εἰθὺς ποιεῖ· ἀντ' ἐρωτήσεως γάρ ἡ νοήσεως ἡ τῆς δρέξεως γίνεται ἐνέργεια. Ποτέον μοι, ἡ ἐπιθυμία λέγει· τοδὶ δὲ ποτόν, ἡ αἰσθησίς εἶπεν ἡ ἡ φαντασία ἡ δ νοῦς· εἰθὺς πίνει.

the level of abstract reasoning, it seems that we have only to deal with its disjointed parts in order to know the whole theory of human Will. We have only to ask what is the nature of the major premiss, and how obtained? What is the nature of the minor premiss, and how obtained? The answer to these questions in the *Ethics* is not very explicit. This is exactly one of the points on which a conclusive theory seems to have been least arrived at. With regard to our possession of general principles of action, there appear to be three different accounts given in different places.

- (1) They are innate and intuitive (vi. xi. 4, vii. vi. 6, 7).
- (2) They are evolved from experience of particulars (vi. viii. 6).\*
- (3) They depend on the moral character (vi. xii. 10, vii. viii. 4).

These three accounts are not, however, incompatible with one another. For as in explaining the origin of speculative principles (*Post. An.* ii. xix.) Aristotle seems to attribute them to reason as the cause and experience as the condition; so in regard to moral principles, we might say that they were perceived by an intuitive faculty, but under the condition of a certain bearing of the moral character, which itself arises out of and consists in particular moral experiences. This reconciliation of the statements is not made for us in the *Ethics*. There the different points of view stand apart, and there is something immature about the whole theory. So too with regard to the minor premiss in action; on the one hand we are told that it is a matter of perception (vi. viii. 9), as if it belonged to everybody; on the other hand we are told that the apprehension of these particulars is exactly what distinguishes the ‘thoughtful’ man.<sup>71</sup> But it is unnecessary to

\* Πρακτικός γε δ φρόνιμος · τῶν γὰρ ἐσχάτων τις. *Eth.* vii. ii. 5.

attempt to go beyond the lead of the *Ethics* in answering these questions, for we should ourselves most probably state them in an entirely different way.

We see in these applications of the Practical Syllogism by the Peripatetics the progress of psychology, and the tendency now manifesting itself to give attention to the phenomena of the Will. The manner in which the theory is stated, abstractedly, and with a full belief in logical formulæ, rather than an appeal to life and consciousness—shows something of the scholastic spirit. To reduce action to a syllogism dogmatically is a piece of scholasticism. Plato would have put it in this way for once, and would then have passed on to other modes of expression. But it is remarkable that this formula is one of those that remains most completely stamped upon the language of mankind. When we talk of ‘acting on principle,’ or speak of a man’s ‘principles,’ perhaps we do not reflect that this expression is a remnant of the Practical Syllogism of the Peripatetics. ‘Principle’ is no other than the Latinised form (*principium*) of *ἀρχὴ*, or the major premiss of a practical syllogism. And this, as we saw above, is in Aristotle’s language ‘a universal conception affirming that one ought to do (or not to do) some kind of thing.’<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> *De An. I.c.* ἡ μὲν καθόλος ὑπόληψις καὶ λόγος . . . λέγει οὐτε δεῖ τὸν τοιοῦτον τὸ τοιόνδε πράττειν.

## ESSAY V.

### *On the Physical and Theological Ideas in the Ethics of Aristotle.*

ALTHOUGH Aristotle endeavoured completely to separate Practical from Theoretic philosophy; and though in the present treatise he professed to adhere exclusively to an ethical (or, as he called it, a political) point of view; and though on this account he postponed, as belonging to another branch of philosophy, the consideration of several important questions<sup>1</sup>—yet still it was perhaps impossible for a system of morals to be composed bearing no trace of the writer's general views of the Universe, the Deity, and the Human Soul. And accordingly, we find more than one passage of the *Nicomachean Ethics* influenced by and indicating such general views. To understand these, and to obtain possession of that which in the mind of Aristotle must have been the setting of the entire piece, we have to follow him to some extent beyond the limits of his Practical writings. To collect a few of Aristotle's more salient dicta on Nature, God, and the Soul, will be an interesting task, but we must not be

<sup>1</sup> As, for instance, the metaphysical question concerning the good, as a universal, *Eth.* i. vi. 13. The question of Divine Providence in relation to happiness, i. ix. 13. The question whether, scientifically speaking, the Soul is divisible into parts, i. xiii. 8-10. The question whether in nature, as a general principle, the like seeks the like, or each thing seeks its opposite, *viii.* i. 7, &c.

expected to set forth a complete and definite system on these subjects, for in regard to them Aristotle's extant writings are far from containing entirely definite results, and it may even be doubted, whether in his own mind he ever succeeded in arriving at such.

In deducing Aristotle's opinions on any question from his extant works, we must not leave out of consideration the probable order and mode of composition of these works, as indicated by internal evidence (see above, p. 71, note). It seems highly probable that Aristotle—having during the previous course of his life thought out the divisions of philosophy, the leading ideas of each department, and the phraseology in which everything was to be expressed, and having also collected great stores of materials on all the subjects which his predecessors had treated of—set to work, when about fifty years old, to make his exposition of the whole, as a settlement of questions and a *κτῆμα εἰς ἀεὶ* for the world. He appears to have commenced with that which was not part of Philosophy, but was a necessary prelude to Philosophy, namely, the discussion of Method under the two forms of Dialectic, or the Logic of Probability, and Analytic, or the Logic of Science. His treatises on these subjects were collectively entitled by his editors<sup>2</sup> *Organon*, or the Instrument of Philosophy. Collaterally, and almost simultaneously with these, he appears to have composed his *Rhetoric*, as treating of a subject closely allied to Dialectic. And an easy transition led him on to deal next with the remaining branches of Practical and Productive philosophy in his *Ethics*, *Politics*, and *Art of Poetry* (see p. 71, note). Leaving all these more or less unfinished, he seems to have

<sup>2</sup> See Grote's *Aristotle*, vol. i. p. 78, and Brandis' *Schol. ad Arist.* p. 259, a. 48, &c.

## THE ORDER OF ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS.

gone on to the composition of his great series of Physical treatises. Of these probably the first to be written was the *Physical Discourse*,<sup>3</sup> which contained, as Hegel said, ‘the Metaphysic of Physics,’ being an account of what Aristotle conceived under the terms ‘Nature,’ ‘Motion,’ ‘Time,’ ‘Space,’ ‘Causation’ (or the Four Causes), and the like. After these *prolegomena* to Physics, he proceeded to treat of the Universe<sup>4</sup> in orderly sequence, beginning with the divinest part, the periphery of the whole, or outer Heaven, which, according to his views, bounded the world, being composed of ether,<sup>5</sup> a substance distinct from that of the four elements and identical with that which constitutes the vital principle and reason in the creatures of the earth. This region was the sphere of the Stars; and below it, in the Aristotelian system, was the planetary sphere, with the seven Planets (the sun and moon being reckoned among the number) moving in it. Both Stars and Planets he seems to have regarded as conscious, happy beings, moving in fixed orbits, and inhabiting regions free from all change and chance; and these regions formed the subject of his treatise *On the Heavens*. Next to this he is thought<sup>6</sup> to have composed his treatise *On Generation and Corruption*, in order to expound those principles of physical change (dependent on the hot, the cold, the wet, and the dry) which in the higher parts of the Universe had no existence. This work formed the transition to the sublunar sphere,

<sup>3</sup> Φυσικῆς Ἀκρόασεως A, B, κ.τ.λ.

*Akroasis* means a scientific, as opposed to a popular, discourse or lecture.

<sup>4</sup> The treatise *On the Universe* (*Περὶ Κόσμου*) which appears among the works of Aristotle, is spurious, being the compilation of some later

Peripatetic.

<sup>5</sup> *De Cœlo*, i. iii. 13, &c.

<sup>6</sup> See Spengel, *Ueber die Reihenfolge der naturwissenschaftlichen Schriften des Aristoteles*, in the Transactions of the Royal Academy of Bavaria, 1848.

immediately round the Earth, in which the meteors and comets moved, which was characterised by incessant change and by the passing of things into and out of existence, and which formed the subject of his *Meteorologics*. The last book of this treatise brings us down to the Earth itself, and indeed beneath its surface, for it discusses, in a curious theory, the formation of rocks and metals. From this point Aristotle would seem to have started afresh with his array of physiological treatises, the first written of which may very likely have been that *On the Parts of Animals*, as containing general principles of Anatomy and Physiology. Next it seems probable that the work *On the Soul* was produced. This, as Spengel points out, was not intended in the first instance to be a treatise on Psychology, but a physiological account of the vital principle as manifested in plants, animals, and men. A set of 'appendices,' as we should now call them, on various functions connected with life in general, such as Sensation, Memory, Sleep, Dreaming, Longevity, Death, &c., were added by Aristotle to his work *On the Soul*. Afterwards the ten books of *Researches on Animals*,<sup>7</sup> and the five books *On the Generation of Animals*—together with the minor treatise *On the Progression of Animals*, and with a collection of *Problems*,<sup>8</sup> which Aristotle probably kept by him, and added to from time to time—made up the series of Aristotle's Physiological and Physical writings, so far as he lived to complete them. Treatises *On the Physiology of*

<sup>7</sup> Ηερπὶ τὰ Ζῷα Ἰστορίαιν A, B, κ.τ.λ. The work is always referred to under this title by Aristotle. The Latin name *Historia Animalium* is therefore a mistranslation. Out of this mistranslation, however, the term 'Natural History,' to denote a particular department of science, seems to have risen.

<sup>8</sup> Prantl, in the Transactions of the Royal Academy of Munich, 1852, shows that while there is probably an Aristotelian nucleus to the collection of *Problems* which have come down to us under the name of Aristotle, the great bulk of the collection is by a variety of Peripatetic hands, and is full of inconsistencies.

*Plants* and *On Health and Disease* had been promised by him, but were never achieved (see above, p. 69). Simultaneously with some of the works now mentioned, but in idea last of all his writings, the *Metaphysics* were probably in progress of composition when the death of Aristotle occurred. It seems strange that Valentine Rose should strenuously have argued<sup>9</sup> in favour of the hypothesis that the *Metaphysics* were composed before the Physical writings of Aristotle. For, against this we may say that in four places of the *Physical Writings*<sup>10</sup> questions are reserved to be discussed in the *Metaphysics*; that in twelve places of the *Metaphysics*<sup>11</sup> the Physical writings are referred to; that in no work of Aristotle's are "the *Metaphysics* quoted; that the very name Τὰ μετὰ τὰ Φυσικά embodies a strong tradition of antiquity, that Aristotle's *Prima Philosophia*, or Theology, followed his Physics both in idea and in order of composition; and finally, that there was another tradition of the ancients (see above, p. 32) to the effect that the *Metaphysics* were edited by Eudemus after the death of Aristotle, and indeed patched together by him, parts having been lost, or, as we might with probability conjecture, never having been completed. Such, or some such, having been the order in which the works of Aristotle were composed, we may observe, by comparing the probably subsequent with the probably prior writings, the following peculiarities: (1) All the more general forms of the philosophy, "such as the four causes, the opposition of the potential and the actual, the laws of the syllogism, the conception of the method of statement, &c., were pretty well cut and dried before the writing of any of the extant books commenced. (2) Even a consider-

\* *De Ar. Lib. Ord. et Auct.* pp. 135-232.

<sup>10</sup> Quoted by Bonitz, *Ar. Metaphys.* vol. ii. p. 4. <sup>11</sup> *Ib.* p. 5.

able portion of the special matter of the special treatises was stored up ready beforehand. Thus there is a rich instalment of ethical matter in the *Rhetoric*, of political matter in the *Ethics*, of metaphysical matter in the *Physical Discourse*, &c.; (3) But when Aristotle came to concentrate his mind on a particular subject he invariably made a great advance in the conception of it: thus the analysis of ethical phenomena in the *Ethics* goes far beyond that arrived at in the *Rhetoric*; <sup>12</sup> (4) Out of an ostensible regard for strict orderly arrangement and the due apportionment of subject-matter to the separate sciences, Aristotle constantly put off the solution of particular questions for ‘another’ or ‘a later’ inquiry. We say *ostensible*, because in some cases it looks as if the excuse were a convenient one for postponing questions to which he was not prepared with an answer. On the other hand, either from neglecting his own rules of method, or from not having as yet seen the limits of a particular science, and from having to write tumultuously and under pressure—he sometimes launches out into not strictly appropriate discussions. Thus in the *Art of Poetry* he goes on into questions of Style, which belonged properly to the *Rhetoric*, and even into elementary questions of Grammar, which rather should have had a treatise to themselves. And in the work *On the Soul*, which is professedly a physiological <sup>13</sup> treatise, he transcends the limits of Physiology or Physics, and introduces discussions on the theory of Knowledge, on the relation of Subject to Object, on the

<sup>12</sup> As, for instance, in the theory of the nature of Pleasure. See above, p. 246.

<sup>13</sup> *De An. I. i. 15.* Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡδη φυσικοῦ τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ ψυχῆς, ἡ πάσης, ἡ τῆς τοιαύτης, i.e. in so far as its functions are dependent on ma-

terial conditions. It is elsewhere implied that some functions of the soul may be not so dependent, and that these will be treated of by metaphysics (*Ib. § 19*), ἢ δὲ κεχωρισμένα διάφορος φιλόσοφος.

Active and Eternal Reason, &c., which, so far as they go, are anticipations of his *Prima Philosophia*, or metaphysics. But these last-mentioned discussions are only partly anticipations, they are not complete or satisfactory in themselves, they are only fragmentary indications, and they stand to the entire metaphysical system which was afterwards to be expounded, as the forestalments of ethical doctrine in the *Rhetoric* stand to the completion of that doctrine in the *Ethics* themselves. But the difference is, that the metaphysical system of Aristotle was, so far as we know, never completed. And thus the result of an examination of the works of Aristotle as a whole, seems to be, that while he was engaged in finishing off, according to his views, the exposition of each separate science, he was constantly deferring the greatest and deepest questions of all for final exposition in a system of Metaphysics, which was to form the key-stone of the entire arch. But of this final exposition only a fragment has reached us; probably no more than this fragment was ever composed, and the appearance it presents is such as to suggest the belief that Aristotle while composing it, at the end of his life, was still only feeling his way to a theory of the relation borne by God to Nature, the Universe, and the Human Soul.

With Aristotle's faults or merits as a Physicist we are not, for the present purpose, much concerned, for they do not affect his ethical system either one way or the other. But it may be mentioned here, in passing, that Aristotle's Physical Philosophy has been made the subject both of the most extravagant eulogy, and also of extreme disparagement.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> See *Aristotle: a Chapter from the History of Science*, by G. H. Lewes (London, 1854), pp. 154, 155, where a specimen of these eulogies is given. Mr. Lewes himself furnishes

an example of the opposite extreme, making the case against Aristotle's failures in physical science far worse than needs be.

On the one hand he has been spoken of as if he had anticipated many of the discoveries of modern times ; on the other hand he has apparently been blamed for not having done so. But it should surely have been remembered that ‘Truth is the daughter of Time,’ and that this is especially the case with regard to the Sciences of Observation, which creep on from one vantage point to another. Aristotle, then, ought not personally to be blamed for the erroneous views of Astronomy, or even of Physiology, which he puts forth. In these he only represents a particular point in the general history of Science, arrived at more than 2,000 years ago. He doubtless added considerably, by his industry in collecting and storing up facts, to the knowledge of Natural History and Physiology previously existing, and by his masterly mapping out of the whole field of science he opened the way to a distinct and lucid inquiry into all parts of nature. It was only owing to political causes—to the influence of the Stoical and Epicurean schools taking men’s minds in a different direction, to the decline of the Greek nation, and to the inferiority of the Roman intellect—that his example was not more fruitfully followed. Aristotle has been accused of ‘explaining Nature by means of the syllogism :’<sup>15</sup> but no one could have made this accusation who had ever read his works. He has also been accused of ‘preaching Induction, while neglecting to practise it ;’<sup>16</sup> but this is far more undoubtedly true of Lord Bacon himself, who, however, gets boundless glory for what he preached, and no blame for his mistakes and failures in such small scientific inquiries as he essayed to make. Another fallacy of this kind consists in supposing that the early philosophies of Greece<sup>17</sup> were superior as explanations

<sup>15</sup> Bacon, *Novum Organum*.

the British Association at Belfast,

<sup>16</sup> By Professor Tyndall, in his  
Opening Address to the Meeting of

August 1874.

<sup>17</sup> Bacon, *Nov. Org.*

of Nature to the philosophy of Aristotle. The early systems were mere guesses based on some slight analogy of superficial facts. Thus, though they curiously anticipated by their conjectures some of the modern theories, yet they had no solidity or power of self-demonstration. They were a kind of ‘false dawn’ which appeared and faded away again. Thus the anticipation of the Nebular Theory by Anaximander, that of the Solar System by the Pythagoreans, that of the Atomic Theory by Democritus, and something like that of the theory of Natural Selection by Empedocles—were rejected by the general voice of Greece and by Aristotle. Aristotle’s theories of an eternal universe, with the earth as its centre, and closed in by the periphery of the Heavens, were neither worse, nor better, than these. All Cosmologies in the fourth century B.C. were equally incapable of verification. Aristotle longed for Science, and strove after it; but the conditions of Science, as yet, did not exist. And yet, there are certain ultimate questions about the Universe in regard to which the thoughts of Aristotle have a value, even at the present day.

The most interesting notices of Aristotle’s general views of Nature may be gathered from the second book of his *Physical Discourse*. He speaks of ‘nature’<sup>18</sup> as ‘a principle of motion and rest implanted and essentially inherent in things, whether that motion be locomotion, increase, decay, or alteration.’ ‘It is absurd<sup>19</sup> to try to prove the existence of nature; to do so would be to ignore the distinction between self-evident and not self-evident things.’ ‘Nature<sup>20</sup> may be said

<sup>18</sup> *Nat. Ause.* II. i. 2. ‘Ος οὖσης τῆς φύσεως ἀρχῆς τινὸς καὶ αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἡρεμεῖν ἐν φύσει τῷ πράτως καθ’ αὑτὸν καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

<sup>19</sup> *Nat. Ause.* II. i. 4. ‘Ος δέ ἐστιν ἡ φύσις πειρᾶσθαι δεικνύναι, γελοῖον . . .

<sup>20</sup> ἀφὸν δυναμένου τρίνειν ἐστὶ τὸ δι’ αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ δι’ αὐτὸν γνάριμον.

<sup>20</sup> *Nat. Ause.* II. i. 8. ‘Ἐνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον οὕτως ἡ φύσις λέγεται, ἡ πρώτη ἐκδοτὴ φύσει μένην ὅλη τῶν ἔχοντων ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς,

in one way to be the simplest and most deep-lying substratum of matter in things possessing their own principle of motion and change; in another way it may be called the form and law of such things.' That is, nature is both matter or potentiality and form or actuality. It is also the transition from one to the other. 'Nature,'<sup>21</sup> says Aristotle, 'spoken of as creation is the path to nature.' Again, 'Nature'<sup>22</sup> is the end or final cause.' In relation to this system of causation, it remains to ask what place is to be assigned to chance or the fortuitous, to necessity and to reason? 'Some'<sup>23</sup> deny the existence of chance altogether, saying that there is a definite cause for all things.' 'Others,'<sup>24</sup> again, have gone so far as to assign the fortuitous as the cause of the existence of the heaven and the whole universe.' 'Others'<sup>25</sup> believe in the existence of chance, but say that it is something mysterious and supernatural, which baffles the human understanding.' With none of these opinions does Aristotle seem exactly to agree. He will not hear of attributing the existence of 'the heaven'<sup>26</sup> and the divinest things that meet our eyes' to blind chance. Again, while allowing the existence of chance as an undefined or incalculable principle of causation, and awarding to it a certain sphere, namely, things contingent, he does not appear to have believed in anything supernatural attaching to it. He distinguishes 'the fortuitous' from 'chance,' considering 'chance' (or 'luck') to be only a species of the

ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.

<sup>21</sup> *Nat. Ausec.* II. i. II. 'Ἐτι δὲ η φύσις ἡ λεγομένη ὡς γένεσις ὅδός ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν.'

<sup>22</sup> *Nat. Ausec.* II. ii. 8. 'Η δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα.'

<sup>23</sup> *Nat. Ausec.* II. iv. 2. 'Ενιοι γάρ καὶ εἰ ἐστιν ἡ μὴ ἀποροῦσιν· οὐδὲν γάρ γίνεσθαι ἀπὸ τύχης φασίν, ἀλλὰ πάντων

εἶναι τι αἴτιον ὥρισμένον.

<sup>24</sup> *Nat. Ausec.* II. iv. 5. 'Εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ καὶ τούρανοῦ τοῦδε καὶ τῶν κοσμικῶν πάντων αἰτιῶνται τὸ αὐτόματον.'

<sup>25</sup> *Nat. Ausec.* II. iv. 8. 'Εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἵς δοκεῖ εἶναι αἴτια μὲν ἡ τύχη, ἀδηλος δὲ ἀνθρωπίνη διανοίᾳ ὡς θεῖόν τι οὖσα καὶ δαιμονιώτερον.'

<sup>26</sup> *Nat. Ausec.* II. iv. 6. 'Τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὰ θειότατα τῶν φαινερῶν.

former, and restricted to the sphere of human actions.<sup>27</sup> As a proof of this he alleges that 'good fortune is held to be the same or nearly so with happiness; now happiness is a kind of action, i.e. doing well.' Where there is no action, there is no chance. Hence no inanimate object, nor beast, nor child, does anything by chance, because it has no choice, nor have these either good or bad fortune, except metaphorically, in the same sense that Protarchus said 'the stones of the altar were fortunate, because they were honoured.' The fortuitous and chance both are merely accidental, and not essential principles of causation; they therefore presuppose the essential, since the accidental is posterior to and dependent on the essential. Therefore <sup>28</sup> of whatever things chance may be the cause, it necessarily follows that nature and reason, which are essential causes, should be presupposed—that they should be in short the causes of the universe.

Has necessity, then, a conditional <sup>29</sup> or an absolute sway in relation to nature? To say that it had an absolute sway, would be equivalent to assigning as the cause of the existence of a wall that the heavy stones *must* be put at the bottom and the light stones and earth a-top. In reality, however, this necessity in regard to the wall is only a necessary <sup>30</sup> condition, not a cause, of the making of the wall. Given a certain end, and certain means to this are necessary; thus far and no

<sup>27</sup> *Nat. Ausec.* II. vi. 1. Διὸ καὶ ἀνάγκη περὶ τὰ πράκτα εἶναι τὴν τύχην· σημείον δὲ θτὶ δοκεῖ ἡτοι ταῦτὸν εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἡ εὐτυχία ἡ ἐγγύης, ἡ δὲ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξις τις· εἰπραξία γάρ.

<sup>28</sup> *Nat. Ausec.* II. vi. 8. "Τοτέρου δρα τὸ αὐτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη καὶ νοῦ καὶ φύσεως· ὅστ' εὶ θτὶ μάλιστα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αἴτιον τὸ αὐτόματον, ἀνάγκη τρότερον νοῦν καὶ φύσιν αἴτιαν εἶναι καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν καὶ τοῦδε παντός.

<sup>29</sup> *Nat. Ausec.* II. ix. 1. Τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης πότερον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὑπάρχει ἡ καὶ ἀπλῶς; Νῦν μὲν γάρ οἰονται τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τὸν τοῦχον ἐξ ἀνάγκης γεγενῆσθαι νομίζοι, θτὶ τὰ μὲν βαρέα κάτω πέφυκε φέρεσθαι τὰ δὲ κοῦφα ἐπιπολῆς.

<sup>30</sup> *Nat. Ausec.* II. ix. 2. Οὐκ ἀνευ μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἔχοντων τὴν φύσιν, οὐ μέντοι γε διὰ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἡ ὡς ὅλην, ἀλλ' ἔνεκά του.

farther has necessity a sway in regard to nature. But the end is the real cause, the necessary means are a mere subordinate condition.

Lastly, What is the position of design or intelligence in relation to nature? Some reduce all nature to a mechanical principle; if they recognise any other principle at all (as Empedocles spoke of ‘love and hatred,’ and Anaxagoras of ‘reason’), they just touch it and let it drop.<sup>31</sup> They say it rains, not that the corn may grow, but from a mechanical necessity, because the vapours are cooled as they are drawn up, and being cooled are compelled to fall again, and by coincidence this gives growth to the corn.<sup>32</sup> ‘Why should it not also be by accident and coincidence, they ask, that in the teeth of animals, for instance, the front teeth grow sharp and suitable for cutting, while the hind teeth grow broad and suitable for grinding?’ Hence their theory is, that whenever blind necessity did not hit by coincidence on results as perfect as if they had been designed, its products perished, while the lucky hits were preserved; and thus Empedocles says that whole races of monsters perished<sup>33</sup> before a perfect man was attained.

Aristotle says, ‘It is impossible that this theory can be true;<sup>34</sup> our whole idea of chance and coincidence is something irregular, out of course of nature, while nature is the regular and the universal. If, then, the products of nature are either according to coincidence or design, it follows that they must be according to design. We see how a house is built; if that house were made by nature, it would be made in exactly the same way, i.e. with design, and according

<sup>31</sup> *Nat. Ause.* II. viii. 1. Καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν οὐλην αἰτίαν εἴπωσιν, δύον ἀνθεμεῖοι χαρέν τῶσιν, δὲ μὲν τὴν φιλίαν καὶ τὸ νεῖκος, δὲ δὲ τὸν νοῦν.

<sup>32</sup> *Nat. Ause.* II. viii. 2.

<sup>33</sup> *Nat. Ause.* II. viii. 4. “Οσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπάλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπερα.

<sup>34</sup> *Nat. Ause.* II. viii. 5-10.

to a regular plan. The same adaptation of means to ends we see in the procedure of the animals which makes some men doubt whether the spider, for instance, and the ant do not work by the light of reason or an analogous faculty. In plants, moreover, manifest traces of a fit and wisely planned organisation appear. The swallow makes its nest and the spider its web by nature, and yet with a design and end; and the roots of the plant grow downwards and not upwards, for the sake of providing it nourishment in the best way. It is plain, then, that end and design is a cause of natural things. And if nature be figured both as matter and as end, we may surely regard the matter as a mere means to an end, and the end itself as really and essentially the cause. The failures of nature, the abortions and monsters which Empedocles spoke of as if they were the normal products of nature, are in reality its mere exceptions. They are mistakes and errors, exactly analogous to the failures in art. It is absurd to doubt the existence of design because we cannot see deliberation actually taking place. Art does not deliberate. If the art of ship-building were inherent in the wood, ship-building would be a work of nature. Perhaps the best conception we can have of nature is, if we think of a person acting as his own doctor and curing himself.<sup>25</sup>

On these views of Aristotle's several observations at once suggest themselves. They contain a recognition quite as strong as that in Paley's *Natural Theology* of the marks of design in creation. But we see that it is possible to recognise these marks of design, and to be led by them to a different view from that of Paley; that Aristotle does not discover in them, as it were, the works of a watch, and proceed immediately to infer the existence of a watchmaker;

<sup>25</sup> *Nat. Anso.* II. viii. 15. Μάλιστα δὲ δῆλον ὅταν τις ἱαρεύῃ αὐτὸς ἔαυτόν τούτῳ γὰρ ξοκεν ἡ φύσις.

but rather that the products of nature appear to him according to the analogy of a watch that makes itself. If we ask, how is it that the watch makes itself? Aristotle would reply, that all things strive after the good; that on the idea of the good, as seen and desired, the whole heavens and all nature depend. Aristotle views the world with a kind of natural optimism. He says (*Eth.* i. ix. 5), ‘All things in nature are constituted in the best possible way.’ If we ask what is it that perceives the good—what gives to nature this eye of reason to perceive an idea and to strive after it?—on this head Aristotle is not explicit. He says there is something divine in nature. ‘Even<sup>36</sup> in the lower creatures there is a natural good above their own level, which strives after the good proper for them.’ We see the indistinctness of this phrase. He speaks of ‘the natural good’ striving after ‘their proper good.’ If it be said that Aristotle’s theory is Pantheism, this would not be exactly true, for Aristotle does not identify God with nature, nor deprive Him of personality. But what the relation is of ‘the divine’ in nature to God, it must be confessed that Aristotle does not make clear. We only see that Aristotle, while tracing design, beauty, and harmony in the world, is not led to figure to himself God as the artist or architect of this fair order, but as standing in a different relation to it. If we ask, how can the beginning be accounted for, how did the watch begin to make itself? Aristotle would say, in looking back we do not find in the past merely the elements (*δύναμις*) of a watch, we find of necessity the idea and the actuality (*ἐνέργεια*) of the watch itself (see above, p. 239). A perfect watch must always precede the imperfect one. It is impossible to think

<sup>36</sup> *Eth.* x. ii. 4. Ἰσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαῦλοις ἔστι τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθόν κρείττους η καθ’ αὑτά, δὲ ἐφέται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγα-

θοῦ. A similar doctrine is given in the Eudemian Book, vii. xiii. 6.

of nature as having had a beginning. ‘The universe is eternal’ (*Eth.* iii. iii. 3). ‘The parts<sup>37</sup> may be regarded as changeable, but the whole cannot change, it is increase and indestructible’ (*De Cœlo*, i. x. 10).

One of the most interesting points to notice in this part of the subject is the way in which Aristotle regards man in relation to nature as a whole. His view appears to be two-fold; on the one hand he regards man as a part of nature. He says,<sup>38</sup> ‘You may call a man the product of a man, or of the sun.’ He looks at the principle of human life as belonging to the whole chain of organised existence. Man has much in common with the animals and the plants. On the other hand, he looks at the human reason and will as a principle of causation, which is not part of nature, but distinct. ‘Man,’ he says, ‘is the cause of his own actions.’ Thus he classifies causation into ‘nature, necessity, chance, and again reason and all that comes from man’ (*Eth.* iii. iii. 7). ‘In art<sup>39</sup> and in action the efficient cause rests with the maker or doer, and not as in nature with the thing done.’ Aristotle’s Ethical theory depends on this principle, that the moral qualities are not by nature; i.e. self-caused, but produced in us in accordance with the law of our nature, by the exercise of will, by care, cultivation, and in short the use of the proper means. We have already observed (see above, p. 151) that one of the first steps of Grecian Ethics, as exhibited in the philosophy of Archelaus and Democritus, consisted in severing man and human society from the general framework of nature. This Aristotle follows out in his *Ethics*, and he seems so easily to content himself with the

<sup>37</sup> “Οστ’ εί τὸ δλον σῶμα συνεχὲς δν  
δτὲ μὲν οὐτώς δτὲ δ’ ἐκείνως διατίθεται  
καὶ διακεκόμηται, ἡ δὲ τοῦ δλον σύ-  
στασίς ἔστι κόσμος καὶ οὐρανός, οὐκ ἀν  
δ κόσμος γίγνοιτο καὶ φθείροιτο, ἀλλ’ αἱ

διαθέσεις αὐτοῦ.

<sup>38</sup> *Nat. Anab.* ii. ii. 11. “Ανθρωπος  
γὰρ ἀνθρωπον γεννᾷ καὶ ήλιος.

<sup>39</sup> So Eudemus, *Eth.* vi. iv. 4.

practical assumption of freedom for man, as to give a narrow and unphilosophical appearance to part of his writing.

While, however, assuming freedom for human actions, Aristotle seems to do so, not so much from a sense of the deep importance of morality, but rather from an idea of the slightness of man and of his actions in comparison with nature, and what he would call the ‘diviner parts’ of the universe. There is a strange passage in his *Metaphysics* (xi. x. 2, 3), which is obscure indeed, but it seems to bear on the question. He says,<sup>40</sup> ‘All things are in some sort ordered and harmonised together, fishes of the sea, birds of the air, and plants that grow, though not in an equal degree. It is not true to say that there is no relation between one thing and another; there is such a relation. All things are indeed arranged together towards one common centre; but as in a household the masters are by no means at liberty to do what they please, but most things, if not all, are appointed for them, while the slaves and the animals do but little towards the common weal, and mostly follow their own fancies. For so the nature of each of the different classes prompts them to act.’ This curious metaphor seems to represent the universe as a household. The sun and stars and all the heaven are the gentlemen and ladies, whose higher aims and more important positions in life prevent any time being left to a merely arbitrary disposal; all is filled up with a round of the noblest duties and occupations. Other parts of the universe are like the inferior members of the family, the slaves and domestic animals, who for most part of the

<sup>40</sup> Πάντα δὲ συντέτακται πως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅμοιως, καὶ πλωτὰ καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ φυτά· ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει διστε μὴ εἶναι θατέρῳ πρὸς θατέρον μηδέν, ἀλλ' ἐστί τι. Πρὸς μὲν γάρ οὐ πάντα συντέτακται, ἀλλ' ὕσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ τοῖς

Ἄλευθέροις ἡκιστα ἔξεστιν δ τι ἔτυχε ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τέτακται, τοῖς δὲ ἀνθραπόδοις καὶ τοῖς θηροῖς μικρὸν τὸ εἰς τὸ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ πολὺ δ τι ἔτυχεν· τοιαύτῃ γάρ ἐκάστου ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις ἐστίν.

day can sleep in the sun, and pursue their own devices. Under this last category it seems almost as if man would be here ranked. Aristotle does not regard the unchanging and perpetual motion of the heavenly bodies as a bondage, but rather as a harmonised and blessed life. All that is arbitrary (*ὅπως ἔτυχε*) in the human will, Aristotle does not consider a privilege. And man (especially in regard of his actions, the object of *φρόνησις* and *πολιτική*) he does not think the highest part of the universe ; he thinks the sun and stars<sup>41</sup> ‘far more divine.’ This opinion is no doubt connected with a philosophical feeling of the inferiority of the sphere of the contingent, in which action consists, and with which chance intermixes, to the sphere of the absolute and the eternal. In this feeling Plato shared, but in Plato’s mind there was set against it, what Aristotle seems deficient in, a deep sense of the even eternal import of morality. To the heavenly bodies both Plato and Aristotle appear to have attributed consciousness, which explains in some degree the sayings of Aristotle. We see, however, that there was necessarily something peculiar, contrasted with our views, in the way Aristotle approached Ethics. He might, indeed, seem to coincide with the utterance of the Psalmist, ‘What is man in comparison with the Heavens ?’ But with him the Heavens were not a mere physical creation ; rather the eternal sphere of Reason, the abode of pure Intelligences, the source of all emanations of Reason and Intelligence throughout the world. Compared with this higher sphere individual man, with his practical and moral life, appeared insignificant ; and yet the End-in-itself, even for the individual, Aristotle acknowledged to be worth an effort, while man in organised societies, in the city or the nation, he recognised as affording scope for the realisation of something more noble and divine

<sup>41</sup> So Eudemus, *Eth.* vi. vii. 4.

(Eth. i. ii. 8, ἀγαπητὸν μὲν ἄρα καὶ ἐνī μόνῳ [i.e. τὸ τέλος], κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν). But again, the individual man, according to Aristotle, shared in that Reason which is the divinest part of the Universe, and by development of this into philosophy he could become like to God (see *Eth.* x. vii. 8). Thus there were two human things about which Aristotle could be enthusiastic—the life of an ideally well-ordered State, and the moments of philosophical consciousness in the mind of an individual thinker.

We can never, perhaps, adequately comprehend Aristotle's philosophical conception of the Deity. The expression of his views that has come down to us seems so incomplete, and contains so much that is apparently contradictory, that we are in great danger of doing Aristotle injustice. Even had we a fuller and clearer expression, there might be yet something behind this remaining unexpressed, as an intuition in the mind of the philosopher. The first thing we may notice is Aristotle's idea of 'Theology' as a science. In classifying the speculative sciences, he says (*Metaphys.* x. vii. 7), 'Physics are concerned with things that have a principle of motion in themselves; mathematics speculate on permanent, but not transcendental and self-existent things; and there is another science separate from these two, which treats of that which is immutable and transcendental, if indeed there exists such a substance, as we shall endeavour to show that there does. This transcendental and permanent substance, if it exists at all, must surely be the sphere of the divine—it must be the first and highest principle. Hence it follows that there are three kinds of speculative science—physics, mathematics, and theology.' In the same strain he speaks in the succeeding book (*Metaphys.* xi. viii. 19), as if the popular polytheism of Greece were a mere perverted fragment of this deeper and truer 'Theology,' which

he conceives to have been, in all probability, perfected often before in the infinite lapse of time, and then again lost. He says,<sup>42</sup> ‘The tradition has come down from very ancient times, being left in a mythical garb to succeeding generations, that these (the heavens) are gods, and that the divine embraces the whole of nature. And round this idea other mythical statements have been agglomerated with a view to influencing the vulgar, and for political and moral expediency; as, for instance, they feign that these gods have human shape and are like certain of the animals; and other stories of the kind are added on. Now, if anyone will separate from all this the first point alone—namely, that they thought the first and deepest grounds of existence to be gods—he may consider it a divine utterance. In all probability, every art and science and philosophy has been over and over again discovered to the farthest extent possible, and then again lost, and one may conceive these opinions to have been preserved to us as a sort of fragment of those lost philosophies. We see, then, to some extent the relation of the popular belief to those ancient opinions.’ Aristotle having thus penetrated to a conception, which he imagined to lie behind the external and unessential forms of the Grecian religion, that is, the conception of a deep and divine ground for all existence, proceeds now to develop it

<sup>42</sup> Παραδέδοται δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παμπαλαίων ἐν μύθῳ σχῆματι καταλειπμένᾳ τοῖς θυτερογάτηις θεοῖς τέ εἰσιν οὗτοι καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν δληγή φύσιν. Τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικῶς ἡδη προσῆκται πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρῆσιν· ἀνθρωποειδεῖς τε γάρ τούτους καὶ τῶν ἔλλων ἥφαντον δύοισι τιού λέγουσι, καὶ τούτοις ἔτερα ἀκόλουθα καὶ παραπλήσια τοῖς εἰρημένοις. “Οὐ εἴ τις χωρίσας αὐτὸν λάβοι μόνον τὸ πρώτον, θτι θεοὺς φοντο τὰς πράτας

οὔσιας εἶναι, θείως δὲ εἰρῆσθαι νομίσειεν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἕικος πολλάκις εὑρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἐκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένων καὶ ταύτας τὰς δόξας ἐκείνων οἷον λείψανα περισσεσῶσθαι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν. Ἡ μὲν οὖν πάτριος δόξα καὶ ἡ παρὰ τῶν πρώτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν φανερὰ μόνον. Cf. Pol. II. viii. 21, and Plato, *Politicus*, 270, *Law*, 677 A: Τὸ πολλὰς ἀνθρώπων φθορὰς γεγονέναι κατακλυσμοῖς τε καὶ νόσοις καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, ἐν οἷς βραχύ τι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λείπεσθαι γένος.

for himself, and in doing so, he lays down the following positions (*Metaphys.* xi. vi.-x.).

(1) It is necessary to conceive an eternal immutable existence, an actuality prior to all potentiality. According to this view, all notions of the world having sprung out of chaos must be abandoned. God is here represented as the eternal, unchangeable form of the whole, immaterial (*ἀνευ δυνάμεως*), and free from all relation to time.

(2) With this idea it is necessary to couple that of the source of motion, else we shall have merely a principle of immobility. We must therefore conceive of a ceaseless motion ; this motion must be circular, no mere figure of philosophy,<sup>43</sup> but actually taking place. Thus the highest heaven with its revolutions must be looked on as eternal. In this we make a transition to the world of time and space. The succession of seasons and years flows everlastinglly from the motion of the circumference of the heavens. It would seem as if we were thus attributing local and material conditions to the Deity himself, if we say that God moves the world by moving the circumference of the heaven. But here, again, Aristotle is saved from this conclusion by merging physical ideas into metaphysical. He says, ‘The mover<sup>44</sup> of all things moves them without being moved, being an eternal substance and actuality, and he moves all things in the following way : the object of reason and of desire, though unmoved, is the cause of motion.’

(3) God has been thus represented as the cause of all things by being the object of contemplation and desire to nature and the world. In this doctrine, as before mentioned, there is something unexplained ; for to attribute thought and rational desire, as well as the power of motion, to nature,

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<sup>43</sup> Καὶ ἔστι τι ἀεὶ κινούμενον κίνησιν | οὐ λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλ᾽ ἐργῷ δῆλον. xi. vii. 1.  
διαναστον, αὕτη δὲ η κύκλῳ· καὶ τοῦτο | <sup>44</sup> See above, p. 222, note.

seems really to place the Deity in nature as a thinking subject, as well as outside nature in the form of the object of thought and wish. Aristotle, however, does not explicitly do so; in relation to nature he seems to represent God only as an object, and he now passes on to depict God in relation to Himself as a subject, as a personal being, possessing in Himself conscious<sup>45</sup> happiness of the most exalted kind, such as we can frame but an indistinct notion of, by the analogy of our own highest and most blessed moods. This happiness is everlasting, and God 'has or rather is' continuous and eternal life and duration.<sup>46</sup>

(4) Aristotle next reverts to the impersonal view of God, and asks whether these principles are one or manifold? Whether there be one highest heaven or more than one? He concludes that there can be one only, for multeity implies matter, and the highest idea or form of the world must be absolutely immaterial.<sup>47</sup>

(5) But again, figuring to ourselves God as thought; on what does that thought think? Thought thinking upon nothing is a contradiction in terms; thought with an external object is determined by that object. But God as the supreme and best cannot be altered or determined by an external object. With God, object and subject are one; the thought of God is the thinking upon thought.<sup>48</sup>

(6) Lastly, how is the supreme good of the world to be represented—whether as existing apart from the world, like the general of an army, or as inherent in the world, like the

<sup>45</sup> See above, p. 244, note.

<sup>46</sup> *Metaphys.* xi. vii. 9. Καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωῆ, ἀκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ' αὐτὴν ἀκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ ἀίδιος· φαμὲν δὲ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῶον ἀίδιον δριστού, διότε ζωὴ καὶ αἰών συνεχής καὶ

ἀίδιος ὑπάρχει πῷ θεῷ. τοῦτο γὰρ δὲ θεός.

<sup>47</sup> *Metaphys.* xi. viii. 18. Τὸ δὲ τὸ θνητὸν εἶναι οὐκέτι θλημὸν τὸ πρῶτον· ἐντελέχεια γάρ.

<sup>48</sup> *Metaphys.* xi. ix. 4. Αὐτὸν ἔρα νοεῖ εἴπερ ἐστι τὸ κράτιστον· καὶ ἐστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις.

discipline of an army?<sup>49</sup> In other words, are we to hold that the Deity is immanent or transcendent? Aristotle gives no direct answer to this question; but seems to say that God must be conceived of both ways, just as the army implies both discipline and general, but it is the general who produces the discipline. In these speculations we see an attempt made by Aristotle to approach from various sides the metaphysical aspect of the existence of the Deity. All metaphysical views of God are entirely foreign to most minds. The profound difficulty of them may be appreciated, if we set before ourselves this question, for instance, If the Deity be immaterial, how can He act upon a material universe? Aristotle does not appear to make any endeavour to obtain a complete view, or to reconcile the contradictions between his different statements—between the impersonal view of God as the chief good and object of desire to the world, and the personal view of Him as a thinking subject. He acknowledges these two sides to the conception, ‘the discipline in the army’ and ‘the general ruling the army,’ but does not attempt to bring them together.

In the *Ethics* there are several popular and exoteric allusions to ‘the gods,’ as, for instance, that ‘It would be absurd to praise the gods’ (I. xii. 3); ‘The gods and one’s parents one cannot fully requite, one must honour them as much as possible’ (IX. ii. 8), &c. There are also some traces of Aristotle’s thoughts as a metaphysician; for instance, he speaks of ‘the good under the category substance’ being ‘God and reason’ (I. vi. 3). And he gives an elaborate argument (X. viii. 7) to demonstrate that speculative thought and the

<sup>49</sup> *Metaphys.* I. x. 1. Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ ποτέρως ἔχει οὐ τοῦ δόλου φύσις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἔριστον, πότερον κεχωρισμένον τι καὶ αὐτὸν καθ’ αὐτό, η τὴν τάξιν, η ἀμφοτέρως ἀσκερ στρά-

τευμα. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τάξι τὸ εὖ καὶ δι στρατηγός, καὶ μᾶλλον οὗτος· οὐ γὰρ οὗτος διὰ τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτον ἐστιν.

exercise of the philosophic consciousness is the only human quality that can be attributed to the Deity. In this argument it is observable that he first begins by speaking of 'the gods,' saying, 'We conceive of the gods as especially blessed and happy. What actions can we attribute to them? whether those of justice? but it would be absurd to think of their buying and selling,' &c. He then argues that 'If life be assigned to them, and all action, and still more, all production, be taken away, what remains but speculation?' And he concludes, 'The life of God then, far exceeding in blessedness, can be nothing else than a life of contemplation.' Thus he reverts to a monotheistic form of speaking, though he says again afterwards, 'The gods have all their life happy, man's life is so, in as far as it has some resemblance to the divine consciousness of thought.' This passage then contains a sort\* of transition from exoteric to philosophical views. Aristotle attributes to 'the gods' that same mode of existence, which in his own metaphysical system he attributed to God, according to the deepest conception that he had formed of Him.<sup>50</sup> It is true, however, that in assigning speculative thought to the Deity, there is no mention made of the distinction which exists between the thought of the philosopher where object is distinct from subject, and the thought of God in which subject and object are one.

The passage to which we are referring in the *Ethics* contains not only a positive assertion with regard to the nature of God, but also a negative one. It asserts that all moral virtue is unworthy of being attributed to God. This, as we have before noticed (see above, p. 215), was a total departure

\* The same point of view is maintained in the Eudemian Book, vii. xiv. 8. 'Hence God enjoys ever one and the same pleasure; that is, the deep

consciousness of immutability.' In the *Magna Moralia*, ii. xv. 3-5, there is a reaction against these speculations. See above, p. 37.

from the view of Plato. Still more opposed is this view of Aristotle to modern ideas. We are accustomed to feel that however great may be the metaphysical problems about the nature of God, the deepest conception of Him that we can attain to is a moral one.

There are yet two other passages in the *Ethics* where theological considerations are entertained. These are both connected with the question of a divine providence for and care of men. The first is where it is asked (*Eth. I. ix. 1*) whether happiness comes by divine allotment (*κατά τινα θελαυ μοῖραν*) or by human means. The second is where the philosopher is spoken of (x. viii. 13) as being most under the favour of God (*θεοφιλέστατος*). With regard to Aristotle's general views of the question of providence, it is often argued that he must have denied its existence, inasmuch as he attributes no objective thought to God. But Aristotle does not himself argue this way; when the question comes before him, he does not appeal to his own *a priori* principle, and pronounce contrary to the general belief—rather he declines to pronounce at all. In the former of the two passages mentioned, he says, 'One would suppose that if anything were the gift of God to men, happiness would be so, as it is the best of human things. But the question belongs to another science. Happiness, if not sent by God, but acquired by human means, seems at all events something divine and blessed.' The latter part of this argument partly seems to be a setting-aside of the question, partly to be a sort of reconciliation of the existence of a providence (*θείον τι*) with the law of cause and effect. In the second passage Aristotle repeats from Plato the assertion that the philosopher is under the favour of heaven (*θεοφιλέστατος*). He says, 'If there is any care of human-things by the gods, as there is thought to be (*ωσπερ δοκεῖ*), we may conclude that they take pleasure

in the highest and best thing, reason, which is most akin to themselves, and do good to those who cherish and honour it.' In these words there may possibly be an esoteric sense, meaning that the philosopher in the exercise of his thought realises something divine. Aristotle may imply that the popular doctrine of providence admits a deeper explanation, but he by no means here or elsewhere denies it. Nor can we presume to tell what Aristotle would include in his conception of the subject-object thought of God. As we saw before, he is not explicit as to the relation of God to nature, neither is he as to the relation of God to man.

If we ask now, What were Aristotle's opinions as to the nature of the human soul, so far as we can gather them ? we find that (advancing, as he shows us, upon the more or less indistinct views of his predecessors) he conceives of the *ψυχή* as a vital principle manifesting itself<sup>51</sup> in an ascending scale through vegetable, animal, and human life. To this scale of life Aristotle appeals in the *Ethics* (I. vii. 10-12). He there argues that man must have some proper function. 'This cannot be mere life in its lowest form, i.e. vegetable ; nor again merely sensational, i.e. animal life ; there remains therefore the moral and rational life.' From this point of view man is regarded as part of the chain of nature. Aristotle doubts, but on the whole concludes, that the *ψυχή* is the proper subject of physical science.<sup>52</sup> This he justifies by the fact<sup>53</sup> that the psychical phenomena, anger, desire, and the like, are inseparable from the body, and from material conditions. Reason itself, if dependent on conceptions derived from the sense (*μὴ ἀνευ φαντασίας*), will fall under

<sup>51</sup> *De Animâ* II. iv. 2.

*πάσχειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν, οἷον ὄργιζεσθαι,*

<sup>52</sup> *De Animâ*, I. i. 18.

*θαρρεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, δλως αἰσθάνεσθαι,*

<sup>53</sup> *De Animâ*, I. i. II. *Φαίνεται*  
δὲ τῶν πλείστων οὐθὲν ἀνευ σώματος

*Cf. I. i. 15. τὰ πάθη λόγοι ξενιλοι εἰσιν*

the same head. Following out this direction of thought, Aristotle defines the *ψυχή* to be ‘The<sup>54</sup> simplest actuality of a physical body, which potentially possesses life, that is, of an organic body.’ Of the meaning of the word *ἐντελέχεια*, used here, we have spoken above (see p. 235); the whole of this definition we see accords with Aristotle’s physical philosophy in general, which conceived great and beautiful results coming out of physical conditions, not by any mechanical system of causation, rather that these ends necessitated the means; the whole was prior to and necessitated the parts. The *ψυχή*, says Aristotle, is to the body as form to matter,<sup>55</sup> as the impression to the wax, as sight to the eye. It is the essential idea of the body (*τὸ τι ἡν εἴναι τῷ τοιωδὶ σώματι*). It is as the master<sup>56</sup> to the slave, as the artist to the instrument. It is the efficient, the final, and the formal cause of the body. It is impossible to treat of the *ψυχή* without taking account of the body; ‘as to the Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of souls, they might as well speak of the carpenter’s art clothing itself in flutes. For a soul<sup>57</sup> can no more clothe itself in a foreign body, than an art can employ the instruments of some foreign art.’ While maintaining this close connection between the *ψυχή* and the body, as between end and means, Aristotle was kept aloof by the whole tenor of his philosophy from anything like materialism. He sums up this part of his reasonings in the following words: ‘That the *ψυχή*, therefore, is inseparable from the body is clear, or at all events some of its parts, if it be divisible. Nothing,<sup>58</sup> however, hinders that some of its

<sup>54</sup> *De Anima*, II. i. 6. Διὸ ψυχὴ ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνμεῖ ζῳην ἔχοντος. Τοιοῦτο δέ, δὲ μὴ δργανικόν.

<sup>55</sup> *De Anima*, II. i. 7.

<sup>56</sup> *Eth.* VIII. xi. 6.

<sup>57</sup> *De Anima*, I. iii. 26. Παραπλήσιον δὲ λέγουσιν ὁσπερ εἰ τις φαῖτην τεκτονικὴν εἰς αὐλοὺς ἐνθέσθαι· δεῖ γὰρ τὴν μὲν τέχνην χρῆσθαι τοῖς δργάνοις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι.

<sup>58</sup> *De Anima*, II. i. 12. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’

parts may be separable from the body, as not being actualities of the body at all. Moreover, it is not certain whether the ψυχή be not the actuality of the body in the same way that the sailor is of the boat.'

Here, then, is the point at which the interest in Aristotle's conception of the ψυχή begins for us. As long as the soul is described as bearing the relation to the body of sight to the eye, of a flower to the seed, of the impression to the wax, we may be content to consider this a piece of ancient physical philosophy. Our interest is different when the soul is said to be related to the body 'as a sailor to his boat.' But here is the point also where Aristotle becomes less explicit. Having once mooted this comparison, he does not follow it up. The only further intimations of his opinion that he affords us are to be found in the places where he speaks of 'those parts of the ψυχή which are not actualities of the body at all.' A striking notice on this subject is to be found in his treatise *De Generatione Animalium*<sup>59</sup> (II. iii. 10), where he argues that 'The reason alone enters in from without, and is alone divine; for the realisation of the bodily conditions contributes nothing to the realisation of its existence.' We have had before a contradictory point of view to this, in the saying that 'Reason may be looked on as dependent on conceptions derived from the senses,' which is also elsewhere repeated. But this contradiction is reconciled in Aristotle's account of the two modes of reason, the receptive or passive (*νοῦς παθητικός*), and the creative or active (*νοῦς ποιητικός*). 'These two modes,' he says, 'it is necessary should be opposed to each other, as matter is opposed everywhere to form, and to all

ἴνιδι γε οὐθὲν κωλύει, διὰ τὸ μηθεύδει  
εἶναι σώματος ἐντελέχειας. Ἐτί δὲ  
οὐδηλον εἰσιντις ἐντελέχεια τοῦ σώματος  
ἢ ψυχὴ πάσπερ πλωτὴρ πλοίουν.

<sup>59</sup> Λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν  
ἐπεισιέναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον· οὐθὲν  
γάρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κδινωμένη σωματική  
ἐνέργεια.

that gives the form.<sup>60</sup> The receptive reason,<sup>60</sup> which is as matter, becomes all things by receiving their forms. The creative reason gives existence to all things, as light calls colour into being. The creative reason transcends the body, being capable of separation from it, and from all things; it is an everlasting existence, incapable of being mingled with matter, or affected by it; prior and subsequent to the individual mind. The receptive reason is necessary to individual thought, but it is perishable, and on the other hand the higher and immortal reason carries no memory with it, because it is unimpressible (*οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές*).

In the *Ethics* this distinction between the Active and the Passive Reason is not entertained. The reason is there spoken of in its entirety, as containing in itself the synthesis of the two opposite modes. It is spoken of as constituting in the deepest sense the personality of the individual.<sup>61</sup> On the other hand, it is spoken of as something divine, and akin to the nature of God.<sup>62</sup> The evocation of this into consciousness constitutes what Aristotle calls ‘the divine’ in happiness; it gives us, according to him, a momentary glimpse of the ever-blessed life of God.

But the above-quoted passage from the third book of the Treatise *On the Soul* has made more sensation in the world than all the rest of the writings of Aristotle put together. After slumbering quietly, as much as if buried in the cellar at Scepsis, this sentence was brought out into

<sup>60</sup> *De An. III. v. 2.* Καὶ ἔστιν δὲ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔξι τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει δυτὰ χρώματα ἐνεργεῖα χρόματα. Καὶ οὗτος δὲ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθῆς καὶ ἀμηγῆς τῇ οὐσίᾳ δὲ ἐνεργεῖα.—‘Η κατὰ δύναμιν (ἐπιστήμην) χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἐνι, δλως δὲ οὐ

χρόνῳ· ἀλλ' οὐχ δτὲ μὲν νοεῖ δτὲ δὲ οὐ νοεῖ. Χωρισθεὶς δὲ ἔστι μόνον τοῦθ δπερ ἔστι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀδίοιο· οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός, καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ.

<sup>61</sup> *Eth. ix. iv. 4, x. viii. 9.*

<sup>62</sup> *Eth. x. viii. 13.*

prominence by Alexander of Aphrodisias, at the end of the second century A.D., and gave rise to innumerable controversies, which lasted not only during the final centuries of Greek philosophy, but also all through the Middle Ages. Averroes and his followers in the Arabian school made it the basis of a doctrine of *Monopsychism*, to the effect that the Active Reason is one, undivided, substance : that it is one and the same in Socrates, Plato, and all other individuals ; whence it follows that individuality consists only in bodily sensations, which are perishable, so that nothing which is individual can be immortal, and nothing which is immortal can be individual. These doctrines spread from the Arabs to the Jews of Spain, and from them to the Christian schools, and Averroism became a leaven in the Scholastic philosophies, causing, as might be expected, the most virulent strife between the opponents and supporters of the theory of Monopsychism.<sup>63</sup> This all arose from a pushing out an isolated sentence of Aristotle's to its extreme logical consequences.

The same text has of late again been made to furnish hard and dogmatic conclusions, coinciding almost verbally with those of Averroes. Grote, in his *Aristotle* (vol. ii. p. 233), says, 'The theorising *Noûs*, as it exists in Socrates, Plato, Demokrites, Anaxagoras, Empedokles, Xenokrates, &c., is individualised in each, and individualised differently in each. It represents the result of the *Intellectus Agens* or Formal *Noûs*, universal and permanent, upon the *Intellectus Patiens* or noëtic receptivity peculiar to each individual ; the co-operation of the two is indispensable to sustain the theorising intellect of any individual man. But

<sup>63</sup> See M. Renan's *Averroes et l'Averroïsme* (Paris, 1852), in which the history of this episode in theo-

logical philosophy is most interestingly traced.

the *Intellectus Patiens*, or *Receptirus*, perishes along with the individual. Accordingly the intellectual life of Socrates cannot be continued farther. It cannot be prolonged after his sensitive and nutritive life has ceased; the noëtic function, as it exists in him, is subject to the same limits of duration as the other functions of the soul. The intellectual man is no more immortal than the sensient man,' &c.

These conclusions, however, have been drawn for Aristotle and never by him. In the passage now referred to, the words *οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές* were probably only meant as an argument, in passing, against Plato's doctrine of *ἀνάμνησις*. This doctrine, says Aristotle, cannot be true, because the Active Reason which existed elsewhere before our birth, receives no impressions, therefore we cannot be said to recollect things seen by the Reason in its antenatal state. Logically, of course, this argument may be carried farther, and it may be said that, according to Aristotle, the Reason in surviving death will carry no recollections, i.e. no individuality with it.

Only Aristotle himself does not say so. When at the beginning of the treatise *On the Soul* he says 'All Nature yearns after immortality, but, being unable to attain this in the individual, she attains it in the species'<sup>64</sup> he is writing, as a physiologist, of the whole animated kingdom of nature. The question of what we mean by the immortality of the soul, was one for metaphysics, or as he called it 'theology.' And such questions he was always putting off. Therefore we are left in doubt as to his views, or as to whether he had decided views. And people are accordingly at liberty to

<sup>64</sup> *De An. II. iv.* 'Ἐπεὶ οὖν κοινωνεῖν  
ἀδυνατεῖ τοῦ δεῖ καὶ τοῦ θείου τῇ  
συνεχείᾳ, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι τῶν  
φθαρτῶν ταῦτα καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ διαμένειν,

ἢ δύναται μετέχειν ἔκαστον κοινωνεῖ  
ταῦτη — καὶ διαμένει οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀλλ' οἷον  
αὐτός, ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὐχ ἐπ., εἰδεις δ' ἐν.

believe a good deal as they may wish on the subject. Spengel thinks that too much stress should not be laid on the 'brief and obscure' intimations regarding the *διανοητικὴ ψυχὴ* which occur in a treatise on *ἢ ψυχὴ ἢ τῶν ζῷων* and he approves of the saying of an unknown ancient (*Anonym. de vita Pythag.* p. 112), 'Plato and Aristotle equally declare the soul to be immortal, however much some, who do not fathom the mind of Aristotle, think that he pronounces it to be mortal.'<sup>65</sup> This, however, is going farther than any data warrant us in following. Torstrik, in his critical edition of the *De Anima*,<sup>66</sup> thinks that he discerns a Platonising spirit in the editors or copyists of the treatise, and that this has caused the introduction of a spurious negative in the passage above quoted (see page 298, note), *ἀλλ᾽ τούχ ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ, ὅτε δὲ οὐ νοεῖ*. Such a spirit seems to show itself in the dictum cited by Spengel. Taking Aristotle as we find him, he 'pronounces' nothing as to the immortality of the soul. In his lost dialogue entitled *Eudemus*, said to have been written when he was about 30 years of age, he appears to have discoursed on the subject.<sup>67</sup> Eudemus of Cyprus, an early friend of Aristotle (and not to be confounded with his scholar and posthumous editor, Eudemus of Rhodes), being sick at Pheræ, received in a vision three prophecies, (1) that he should recover, (2) that Alexander the tyrant of Pheræ would shortly die, (3) that in five years he would be restored to his home. The first two prophecies having been at once fulfilled, Eudemus and his friends looked out for some chance which should restore him to Cyprus, whence he had been exiled; but at the end of the appointed five years he fell in

<sup>65</sup> "Οτι πλάτων, φησί, καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀθνατον δμοίως λέγουσι τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ τινες εἰς τὸν Ἀριστοτέλους νοῦν οὐκ ἐμβαθύνοντες θνητήν νομίζουσιν αὐτὸν λέγειν.

<sup>66</sup> Ar. *De An.* recensuit A. Torstrik (Berlin, 1862), p. 185.

<sup>67</sup> See Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles* (Berlin, 1863), pp. 21, 143.

battle, and thus in another sense was ‘restored to his home.’ This story was made the subject of the dialogue in question, of which the fragments seem to show that it argued the independence of the doctrine of immortality from Plato’s theory of Ideas. From so early a production, if indeed we could be certain of its genuineness, we can conclude nothing, except that when it was written Aristotle could not have ‘pronounced the soul to be mortal.’ When we turn to the *Ethics* we find him unwilling (I. xi. 1) even to affirm that the dead cannot be affected and made more or less happy by the fortunes of their descendants and friends upon earth, because ‘this would seem a heartless doctrine and opposed to general belief’ (*λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον*). Aristotle thus shows great tenderness in dealing, or affecting to deal, with an important question. But in the end, having allowed, as a concession to popular feeling, that the dead may be affected by the fortunes of the living, he argues that this effect on them must be almost unappreciable, and he reminds us, in conclusion, of the extreme doubtfulness<sup>68</sup> as to whether the dead do share at all in the interests of the world. In this discussion one phrase occurs in which the real feeling of Aristotle, for the moment at least, seems to be let out. He asks (*Eth. I. x. 2*), ‘Can Solon have meant that a man is happy when he has died?’ and replies, ‘This would be an absurdity, especially since we consider happiness to be an *ἐνέργεια*.’ However we translate *ἐνέργεια*, whether as the exercise of the powers, the consciousness of life, or however else (see Essay IV.), it is clear that we have here a brief indication that death destroys those potentialities that result in happiness. It would seem then that the only immortality which is left possible by this belief is a Buddhist nirvâna.

<sup>68</sup> *Eth. I. xi. 4.* See notes on this passage.

Aristotle, however, in his *Ethics* was not entering on such a question. It may be that, like many other men who have lived and died, he did not see his way to a clear opinion on the subject. He did not, like Plato, base a belief upon grounds of faith. Nothing that he says about man's moral nature seems to have any connection with the idea of a future life. His doctrine of the End-in-itself seems indeed rather to supersede such an idea ; it does not contradict it, but rather absorbs all consideration of time and space, of present and future, in itself, as being the absolutely sufficient for men's thoughts.

## ESSAY VI.

### *The Ancient Stoics.*

DOWN to the time of Aristotle, Greek philosophy may be said to have lived apart. It contained within itself a gradual progress and culmination of thought, but the great philosophers who were the authors of this progress moved on a level far above the ordinary modes of comprehension. After the death of Aristotle a new spectacle is presented—philosophy no longer an exclusive and esoteric property of the schools, but spreading its results over the world.

The immediate cause which brought about this change—which turned philosophy into a universal leaven, leavening, under one form or another, the thoughts of all cultivated men—must be sought for in the changed position of Ethics in relation to the other parts of philosophy. In spite of the exclusive attention of Socrates to ethical investigations, in spite of the exclusive effort of the Cynics and Cyrenaics to promulgate respectively a conception of practical life for the individual, in spite of the moral earnestness of Plato and the brilliant contributions to anthropology, in the way of accumulation, analysis, and classification of data, made by Aristotle—Ethics had hitherto continued to occupy a really subordinate position in the mind of Greece. With Socrates the paramount interest had been the attainment of universal

conceptions; with him Ethics were rather the field for scientific experiments in method, than an ultimate end to which all else was to be subordinated. The one-sided Socratics<sup>1</sup> had been regarded as merely exceptional and paradoxical non-conformists to the ordinary mode of life. In the mind of Plato Ethics blended themselves with aspirations after a perfectly ordered State, and to him 'the contemplation of all time and all existence' under the light of idealism was as dear as was the education of the individual soul. Aristotle, in the process of reconstructing all the departments of thought and knowledge, took Ethics, so to speak, in his stride. He allotted to man, as a practical being, an important position in the scale of the universe, but still he said that the good attainable in a life of moral virtue was 'secondary' to that attainable in a life of philosophy (*Eth.* x. viii. 1); that 'the end-in-itself' for a State was more beautiful and divine than that for an individual (i. ii. 8); and (as Eudemus expressed it, *Eth.* vi. vii. 4), that 'there are in the universe many things diviner than man.' Such sayings imply that Ethics are inferior in practical interest to Politics, and in intellectual interest to the speculative branches of philosophy. But after Aristotle, the order which he had given to the hierarchy of the sciences became subverted. All considerations of the State now dropped out of sight, as of a subject no longer capable of being entertained; Ethics came to the fore-front, as if the practical interests of the individual were of paramount and absorbing importance; and all other departments of inquiry, whether logical, metaphysical, or physical, were cultivated only as subsidiary to the one great object of obtaining a theory for the regulation of individual life.

These features were equally characteristic of the two great post-Aristotelian schools, the Stoic and the Epicurean.

To account for them it does not seem quite sufficient to refer, with Zeller,<sup>1</sup> to the political condition of Greece. The loss of independence in the Greek States might reasonably account for the abandonment of Politics as a science; but the times do not seem to have been dangerous and oppressive, such as would force the mind by fears and interruptions away from philosophical inquiry. Political freedom does not appear to be an absolute necessity for freedom of speculation, for in Germany the greatest achievements in philosophy were made at a time when the liberties of the people were most scanty. And in Athens during the third century B.C., there was a vast amount of active philosophising on almost all the great subjects, though these now received a peculiar turn in their mode of treatment. And Plutarch<sup>2</sup> speaks of the early Stoics, Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, as living at Athens 'as though they had eaten of the lotus, spell-bound on a foreign soil, enamoured of leisure, and spending their long lives in books, and walks, and discourses.' Athens was still a genial home for philosophy 'native To famous wits, or hospitable, in her sweet recess.' And other causes, besides political circumstances, must be sought for the peculiar character of the philosophical schools that now arose within her walls. That they exhibited a decline in force of thought, is indubitable: but in this world it appears as if a succession of great geniuses can never be long maintained. In Germany the great idealistic systems of philosophy were succeeded by a strong reaction in the direction of materialism. And in Greece the same phenomenon presented itself after the death of Aristotle. Zeno and Epicurus displayed an equal aversion to that idealism which characterises the

<sup>1</sup> *The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*, translated from the German of Dr. E. Zeller, by O. J. Reichel, &c.

| (London, 1870), p. 16 sq.

<sup>2</sup> *De Repugnantibus Stoicis*, c. 2.

thought of Aristotle no less than Plato; each denied the existence of anything immaterial; and each reverted to the physical system of a pre-Socratic philosopher as a more reasonable explanation of the world than that which Plato or Aristotle had given. Zeno thus espoused the physics of Heraclitus, and Epicurus those of Democritus. Besides this reaction towards pre-Socratic materialism, there was another reaction in which both these philosophers shared, namely, towards the pre-Aristotelian individualism of the Cynics and Cyrenaics. The character of the times certainly favoured the rehabilitation and development of this principle; the scope for public life and action was gone, and thus individuality supplanted the idea of citizenship. To find out the way of happiness for the individual soul, became now, not one problem among many, but the one great problem for philosophy, to which all others were to be secondary and subordinate. Thus a new era of thought commenced with Zeno and Epicurus, in which Ethics was elevated to the first place and became the architectonic science. And the causes for this, so far as we have reviewed them, were common to both Zeno and Epicurus, consisting in a decline of personal ability and philosophic power, in an inability to keep up to the level of the speculative and idealistic systems, and also in the circumstances of the times, which encouraged a monkish exclusiveness of attention to the subjective and practical well-being of the individual soul.

But there was another special cause which contributed greatly to give its peculiar character to the Stoical school, and which is the source of much of the interest that attaches to the history of that school. In a former edition of *An Essay* it was suggested that the striking features of attitude exhibited by the Stoical doctrine were at to the Race from which its founders sprang. Th

subsequently been accepted and worked out,<sup>3</sup> and may be now considered to have been established. If we cast our eyes on a list of the early Stoics and their native places, we cannot avoid noticing how universally the leaders of this school came from the East to Athens, how many of them came from Semitic towns or colonies. Zeno was from Citium, a Phœnician colony in Cyprus, and himself belonged to the Semitic race, as is testified by the *sobriquet* of ‘the Phœnician’<sup>4</sup> commonly applied to him. Of his disciples, Persæus came also from Citium; Herillus was from Carthage; Athenodorus from Tarsus; Cleanthes from Assus in the Troad. The chief disciples of Cleanthes were Sphaerus of the Bosporus, and Chrysippus from Soli in Cilicia. Chrysippus was succeeded by Zeno of Sidon, and Diogenes of Babylon; the latter taught Antipater of Tarsus, who taught Panætius of Rhodes, who taught Posidonius of Apamea in Syria. There was another Athenodorus, from Cana in Cilicia; and the early Stoic Archedemus is mentioned by Cicero as belonging to Tarsus. The names of Nestor, Athenodorus, Cordylion, and Heraclides, may be added to the list of Stoical teachers furnished by Tarsus. Seleucia sent forth Diogenes; Epiphania Euphrates; Scythopolis Basilides; Ascalon Antibus; Tyre Antipater; Sidon Boëthus; Ptolemais Diogenes. We see then what an Oriental aspect this catalogue presents. Not a single Stoic of note was a native of Greece proper. From Tyre and Sidon, and Ptolemais and Ascalon and Apamea, from Babylon and Carthage, the future ‘doctors

<sup>3</sup> See especially the interesting ‘Dissertation’ on ‘St. Paul and Seneca’ given by the Rev. Canon Lightfoot, D.D., &c.,<sup>5</sup> now Lord Bishop of Durham, in his edition of the *Epistle to the Philippians* (1st ed. London, 1868), pp. 268–326.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Diog. Laert. II. 114, Ζήνων τὸν Φοίνικα, vii. 3, where Crates says to him, τί φεύγεις, ὁ Φοίνικεῖον; § 25. Φοίνικικῶς, § 30. εἰ δὲ πάτρα Φοίνισσα τὶς δὲ φθόνος; § 7. ἀντεποιοῦντο δέ αὐτοῦ καὶ οἱ ἐν Σιδώνι Κιττεῖς.

of the Stoic fur' come flocking to Athens ('in Ilium de-fluxit Orontes'). No country more Greek than Rhodes or Phrygia, is the home of any. On the whole, Cilicia and the Semitic colony in Cyprus are the chief head-quarters whence the leaders of this sect were derived.

These facts give us an insight into the fundamental and essential character of Stoicism. Its essence consists in the introduction of the Semitic temperament and a Semitic spirit into Greek philosophy.

The meeting of Eastern and Western ideas had been prepared by the conquests of Alexander, and the production of Stoicism was one of its first fruits. We moderns have all been imbued with the Semitic spirit in its highest manifestations by the pages of Holy Writ. Other manifestations of that spirit, as for instance the Mahomedan religion, exhibit it as an intense, but narrow, earnestness, averse on the whole to science and art, but tending to enthusiasm and even fanaticism for abstract ideas of religion or morality. The Semitic spirit found a new and favourable field for its development in Athens at the close of the fourth century B.C. If philosophy in general was then tending from other causes to the exaltation of Ethics over Metaphysics, this tendency just suited the Semitic moral earnestness. Ethics were taken up by the Phoenician Zeno, and came out from his hands with a new aspect. A phase of thought now appears for the first time on Hellenic soil, in which the moral consciousness of the individual—the moral *ego*—is made the centre and starting-point. Such a point of view, with various concomitant ideas, such as duty and responsibility, and self-examination, and the sense of shortcoming, and moral self-cultivation, is familiar to us in the Psalms of David and afterwards in the writings of St. Paul, but it was not to be found in the conversations of Socrates, nor in the

dialogues of Plato, nor in the *Ethics* of Aristotle. It was alien indeed from the childlike and unconscious spirit of the Hellenic mind, with its tendency to objective thought and the enjoyment of nature. Our own views in modern times have been so much tinged with Hebraism, that the highest degree of moral consciousness seems only natural to us, and thus Stoicism, which introduced this state of feeling to the ancient Hellenic world, may be said to have formed a transition step between Greek philosophy and the modern ethical point of view. So it is that in many modern books of morals, and even in many practical sermons, we come upon much that has a close affinity with the modes of thinking of the ancient Stoics, while with the modes of thinking of Plato and Aristotle such productions have rarely any affinity at all. And this is the secret of the interest that Stoicism has for modern times.

Epicurus, the son of Athenian parents, handled the problem of his epoch—that of the well-being of the individual soul—in a sense widely different from that of Zeno. Much as the two schools, Stoicism and Epicurism, had originally in common, they each followed out their fundamental tendencies so as to diverge ultimately into the strongest contrast and to stand in the sharpest antithesis to each other. If we ask on what does this antithesis rest? we shall find that it rests on the twofold essence of man, as a thinking and as a feeling subject; as consisting, on the one hand, of spirit, or free and self-determined thought; and, on the other hand, of nature, or an existence determined by physical laws expressing themselves in the sensuous feelings and desires. These two sides of man's being may often stand in opposition to each other; or again, they may be harmonised so as to give either the one side or the other the precedence and authority. Either we may say 'a thing is good because it

is pleasant,' and thus refer the decision to the natural feelings; or we may say 'it is pleasant because it is good,' and thus refer the decision to the inner spirit or reason. How far these two sentences actually express the leading principles of the Stoic and the Epicurean schools, we may best see by considering the ideal of man which they each proposed to themselves. The Epicurean ideal was a being moving harmoniously according to natural impulses; one, in short, in whom the spirit and thought should rather form a part of the natural life than prominently control it. The Stoic ideal, on the contrary, was a being in whom the natural impulses and desires should be absolutely subjected to the laws of abstract thought. Epicurism is essentially Greek and essentially Pagan; the beautiful and genial Greek mythology is but a deification of the natural powers and impulses. Stoicism is a reaction against this; it consists in an inner life, in a drawing away from the body, and in disregarding as worthless and of no moment the 'law in the members.' Epicurism and Stoicism both received as an inheritance the results of Grecian speculation, but in both, the moral attitude was what was essential. Of both it has been truly said that they were less and more than philosophy. Less, because they were thoroughly unspeculative in their character, and indeed consisted in the popularising of speculation; more, because they were not mere systems of knowledge, but a principle for the whole of life. They soon lost their local and restricted character as schools; they assimilated to themselves more and more broadly human thought, and became 'the two great confessions of faith of the historical world.'<sup>5</sup> Thus were these two ideas set against each other. Regarding, however, Stoicism, with its weak-

<sup>5</sup> Braniss, *Uebersicht des Entwicklungs-ganges der Philosophie* (Breslau, 1842), p. 218, whence several points of this comparison are taken.

ness and its strength, as far the more interesting and important, as it is, of course, also far the higher tendency of the two, we shall henceforth, in tracing its history, only incidentally allude to the fortunes of its rival.<sup>6</sup>

In the history of Stoicism, the following parts of the subject seem naturally to stand apart from each other, and to demand in some sort a separate treatment: First, the period of the formation of the Stoical dogma in Athens, from Zeno to Chrysippus; second, the period of the promulgation of Stoicism and its introduction to the knowledge of other civilised nations; third, Stoicism in the Roman world, its different phases, and its influence on individual thought and on public manners and institutions. I. The first period of Stoicism takes us down to the year 207 B.C., which was the date of the death of Chrysippus. The chronology of the commencement of this period is difficult to fix. Zeno probably lived till after the year 260 B.C., and he may have been born rather before 340 B.C. It is uncertain whether he came to Athens in his twenty-second or his thirtieth year. On the whole, we may assume that he did not arrive there till after the death of Aristotle, which took place in the year 322 B.C. Chrysippus may possibly in early youth have heard some of the discourses of Zeno; but Cleanthes, who succeeded Zeno as leader of the Porch, was the true link between them. By these three the Stoical doctrine, properly so called, received its completion. Nothing was afterwards added to it, except

<sup>6</sup> Among the posthumous papers published in the Appendix to Grote's *Aristotle*, we find (pp. 434-443) a short and lucid account of 'Epikurus.' Grote's editors tell us that he aimed 'at setting in its true light a much-maligned system of thought.' The same generous spirit which made him the apologist of the Sophists induced him to become the vindicator

of Epicurus. But he does not exactly tell us whether he considers the system of Epicurus to be one that it would be desirable for the majority of men to follow. This paper and Grote's fragment on the Stoics are worth consulting; but all detail of accurate information in these schools must be sought in Zeller's account of them, referred to in note 1.

the eclectic amalgamation of other doctrines. These three personages come before us with great distinctness. The anecdotes that have been handed down about them, though perhaps in some cases mythical, are at all events highly symbolical, and give us a very definite conception of their separate characteristics. Zeno is described<sup>7</sup> as a slight, withered little fellow, of a swarthy complexion, and with his neck on one side. The story goes, that in trading to Athens he was shipwrecked at the Piræus, and was thus 'cast on to the shores of philosophy.' Going up to the city, he sat down at the stall of a bookseller, where he read the second book of the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, and asked with enthusiasm 'where such men lived.' Crates, the Cynic, happened to be passing at the moment, and the bookseller cried, 'Follow him.' Zeno then studied under Crates, but held himself aloof from the extravagant unseemliness of Cynicism. He is also said to have studied under the Megarians, Stilpo, Cronus, and Philo, and under the Academicians, Xenocrates and Polemo. After twenty years, he opened his school in the Stoa Pœcile, the porch adorned with the frescoes of Polygnotus. Zeno appears to have impressed the Athenians with the highest admiration for his character. Their treatment of him was a contrast to their treatment of Socrates. It is perhaps an apocryphal tradition which relates that they deposited the keys of their citadel with him, as being the most trustworthy person; but it may be true that they decreed to him a golden crown, a brazen statue, and a public entombment. In extreme old age he committed suicide. Cleanthes, the disciple of Zeno, was perhaps the most zealous disciple that a philosopher ever had. He is said to have been originally a boxer, and to have come to Athens with four drachmas in his possession.

<sup>7</sup> Diog. Laert. vii. i. 1.

By his strength, his endurance, and his laborious life, he acquired the name of ‘the New Hercules.’ ‘Falling in with Zeno,’<sup>8</sup> it is said, ‘he took the philosophy most bravely.’ He wrote notes of his master’s lectures on potsherds and the bladebones of oxen, not being able to afford to purchase tablets. He was summoned before the Areopagus to give an account of his way of living, since his whole days were passed in philosophy, and he had no ostensible calling nor means of support. He proved to his judges that he drew water by night for a gardener, and ground the corn for a flour-dealer, and thus earned a maintenance. The story goes on that his judges, on hearing this account, voted him ten minæ, which the rigid Zeno forbade him to accept. There is something quaint about the whole personality of Cleanthes. He was nicknamed ‘the Ass,’ for his stubborn patience. He seems to have left the impression that it was this indomitable perseverance, rather than the superiority of his genius, that gave him precedence over other noteworthy disciples of Zeno. ‘High thinking,’ however, appears to have accompanied the ‘plain living’ of Cleanthes. His reflections on Destiny, and his *Hymn to Jupiter*, will best be treated of hereafter. When asked,<sup>9</sup> ‘What is the best way to be rich?’ he answered, ‘To be poor in desires.’ No reproaches or ridicule ever ruffled the sweetness and dignity of his presence. His calm bearing, when satirized on the stage by the comic poet Sositheus, caused the spectators to applaud him and to hiss off Sositheus. The idea of death seems to have been long present to his mind. Being taunted with his old age, he said, ‘Yes, I am willing to be gone, but when I see myself sound in every part, writing and reading, I am again tempted to linger.’ The story of his death is characteristic. Having suffered from an

ulcer on the tongue, he was advised by his physician to abstain from eating for a while in order to facilitate the cure. Having fasted for two days he was completely cured, and his physician bade him return to his usual course of life, but he said that 'Since he had got so far on the road, it would be a pity not to finish the journey ;' so continuing his abstinence, he died.

Hardly any personal details of the life of Chrysippus have come to us. On the other hand, we have more fragments of his actual writings than of those of all the early Stoics put together. In Chrysippus the man seems swallowed up in the writer and disputer. He is said<sup>10</sup> to have been slight in person, so that his statue in the Cerameicus was totally eclipsed by a neighbouring equestrian figure, and from this circumstance Carneades nicknamed him Crysippus. His literary activity was most unrivalled : he wrote above seven hundred and five works on different subjects. Epicurus alone, of the ancient philosophers, outstripped him in voluminousness of writing. He is said to have been keen and able on every sort of subject. He told Cleanthes that he 'only wanted the doctrines and he would soon find out the proofs.' This boast appears to betray a want of earnestness as to the truth, and somewhat too much of the spirit of a dialectician. In this respect Chrysippus must have differed widely from his two distinguished predecessors, with whom Stoicism was above all things a reality and a mode of life. However, there is no doubt that Chrysippus did great service to the Stoic school by embodying their doctrines and stating them in manifold different ways. Hence the saying, 'But for Chrysippus, the Porch would never have been.' He developed Stoicism on its negative and antagonistic side by

<sup>10</sup> Diog. Laert. vii. vii. 4.

arguing with trenchant dialectic against Epicurus and the Academy. We shall see that he really mooted and boldly strove to reconcile some of the deepest and most difficult contradictions of human thought—difficulties which are ever present in modern metaphysics, but which had never truly occupied the ancients before the death of Aristotle. We know most about Chrysippus from Plutarch's book *On the Inconsistencies of the Stoics*. It consists really of the inconsistencies of Chrysippus, extracted from various parts of his voluminous writings. This interesting book gives the impression that Plutarch is unphilosophical, though we are not able to exonerate Chrysippus from inconsistency. Such rapid and extensive writing, such a warm spirit of advocacy, such an attempt to round off and complete a doctrine in spite of all difficulties, such a various controversialism, such an elevated theory, paradoxical even in the grandeur of its aims, combined, on the other hand, with an extremely practical point of view—could not fail to give rise to manifold inconsistencies. Chrysippus was inconsistent, just as Seneca afterwards was inconsistent, because it suited the genius of Stoicism to abandon the stern simplicity and unity of a scientific principle. Stoicism became learned, complex, and eclectic; embracing in its grasp a far greater variety of problems than the philosophy of Plato or Aristotle had done, it treated these more loosely, and often oscillated between mere empiricism and a more philosophical point of view.

Taking now the Stoical doctrine as it gradually formed itself during the entire course of the third century B.C., we may proceed to trace its essential features, though in the lack of direct writings<sup>11</sup> of the successive masters of the

<sup>11</sup> No fragment even, of any length, belonging to the early Stoics, has come down to us, except the hymn of

Cleanthes. Our main sources of information with regard to them are Cicero, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus,

school we must give up attempting to fix their several contributions, and their differences from each other. Early Stoicism consisted of two elements—the one might be called dynamical : it was the peculiar spirit, tendency, and mental attitude assumed ; the other element was material, being an adaptation of the results of existing philosophy. The material side of Stoicism was comparatively unimportant. This it was, however, which caused Cicero<sup>12</sup> to make the mistaken observation that Zeno was no real innovator, but only a reproducer of the Peripatetic doctrines. And indeed it is sufficiently striking at first sight of the Stoical compendia, that their ethic seems a patchwork of Peripatetic and Platonic formulæ ; their logic, a development of the doctrine of the syllogism ; and their physic, a blending of Heraclitus with Aristotle. Yet, in spite of all this, Zeno was no mere eclectic ; all that was Peripatetic in his system was the outward, and not the inner and essential part. And in short, the vestiges of previous Greek philosophy existing in Stoical books may be said, *mutatis mutandis*, to bear the same relation to Stoicism as the vestiges of Jewish and of Alexandrian ideas existing in the New Testament bear to Christianity. What we have called the dynamical element of Stoicism constitutes its real essence. This it derived partly from the idiosyncrasy and perhaps the national characteristics of its founder, partly from the peculiarities of the Cynical school in which it was nurtured.

Zeno agreed with Crates, and Stoicism coincides with the Cynic view thus far, that it makes the starting-point of all thought to be the conception of a life. The setting of this

Diogenes Laertius, and Stobæus. We have the reflection of their doctrine in the writings of the Roman Stoics, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius ; and numberless scattered allu-

sions to them in the later literature of antiquity may be easily combined into a complete and tolerably certain view.

<sup>12</sup> *De Fin.* iv. ii. 3; iv. xxvi. 72.

moral and practical conception above all speculative philosophy separates Zeno from the previous schools of Greece. We have now to ask, What is it that distinguishes him from Crates?—what is the essential difference between the Stoic and the Cynic creeds? This is generally stated as if the former were merely a softened edition of the latter. The Cynic said, ‘There is nothing good but virtue; all else is absolutely indifferent.’ The Stoic said, ‘Yes, but among indifferent things some are preferable<sup>13</sup> to others; health, though not an absolute good, is, on the whole, preferable to sickness; and this, though not an evil, is, on the whole, to be avoided.’ Again, it is said that Cynicism is unseemly and brutal, and tramples upon society; Stoicism is more gentle, and outwardly conforms with the world. But this comparison does not go sufficiently deep, and does not explain the facts of the case, for the Stoics were often as paradoxical as the Cynics in denying that anything was a good besides virtue; and if they were outwardly less ferocious, we want to know what was the inward law of their doctrine that made them so. Perhaps we nearest touch the spring of indifference, by observing that Cynicism is essentially mere negation, mere protest against the external world; while Stoicism is essentially positive, essentially constructive, and tends in many ways to leaven the external world. Cynicism despised the sciences, disdained politics, exploded the social institutions, and ridiculed patriotism or the distinctions of country. Zeno, on the contrary, rearranged the sciences according to his views: he enjoined the wise to mix in affairs; and he conceived not a mere negation of patriotic prejudices, but

<sup>13</sup> This was the famous Stoical distinction between things *προηγμένα* and *ἀποπροηγμένα*; see Diog. Laert. vii. i. 61. It was a compromise

between the paradox that ‘nothing is good but virtue,’ and the practical facts of life. Stoicism is forced to be full of such compromises.

the positive idea of cosmopolitanism. Cynicism, therefore, is a withdrawal from the world into blank isolation, while Stoicism is the withdrawal into an inner life, which forms to its votaries an object of the highest enthusiasm. Hence the elation, often hyperbolical, which tinges the Stoical austerity; hence the attractiveness of the doctrine and its spread over the world. And connected, too, with the positive and constructive impulse of Stoicism, we may reckon its plastic character, its external eclecticism, and its tendency to be influenced and modified by the course of surrounding civilisation.

Lists have been preserved<sup>14</sup> for us by the ancients of the different formulæ in which the Stoical masters expressed the leading principle of life. They are all modifications of the same idea, that 'the end for man is to live according to nature.' Nature here means that which is universal—the entire course of the world, as opposed to individual and special ideas and impulses. Until we remember this interpretation, the Stoical formula appears surprising; for how could *they* enjoin life according to nature, whose whole endeavour was to be superior to nature—to overcome and subdue desire, sorrow, pain, the fear of death, and all that in another sense we are accustomed to call the natural instincts? If 'nature' were taken to mean the involuntary and immediate impulses, then the phrase 'follow nature' would express not the Stoical, but the Epicurean, principle. The Stoical 'nature' was the conception of an abstract and universal order, and was to be apprehended by the discursive Reason. This clear-sightedness and authority of the Reason is, of course, only slowly arrived at, and the Stoics explained their theory by saying that 'all our duties come from nature,

<sup>14</sup> Stobæus, *Eccl.* ii. 134; Clemens Alexandrinus, *Strom.* ii.; Diog. Laert. vii. i. 53.

and wisdom among the number. But as, when a man is introduced to anyone, he often thinks more of the person to whom he is introduced than of him who gave the introduction—so we need not wonder that, while it was the instinctive impulses of nature that led us to Wisdom, we hold Wisdom more dear than those impulses by which we arrived at her.<sup>15</sup> In order to avoid seeming to approximate to the Epicureans, they denied that pleasure and pain are among the principles of nature. In short, starting from nature, the Stoics came round utterly to supplant Nature (in the usual sense), and to substitute in her room pure thought and abstract ideas.

The phrase ‘follow nature,’ to express the highest kind of life, has never yet established itself in language. ‘One touch of nature makes the whole world kin’—that is, any perfectly simple and instinctive feeling, the very opposite of anything abstract or cultivated. Again; the ‘natural man,’ as opposed to the ‘spiritual man,’ denotes something utterly different from the Stoical idea of perfection. Thus, common parlance retains its own associations connected with the term nature, and rejects those of the Stoics. But it is interesting to observe that Bishop Butler has espoused their formula, and has argued that ‘nature’ does not mean single impulses or desires, but the idea of the constitution of the whole, reason and conscience as regulative principles being taken into consideration. Butler’s object in maintaining this position was obviously one relative to his own times. As in appealing to a selfish age he thought it necessary to assert that virtue was not inconsistent with the truest self-love, so also he argued that virtue was not against ‘nature, but in reality man’s natural state. He here takes up, just like the Stoics, an

<sup>15</sup> Cicero, *Dc Fin.* iii. vii. 23.

abstract ideal of nature; for he makes the basis of his reasoning a proviso that the moral rules of conscience not only exist, but that they have authority—that is, that they control, as they *ought* to do, the rest of the human principles.

The commonest ideal of virtue according to nature is the picture of mankind in a state of innocence, whether the scene be laid in some far-off island, or remote in point of time, in the golden age of the world. To imagine a primitive and pastoral existence, in which every impulse is virtuous and every impulse is to be obeyed—this is an easy reaction from a vitiated and over-refined civilisation. Some have supposed that the Stoics made this ideal of uncorrupted nature part of their views; but in reality it would not suit the genius of Stoicism to do so. Though they railed at the actual state of the world, their remedy was placed rather in the power of the will, in the effort to progress, than in dreams of a bygone state of innocence. The only allusion which we can trace in their fragments to this conception is a saying of the later Stoic, Posidonius, that ‘in the golden age the government was in the hands of the philosophers.’<sup>16</sup> The context, however, of this remark, makes it appear rather as a rhetorical praise of philosophy than as a serious piece of doctrine. Seneca, in one of whose epistles it is quoted, comments upon it in an interesting manner. After echoing for a while the strain of Virgil, and praising those times of innocence ‘before the reign of Jupiter,’ when men slept free and undisturbed under the canopy of heaven, he returns to the true Stoical point of view, and asserts that in those primitive times there was, in fact, no wisdom. If men did wise things, they did them unconsciously. They had not even virtue; neither justice, nor prudence, nor temperance, nor fortitude. It is

<sup>16</sup> Seneca, *Ep. xc.*

a profound truth that Seneca perceives—namely, that the mind and the will evoked into consciousness and perfected even by suffering, are greater possessions than the blessings, if they were attainable, of a so-called golden age and state of nature.

The Stoical principle of ‘life according to nature’ would have been a blank formula, were it not for the further exposition of their doctrine which they have left us in their ideal of the Wise Man. This ideal exhibits not the pursuit of wisdom for its own sake—not the excellence of philosophy in and for itself, as Plato and Aristotle used to conceive it, but rather the results of wisdom in the will and character—results which Zeno summed up in the terms ‘an ‘even flow of life.’<sup>17</sup> The notion that equanimity is the most essential characteristic of a philosopher is perhaps traceable to this conception of the Stoics; according to whom the Wise Man is infallible, impassive, and invulnerable.<sup>18</sup> And while possessing this external immunity from harm, he is in himself full of divine inspirations—he is alone free, alone king and priest, alone capable of friendship or affection. These and other splendid and exclusive attributes did the Stoics attach to their imaginary sage, till Chrysippus, becoming conscious in one place<sup>19</sup> of the paradoxical character of the picture, allows that he ‘may seem, through the pre-eminent greatness and beauty of his descriptions, to be giving utterance to mere ‘fictions, things transcending man and human nature.’ At the Stoical paradox Horace laughed. Plutarch wrote a book (now lost, but of which the outlines remain) to prove that it surpassed the wildest imaginations of the poets. But in truth ‘the curtain was the picture;’ the paradox was an essential part of the doctrine. For of

<sup>17</sup> Εὐεργεία τὸν βλέπε. Stob. Eccl. ii. 138.

<sup>18</sup> Diog. Laert. vii. i. 64.

<sup>19</sup> Plutarch, *De Repug. Stoic.* c. xv.

necessity these pictures of the inner life are paradoxical. They speak of a boundless freedom and elevation, with which the narrow limits of external reality come into harsh contrast. And in the vaunts of the Stoics we only see what is analogous to one side of Lord Bacon's famous 'character of a believing Christian, drawn out in paradoxes and seeming contradictions.' 'He is rich in poverty, and poor in the midst of riches; he believes himself to be a king, how mean soever he be; and how great soever he be, yet he thinks himself not too good to be servant to the poorest saint.'

Some of the qualities of the Stoic ideal seem inferior to the conception of goodness afterwards developed by the school. The Wise Man of Zeno was represented as stern and pitiless, and as never conceding pardon to any one. This forms a great contrast with the gentle and forgiving spirit of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Such harsher traits of the picture are Semitic in tone; they were afterwards discarded during subsequent transmutations of the Stoical principle. More inward meaning is there in the saying, paradoxical as it might appear, that nothing the Wise Man can do would be a crime. Cannibalism, and incest, and the most shocking things, are said to be indifferent to the sage. This, however, though stated so repulsively, can only have meant something resembling the principle that 'whatever is of faith is no sin.' One of the interests of the Stoical ideal consists in the parallel it affords at many points to different phases of religious feeling. Such for instance is the tendency, more or less vaguely connecting itself with the Stoic doctrine, to divide all the world into the good and the bad, or, as they expressed it, into the wise and the fools—an idea evidently belonging to the inner life, and hard to bring into conformity with external facts. Entirely in the same direction, the Stoics said that short of virtue—in other words,

short of the standard of perfection—all faults and vices were equal. Chrysippus, indeed, tried to soften down this assertion; but in its extreme form it only reminds us of certain sayings which have been heard in modern times, about the ‘worthlessness of morality.’ In the presence of a dazzling idea of spiritual perfection, the minor distinctions of right and wrong seem to lose their meaning.

The Stoics, after portraying their Wise Man, were free to confess that such a character did not exist, and indeed never had existed. With small logical consistency, but with much human truth, while they allowed their assertions about the worthlessness of all except absolute wisdom to remain, and always held up this unattained and unattainable ideal, they admitted another conception to stand, though unacknowledged, beside it—namely, the conception of ‘advance.’<sup>20</sup> Zeno and the rest, though they do not claim to be wise, yet claimed to be ‘advancing.’ This notion of conscious moral progress and self-discipline is too familiar now for us easily to believe that it was first introduced into Greece in the third century B.C. It may be said, indeed, to be contained implicitly in Aristotle’s theory of ‘habits;’ but it is in reality the expression of a new and totally different spirit. By this spirit we shall find the later Stoics deeply penetrated. It constituted perhaps the most purely ‘moral’ notion of antiquity, as implying the deepest associations which are attached to the word ‘moral.’

Another great idea, of which the introduction is generally attributed to the Stoics, is the idea of ‘duty;’ but on consideration, we shall perceive that this, entirely conformable as it was with their point of view, was not all at once enunciated by them; but was only gradually developed in or by

<sup>20</sup> προκόπη, προκόπτειν (Diog. Laert. vii. i. 54). In Latin, *profectus*, *proficere* (Seneca, *Ep.* 71).

means of their philosophy. There were two correlative terms introduced by the early Stoics, signifying the ‘suitable’<sup>21</sup> and the ‘right.’ The ‘right’ could only be said of actions having perfect moral worth. The ‘suitable’ included all that fitted in harmoniously with the course of life—everything that could on good grounds be recommended or defended. This term, ‘the suitable,’ seems to fall short of the moral significance of what we mean by duty; and yet it is remarkable that this term became translated into Latin as *officium*, and thus really stands to our word ‘duty’ in the position of lineal antecedent. So much casuistical discussion took place upon what was, or was not, ‘suitable,’ that a train of associations became attached to the word, associations which were inherited by the Romans. Thus the idea of duty grew up, more belonging, perhaps, to the Roman than to the Greek elements in the Stoical spirit, fostered by a national sternness and a love of law, and ultimately borrowing its modes of expression from the formulae of Roman jurisprudence.<sup>22</sup>

The most prominent conception in the Stoical system being the effort to attain a perfect life in conformity with universal laws, we may now ask what forms the background to this picture. Aristotle and Plato would certainly have conceived to themselves a limited state, essentially Greek in character, the institutions of which should furnish sufficiently favourable conditions for the life of the Wise Man. But in the third century B.C. these restricted notions had become

<sup>21</sup> καθήκον and κατόρθωμα, Stob. *Ecl.*

ii. 158. Cicero's *De Officiis* is taken, with but little alteration and addition, from the work of Panætius, περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων. Cicero complains that Panætius gave no definition of his subject (*De Off.* i. ii. 7). Thus we see that the Greek Stoics had really no formula to express what we mean by

duty.

<sup>22</sup> For instance, the word ‘obligation’ is a Latin law term. The word ‘law’ itself is employed with a moral meaning, and on consideration it will be found that our notions of duty (‘what is owing’) are intertwined inextricably with legal associations.

exploded. Zeno now imagined, what surpassed the *Republic* of Plato, a universal state, with one government and manner of life for all mankind. This admired polity,<sup>23</sup> which Plutarch calls ‘a dream of philosophic statesmanship,’ and which, he rhetorically says, was realised by Alexander the Great, owed, no doubt, its origin to the influence upon men’s minds produced by the conquests of Alexander. This influence, partly depressing—in so far as it diminished the sense of freedom, and robbed men of their healthy, keen, and personal interest in politics—was also partly stimulating, since it unfolded a wider horizon, and the possibility of conceiving a universal state. Thus were the national and exclusive ideas of Greece, as afterwards of Rome, changed into cosmopolitanism. The first lesson of cosmopolitanism, that said, ‘there is no difference between Greece and barbarians—the world is our city,’ must have seemed a mighty revelation. To say this was quite natural to Stoicism, which drawing the mind away from surrounding objects, bids it soar into the abstract and the universal. By denying the reality and the interest of national politics, the moral importance of the individual was immensely enhanced. Ethics were freed from all connection with external institutions, and were joined in a new and close alliance to physics and theology.

The cosmopolitanism of the Stoics was a cosmopolitanism in the widest etymological sense, for they regarded not the inhabited earth alone, but the whole universe, as man’s city. Undistracted by political ideas, they placed the individual in direct relation to the laws of the Cosmos. Hence Chrysippus said,<sup>24</sup> that ‘no ethical subject could be rightly approached except from the preconsideration of entire nature and the ordering of the whole.’ Hence his regular preamble to every

<sup>23</sup> Plutarch, *De Alexandri Magni fortunâ aut virtute*, c. vi.

*Ap.* Plutarch, *De Repug. Stoicis,*

discussion of good, evil, ends, justice, marriage, education, and the like, was some exordium about Fate or Providence. So close and absolute a dependence of the individual upon the Divine First Cause was asserted by the Stoics, that their theological system reminds us, to some extent, of modern Calvinism, or of the doctrines of Spinoza. Body, they said, is the only substance. Nothing incorporeal could act upon what is corporeal, or *vice versa*. The First Cause<sup>25</sup> of all is God, or Zeus—the universal reason, the world-spirit, which may also be represented as the primeval fire, just as the soul of man, which is an emanation from it, consists of a warm ether. God, by transformation of his own essence, makes the world. All things come forth from the bosom of God, and into it all things will again return, when by universal conflagration the world sinks into the divine fire, and God is again left alone. The universe is a living and rational whole; for how else could the human soul, which is but a part of that whole, be rational and conscious? If the Cosmos be compared to an individual man, then Providence is like the spirit of a man. Thus all things are very good, being ordered and preordained by the divine reason. This reason is also destiny, which is defined to be<sup>26</sup> ‘the law according to which what has been, has been; what is, is; and what shall be, shall be.’ The round world hangs balanced in an infinite vacuum. It is made up of four elements—fire and air, which are active powers; water and earth, which are passive materials. Within it are four classes of natural objects—inorganic substances, plants, animals, and rational beings. First and highest among rational beings are the sun and the stars and

<sup>25</sup> For the particulars of their physical and theological system, and the authorities which establish the various parts of the doctrine, see Zeller's

account.

<sup>26</sup> Plutarch, *De Placitis Philosophorum*, i. 28.

all the heavenly bodies, which, as Plato and Aristotle used to say, are conscious, reasonable, and blessed existences. These, indeed, are created gods, divine but not eternal. They will at last, like all things else, return into the unity of the primeval fire. Other gods, or rather other manifestations of the one divine principle, exist in the elements and the powers of nature, which, accordingly, are rightly worshipped by the people, and have received names expressive of their different attributes. Heroes, also, with divine qualities, are justly deified; and the Wise Man is divine, since he bears a god within himself. In this city of Zeus, where all is holy, and earth and sky are full of gods, the individual man is but a part of the whole—only one expression of the universal law.

Abstractedly, the theology of the Stoicks appears as a materialistic pantheism; God is represented as a fire, and the world as a mode of God. But, practically, this aspect of the creed is softened by two feelings—by their strong sense, first, of the personality of God; and secondly, of the individuality of man. These feelings express themselves in the hymn of Cleanthes, the most devotional fragment<sup>27</sup> of Grecian antiquity. In this hymn, Zeus is addressed as highest of the gods, having many names, always omnipotent, leader of nature, and governing all things by law.

‘Thee,’ continues the poet, ‘it is lawful for all mortals to address. For we are thy offspring, and alone of living creatures possess a voice which is the image of reason. Therefore, I will for ever sing thee and celebrate thy power. All this universe rolling round the earth obeys thee, and follows willingly at thy command. Such a minister hast thou in thy invincible hands, the two-edged, flaming, vivid, thun-

<sup>27</sup> Preserved by Stobæus, *Ecl. Phys.* i. 30.

derbolt. O King, most high, nothing is done without thee either in heaven or on earth, or in the sea, except what the wicked do in their foolishness. Thou makest order out of disorder, and what is worthless becomes precious in thy sight; for thou hast fitted together good and evil into one, and hast established one law that exists for ever. But the wicked fly from thy law, unhappy ones, and though they desire to possess what is good, yet they see not, neither do they hear, the universal law of God. If they would follow it with understanding, they might have a good life. But they go astray, each after his own devices—some vainly striving after reputation, others turning aside after gain excessively, others after riotous living and wantonness. Nay, but, O Zeus, giver of all things, who dwellest in dark clouds, and rulest over the thunder, deliver men from their foolishness. Scatter it from their souls, and grant them to obtain wisdom, for by wisdom thou dost rightly govern all things; that being honoured we may repay thee with honour, singing thy works without ceasing, as is right for us to do. For there is no greater thing than this, either for mortal men or for the gods, to sing rightly the universal law.'

In this interesting fragment we see, above all, a belief in the unity of God. This, Plato and Aristotle had most certainly arrived at. Even in the popular ideas it probably lay behind all polytheistic forms, as being a truth necessary to the mind. But Monotheism here, as in the early Hebrew Scriptures, is co-existent with a mention of other gods besides the one highest God. These are represented as inferior to Zeus, and singing his praises. The human soul is here depicted as deriving all happiness from wisdom and a knowledge of God. The knowledge of God and a devotional regard to Him are mentioned as needs of the human soul,

though the knowledge spoken of appears partly under the aspect of an intuition into the universal and impersonal law. When Cleanthes speaks of ‘repaying God with honour,’ we see a strong assertion of the worth of the individual. Heraclitus had said of old that ‘Zeus looks on the wisest man as we look on an ape.’ But now the feeling about these things was changed, and Chrysippus<sup>28</sup> even went so far as to say, that ‘the sage is not less useful to Zeus than Zeus is to the sage’—a saying which is rendered less offensive by taking it partly in a metaphysical sense, to mean that the individual is as necessary to the universal law as *vice versa*.

As strong an assertion as this would seem almost required to counterbalance the absorbing necessarian element in early Stoicism. At first it excites surprise that a system putting so great store on the moral will should on the other hand appear to annihilate it. If all proceeds by destiny, what scope is left for individual action, for self-discipline and moral advance? But we must leave this contradiction unresolved. Other systems with a profoundly moral bearing have also maintained the doctrine of necessity. And it was plainly the intention of the Stoics that the Wise Man, by raising himself to the consciousness of universal necessity, should become free, while all those who had not attained to this consciousness remained in bondage. ‘Lead me, Zeus, and thou Destiny,’<sup>29</sup> says Cleanthes, in another fragment, ‘whithersoever I am’ by you appointed. I will follow not reluctant; but even though I am unwilling through badness, I shall follow none the less.’ Yet still with the Stoics the individual element remained equally valid; the individual

<sup>28</sup> Plutarch, *Adversus Stoicos*, 33.

<sup>29</sup> ἄγου δέ μ' ὁ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ' ἡ Πε-  
πρωμένη,  
ὅποι ποθ' ὑμῖν εἰμὶ διατεταγμένος,

δῶς ἔψομαι γ' ἕρκυος· ἦν δὲ μὴ θέλω  
κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἡττον ἔψομαι.  
These verses are translated by Seneca.

consciousness was the starting-point of their thought ; and hence the difficulty arose, as in modern times, how to reconcile the opposite ideas of individual freedom, and of a world absolutely predetermined by divine reason. To the task of this reconciliation Chrysippus devoted himself, and Cicero describes him as ‘labouring painfully to explain how all things happen by Fate, and yet that there is something in ourselves.’<sup>30</sup> To effect this, he drew a distinction between ‘predisposing’ and ‘determinant’ causes, and said that only the ‘predisposing’ causes rested with Fate,<sup>31</sup> while the ‘determinant’ cause was always in the human will. This distinction will hardly bear much scrutiny. When Chrysippus was confronted with what philosophers called the ‘lazy argument’<sup>32</sup>—namely, the very simple question, Why should I do anything, if all is fated ? Why, for instance, should I send for the doctor, since, whether I do so or not, the question of my recovery is already fixed by fate?—to this he replied, It is perhaps as much fated that you should send for the doctor, as that you should get well ; these things are ‘confatal.’ In other words, the fate of the Stoics was, of course, a rational fate, acting, not supernaturally, but by the whole chain of cause and effect. The reasonings of Chrysippus are interesting historically, as being the first attempt to meet some of the difficulties of the doctrine of human freedom ; and much that he urges has been repeated in after times. We have already seen the optimism of Cleanthes expressed in his hymn. He says on the one hand, that nothing is evil in the hands of God ; God fits good and evil together into one frame. On the other hand, he says that

<sup>30</sup> Fragment of Cicero, *De Fato*, ap. Aul. Gell. vii. ii. 15.

<sup>31</sup> Plut. *De Repug. Stoic.* xlviij. : οὐκ ὑποτελῆ τούτων αἰτίαν, ἀλλὰ προκα-

ταρτικὴν μόνον ἐποιεῖτο τὴν Σίμαρμένην.

<sup>32</sup> ἀργὸς λόγος (Cicero, *De Fato*, xii. xiii.).

'God does all that is done in the world, except the wickedness.' Chrysippus, touching on the existence of evil and the afflictions which happen to good men, says that the existence of evil is necessary, as being the contrary to good; <sup>33</sup> without it, good could not exist. Again, that as in a large family a little waste must occur, so in the world there must be parts overlooked and neglected. Again, that the good are afflicted not as a punishment, but 'according to another dispensation.' Again, that evil demons may preside over some parts of the world. Of these inconsistent arguments the first is, perhaps, the most philosophical. It is taken from Heraclitus, according to whom all things exist by the unity of contradiction. Plutarch objects to this argument, that if good can only exist by implying evil, what will become of the good after the conflagration of the world, when Zeus is all in all? If evil is destroyed, then good will be destroyed also; an objection hard to answer from the point of view of Chrysippus.

The Stoics generally professed themselves on the side of the 'common notions.' They accepted the popular theology in an allegorising spirit, as being a slightly perverted expression of the truth. Though denying the marvellous and the supernatural, and being quite unable to attribute to God a meddling in the *minutiae* of human affairs, they yet declared <sup>34</sup> for the reality of omens, oracles, and portents. They explained their belief by saying that there was no special revelation, but that certain signs were universally preordained to accompany certain events. The portent and the thing to be signified were 'confatal.' Thus the world was full of divine coincidences, if men could but discern them. We can well fancy that this theme would suit the subtle intellect of Chry-

<sup>33</sup> Plutarch, *De Repug. Stoic.* xxxv.-xxxvii.

<sup>34</sup> Cicero, *De Divinatione*, i. iii. &c.  
Seneca, *Quæst. Nat.* ii. 52.

sippus, who appears to have written two books on Divination, one on Oracles, and one on Dreams. But a difference on the subject afterwards arose in the school, and Panætius expressed his doubts as to the reality of divination. With regard to the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, the Stoics were opposed to the general belief. Chrysippus finds fault with Plato for having, in the person of Cephalus, adopted such a vulgar bugbear.<sup>35</sup> But they asserted the moral government of the world, saying that the good alone are happy, and that misfortunes happen to the wicked by Divine Providence. The Stoics would seem excluded by their theological system from holding the immortality of the soul. If all the world by conflagration sinks into the essence of God, how can the individual soul continue to exist? But Cleanthes and Chrysippus spoke of the continuance of the souls of the wise, and the possible continuance of all souls, until the next conflagration. And, as Zeller<sup>36</sup> says, 'since the Stoics thus admitted a future existence of limited, but yet indefinite, length—the same practical results followed from their belief as from the current belief in immortality. The statements of Seneca that this life is a prelude to a better; that the body is a lodging-house, from which the soul will return to its own home; his joy in looking forward to the day which will rend the bonds of the body asunder, which he, in common with the early Christians, calls the birthday of eternal life;<sup>37</sup> his description of the peace of the eternity there awaiting us, of the freedom and bliss of the heavenly life, of the light of knowledge which will there be shed on all the secrets of nature;<sup>38</sup> his language on the future recognition and happy

<sup>35</sup> τὸν περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κολαστεων λόγον, ἡς οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῆς Ἀκοῦσις καὶ τῆς Ἀλφίτου, δι' ᾧ τὰ παιδάρια τοῦ πακοσχολεῖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἀνέργυουσι.—Plut. *De Repug. Stoic.* c. xii.

<sup>36</sup> Zeller's *Stoics and Epicureans*, English translation, pp. 207–209.

<sup>37</sup> Seneca, *Ep.* 102, 22.

<sup>38</sup> *Consol. ad Marc.* 24, 3.

society of souls made perfect ;<sup>39</sup> his seeing in death a great day of judgment, when sentence will be pronounced on everyone ;<sup>40</sup> his making the thought of a future life the great stimulus to moral conduct here ;<sup>41</sup> even the way in which he consoles himself for the destruction of his soul by the thought that it will live again in another form hereafter<sup>42</sup> —all contain nothing at variance with the Stoic teaching, however near they may approach to Platonic or even Christian modes of thought. Seneca merely expanded the teaching of his school in one particular direction, in which it harmonises most closely with Platonism.'

In like manner we see the Roman Cato fortifying his last hours with arguments and ideas drawn not from the orthodox authorities of Stoicism, but from the *Phædo* of Plato. It was but natural that in the history of Stoicism a tendency should be evinced to sympathise with Plato in exalting the idea of a future life. If there be any principle in the human mind, short of revelation, which could lead men to trust and believe in their own immortality, it must assuredly be that principle which so largely animated the Stoics, the principle of aspiration, of moral energy, of a life above all ordinary pleasures and interests. And the working of this principle belied and neutralised the logical conclusions of a pantheistic materialism.

The culminating act of self-abnegation with the Stoics was suicide. The first leaders of the school, by their precept and example, recommended the wise, on occasion, to 'usher themselves out'<sup>43</sup> of life. If suicide, thus dignified by a name, were an escape from mere pain or annoyance, it

<sup>39</sup> *Consol. ad Marc.* 25, 1.

<sup>40</sup> *Ep.* 26, 4.

<sup>41</sup> *Ep.* 102, 26.

<sup>42</sup> *Ep.* 36, 10.

<sup>43</sup> ἀξάγειν ἁυρούσ—ἀξαγωγή is the regular word with the Stoics for suicide.—Diog. Laert. vii. i. 66.

would be an Epicurean act; but as a flight from what is degrading—as a great piece of renunciation, it assumes a Stoical appearance. The passion for suicide reached its height in the writings of Seneca, under the wretched circumstances of the Roman despotism; but, on the whole, it belongs to immature Stoicism—Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius dissuaded from it. In saying this, we cannot for a moment pretend that the Stoical principle ever entirely became clear of alloy; it was too wanting in objective elements—it had too little to draw men out of themselves ever to satisfy the human spirit, ever to be otherwise than very imperfect. Stoical pride will always be a just subject of reproach; for the development of the subjective element of morality necessary to the deepening of the thoughts of the world was overdone by the Stoics, and they supplied nothing in counterbalance. It is not as a complete system, or with any inherent capacity for completeness, certainly not as a rival to Christianity, that we regard the Stoical Idea; but only as a strange and interesting doctrine which has played an important part in the history of the world.

II. The Stoical doctrine was not destined to remain the property of a mere school in Athens; owing to the active intercommunion of nations round the shores of the Mediterranean which took place after the conquests of Alexander, this influence, as well as others, rapidly spread. We have seen how Stoicism owed its origin to the East, and upon the East it apparently reacted at a very early period. This is especially exemplified in the history of the Jews. There seems little doubt that during the third century B.C. many of the Jews became indoctrinated with the teaching of one or other of the two great Greek schools, the Stoic and the Epicurean. The original founder of the sect of the Sadducees was Antigonus of Socho (the master of Zadok), who taught

that men should not serve God like hirelings, for a reward. This Antigonus appears to have lived during the former half of the third century, and he is the first Jew who is recorded to have borne a Greek name. It is conjectured<sup>44</sup> that he had travelled in Greek cities, and through admiration for Greek philosophy and culture, adopted a Greek name, and that he had heard Epicurus, or one of his followers, at Athens, and that his subsequent theological teaching became modified by the Epicurean repudiation of future rewards and punishments. However this may be, it is, to say the least, remarkable that the sect of the Pharisees should have arisen about this time, bearing a relation to that of the Sadducees so much analogous to the relation of the Stoics to the Epicureans. Josephus (*Antiq. xviii. i. 2*) says that the Jews had had for a long time three kinds of philosophy, and (*Vita, 2*) that the sect of the Pharisees came very near that of the Stoics (*ἢ παραπλήσιός ἐστι τῇ παρ' Ἑλλησι Στωικῇ λεγομένῃ*). And in describing the Pharisaic doctrines he uses terms that seem borrowed from Stoicism; he says (*Bell. Jud. II. viii. 14*) that ‘the Pharisees ascribe all things to Fate and God’ (*εἰμαρμένη τε καὶ θεῷ προσάπτουσι πάντα*);<sup>45</sup> that (*Ib.*) according to them ‘to act what is right or the contrary lies principally in the power of men, although Fate does co-operate in every action’;<sup>46</sup> that (*Ib.*) they teach that ‘the souls of good men only are removed into other bodies;’ and that (*Antiq. xviii. i. 3*) those who have lived virtuously will

<sup>44</sup> See *Ecclesiastes; a Contribution to its Interpretation*, by Thomas Tyler, M.A. &c. (London, 1874). The Greek name of the Jew Antigonus may remind us of the Greek names borne by the Phœnician, Babylonian, Syrian, and Carthaginian founders of the Stoic school (see above, page 308). These must all have been

names of adoption, out of compliment to Athens, in lieu of Semitic, or ‘barbarous,’ appellations. This fact may account for the repetitions of the same name which occur, e.g. Zeno, Diogenes, Antipater, Athenodorus, &c.

<sup>45</sup> Compare the saying of Cleanthes, quoted above, page 330.

<sup>46</sup> See above, page 331.

have liberty to live again (*φαστώνην τοῦ ἀναβιοῦν*), which seems to be a modification of the Stoical eschatology. It is said by the author lately referred to<sup>47</sup> that the *Chasidim*, or Assideans of Maccabean times, invested their conservative Judaism ‘to some extent with a Stoic garb,’ and that the Fourth Book of *Maccabees* ‘exhibits to us Stoicism associated and interwoven with Judaic legalism.’ It is the object of the same writer to prove that the Book of *Ecclesiastes*, to which he assigns a date about 200 B.C., contains references to both Stoical and Epicurean tenets,<sup>48</sup> and was written with the object of dissuading from the study of both these philosophies, which at the time ‘were exerting among the theocratic people an influence adverse to the ancient faith of Judaism.’ The relation of Stoicism to the Talmud is a question which, if worked out, might probably furnish some interesting results. And of the influence produced by the Stoical modes of thought and phraseology<sup>49</sup> upon the mind of St. Paul, his epistles furnish ample evidence.

St. Paul was born at Tarsus, a meeting point between the East and the West, the congenial soil and chief father-land of Stoicism. Six of the eminent Stoic teachers had their home there, Chrysippus and Aratus belonged to the neighbouring Soli, and three other leaders of the sect to

<sup>47</sup> Mr. Tyler's *Ecclesiastes*, page 45.

<sup>48</sup> Mr. Tyler finds the Stoical doctrine of ‘following Nature’ in the passage on ‘Times and Seasons,’ *Eccles.* iii. 1-8; the Stoical doctrine of Fate in ‘Time and Chance happen unto all,’ *Eccles.* ix. 11, 12; the Stoical doctrine of Cycles in ‘whatever hath been, it had been long before,’ *Eccles.* iii. 15; the Stoical identification of Folly with Madness, in the frequent conjunctions of these terms ‘madness and folly,’ *Eccles.* i. 17, ii. 12, vii. 25, ix. 3, x. 13; the Epicurean doctrine

that men are but as beasts in *Eccles.* iii. 18-20; and the Epicurean conception of Pleasure as the chief good in *Eccles.* v. 18-20. M. Renan, however, in his monograph on *Ecclesiastes*, takes a different view, and refuses to find in that book any reference to Greek ideas.

<sup>49</sup> This point has been most ably investigated by Bishop Lightfoot, in his Dissertation on ‘St. Paul and Seneca,’ and of his conclusions we avail ourselves. \*

Mallos, which was also a Cilician town. St. Paul was brought up as a Pharisee, in a sect which had a natural, and probably an historical, affinity with the Stoical doctrines. His master was Gamaliel, ‘the most liberal teacher of the day, who had no dread of Greek learning.’ St. Paul’s writings show him to have imbibed the current Greek cultivation. When he came to Athens, after encountering certain philosophers of the Epicureans and of the Stoics, he ‘stood up in the midst of Mars’ Hill’ and addressed the multitude. While speaking to the mass of the Athenians, and making its popular superstition his starting-point, St. Paul appears to appeal to the philosophic part of his audience, weaving in their ideas into his speech, referring to their literature, and producing ‘a studied coincidence with their modes of expression.’ Thus the cosmopolitan theory of the Stoics seems distinctly assumed,<sup>50</sup> and both Aratus and Cleanthes may be comprehended under the terms ‘certain of your own poets have said;’<sup>51</sup> and in the saying that ‘God dwelleth not in temples made with hands’ St. Paul agrees remarkably with the expressions of Zeno (ap. Plutarch *De Repug. Stoic.* c. 2). But it was not merely when he was addressing an Athenian audience that St. Paul made use of Stoical forms of expression. ‘As the speculations of Alexandrian Judaism had elaborated a new and important theological vocabulary, so also to the language of Stoicism, which itself likewise had sprung from the union of the religious sentiment of the East with the philosophical thought of the West, was due an equally remarkable development of moral terms and images. To the Gospel, both the one and the other paid their tribute. As St. John (nor St. John alone) adopted the terms of Alexandrian theosophy

<sup>50</sup> ‘God hath made of one blood all nations of men,’ &c., Acts xvii. 26.

<sup>51</sup> In Aratus the words are Τοῦ

γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν, in the hymn of Cleanthes (see above, page 328), Εκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν.

as the least inadequate to express the highest doctrines of Christianity, so St. Paul (nor St. Paul alone) found in the ethical language of the Stoics expressions more fit than he could find elsewhere to describe in certain aspects the duties and privileges, the struggles and triumphs, of the Christian life.<sup>52</sup> Instances of ‘the characteristic commonplaces of Stoic morality’ emerging in the writings of St. Paul are as follows: (1.) The Stoical ideal of the wise man (so full of paradox, see above, page 322), with his perfect self-sufficiency—who alone is free, alone is happy, alone is rich, alone is king and priest—was a topic that furnished to St. Paul many a passage both of irony and earnestness. ‘Even now are ye full,’ he says to the Corinthians,<sup>53</sup> ‘even now are ye rich, even now are ye made kings without us;’ ‘we are fools for Christ, but ye are wise in Christ: we are weak, but ye are strong: ye are glorious, but we are dishonoured.’<sup>54</sup> ‘All things are yours.’<sup>55</sup> And of himself he speaks ‘as being grieved, yet always rejoicing; as beggars, yet making many rich; as having nothing and yet possessing all things.’<sup>56</sup> ‘In everything at every time having every self-sufficiency (*αὐτάρκειαν*), in everything being enriched.’<sup>57</sup> ‘I have learnt, in whatsoever circumstances I am, to be self-sufficing. I have all strength in him that giveth me power. I have all things to the full and to overflowing.’<sup>58</sup> (2.) The Stoical cosmopolitanism, the idea of a city coextensive with the universe (see above, page 326), furnished another set of images to St. Paul. ‘Our citizenship is in heaven.’<sup>59</sup> ‘Therefore ye are no more strangers and sojourners, but fellow-citizens with the saints and members of God’s house-

<sup>52</sup> Bishop Lightfoot's *Philippians* (1st ed.), page 302.

<sup>53</sup> 1 Cor. iv. 8.

<sup>54</sup> Ib. iv. 10.

<sup>55</sup> Ib. iii. 22.

<sup>56</sup> 2 Cor. vi. 10.

<sup>57</sup> 2 Cor. ix. 8, 11.

<sup>58</sup> Phil. iv. 11, 13, 18.

<sup>59</sup> Phil. iii. 20.

hold.'<sup>60</sup> 'Fulfil your duties as citizens worthily of the gospel of Christ.'<sup>61</sup> 'We being many are one body in Christ, and members one of another.'<sup>62</sup> 'There is neither Jew nor Greek; there is neither bond nor free; there is no male or female; for ye are all one in Christ Jesus.'<sup>63</sup> 'Not Greek and Jew, circumcision and uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bond, free: but Christ is all things and in all.'<sup>64</sup> Such was the noble use that St. Paul made of Stoical ideas and forms of thought; with him the spirit of Christianity purifies these ideas from their alloy and turns them into pure gold. But it cannot be doubted that Stoicism, by the early and not uncongenial influence which it had produced upon the mind of St. Paul, contributed something to the form under which Christian doctrine was set forth by its greatest expositor. On the other hand there are no good grounds for believing that Stoicism ever received any influence from Christianity. The hypothesis of an intercourse between St. Paul and Seneca has no historical foundation. And internal evidence forbids our supposing that either Seneca, or any other Stoical writer, borrowed from, or was acquainted with, the Christian doctrines.

Having now traced some indications of the effect produced by Stoicism on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, let us turn to watch its promulgation in the West and throughout the Roman world in general, where it was destined to play the part of, to some extent, a regenerating element in the last days of Pagan civilisation. There was a direct succession, as we have seen above (p. 308), in the lists of the Stoic doctors from Chrysippus to Posidonius, and Posidonius was master to Cicero. During the interval

<sup>60</sup> *Ephes.* ii. 19.

<sup>63</sup> *Gal.* iii. 28.

<sup>61</sup> *Phil.* i. 27.

<sup>64</sup> *Col.* iii. 11.

<sup>62</sup> *Rom.* xii. 5.

spanned by these successive teachers (from 200 B.C. to 50 B.C.), many circumstances turned the tide of philosophy towards Rome, and commenced the intellectual subjugation of the victors in the domain of thought as well as of imaginative literature. The first awakenings of the national curiosity are somewhat obscured. Aulus Gellius records a decree of the Senate, of the date B.C. 161, for banishing from Rome philosophers and rhetoricians, at the instance of M. Pomponius, the prætor. This fact appears to stand in isolation. Six years later (B.C. 155), we hear of the famous embassy of the philosophers sent from Athens to Rome to obtain the remission of a fine. Doubt<sup>65</sup> has been thrown on the reality of this event. But independently of the constant oral tradition from Scipio and Lælius down to Cicero, the historical certainty of the embassy is established by a reference which Cicero makes<sup>66</sup> to the writings of Clitomachus, a Carthaginian philosopher who settled at Athens, and was disciple to Carneades immediately after the date assigned to the embassy, and who therefore is an undoubted authority for the facts. However, we may easily believe that the story has been decked out and improved. In some accounts, Carneades the Academic, and Diogenes the Stoic, are mentioned as the envoys; but other accounts, probably for completeness' sake, add Critolaus the Peripatetic. And hence it came to be said<sup>67</sup> that these three represented the three styles of oratory—the florid, the severe, and the moderate. Cicero<sup>68</sup> tells us of a philosophic party at Rome, in compliment to whom these particular ambassadors were sent; while, on the other hand, Cato the Censor viewed with impatience their favourable reception, and urged upon

<sup>65</sup> Mr. Merivale's *History of the Romans under the Empire*, ii. p. 511, note.

<sup>66</sup> *Academics*, ii. xlv. •  
<sup>67</sup> Aulus Gellius, vii. xiv. 3.  
<sup>68</sup> *De Oratore*, ii. xxxvii.

the Senate their speedy dismissal. The most interesting anecdote connected with this embassy is that quoted from the works of Clitomachus,—that A. Albinus, the prætor, said to Carneades in the Capitol, before the Senate, ‘Is it true, Carneades, that you think I am no prætor because I am not a wise man, and that this is no city, and that there is no true state in it?’ To which Carneades replied, ‘I don’t think so, but this Stoic does.’ This story amusingly represents the confusion in the mind of the Roman prætor, who did not distinguish between the philosophical schools, but was struck by the great paradox he had heard, and was not able to comprehend that inner point of view from which it was said that mighty Rome was no city, and the august prætor had no real office or authority at all.

The anti-philosophical party seem to have continued their exertions at Rome, and under the date 93 B.C. we read<sup>69</sup> of a decree of the censors Domitius Aenobarbus and Licinius Crassus against the schools in which a new sort of learning was taught by those who called themselves Latin rhetoricians, and where youths wasted their whole days in sloth. This decree is in fine grand Roman style; it says, ‘these things do not please us.’ But it was in vain to attempt resisting the influx of Greek philosophy, when the leading and most able men warmly welcomed it. Africanus, C. Lælius, and L. Furius were extremely pleased at the embassy, and always had learned Greeks in their company. A little later than 150 B.C., no one was more instrumental in recommending Stoicism to the Romans than Panætius of Rhodes, whose instructions in Athens were attended by Lælius and his son-in-law, C. Fanucius, and also by the conqueror of Carthage. Panætius accompanied the latter on his famous mission to

the courts in Asia Minor and Egypt. He is always spoken of as the friend and companion of Scipio and Lælius. He is recorded to have sent a letter to Q. Tubero, on the endurance of pain. Not only by personal intercourse did Panætius influence the cultivated Romans, but also still more by his books. These seem to have been of a character eminently fitted for the comprehension of the Romans, being extremely practical, avoiding the harshness and severity of the early Stoics, and being free from 'the forms of dialectic.'<sup>70</sup> One peculiarity above all, while it made Panætius a worse Stoic, made him at the same time a more attractive expositor of philosophy, and was only a fulfilment, after all, of the destiny of Stoicism—namely, his tendency to eclecticism. He constantly had Plato, Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus, Dicæarchus, in his mouth ; he was always speaking<sup>71</sup> of Plato as divine, most wise, most holy, and the Homer of philosophers. We can form a very good conception of his writings from Cicero's work *On Offices*, which is taken almost exactly from Panætius' *On Things Suitable*. An extract *verbatim*, from the latter, is preserved by Aulus Gellius. It recommends those who are mixed up in affairs to be on their guard, like pugilists, against every sort of attack. It is in rhetorical style, and full of a sensible worldly prudence. Such prudence is no more alien from a particular phase of Stoicism, than it is from a particular phase of religion.

Posidonius (B.C. 135–50) maintained the same intercourse with the Romans, and the same eclectic tendencies as his master. After the death of Panætius (B.C. 112), he made some extensive travels for the sake of physical inquiry. At Cadiz he spent some time in observations on the sunset ; he visited Sicily, Dalmatia, and other countries, and finally

<sup>70</sup> Cicero, *De Fin.* iv. xxviii. 79.

<sup>71</sup> Cicero, *Tusculan. Disputat.* i. xxxii. 79.

settled in Rhodes. Strabo, with a sympathy for his geographical knowledge, called him ‘the most learned philosopher of the day.’ In the year 86 B.C. he was sent as ambassador to Rome, and became acquainted with Marius. Pompey visited Posidonius twice in Rhodes (67 and 62 B.C.); and the story goes that on one of these occasions, Posidonius, having a bad fit of the gout, discoursed from his bed to Pompey on the topic ‘that virtue is the only good, and that pain is no evil.’ Cicero also studied under him in Rhodes; and finally, coming to Rome in his old age (B.C. 51), he died there a short time afterwards, having had as his hearers C. Velleius, C. Cotta, Q. Lucilius Balbus, and probably Brutus. Posidonius wrote a commentary on the *Timaeus* of Plato, apparently to reconcile it with the Stoical physics. He approximated in some things to Aristotle, and even, it is said, to Pythagoras. On divination, however, he reverted to the old Stoical view, abandoning the scepticism of Panætius. The ancients make mention of the elegance of his style; and Cicero, while dissenting from his opinions on fate and other subjects, speaks of him at the same time with the greatest respect.

Besides those Stoicks who were of eminence and originality enough to advance, though only by amalgamation, the traditional doctrine, there were by this time many others who received it merely and adopted it as an article of faith, without thinking of addition or change. Such was probably Antipater of Tyre, who became the friend and instructor of Cato the younger. And now we find, in the last half-century before Christ, frequent instances of a new fashion in Rome—namely, for a great man to ‘maintain a philosopher in his house, as in modern days a private confessor. Of this custom Cato<sup>72</sup> of Utica was himself an instance, for he is reported

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<sup>72</sup> Plutarch, *Cato Minor*, c. x.

to have made a journey to Pergamus with the express object of inducing the famous Stoic Athenodorus, surnamed Cordylion, to accompany him to Rome, in which mission he succeeded, and brought back the sage in triumph, who ended his days in the house of Cato. After this, at Utica, Cato appears to have had among the members of his family Demetrius a Peripatetic, and Apollonides a Stoic. On the night before Cato's suicide, they disputed with each other on the paradox that the Wise Man only is free, Cato warmly supporting the Stoical side. Another<sup>73</sup> Athenodorus, of the same sect, but surnamed Cananites, was highly honoured by the great Augustus. Attracting the notice of the Emperor at Apollonia, where he held a school, he was invited to Rome, and had the young Claudius placed under his instruction. In his old age returning to Tarsus, he seems to have procured some advantages for his country through his influence with Augustus. Among the few works attributed to him there is one with an eminently Stoical title, *On Earnestness and Education*.

Arguing by analogy from these external indications, we may imagine the Roman nation at this period imbibing Greek philosophy, or so-called philosophy, at every pore. The Romans, indeed, had not the slightest stomach for metaphysics, and in no one of their writers do we find any trace of a real acquaintance with the systems of Plato or Aristotle. But we can find abundant traces of an acquaintance with Epicurus and Chrysippus, and Panætius and Posidonius. The inducement of the Romans in taking up with this kind of literature was twofold : first, a natural affinity for practical moralising and maxims of life ; second, a rhetorical necessity —the desire to turn sentences, to be terse, apposite, and

<sup>73</sup> Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography*, sub voce.

weighty. The constant practice of declamation gave an immense stimulus to the sermonising tendency of the day, and as the despotism of the Empire shut up other subjects, declamation became more and more exclusively moral. Instruction under some Greek rhetorician became part of the education of a Roman youth, and in Athens, Rhodes, Marseilles, and Alexandria, everywhere throughout the great Roman world, Sophists and declaimers might be heard setting forth the theses of the different schools, among which the florid paradoxes of the Stoics were no doubt most striking and attractive.

The Romans who took any side in philosophy invariably became either Epicureans, Stoics, or Academics, or else, as was not unfrequent, they combined the Academical opinions on knowledge with the Stoical morals or some admixture of the Stoical physics. This was the case with L. Lucullus, with M. Brutus, and Terentius Varro. Cicero's creed we know to have been a learned and sensible eclecticism, a qualified Stoicism with a use of the Academic arguments, and an approach in some things to the Peripatetic views. Such a compound was suitable to a statesman and a man of letters; it exhibits acuteness, refinement, breadth of view, and an affinity to what is elevated in the different systems: but at the same time it avoids all extremes, and shuns that unity of principle on which philosophy, properly so called, depends. When such a balance as this was wanting, the Romans joined the opposite ranks of the Stoics or the Epicureans. To either side they had certain elements that inclined them. Their capacity for the physical enjoyment of life, their taste for rural ease and the delights of their beautiful villas, and that healthy realism which we find expressed by Lucretius, all tended to recommend the Epicurean doctrine to the Romans. And added to these predisposing causes

was the fact that the first book of philosophy written in the Latin language was the work of one Amasinius,<sup>74</sup> setting forth Epicurism. This treatise, though of no merit according to Cicero, had immense influence, and brought over the multitude to adopt its views. ‘Other works of a similar character followed, and through their popular style took possession of the whole of Italy.’ Of this phase of feeling hardly any trace remains to us, if we except the splendid poem of Lucretius, and the record of one or two great names among the Roman Epicureans, such as Atticus, the friend of Cicero, Cassius, the murderer of Caesar, L. Torquatus, and C. Velleius. Perhaps its most lasting result was the spread of ‘a wisdom,’ as Livy calls it, ‘which had learned to despise the gods.’ Epicurism was transient in Rome, like Sentimentalism in England, because alien to the national characteristics; for on the whole the Romans were far more disposed to energy and sublime virtue, and the conquest of external circumstances, than to easy and harmonious enjoyment. Without a great intellectual capacity for the apprehension of the universal, there was yet something abstract about their turn of mind; this is shown in their love of law, and in the sternness of the high Roman mood. It has been often said that the old Roman worthies were unconscious Stoics. And now, from Cato to M. Aurielius, we find through the Roman empire an immense diffusion of Stoical principles and of the professors of Stoicism.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>74</sup> Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* iv. iii.; *Acad.* Post. II. | became extinct. He says of Sextius

<sup>75</sup> Among the most celebrated of these is to be named Q. Sextius, contemporary with Julius Cæsar, who founded a school. This school, Seneca tells us (*Quest. Nat.* viii. xxxii.), began with great *éclat*, but soon

that he was ‘a great man and a Stoic, although he himself denied this.’ Sextius appears to have followed Pythagoras in some points, and to have enjoined abstinence from animal food. Sotion, the disciple of Sextius, was Seneca’s master, and induced him

III. These professors assumed, it appears, not only distinctive principles, but also certain external marks and badges of their sect. We read in Juvenal<sup>76</sup> of the 'long robe' as synonymous with Stoicism; in Persius we read of their close-cropped hair,<sup>77</sup> and their look of having sat up all night; in Tacitus,<sup>78</sup> of their set countenances and gait expressive of virtue. Like their Jewish counterpart, the Pharisees, they were formal, austere, pretentious, and not unfrequently hypocritical. Under the mask of asceticism, they appear sometimes to have concealed gross licentiousness,<sup>79</sup> and under their sanctimonious face the blackest heart. With bitter indignation does Tacitus<sup>80</sup> record the perfidy of Publius Egnatius Celer, the Stoic philosopher, the client, the instructor, and the false friend of Barea Soranus, whom, with his daughter, he betrayed to Nero, by giving the lying evidence which procured their deaths. Such cases as this, however, are to be regarded like stories of the corruption of priests and monks, and to be judged apart, as giving no sufficient clue to the working of the system. Partly they illustrate the maxim that 'that corruption is worst which is the corruption of the best;' partly they show that an elevated and spiritual creed is apt, by the very nobleness of its appearance, to attract unworthy followers. We may also

to practise this kind of asceticism at one time; but after a year's trial of it, he was persuaded by his father, who 'hated philosophy,' and who dreaded the imputation of certain foreign superstitions, to return to the common mode of diet (*Ep. cviii.*). 'What is most remarkable about Sextius is his daily habit, according to Senecca (*De Ira*, iii. xxxvi.), of self-examination. This shows the spirit of the times.'

<sup>76</sup> 'Facinus majoris abolitæ.'—*Sat.* iii. 115.

<sup>77</sup> 'Insomnis . . . et detonsa juventus.'—*Sat.* iii. 54.

<sup>78</sup> 'P. Egnatius . . . auctoritatem Stoicæ sectæ præferebat, habitu et ore ad exprimendam imaginem honesti exercitus.'—*Annal.* xvi. 32.

<sup>79</sup> 'Frontis nulla fides, quis enim non vicius abundat  
Tristibus obscœnus?'—*Juv. Sat.* ii. 8.

<sup>80</sup> *Ann.* xvi. 32, 33.

add that, beside the antinomian tendencies which might logically be connected with this creed,<sup>81</sup> there was a narrowness in the intensity of Stoicism, and an abstract unreality about its ideas, not favourable to the development of the more human virtues. Acknowledging these things, we may turn away from this ungracious side of the system, and leave it to the tender mercies of the satirists. For even externally, Stoicism, on the whole, presented a better aspect and won a better opinion than this from intelligent observers during the early Roman empire. Nothing can be more significant than the accusation brought against C. Rubellius Plautus<sup>82</sup> by Tigellinus. This Plautus was son of Julia, and great-grandson of Tiberius. Becoming an object of suspicion to Nero, he retired—not from the Roman world, for that was impossible, but from the Court—to Asia, where he lived in the pursuit of the Stoic philosophy. Tigellinus, to stir up Nero's hatred against him, declared, 'That man, though of immense wealth, does not even pretend a wish for enjoyment, but is always bringing forward the examples of the ancient Romans. And he has now joined to these ideas the arrogance of the Stoics—a philosophy which makes men turbulent and restless.' It is easy to see that this accusation was a panegyric. It was followed up by an order sent from Nero that Plautus should be put to death. His friends counselled resistance, but Cæranus and Musonius Rufus, two philosophers who were with him, preached the doctrine of resignation and fortitude; and, armed with their suggestions, he met his death unmoved. This manner of death and life was not confined to Plautus: the reigns of Claudio<sup>s</sup> and Nero exhibit a constellation of noble characters, formed on the

<sup>81</sup> See above, p. 323.

<sup>82</sup> Tacitus, *Annal.* xiv. 57. Cf. Plutarch, *Vit. Cleom.*—'Ἐχει τι δέ  
Ξτωκίδες λόγος πρὸς τὰς μεγάλας καὶ

δέξεις φύσεις ἀπισφαλὲς καὶ παράβολον·

βαθεῖ δὲ καὶ πράφι κεραυνόμενος θεῖς  
μάλιστα εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδίδωσι.

model of the younger Cato, and showing the same republican front and the same practical conception of Stoicism as he did. Such were Cæcina Pætus and his heroic wife Arria, who died at the command of Claudius. Such was Soranus Barea, already mentioned, and such Thrasea, and his son-in-law Helvidius. Seneca, too, in his death, at all events, must be added to the list—a list of martyrs at a time when all good eminence was sure to attract the stroke. There is something perhaps theatrical and affected about the record of these death-scenes. When we think of Cato arguing on the freedom of the wise man, and then reading the *Phædo* through the night, before he stabs himself; when we think of Thrasea pouring out a libation of his own blood to Jupiter the Liberator, and discoursing in his last moments with the Cynic Demetrius on immortality—it seems as if these men had played somewhat studied parts. Such scenes appeal to the rhetorical faculty, rather than to the imagination and the heart. But it is the privilege of certain unhappy periods to be rhetorical. It is the privilege of patriots in miserable days to be excited, strained, unnatural. And hence we can understand how it was that from the Girondists in France the Roman Stoics obtained such sympathy and admiration.

And now let us take some notice of the character and the thought of Seneca, a man who has been most differently estimated, according to the temperament of his judges, and according as he has been taken at his best or his worst. Probably we may admit almost all the accusations against him, and yet end without judging him too hardly. When just rising into success, Seneca was banished by Claudius, on an obscure charge preferred by Messalina. From Corsica, his place of banishment, he addressed what was called a ‘Consolation’ to Polybius, the freedman of the Emperor, on the death of his brother. Seneca’s object in this ‘Consolation’

was to effect his own recall, and the means he used were the most fulsome and cringing terms of flattery towards Claudius. His mean adulation quite failed in obtaining his pardon ; and he was only recalled, after eight years' exile, through the influence of Agrippina, who made him tutor to her son Domitius, the future emperor Nero. In the museum at Naples one sees frescoes brought from Pompeii, which represent a butterfly acting as charioteer to a dragon. These designs were meant to caricature the relationship of Seneca to his pupil Nero. No doubt he was drawn violently and without the power of resistance through much that was unseemly by his impetuous charge. No doubt he tried, with the help of Burrus, to keep the reins straight. But he was obliged to connive and even assist at things which made people say, with natural surprise, 'This is a strange part for a Stoic to play.' The poor painted butterfly behind the dragon could not choose what part he should play. Other things that have been complained of in Seneca are his violent reaction of spite against Claudius, shown in the satire which he wrote upon his death ; his reputed avarice, and the enormous fortune which in a short time he actually amassed under Nero ; certain scandalous intrigues, with regard to which there really is not evidence enough to enable us to say whether Seneca was guilty of them or not ; and lastly, his possible complicity in the murder of Agrippina. Seneca was no Roman, but a Spaniard,<sup>63</sup> and we can fancy how the milk of his flattery towards Claudius turned sour during his eight years' exile, and how deep resentment settled in his heart. With regard to his accumulating wealth when it was in his

<sup>63</sup> Bishop Lightfoot thinks that Seneca may have had Semitic blood in his veins, as his native province, Baetica, had been thickly populated

with Phoenician settlers, and the name Σενέκας appears in a list of Jewish names. This, however, is mere conjecture.

power to do so, we may perhaps explain it to ourselves, by remembering that many ecclesiastics professing a still more unworldly creed than Stoicism have done the same. With regard to his privity to the death of Agrippina, all that can be said is that Seneca was, towards the end of his career, so thoroughly scared by Nero, that all power of independent action was taken from him. Physically timid and gentle by nature, Seneca was not born to play a consistent and unyielding part. Considering his hideous position, we may well condone his offences. If we study his writings, and especially his letters, we shall see that he possessed one essentially Stoical characteristic—namely, the intense desire for advance and improvement. The picture of the inner life of Seneca, his efforts after self-discipline, his untiring asceticism, his enthusiasm for all that he esteems holy and of good report —this picture, marred as it is by pedantry, and rhetoric, and vain self-conceit, yet stands out in noble contrast to the swinishness of the Campanian villas, and is in its complex entirety very affecting.

The works of Seneca are over-harshly judged by those who have no taste except for metaphysical philosophy, or who, expecting to find such in Seneca, have been disappointed. But if we approach these writings from a different side, and look at them historically and psychologically as the picture of the times and the man, we find them full of interest. If we can endure being a little cloyed with excess of richness in the style, if we can pardon occasional falsity and frequent exaggeration, we shall discover in them a most fertile genius, and a vein of French wit, so to speak, which is always neat and clever, and often surprising, on the tritest moral subjects. Of all sets of letters that have ever been preserved, there is none that exhibits better and more vividly the different phases of a peculiar idiosyncrasy—of a mind under the dominion

of a peculiar kind of thought—than the *Epistles* of Seneca. Let us take a glance at the more striking features of their contents, and see what sort of a working in the heart was produced by Stoicism under the circumstances of the case. The *Epistles* of Seneca consist of one hundred and twenty-four letters, written almost continuously in the old age of their author, and all addressed to a person of the name of Lucilius. The first point to be noticed about them is their entire abstraction from all public events of the day, an abstraction very Stoical in itself, and very significant also of the ungenial atmosphere of the political world. Only one allusion is there to Nero, where Seneca takes occasion (*Ep. 73*) to find fault with the opinion that philosophers are necessarily turbulent and refractory, and despisers of the ruling power. ‘On the contrary,’ he says, ‘none are more grateful to him who affords them security and tranquillity of life. They must regard the author of these blessings in the light of a parent.’ ‘Like Tityrus, they must say that a god has provided them tranquillity, and left their cattle to roam and themselves to play the pipe.’ ‘The leisure thus granted them is indeed godlike, and raises them to the level of the gods.’ In such terms does Seneca appreciate the hours of gilded oppression and treacherous reprieve which were conceded him. Most naturally the topics of his correspondence were not political. His letters were uniformly didactic and moral. In them we see developed the passion for self-improvement and for the cultivation of others. Both by nature and from the influences of Stoicism, Seneca was essentially a schoolmaster; it was evidently the foible of his life to be bringing some one on; he was a pedagogue to himself, and he wanted somebody else whom he might lecture. Of this tendency Lucilius was made the victim. On one occasion he seems to have remonstrated, and to have reminded Seneca

that he was forty years of age, and rather old for schooling (*Ep. 25*). But Seneca will not be deterred. He says it shall not be his fault if his friend does not improve, even though the success be not very brilliant. In every shape and from every side he urges upon him cultivation, and once fairly tells him he cannot remain on the footing of friend unless he cultivates himself and improves (*Ep. 35*). He hails his good deeds with triumph; rejoices to hear that Lucilius lives on terms of familiarity with his slaves (*Ep. 47*)—‘are they not,’ he asks, ‘men like ourselves, breathing the same air, living and dying like ourselves?’—praises a book he has written, lectures him on the economy of time (*Ep. 1*); tells him to be select in his reading (*Ep. 2*); bids him examine himself to see whether he is progressing in philosophy or in life, since only the latter is valuable (*Ep. 16*); above all, exhorts him without ceasing to get rid of the fear of death, ‘that chain which binds us all’ (*Ep. 26*), though he is half afraid, as in one place he naïvely confesses (*Ep. 30*), that Lucilius may come to dread his long-winded letters more even than death itself. However, as a compensation, he promises his friend that these epistles shall insure him a literary immortality, just as the letters of Cicero had made the name of Atticus immortal (*Ep. 21*).

Such is a specimen of the didactic element in the letters of Seneca; the indications of his own self-discipline and conscious self-culture are equally pregnant and still more characteristic. One sentence of his might be taken as the summary and expression of his entire spirit. In speaking of the state of the ‘advancing man’ as distinguished in Stoical parlance from the ‘wise man,’ he says (*Ep. 71*), ‘It is a great part of advance to will to be advancing. Of this I am conscious to myself; I will to advance, nay, I will it with my whole heart.’ In the will thus fixed and bent there is often

a sort of unreal triumph, independent of actual success or failure. Seneca does not conceal from us his failures in realising his conception of philosophic behaviour. But while he confesses, he is never humbled. Rather he seems proud of detecting his own falling off. On one occasion (*Ep. 87*) he relates an excursion which he made into the country with a friend, and in which he says they spent 'two delightful days.' They took very few slaves, and one rustic vehicle. On meeting with persons riding in grander equipages, he tells us, he could not refrain from blushing, and secretly wished that they should not think that this sordid conveyance belonged to *him*. 'I have made but little progress as yet,' he sighs, 'I dare not yet openly assume frugality. I mind the opinions of passers-by.' Whereupon he proceeds to lecture down this weakness in the grandest terms, and occupies many pages of a letter in proving that riches are not a good. On another occasion he recounts a voyage which he had undertaken from Naples to Puteoli (*Ep. 53*). In these few miles the sea became rough, and the philosopher grew sick, and, unable to endure the horrible sufferings of his position, he commanded the pilot to set him ashore. 'As soon as I had recovered my stomach,' he says, 'I began to reflect what a forgetfulness of our defects follows us about.' Pursuing this train of reasoning, he enters upon the praises of philosophy, and soaring far above sea-sickness, he exclaims, 'Philosophy sets one above all men, and not far behind the gods. Indeed, in one point the wise man might be said even to surpass the Deity; for the Deity is fearless by the gift of nature, but the wise man by his own merits.' This last saying, which is often quoted against Seneca, is perhaps the most foolish thing he ever said, and must not be taken as an average specimen of his thoughts. One failure which he ascribes to himself may be justly reckoned as a merit; for

while dissuading Lucilius (*Ep. 63*) from overmuch grieving at the loss of a friend, he says, ‘I myself so immoderately wept for Annæus Serenus, that I must rank among the bad examples of those who have been overcome by grief.’ And he reflects that the reason of this weakness must have been that he had not sufficiently considered the possibility of his friend dying first. We may also attribute it to the existence in Seneca of an affectionate heart, which had not been entirely supplanted by the abstractions of Stoicism, not entirely ‘sicklied o’er by the pale cast of thought.’ After alluding to cases where Seneca confessed to have fallen from the philosophic height, it is surely fair not to leave unrecorded an occasion where he effected an important triumph of the will. The kind of self-discipline chosen was somewhat surprising; it is related in the Fifty-sixth Epistle, where Seneca tells his friend that he had taken lodgings ‘over a bath.’ He details with minuteness the various mixed and deafening sounds by which his ears were perpetually assailed. He could hear distinctly the strong fellows taking their exercise—throwing out their hands loaded with the dumb-bells—straining and groaning—hissing and wheezing—breathing in every kind of unnatural way—at another moment some one having his shoulders slapped by the shampooer—a hue and cry after a thief—a man practising his voice in the bath—people leaping and splashing down into the water—the various cries of the piemen and sellers of baked meats, as they vended their wares—and several other sounds, to all of which Seneca compelled his mind to be inattentive, being concentrated on itself. The power of abstraction gained by such a discipline he seems to have thought very valuable. At the end of his letter, he declares that as the experiment is quite successful, and as the sounds are really abominable, he has now determined to change his quarters.

About such moral peddling as this there is of course nothing great. But the spirit which actuates it is in its origin deep and good, and is only not admirable when it becomes perverted. The conscious desire for moral progress becomes unfortunately very easily perverted ; it degenerates too often into small self-analysis, and that weak trifling which is most utterly opposed to real progression. We find Seneca remaining in his moral nature a strange mixture of the pedant and the schoolboy ; on the one hand always teaching himself, and on the other hand with everything to learn ; and yet still, with all its imperfections, we may question whether this attitude is not more human and better than anything like an Epicurean acquiescence and content in one's nature as it is. That self-reflection, that communing of man with his own heart, which the tendencies of Stoicism and the course of the world's history had now made common, produced in Seneca occasionally intuitions into the state of the human race, which he expresses in language curious to meet with in the writings of a Pagan. He says (*De Clementia*, I. vi.) :

'Conceive in this vast city, where without cease a crowd pours through the broadest streets, and like a river dashes against anything that impedes its rapid course—this city, that consumes the grain of all lands—what a solitude and desolation there would be if nothing were left save what a severe judge could absolve of fault ! We have all sinned (*peccavimus omnes*), some more gravely, others more lightly, some from purpose, others by chance impulse, or else carried away by wickedness external to them ; others of us have wanted fortitude to stand by our resolutions, and have lost our innocence unwillingly and not without a struggle. Not only we *have* erred, but to the end of time we shall continue to err. Even if anyone has already so well purified his

mind that nothing can shake or decoy him any more, it is through sinning that he has arrived at this state of innocence.'

Those who have been anxious to obtain the authority of Aristotle for the doctrine of 'human corruption' will find on consideration that this idea, which was historically impossible for a Greek of the fourth century B.C., came with sufficient vividness into the consciousness of persons in the position of Seneca, but not till much later than Aristotle, probably not before the beginning of our era. On the other hand, we are not to fancy that the thoughts of Seneca received any influence from Christianity. We learn from passages like that above quoted, not that Seneca had any acquaintance with Christian doctrines, but that some of the thoughts and feelings which St. Paul had about the world were held also by Pagans contemporaneous with him.

There is one more characteristic of the letters of Seneca which ought not to be left unmentioned, and that is, the way in which they are perpetually overshadowed by the thought of death. The form assumed by this *meditatio mortis* is a constant urging of arguments against fearing to die. These arguments are, as might be expected, infinitely varied and ingenious. 'Death,' he says, 'lurks under the name of life. It begins with our infancy.' 'It is a great mistake to look forward to death, since a great part of it is already over. We die daily' (*Ep. 1*). Death is no punishment, but the law of nature.' 'Children and idiots do not fear death, why cannot reason attain to that security which folly has achieved?' (*Ep. 36*). 'Death is the one port in a stormy sea—it is either end or transition (*aut finis est aut transitus*)—it brings us back to where we were before birth—it must be a gain, or nothing.' 'The apparatus of death is all a cheat; if we tear off the mask, there is nothing fearful.'

‘ Behind fire and steel and the ferocious crowd of executioners there is death hiding—merely death, which my slave or my waiting-maid has just despised’ (*Ep. 24*). Not content with bringing forward these considerations dissuasive of terror, Seneca in other places does all he can to familiarise the mind with the idea of suicide. He says, ‘ There is nothing more contemptible than to wish for death. Why wish for that which is in your power?—die at once, if you wish to do so’ (*Ep. 117*). He relates with approbation the suicide of his friend Marcellinus, who, being oppressed with a long and troublesome invalidism, was recommended by a Stoic to give up the trivial round of life; whereupon, having distributed his goods among his weeping slaves, he effected death by a three-days’ abstinence from food, betaking himself to a hot bath when his body was exhausted, wherein he fainted and died (*Ep. 77*). Other instances of self-destruction are scattered through the letters of Seneca, some of which give a sad illustration of the unhappiness of the times. It seems to have been not uncommon for the wretched captives who were doomed to the conflicts of the arena to steal themselves away, sometimes by the most revolting modes of death. And it is surely a miserable sign when cultivated men of the day look on such deeds with pleasure and admiration. So great was the tendency to suicide under Claudius and Nero, that even Seneca on one occasion acknowledges that it is excessive. He says, ‘ We ought not to hate life any more than death, we ought not to sink into that mere life-weariness to which many are prone who see nothing before them but an unvarying routine of waking and sleeping, hungering and eating.’ But the majority of Seneca’s arguments are in the other direction. They are the results of a deep sense of unhappiness and insecurity, which existed side by side with his philosophic self-complacency. They

were connected, on the one hand, with a timidity of nature and a real love of life; on the other hand, with a presentiment of evil and a sense of the necessity of preparing for the worst. When death suddenly and actually came upon Seneca—like Cicero, he met it with fortitude, in spite of his timidity, and probably not on account of his previous reasonings, but from an innate elevation of mind called out on emergency. We have observed that Seneca spoke of death as ‘either end or transition;’ this sums up his views of the future under an alternative. But his real tendency was to Platonic<sup>84</sup> visions of the soul freed from the trammels of the body and restored to freedom. He is unwilling that Lucilius should arouse him from the ‘pleasant dream’ of immortality. He likes to expatiate on the tranquillity of mind and absolute liberty which await us ‘when we shall have got away from these dregs of existence into the sublime condition on high.’<sup>85</sup>

It is a great contrast if we turn from Seneca to Epictetus. It is going from the florid to the severe, from varied feeling to the impersonal simplicity of the teacher, often from idle rhetoric to devout earnestness. No writings of Epictetus remain, but only (what is perhaps equally interesting for us) records of his didactic conversations, preserved as near as

<sup>84</sup> See above, page 334, where in an extract from Zeller we have anticipated the mention of Seneca’s fondness for dwelling on the imagination of a future state.

<sup>85</sup> We have not entered upon the analysis of Seneca’s philosophical works, because, in short, they are not speculative and philosophical, but of the same moralising stamp as his letters. It is, however, just to pay a tribute to the force of imagination shown by him in preconceiving the

physical discoveries of future ages (see his *Naturales Quæstiones*, VII. xxxi.).

‘Quam multa animalia hoc primum cognovimus sæculo! quam multa negotia no hoc quidem! Multa venientis ævi populus ignota nobis sciet. Multa sæculis tunc futuris, cum memoria nostri exoleverit, reservantur.’ Through his vividness of mind, this Spaniard of [the first century has got the credit of predicting elsewhere, in terms remarkably coincident, the discovery of America.

possible in his own words by Arrian, the historian, who studied under him at Nicopolis. Epictetus was a lame slave, the property of Epaphroditus, who was himself the freedman and the favourite of Nero. While yet a slave, Epictetus was won over to the Stoic doctrine by Musonius Rufus.<sup>86</sup> Obtaining his freedom, he taught in Rome, and afterwards, when the philosophers were banished from the city by Domitian, in Nicopolis of Epirus. What is most striking about his discourses is their extremely religious spirit, and the gentle purity of the doctrines they advocate. In them Stoicism reached its culmination, and attained an almost entirely un-pagan character; its harsher traits were abandoned, and while Epictetus draws the picture of the wise man under the name of Cynic, there is hardly a trace of anything cynical in the life which he recommends. To mention the subjects of some of his discourses may serve to give an idea of their nature. The following headings strike the eye: 'On things in our power and not in our power.' 'How to preserve one's own character in everything.' 'How to follow out the conception that God is Father of mankind.' 'On moral advance.' 'On Providence.' 'On equanimity.' 'How to do all things pleasing to the gods.' 'What part of a sin is one's own.' 'On moral training.' As might be conjectured, there is nothing speculative in these discourses. Epictetus both received and imparted philosophy as a fulfill-

<sup>86</sup> Musonius Rufus, whom we have noticed before as the companion of Rubellius Plautus in Asia, 'returned from exile on the accession of Galba; and when Antonius Primus, the general of Vespasian, was marching upon Rome, he joined the ambassadors that were sent by Vitellius to the victorious general, and going among the soldiers of the latter, descended upon the bless-

ings of peace and the dangers of war, but was soon compelled to put an end to his unseasonable eloquence. (Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Biog.*) He afterwards obtained the condemnation of Publius Celer, the traducer of Barea. (Tac. *Hist.* iii. 81; iv. 10, 40.) Fragments of his philosophy are preserved by Stobæus.

ing of the needs of the soul, not as a mere development of the intellect. His words on this and other subjects present very often a strange coincidence with the language of the Gospel. He says (*Dissert.* ii. xi. 1), ‘The beginning of philosophy is the consciousness of one’s own weakness and inability with regard to what is needful.’ ‘The school of the philosopher is a physician’s house; you should not go out from it pleased, but in pain. For you come not whole, but sick—one diseased in his shoulder and another in his head’ (*Dissert.* iii. xxiii. 30). ‘Young man, having once heard these words, go away, and say to yourself, “Epictetus has not spoken them to me (from whence came they to him?), but some kind god by his means. It would not have come into the mind of Epictetus to say these things, since he is not accustomed to reason with anyone. Come, then, let us obey God, lest we should move God to anger.”’<sup>87</sup> ‘The true Cynic should recollect that he is sent as a messenger from Zeus to men, to declare to them concerning things good and evil, and to show them that they seek good where it is not to be found, and where it is to be found they do not desire it’ (*Dissert.* iii. xxii. 23).

With regard to the manifestations of Providence, Epictetus says (*Dissert.* i. 16, 19): ‘What, then; since ye are all blind, is there not need of one who should fill up this place, and sing in behalf of you all the hymn to God? Of what else am I capable, who am a lame old man, except to sing the praises of God? Were I a nightingale, I would do as the nightingale; were I a swan, I would do as the swan. But now, since I have reason, I must sing of God. This is my office, and I perform it, nor will I leave my post, as far as in me lies, and I exhort you to join in the same song.’

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<sup>87</sup> Ήρα μὴ θεοχόλωτοι ἀμεν (*Dissert.* iii. i. 36).

' If anyone will properly feel this truth, that we are all especially born of God, and that God is the father of men and gods, I think that such a one will henceforth allow no mean or unworthy thoughts about himself. If Cæsar were to adopt you, would not your pride be unbearable ; and now that you are the son of Zeus, will you not be elated ? ' (*Dissert. i. 3, 1*).

Such sayings as these are a specimen of the vein of piety which runs through the teachings of Epictetus. In moral life, he exhorts to purity, equanimity, and forgiveness of injuries. He draws a broad line of distinction between things in our power and things out of our power. Within our power are the will and our opinion of things ; beyond our power, the body, possessions, authority, and fame. The will itself nothing can touch ; bonds, imprisonment, and death itself, do not impair the internal freedom of the will. Lame-ness impedes the leg, but not the will. True wisdom and happiness consist in placing all one's thoughts and hopes on things within our power—that is to say, on the will itself and the internal consciousness. This attitude will render happiness impregnable, for the wise man will enter no contest save where he is sure of the victory.

In an exaltation of the will, and in thus withdrawing into its precincts, the Stoicism of Epictetus declares itself. To some extent he provided an objective side for his thought, by the pious and theological reflections which he introduced into his philosophy. But they were not sufficiently made to pervade his whole system, and with regard to the question of immortality he contented himself, as far as we know, with certain brief remarks, implying the utter resolution of personality after death. ' Come,' he says, ' but whither ?—to nothing dreadful, but only to what is near and dear to thee, to the elements whence thou hast sprung ' (*Diss. iii. xiii.*

14). ‘This is death, a mighty change, not into the non-existent, but into what is now non-existent. “Shall *I* then not exist?” No, *thou* wilt not exist, but something else of which the universe has need’ (*Diss.* III. xxiv. 94). While placing the will in our own power, Epictetus at the same time adopted an entirely necessarian scheme. He followed Plato in making vice the result of ignorance, and he considered that men differed from brutes, not in freedom, but only in consciousness (*Diss.* II. viii. 4).

The same spirit as that of Epictetus the slave expresses itself in Marcus Aurelius the emperor, whose thoughts have come down to us in the shape of a monologue in twelve books. These last two great Stoical writers appear both to have been influenced by Neo-Platonic views, for which Stoicism, on its spiritual side, had a considerable affinity. The weakness of humanity is a leading idea with M. Aurelius.

‘Of human life,’ he says (ii. 17), ‘the duration is a point ; the substance is fleeting ; the perception is dim ; the fabric of the body is corruptible, the soul is an idle whirling ; fortune is inscrutable, and fame beyond our judgment. In short, all that there is of the body is a stream, and all that there is of the soul is a dream and a smoke. Life is a war, and a lodging in a strange country ; the name that we leave behind us is forgetfulness. What is there, then, that can conduct us ? Philosophy alone. . . . Oh, my soul ! wilt thou ever be good, and simple, and one, and naked, and more transparent than the body which clothes thee ? Wilt thou ever be full and without a want, desiring nothing, hankering after nothing, whether animate or inanimate, for the enjoyment of pleasure, but content with thy present condition ?’ (x. 1.)

Such are the mystical ecstasies into which Antoninus rises in communing with himself. With these, honest self-examinations and humility of feeling are often combined, and

the whole is tempered by a cold spirit of Stoical resignation. Of the philosophy of the Emperor we need not add anything further beyond one slight point—namely, that we find in him<sup>ss</sup> the same psychological division of man into body, soul, and spirit, as had also been employed by St. Paul. We may take our leave of the monologue of Antoninus by quoting from it his feeling about the Christian martyrs. ‘The soul,’ he says, ‘when it must depart from the body, should be ready to be extinguished, to be dispersed, or to subsist a while longer with the body. But this readiness must proceed from its own judgment, and not from mere obstinacy, as with the Christians; it must be arrived at with reflection and dignity, so that you could even convince another without declamation’ (xi. 3).

In Marcus Aurelius we appear at first sight to have the desire of Plato fulfilled. We see a philosopher on the throne. But even absolute power does not give influence or sway. Plato wished the whole State to bend and turn under the control of omnipotent wisdom, as the limbs of a man would follow the impulses of his mind. But very far was Marcus Aurelius from being gifted with that sort of electric force which could put itself out and transform the world, even if the Roman empire were not too huge and too corrupt for such a process. Philosophy in general must be considered as something incapable of coming immediately into contact with politics and practical life, and the philosophy of Antoninus consisted peculiarly in a withdrawal from the world, in self-examination, moral progress, and thoughts about God. While

<sup>ss</sup> “Ο τι ποτε τοῦτό είμι σαρκά ἐστι καὶ πνευμάτιον καὶ τὸ ήγεμονικόν (ii. 2). Cf. iii. 16. Σῶμα, ψυχή, νοῦς xii. 3. Τρία ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκας, σωμάτιον, πνευμάτιον, νοῦς. Cf. St.

Paul, *Thessal.* i. v. 23. Τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα. The πνεῦμα of St. Paul answers to the νοῦς or ήγεμονικόν of Antoninus.

the Emperor was thus busied more with his own soul than with penetrating State reforms, the world enjoyed a halcyon time. The ruler was mild, just, and forgiving; he had only one deficiency, but that the greatest which could possibly attach to him, namely, an utter want of insight into character. The sole exception to his clemency was that, excited probably by the narrow malignance of his fellow Stoics—he condescended to persecute the Christians. The adoration of the people showed how much the gentleness of Marcus Aurelius was appreciated—but it is not the mild monarchs who leave permanent blessings to their country. Among his most public tastes seems to have been a fondness for jurisprudence; he produced several volumes of *Constitutions*. This province of industry was the one most attractive of the day. In the absence of literature, Roman jurisprudence is the one great and lasting product of the age of the Antonines.

And now a word must be said upon an often mooted and never thoroughly discussed subject—the influence of the Stoic philosophy upon Roman law. Acquaintance with Grecian philosophy in general began at Rome contemporaneously with a change in the laws. The first epoch of Roman law was an epoch of rigid forms, and a narrow but coherent system, exclusively adapted to Roman citizens. Commerce and conquest made it necessary that law should widen so as to embrace the inhabitants of the Italian States. Hence the growth of the prætor's adjudicating power. By degrees the decisions of the prætors in regard to the hitherto over-exclusive laws of property, and the rights of persons born out of the Roman city, grew up into a body of equity by the side of the civil law. This body of equity, which was framed on the principles of natural reason, of course reflected the highest general enlightenment and the most cultivated ideas of the jurisconsults of the day. We have already seen that during

the first and second centuries B.C. the most eminent Romans attached themselves to the direct study of Greek philosophy. To the list of the disciples of the Stoicks we may add some names more immediately connected with jurisprudence. Q. Mutius Scævola (as well as Q. *Aelius Tubero*) appears to have been among the hearers of Panaetius. C. Aquilius Gallus and Lucilius Balbus, distinguished jurisconsults of the time of Cicero, studied again under Scævola; and Balbus, who in Cicero's *De Naturâ Deorum* is made the expositor of the Stoical view, was teacher of Servius Sulpicius. Equity attained in the eyes of such persons an immense preference over the civil law. To this tendency of opinions Cicero gave a great stimulus, maintaining, as he did always, that justice must be based on humanity and reason, and 'that the source and rule of right were not to be sought in the laws of the Twelve Tables, but in the depths of the human<sup>89</sup> intelligence.' Now, if we wish to form an idea to ourselves of the sort of way in which philosophy at Rome influenced jurisprudence, we may think of the philosophy of Cicero, that is, a philosophy not exclusively Stoical, but eclectic, practical, and human. Even the philosophers of the Stoic school themselves were by this time, as we have seen, all eclectic. Much more, then, would the lawyers avoid any rigid adherence to one set of formulæ; they would be sure to accept a certain mixture and modification of views. A number of humane and enlightened principles were now diffused, and it is perhaps true that the most noble of these ideas were due primarily to Stoicism—as, for instance, the cosmopolitan thought, that the world is our State, and that mankind are of one race, being all the children of God. • But it is true also that the general course of history had tended to foster and develop this and other ideas which Stoicism forcibly enunciated.

<sup>89</sup> Mr. Merivale's *History of the Romans under the Empire*, vol. ii. p. 528.

In the growth, then, of the Roman ‘*Jus Gentium*,’ and in the amelioration and softening of many austere legal usages (as, for instance, the absolute authority of fathers over their children), we see not simply and solely the influence of Stoicism, but of a generally enlightened practical philosophy, in which Stoicism was not more than an important element. But besides the material alterations which occurred in the spirit of the Roman laws, besides the era of the *Jus Prætorium*, we must look in another direction—to the era of ‘codification,’ if we wish to trace philosophical influences. An eminent authority maintains that ‘the Stoical philosophy was to Roman jurisprudence what Benthamism has been to English law’—namely, a directing influence that came into play in the absence of any absolutely determining causes. These two principles of action might be said to be diametrically opposite to each other; for Benthamism, which looks to utility, commences with the concrete; while it is the essence of Stoicism to take an abstract point of view. The writings of Zeno and Chrysippus on the ‘universal state’ are lost, so we know not its details as conceived by them, but we may be sure that if Stoicism had had the framing of the laws for the Roman empire entrusted to its hands, there would have been a logical deduction from the principle of the natural freedom and equality of the whole human race. But what do we find? That slavery, even under Justinian, was mitigated, and not abolished; that men of different ranks were not equal in the sight of the law; that the civil incapacity of women (which Zeno had denied) still remained; that the application of cruel punishments, and even of torture, was treated by the new codes in a way which showed more a respect for existing usage and for the old statutes than a disposition to legislate synthetically from philosophical principles. ‘Gaius, Ulpian, Papinian, and Paulus, appear very timid by the side of

Seneca and Epictetus.<sup>90</sup> Perhaps this belongs of necessity to the progress of jurisprudence, that it must not break too hastily with the past : but we are obliged, if this view be correct, to confine the influence of Stoicism on Roman law to the introduction of an idea of form, to the endeavour to bring the actual under the scope of certain abstract formulæ. We must not expect to find the logical and systematic development of these formulæ, but rather we must recognise a frequent antithesis between abstract principles and the details to which one might have expected them to be applied. And yet again it appears, if we look a little further, that the philosophical ideas to which the Jurists appealed, though not immediately triumphant over all other considerations in the Roman Code, did yet in some cases come into direct application ; and what is of far more importance, that these principles, being enunciated with reverence, were held up for the admiration of posterity, and so came to exert an influence on the whole bearing of subsequent jurisprudence. When we read in the *Digest* the stately preamble concerning the Jus Naturale—which nature has taught all animals, and which is prior even to the Jus Gentium prevailing among the human race—we are apt to be most struck with the abstract and, we might almost say, futile appearance of such a principle, followed out afterwards with so little consistency. But the idea of the ‘Law of Nature,’ enunciated here and elsewhere in the Roman Code, being taken up by Grotius and the Continental Jurists, became a leading idea of jurisprudence, the characteristic principle of a particular school, and the antithesis of Benthamism. What is the meaning of this conception, the ‘Law of Nature,’ and whether it has

<sup>90</sup> M. Denis, *Histoire des Théories et des Idées Morales dans l'Antiquité*, vol. ii. p. 215. Paris, 1856.

any reality or value as separate from, or opposed to, utility and experience, is a matter of keen debate amongst philosophical Jurists. It is not the province of the present Essay to enter upon this question. That which is our concern we may dismiss with only two remarks of recapitulation : First, the idea of the Law of Nature, as introduced into the Roman law, was not by any means purely Stoical, but was the result of the general growth of ideas in the first century b.c., and was vividly apprehended by the eclectic and practical Cicero ; second, this idea, though subsequently so influential, was not by any means uniformly applied in the details of the Corpus Juris.

Whatever fragments of Stoicism were preserved in the Roman law descended, no doubt, as a contribution not only to modern law, but also to modern morals. In other channels the direct connection of our own thoughts with the ancient Stoics is hard to trace, because, long before modern thought began a separate existence, Stoicism had sunk into the world, and had influenced the ideas of men far beyond its own immediate school. But in acknowledging the influence of ancient civilisation at all, in acknowledging the impress of Cicero and Tacitus, and even of the Fathers of the Church, we acknowledge to an appreciable extent a debt to Stoicism. This, while arising in a form of a Greek philosophy, was at the same time a reaction, from a Semitic point of view, against the Grecian and the philosophical spirit. Hence its affinity to modern feelings. We have seen how it held up the delights of an igner life as preferable to all tangible and palpable enjoyments, however innocent they might be ; we have seen how it drew the mind away from external realities into an abstract ideal ; how it delighted in the conception of moral progress and the triumph of will ; how it developed the thought of duty and the responsibility of the individual ;

how, deserting the restrictions of national politics, it raised itself to conceive of all mankind as one brotherhood, each member standing in direct relation to God; finally, we have seen how, following its natural tendencies, Stoicism became more and more exclusively theological in its views. To some extent, then, this doctrine supplied the needs of the human soul and the wants of a spiritual religion. Running parallel with Christianity, and quite uninfluenced by it, it yet exhibited the development of pure, gentle, and unworldly thoughts in the mind. It showed us how high it was possible for the Pagans to reach. At the same time it bore upon its face its own imperfection, its onesidedness, and its unnatural and paradoxical character.

## ESSAY VII.

### *On the Relation of Aristotle's Ethics to Modern Systems.*

IT was not by means of his Ethical Treatise that Aristotle obtained his great and lasting influence over the mind of Europe. We have seen how, almost immediately after the death of Aristotle, Ethics in Greece were constructed afresh---from a Greek point of view by Epicurus, and in a Semitic spirit by Zeno and the Stoics. Henceforth the Platonic-Aristotelian moral system may be said to have been superseded. Systems less philosophical and artistic, but which responded more directly to the wants of the individual soul, now occupied the attention of antiquity. When we come to Cicero, who may be regarded as a fair representation of the philosophical culture of the first century B.C., we find that he knows nothing about Aristotle's *Ethics*, while he is deeply imbued by many of the Stoical writings. Afterwards the tribe of professional Sophists increased and multiplied, so that Lutian said that 'it would be easier to fall into a ship without touching timber, than to go into any town without encountering a Sophist.' These persons—who were different in many ways from their predecessors of the fifth century B.C., and of whom Dion Chrysostomus was one of the highest specimens—were like modern popular preachers, and often

itinerant, like the mendicant orders of friars. They mixed up the sometimes incompatible theories of Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, and Epicurus, and compounded out of them a moral doctrine for the people. In the meanwhile philosophy proper (as it then existed), under the forms of Stoicism or Neo-Platonism, was always becoming more and more theological ; and a scientific, but limited, system of ethics, like that of Aristotle, which treated Man as the happy citizen of a Greek republic, and which excluded all metaphysical and theological considerations, can have had no attractions for even thoughtful minds under the Roman Empire. ‘Then came the inundation of Barbarians, with whose uncultivated and instinctive natures a wise and refined philosophy had nothing in common. The tale of Christianity appealed to their child-like imaginations, and its simple morals to their unsophisticated hearts, and throughout the Middle Ages a religion inspired with a divine spirit, but whose outward materials consisted of a mixture of Jewish with Greco-Latin traditions, reigned supreme over men’s minds. Happiness, which the philosophers had sought to find in this world in the practice of virtue, was postponed to a life to come, and Pain became the ideal of man upon earth. But as this ideal was insufficient for the conduct of society, primitive Christianity appropriated to itself the fragments of ancient wisdom which had survived the shipwreck, and the teaching of the Gospel spread them abroad.’<sup>1</sup> Thus Aristotle, too, was saved from oblivion. Owing, probably, to the labours of Andronicus, his works as a collective whole were still in existence. At first excommunicated as ‘atheistical’ and kept aloof by the Church, he was afterwards received and adopted for the sake of his method, and then almost incorporated with

<sup>1</sup> *L’Année Philosophique ; études générales, par M. F. Pillon* (Paris critiques sur le mouvement des idées 1868), p. 145.

Christianity. His Greek and philosophical point of view was utterly ignored, but his words were used to set forth the ideas of ecclesiastics and schoolmen, and his peculiar formulæ—logical, metaphysical, and ethical—became stamped to a remarkable extent upon the language of the world. But it must not be supposed that Aristotle, even in any sense, was read and known throughout the Middle Ages. For some centuries it appears that only the *Categories* and the treatise *On Interpretation* (neither of them, probably, a genuine work of Aristotle) were studied by the schoolmen, and these only in the Latin translations of Boëthius; and yet these two treatises were the sole armoury from which the Nominalists had to fight the Realists. Afterwards the Arabian Averroes (1120–1198 A.D.) introduced a richer knowledge of Aristotle, through Spain, into Europe; and then, after the Crusades (1270), western Christendom obtained translations of *all* the works of Aristotle,<sup>2</sup> partly from Arabian copies in Spain, partly from Greek originals which the Crusaders brought with them from Constantinople, or other Greek cities. The first of the works translated at this time into Latin by a western writer seems to have been the *Ethics*—translated by Hermannus Alemannus at Toledo, in Spain. Afterwards the *Ethics* were commented on by St. Thomas Aquinas, and with this commentary Dante appears to have

<sup>2</sup> In the years 1260–70, Thomas Aquinas prepared, through the instrumentality of the monk Wilhelm of Moerbeke, his new Latin translation of the works of Aristotle after Greek originals. This goes by the name of the *Vetus Translatio*, and its verbal accuracy is considered to place it on a level with the best MSS. (Stahr, in Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Biog.*). The *Vetus Translatio* is full

of a strange Latinity, which arises out of a transliteration, often incorrectly made, of Greek words into the Roman character. Thus we find 'chaymus' as the translation of χαῦμος, 'epychia' of ἐπιέκτεια, 'michrohiudinus' of μικροχινδύνος, &c. And mediævalisms occur occasionally, such as the word 'costa' for a side, instead of 'latus.'

been acquainted. If one turns it over, one is struck by the straightforward manner in which it is composed; its only object seems to be to convey exactly what Aristotle said, especially by the enucleation of his arguments. Occasionally, however, it introduces a word or two for the sake of reconciling Aristotle with the doctrine of the Church. For instance, when Aristotle says (*Eth.* i. x. 2) that 'it is absurd to speak of a man being happy after he is dead,' Aquinas observes, 'Est notandum, quod Philosophus non loquitur hic de felicitate futuræ vitæ, sed de felicitate præsentis vitæ, utrum attribui possit homini dum vivit vel solum in morte.' And when Aristotle denies (*Eth.* x. viii. 7) that moral virtue can be attributed to the gods, Aquinas explains 'Diis, id est substantiis separatis—substantiis superioribus,' thus softening Greek polytheism into the doctrine of Angels. But there can be no doubt that to some extent Aristotle exercised a secularising and pagan influence upon the churchmen who studied him so laboriously. He was now recognised as the great Encyclopædist, as the 'Master of those that know,' as the strongest of the ancients, to whom Socrates and Plato and the rest must look up.<sup>3</sup> For such a position Aristotle had unconsciously laid himself out by setting himself 'to philosophise upon every department of knowledge, and not to regard mere practical utility, but as far as possible to leave nothing unexplored.'<sup>4</sup> And yet 'could he have reappeared among later generations, he would have been the first to repudiate the servility of his followers, the first to point out the inanity of Scholasticism.'<sup>5</sup> He would have justly complained

<sup>3</sup> Dante, *Inferno*, Canto iv. 131.

<sup>4</sup> Vidi il Maestro di color che sanno,  
Seder tra filosofica famiglia.  
Tutti lo miran, tutti onor gli fanno;

Qui vi vid' io e Socrate e Platone,  
Che innanzi agli altri più presso gli  
stanno.'

<sup>5</sup> See above, page 183, note.

<sup>6</sup> Lewes, *Aristotle*, p. 382.

of the prolonged monopoly of study and the undue predominance given to his Logical treatises, which he had intended to be mere *prolegomena* to the great body of knowledge. He would have complained that so much which he had left unfinished and arrested by his death, should be regarded as complete and final, to the repression of all further inquiry. When the revival of learning came, he ‘would have been the first to welcome and extend the new discoveries, and to have sided with Galileo and Bacon against the Aristotelians.’<sup>6</sup>

The *Ethics* of Aristotle do not appear at any period of the Middle Ages to have held a foremost place in the consideration of men ; with this treatise Aristotle was not primarily identified, either for praise or blame. And thus the reaction made by Ramus and others against the garbled philosophy of the Aristotelians was an attack against their method in physics, and not against their ethical doctrines. Patricius, writing in 1580 A.D., gives a list of the works of Aristotle lectured on in the Italian schools.<sup>7</sup> In this list neither the *Ethics* nor *Politics* are included. The works enumerated as constituting a four years’ *curriculum* of study are the *Predicables* (by Porphyry), the *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, a few chapters of the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, 4 books of the *Physical Discourse*, 2 books of the treatise *On the Heavens*, 2 of that *On Generation and Corruption*, the whole of the work *On the Soul*, and the 4 most important books of Metaphysics. Patricius speaks of this as if it had been a *curriculum* intended for medical students, to qualify them for their profession as soon as possible. If so, it is curious that the treatise *On the Parts of Animals* and that *On the Generation of Animals* should

\* Lewes, *Aristotle*, p. 382.

<sup>7</sup> *Discussiones Peripateticæ*, Tom. I. lib. xiii. p. 173.

not have been studied. Rather, this looks like a scheme for general liberal education, and what we have to notice is, that the *Ethics* should not have been admitted into it.

The Renaissance and the Reformation gave rise to a fresh start in philosophy, which commenced anew in Descartes and Bacon, with two divergent but highly fruitful and important tendencies. Ethics also were opened afresh, quite independently of ancient systems, but still bearing traces of the ten centuries of Theology which had brooded over Europe. Two great conceptions, both of them Semitic in character, Theology had bequeathed to Ethics—the conceptions, namely, of the will of God and of the will of Man. And the first speculative ethical systems of modern times, as conceived by Spinoza and Leibnitz, essayed to fix the relation to each other of these two conceptions by the attainment of a higher point of view from which they might be reconciled. The question of Free-will and Necessity was now the natural *ἀρχή* for Ethical science. And this consideration alone would be enough to show how much Aristotle's system had been left behind, how little it would suffice to meet the exigencies of modern thought. Neither to the Theological question, How is the freedom of the will compatible with the omnipotence of God? nor to the Metaphysical question, How is the independence of the will reconcilable with the unalterable sequence of cause and effect in nature? do Aristotle's *Ethics* attempt any answer. It is not merely that the treatise takes a 'political' point of view, and defers all metaphysical and theological questions. Aristotle argues against the Platonic view that vice, being ignorance, is involuntary. But he does so (*Eth.* III. v. 23-6) on the assumption that virtue is voluntary, and with the practical postulate that man is the originator of his own actions. The real

thing is, that the question of Free-will and Necessity, as it came up in modern times, had not forced itself upon Aristotle.

A second question, which differentiates modern systems from the *Ethics* of Aristotle, is the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries' question of the ground of action, Why am I obliged to do this rather than that? To which in England there came various answers from Hobbes, Cudworth, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Butler, Mandeville, Adam Smith, Hume, and Paley; some of whom placed the ground of action in enlightened selfishness, or utility, with or without religious sanctions added, and others in an authoritative internal principle, the dictates of conscience, or an intuitive moral sense; while Kant, afterwards taking up the question, rejected, as unworthy, all external motives and inducements to right action, and endeavoured to reduce all to the idea of duty, as an *a priori* law of the will. On this point the utterances of Aristotle were simpler than those of the modern writers above mentioned. He took a broad view of man, as a creature in the Universe, and asked what is the chief good for man, and how is it attainable? And he answered that the chief good consists in the sense of vital action in accordance with the law of man's being (*ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατὰ τὴν οἰκεῖαν ἀρετήν*); that this is only permanently attainable by the formation of habits; and that habits, or formed states, arise out of acts. On the inducements to particular acts he speaks only incidentally. He says (*Eth. III. i. 11*) that the beauty of an act may put us under a sort of compulsion to do it; that we have an intuitive sense of moral beauty (*αἰσθητικὴ μεσότης*, see above, p. 257); that we have a general wish for the good (*Eth. III. iv. 4*) which furnishes the idea of the end to be aimed at in action, and that it is only a very foolish person (*κομιδῆς ἀναισθίτου*, *Eth. III. v. 12*) who does not take

the right means to this, or who forgets that a single bad act tends to the formation of a bad habit. All this absorbs the Right in the Beautiful and the Good, and refers everything in life to the law of man's being ; it is a great and simple theory. Yet still the conception of the Right is deeper than that of the Beautiful and the Good. It springs perhaps from a Semitic source, and with its cognate conceptions of Duty and Obligation, it predominates over the ethical systems of modern times, which are thus strongly distinguished in character from a Greek system of the fourth century B.C.

The Ethics of modern Europe are far more psychological than those of Aristotle. They start with the possession of a mass of long-inherited distinctions, the foundations of some of which had been laid by Aristotle. He it was who, following out the suggestions of Plato, gave the first impulse to psychology by his division of the soul into rational, irrational, or semi-rational (*μετέχον λόγου*) elements ; by another division of mental phenomena into *δυνάμεις*, *πάθη*, and *ἔξεις* ; by the distinction of different forms of the voluntary into *βούλησις*, *βούλευσις*, and *προαίρεσις* ; and by separating the two spheres of the practical and the speculative reason. But these various analyses of the mind were thrown out in a somewhat cursory manner ; they were not laid down as the basis of ethical science, whereas a modern writer, like Dugald Stewart—whose *Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man* might be taken as the representative of a large class of modern systems—considers the analysis of the ‘active propensities’ in men to be the ‘only way in which the light of nature enables us to form any reasonable conclusions concerning the ends and destination of our being, and the purposes for which we were sent into the world.’ Dugald Stewart thus makes it the object of ethics to learn the designs of God in placing man in the world—which is

considerably different from Aristotle's inquiry into the *rēlos* for man (see above, page 223)—and he makes the means to this to consist in a psychological classification of man's powers and propensities. Aristotle only goes so far in the same direction as to say that the chief good for man must be found in the employment of that faculty which is highest in man, but it is hardly by psychology that he arrives at the conclusion that Reason is the highest faculty in us. This is rather a metaphysical *datum*—Reason being, according to Aristotle's general philosophy, 'the only divine thing in the world.' For the rest, Aristotle does not obtain his lists of the Virtues from a classification of man's 'appetites,' 'desires,' 'affections,' and the like; he accepts ready-made the cardinal and subordinate virtues recognised by Greek society. And in the same way he accepts the idea of Friendship, as current in his times, without basing it on any special need or tendency to be found by a partition of the mind.

The most striking ethical term of modern days is the term 'Conscience.' This term, which owed its first origin and currency to the thoughts and expressions of the Stoics and St. Paul, naturally assumed a great prominence and importance in the history of the Church, especially owing to the practice of the Confessional. Then arose the conflict of different obligations with regard to the same act, and hence 'cases of Conscience,' and 'Casuistry,' the science of dealing with such cases. The Jesuits especially applied themselves to this science; they compiled great systems of Casuistry to meet every conceivable question as to moral, or rather religious, obligation, and these systems for the time being usurped the place of ethical science. Aristotle had no one word to express what we mean by 'Conscience'; his moral psychology had not advanced so far as this; the idea of the 'relief of conscience' by confession, or otherwise, being un-

Greek, would have been alien from his modes of thought. He describes, indeed, in graphic terms the self-reproach and unhappiness of a man who has yielded to temptation, and who 'could have wished that those pleasures had not happened to him' (*Eth.* ix. iv. 10), but this description is given in simple and concrete form, and Aristotle does not make an abstraction of the Conscience. His *ἀπορίαι* or difficult questions on different points of morals have sometimes the appearance of questions in Casuistry (cf. *Eth.* ix. i.-iii.), but in reality they stand on the same footing with *ἀπορίαι* in all other sciences; they are a mode of testing some general definition by bringing forward apparent exceptions to it; they are merely an intellectual instrument for obtaining clearness of conception.

Ethics in the modern world have tended, ever and anon, more and more to free themselves from Theology. Of late, not content with the analysis of man's nature as it is, they have entered upon the speculative question, How has man's moral nature come to be what it is? This is the inquiry of certain Schools which commence by denying the reality of any *a priori* ideas in Morals or in any other subject. This being assumed, a genesis for each moral idea must be sought in experience; it must be shown how mankind out of mere animal instincts of self-preservation and desire for pleasure slowly built up the ideas of Justice, Purity, Truth, Benevolence, Modesty, the Right, and all kindred notions. Many of these ideas are, it is true, as old as the history of mankind, and some philosophers go so far as to assert generally that moral ideas admit of no advance. The late Mr. Buckle, who took this view, gladly quotes<sup>8</sup> Sir James Mackintosh as saying 'Morality admits of no discoveries. . . . More than

three thousand years have elapsed since the composition of the Pentateuch; and let any man, if he is able, tell me in what important respect the rule of life has varied since that distant period. Let the Institutes of Menu be explored with the same view; we shall arrive at the same conclusion. The fact is evident that no improvements have been made in practical morality. The facts which lead to the formation of moral rules are as accessible, and must be as obvious, to the simplest barbarian as to the most enlightened philosopher.' But these remarks involve a great exaggeration; instead of its being true that 'no improvements have been made in practical morality,' it is far rather 'evident' that morality improves and must improve with the growth of knowledge and other civilisation. To trace, as far as possible, the formation and growth of moral ideas, is a most legitimate inquiry. And contemporary writers, with the view of throwing light on this subject, have brought together many curious facts from the traditions of early society and from the customs observed to exist among savage peoples who are still in an infantile condition. Such investigations are an endeavour to account for the actual 'content' of man's moral nature, to explain how the otherwise blank formulæ of morality have come to be filled up in a particular way. It is another, and still more speculative, endeavour to go on and ask, What is the genesis of the moral faculties themselves? In answer to this we have the famous 'Evolution theory' of the present day, which points to hereditary habits and tendencies in the nervous and cerebral organisations of animals, and argues that the moral nature of modern civilised man is but the complex result of a long series of these hereditary transmissions—the habit or tendency, so transmitted, having been in each case the result of some experience of life. And thus, by going back from the complex present to the simple past, we

arrive at the early ancestry of man's moral nature in the 'Ascidians' of Mr. Darwin, or in some portion of matter possessing the power of contractility. In this speculation *ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte*. Man's moral nature has its basis in Reason, and if it can be conceived that Reason has grown out of Matter, without having originally existed in Matter or in relation to Matter, then Mr. Darwin's theory of the genesis of man's moral nature may be received;—it is, in fact, nearly identical with that of Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius in old times, though, up to a certain point, better supported than theirs by observations and analogies.

Aristotle's *Ethics*, and indeed his philosophy in general, are left far in the background by these recent systems. In comparison with all modern scientific accounts of the development of this Earth and of Man, Aristotle's views are of no value. He repudiated the theory of Democritus, and believed in the eternity of the world, the same as a whole, and pretty much the same in its parts, during an infinite past. He admitted a certain progress and development in human societies, and even accepted a strange theory thrown out by Plato (*Laws*, 677 A.) that the human race had periodically been destroyed by floods, all but a few individuals, who had in each case the task of beginning civilisation anew (see above, page 289). But he considered that the possession of Reason by the individuals who were left, would always insure the fresh perfecting of art and science, for in Reason everything is included. To say that Reason could be developed out of Matter, would have seemed to Aristotle a contradiction in terms. Reason was with him the absolute antithesis to Matter. He thought that in man the Reason was in no way connected with his physical organisation—that it was 'something of the nature of God, which came into him from

without.'<sup>6</sup> While admitting that Reason in the individual is of the nature of a potentiality ever and anon evoked into actuality, and then again subsiding (see above, page 251), Reason in the Universe was figured by him as *ἐνέργεια ἀνενδυνάμεως*, as that which never is, nor ever could have been, in abeyance. When all has been said and done by the great physical investigators of the present day, they will still have to settle with Aristotle this metaphysical question: Can Reason be conceived as a mere result growing out of the blind and accidental changes of Matter, or must Reason be regarded as a pre-existing and absolutely necessary condition to the historical development of the material and intellectual world?

There is one other phase of Modern Ethics which may be mentioned in comparison, or rather contrast, with the system of Aristotle—namely, the modes of thinking, now pretty widely spread, which have arisen out of, or have an affinity to, Comte's *Religion of Humanity*. These modes of thought have a negative side, being founded on atheism, and they have also a constructive side, in so far as they endeavour to supply other considerations which may fill up the vacuum caused by the negation of God and of a future life. The following sentences may serve to give a specimen of the results arrived at: 'All moral action arises from the individual's acting in consonance with the idea of his kind. To realise this, in the first place, and to bring himself as an individual, into abiding concord with the idea and destiny of mankind, is the essence of the duties which man owes to himself. But in the second place, to practically recognise and promote in all other individuals also this permanently enduring kind, is the essence of our duties to others.'\* Obliga-

\* *De Gen. An.* ii. iii. 10, quoted above, p. 297; note.

tions of gratitude are specified to the Family, and then to the State: 'From the nation we have received our language and the entire culture connected with language and literature; national habits are also the basis of family life; to the nation we must be ready to consecrate our best energies—if need be, our lives. But we must recognise our own nation to be but one member of the body of humanity, of which we must not wish any other member, any other nation, to be mutilated, or stunted; as Humanity can only flourish as a whole in the harmonious development of all her members; as again, her stamp is to be recognised and respected in every single individual, to whatever nation he may belong.' 'Ever remember that thou art human, not merely a natural production; ever remember that all others are human also, and, with all individual differences, the same as thou, having the same needs and claims as thyself: this is the sum and substance of morality.' Then follow duties of man to Nature: 'Man is labouring in his own special vocation, if not one of Nature's creatures appears to him too insignificant for the investigation of its structure and habits, but neither any star too remote to be drawn within the sphere of his observation for the calculation of its motions and its course.' Finally man's duties to the brute creation are indicated. 'He knows that the animal is as much a sentient being as himself.' He will spare the sufferings of animals, in their necessary deaths, as much as possible and render their service as tolerable as possible. 'The manner in which a nation in the aggregate treats animals is one chief measure of its real civilisation.'<sup>10</sup> All this, and much more of the same kind, if we can forget its negative and atheistical origin, and treat it merely as a system of Ethics entirely divorced from Theology,

<sup>10</sup> Strauss. *The Old Faith and the New* (English translation, London, 1873), pp. 274 sqq.

is in itself sufficiently noble. It inculcates the principles of self-sacrifice, love of one's neighbour, persistent effort for the good of society, striving after knowledge of all kinds, tenderness to all, even to the dumb animals. The Comtist morality, to a somewhat striking extent, resembles Buddhism, which also seems to have consisted in the union of positivist views regarding God, with a tender sympathy for mankind and the animals. But the resemblance is accidental, as there is no trace of Comte having copied the doctrines of Buddha. On the other hand, the best features of the Comtist morality cannot claim to be original. What is there in the doctrine of our duties to 'humanity,' which cannot be found first in Stoicism, and afterwards, in a simpler and sweeter form, in Christianity itself? Aristotle's *Ethics* therefore exhibit the same contrast to the morality of Comte as they do to that of Stoicism or of the Gospel. *First*, in the Grecian narrowness of their view, since the idea of the brotherhood of mankind had not dawned on Aristotle; to him Greek and Barbarian, Bond and Free, were in perpetual antithesis. *Secondly*, in their upholding the institution of Slavery as a matter of theory. Practically, indeed, Stoicism only served to mitigate, without abolishing, Slavery. And Christianity had existed for more than eighteen centuries in the world before any serious effort was made to abolish the Slavery of inferior races. But this was only a failure of carrying out the spirit and principles of Stoicism and Christianity. On the other hand, Aristotle supported the institution of Slavery in deliberate theory. Some thinkers of his age had considered slavery to be a mere institution of custom (*νόμῳ*), and unjust and unnatural, because based on no difference of nature between the master and the slave.<sup>11</sup> But Aristotle maintained on the contrary

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<sup>11</sup> *Politics*, i. iii. 4.

that part of mankind are by nature slaves, being only fitted to be under control, not having a law of reason (*λόγον*) in themselves, and only sharing in it, so far as to be able to understand it when enunciated.<sup>12</sup> And hence he deduced the detestable doctrine that it is justifiable to make war for the purpose of reducing to slavery those who, having been by nature intended to be subject, refuse to be so.<sup>13</sup> Domestic slavery in Athens was probably mild, and the lot of an Athenian slave may have been far better than that of many a free labourer in modern times. But the question is one of theory: Aristotle plainly denied the rights of humanity to a slave. He said, 'you cannot conceive a slave sharing in Happiness, any more than in a career in the State' (*Eth.* x. vi. 8).

Perhaps enough has been said to indicate the differences of point of view, which separate Aristotle from all modern systems. One difference is *that* between the Hellenic and the Semitic spirit; between a simple, joyous, and artistic theory of life, which points out how the Beautiful is attainable in action, and a Happiness 'more than mortal' in philosophic contemplation—and a mode of thought which removes Happiness to a region beyond the grave, makes this life a mere means to the attainment of a better life hereafter, and, so far as this world goes, raises Self-abnegation and Pain into objects to be chosen for their own sakes. Again, all the differences have to be taken into account which divide a system only contemplating a small Greek republic, and reflecting many of its peculiarities, from the wider views and changed circumstances of the modern world. The progress of Psychology and its abstractions, deepened by religion and religious morality, is another

<sup>12</sup> *Pol.* i. v. 9.

<sup>13</sup> *Pol.* i. viii. 12.

matter in which Aristotle is left behind. The conception of the development of the Earth and of Man to which Palæontology and other sciences have given rise, is of purely modern origin, and influences to some extent even the theory of Morals. Lastly, the bold materialism of the last few years offers conclusions utterly irreconcilable with the philosophy of Aristotle.

Many of Aristotle's peculiar terms and phrases still live in ethical phraseology, having been perpetuated in modern language by the schoolmen. But they have for the most part lost their original philosophic import, and are used to express ideas quite out of the Aristotelian context. 'Habits' is no doubt only the Latinised form of *ἔξεις*, but the meaning which attached to *ἔξεις* does not remain pure in 'habit,' which, as it is generally used, rather implies *ἔθος*, i.e. that process by which a *ἔξεις* is formed. The 'passions' with us, though a translation of *πάθη*, do not quite correspond with them, they more nearly answer to the *ἐπιθυμίαι* of Aristotle. 'Motive' is properly the 'efficient cause' (*ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις*), but applying it to action we use it invariably for the 'final cause' (*οὐδὲν σύνεκα*) which was Aristotle's term for the motive of an action. 'Principle,' as above mentioned (page 270), corresponds with the *ἀρχή* of the practical syllogism, but according to the Peripatetic system this major premiss contained an idea of the good, while our 'principle' is meant to imply an idea of the right. 'Energy,' though identical in form with *ἐνέργεια*, has quite lost all notion of a contrast and correlation with *δύναμις* or potentiality, and implies merely the existence of physical or moral force. In saying 'extremes meet,' we forget the philosophical antithesis between the extremes and the mean, and all which that 'mean' originally implied. In translating Aristotle's *ἡθικὴ ἀρετή* by the terms 'moral virtue' we omit to notice how

much all these associations connected with the individual will, which go to make up our conception of 'moral,' were wanting in Aristotle's *ἡθικὴ ἀρετή*, while this, strictly speaking, might perhaps be better represented by the words 'excellence of the character;' and, as has been already made apparent, in speaking of 'the end of man,' we substitute a religious for a philosophical association. The above-mentioned terms, however, have all a direct affinity to, and a lineal descent from, the system of Aristotle. They have only suffered that degree of change to which all language is liable, and which so many ancient words have undergone in their transition to modern use. Modern terms of this derivative character present, for the most part, two characteristics, as contrasted with their antique originals. In the first place, they are more definite. In the second place, they are less philosophic. The philosophy, however, that once surrounded them and formed their proper context, in ebbing away from them has really sunk into the general thought of the world and become absorbed in it. If 'energy' no longer represents *ἐνέργεια*, 'actuality' and many other forms of thought contain and reproduce all that was philosophical in the original word. If 'habit' is not exactly *ἕξις*, the 'law of habits' is a received doctrine in all practical Ethics. And so in a variety of ways Aristotle has influenced modern forms of expression.

But in the *matter* of morals the world has clearly outgrown the *Ethics* of Aristotle. And so, in a utilitarian age, the question may be raised, Why, then, should this treatise be any longer studied? To this, perhaps, dozens of answers might be offered, but we may content ourselves with a few. It might suffice to say in the words of a recent writer, 'nothing which has ever interested living men and women can wholly lose its vitality—no language they have spoken,

no oracle by which they have hushed their voices, no dream which has once been entertained by actual human minds, nothing about which they have ever been passionate, or expended time and zeal.'<sup>14</sup> But if this answer be deemed inadequate by the utilitarian, then let him believe that the study of Aristotle is an essential part of high cultivation. If cultivation consists primarily in an acquaintance with the thoughts and words of the greatest writers of the world, Aristotle undoubtedly is one of those greatest writers. Again, cultivation consists in a knowledge of the past, for without this knowledge we cannot understand the present. And in tracing the progress of the thought of Europe a knowledge of Aristotle is an essential ingredient. As a training for youthful minds the *Ethics*, *Politics*, *Rhetoric*, and *Art of Poetry* of Aristotle are found by experience to have a peculiar value. The rich knowledge of life and human nature (the same in all ages) which they contain, their method of exhaustive classification, and their manly handling of all questions which arise, render these works a suitable propædeutic for many careers in life. And the late Dr. Arnold of Rugby<sup>15</sup> used to set especial store on these studies as a main part of the curriculum of the University of Oxford. But again, if, apart from general education, a man would wish to form himself to be a philosopher, he can hardly dispense with a knowledge of the ancient systems, of which Aristotle is the culmination—the want of this knowledge is a deficiency and the source of a certain weakness in some of the most eminent English philosophers of the present day. Finally, it may certainly be good for us all, as a supplement to, and sometimes as a corrective of, our ordinary modes of thought, to imbibe a

<sup>14</sup> *Studies in the History of the Renaissance*, by W. H. Pater, &c. (London, 1873), p. 38.

<sup>15</sup> *The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold, D.D.*, by Dean Stanley, vol. ii. letter 274.

portion of the Hellenic spirit and to endeavour to infuse it into our daily life. And there are three great ideas, all too much neglected by the modern world, which we may learn from the *Ethics* of Aristotle to restore to their proper importance ; and these are—the Beauty attainable in action, the high pleasure attainable in Philosophy, and the value and grandeur of a noble Friendship.

## APPENDIX A.

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### *On the Ethical Method of Aristotle.*

SOME notice of Aristotle's Ethical method seems necessary for completeness ; it is a subject too long for a note and too short for an Essay, and may be briefly despatched here. Incidentally we have already alluded to several characteristics of his point of view. And in the last resort a philosopher's method, whatever be the subject or science, depends on the whole bearing of his mind and thought. With regard to Ethics, we may first observe, that while Aristotle seems to occupy himself much with the logic of the sentence, and the question, What is its appropriate method ? he is quite tentative and uncertain, and to some extent confused, in all he directly answers to this question. In the second place, we may notice that this method unconsciously declares itself, not in the abstract but in the concrete, throughout the pages of his treatise.

At the very outset of his work, in the first seven chapters, he has no less than three digressions on the logic of Ethics. In the first (*Eth.* i. iii. 1-4), he cautions his readers against expecting too much *ἀκρίβεια* in the present science. This term *ἀκρίβεια* (see the notes on *Eth.* i. vii. 18) seems to imply both mathematical exactness, and also metaphysical subtlety. The Ethical treatise of Spinoza might be said to

exhibit *ἀκριβεία* in both senses of the word, on account of its demonstrative statement, combined with its metaphysical character of thought. Kant's system, without aiming at a mathematical method, might be called *ἀκριβής*, on account of its speculative depth of view. The question then is, of how much *ἀκριβεία* is this 'branch of Politics' (*πολιτική τις*) capable? Aristotle tells us, that 'the matters of which it treats—virtue and justice—have so much about them that is fluctuating and uncertain, as even to have given rise to the opinion that they are only conventional distinctions. Hence, with such conceptions on which to reason, we cannot expect demonstrative and exact conclusions, we must be content with rough and general theories.' It is to be observed here, that Aristotle departs from the point of view with which he had started. He started with an *a priori* conception of the End-in-itself, which 'must be identical with the chief good for man.' Here he goes off into another point of view—that which looks at action from the outside, recognises the variations in the details of action, and allows the empirical casuistry of the Sophists to have an influence in determining the character of his science.

In his second digression upon this topic (*Eth. I. iv. 5*) he shows even more plainly a tentative and uncertain attitude. He says, 'We must not forget the distinction drawn by Plato between the two methods of science—the method which proceeds *from* principles, and that which proceeds *to* principles. The question is, Which must we adopt at present? We must begin, at all events, with things known. But again, things are *known* in two ways, absolutely and relatively. Perhaps *we*—i.e. as ethical philosophers—may be content to begin with what *we* know (i.e. relative and not absolute truths). Hence the necessity of a good moral training previous to the study of this science. For one who has been so trained is in

possession of facts which either already do, or soon can, stand in the light of principles.' In this passage there appears to be more than one play upon words: (1) In saying, 'perhaps then *we* must begin with what *we* know,' there is a sort of implication that the method of Ethics must be inductive, starting from relative and individual facts. But there is a fallacy in such an insinuation, because, though the individual must begin with what 'he knows,' there is nothing to prevent an absolute truth ( $\tauὸ\; ἀπλῶς\; γνώριμον$ ) forming part of the intuitions and experience of the individual. (2) There appears to be a play on the word  $\dot{\alpha}\rhoχή$ ; for while Aristotle implies that the procedure must be to principles, and not starting from them, he says, on the other hand, that 'the fact is a principle.' Now, this may mean two things. It may mean that 'a moral fact or perception really amounts to a law.' But, in this case, the science of Ethics, beginning with moral facts, really begins  $\dot{\alpha}\pi'\; \dot{\alpha}\rhoχῶν$ . Or it may mean that 'the fact is a beginning or starting-point for discussion.' In this latter case the word  $\dot{\alpha}\rhoχή$  should not have been used, as it introduces confusion into the present passage—the upshot of which, on the whole, seems to be, to assert in a very wavering way that Ethics must be inductive rather than deductive, and must commence with experience of particulars rather than with the intuitions of the universal.

The third digression on the same subject occurs *Eth.* i. vii. 17–21, where Aristotle points out his definition of the chief good as 'a sketch to be filled up;' and also, it would appear, as an  $\dot{\alpha}\rhoχή$  or leading principle, which in importance amounts to 'more than half the whole' science. In filling up the sketch, he again cautions us that too much  $\dot{\alpha}κρίθεια$  is not to be expected. But it is plain that he has deserted his former view of the science as inductive; he now makes it depend on

a general conception of the chief good, which is to be applied and developed.

Elsewhere in the *Ethics* Aristotle appears puzzled how to deal with the casuistry of his subject. He says (*Eth.* ii. ii. 3, 4) that 'the actions and the interests of men exhibit no fixed rule, any more than the conditions of health do; and if this is the case with the universal theory, still more is the theory of particular acts incapable of being exactly fixed, for it falls under the domain of no art or regimen, but the actors themselves must always watch what suits the occasion, as is the way with the physician's and the pilot's art. And yet, though the theory is of such a kind, we must do what we can to help it out.' He reverts to the same point of view, *Eth.* ix. ii. 6, mentioning some casuistical difficulties, and saying it is impossible to give a fixed rule on such points.

Much as Aristotle speaks of the logic of science, we find, when we come to examine his real procedure, how little he is influenced by his own abstract rules of method. It has been sometimes said that his *Ethics* exhibit a perfect specimen of the analytic method. But this is not the entire case. The discussions are very frequently of an analytic character, different parts and elements of human life are treated separately, and indeed are not sufficiently considered in their mutual relationship. And in subordinate questions the strength of his analytic investigation is manifest. Take, for instance, his treatment of Friendship—by analysing  $\tau\delta\varphi\iota\lambda\eta\tau\delta\sigma$  into the good, the pleasant, and the useful, he at once obtains an insight into the whole subject. But the leading principles of his ethical science are not obtained by this sort of analysis, there is not by any means a procedure *τη̄ ἀρχάς*. Aristotle's bias of mind was only on one side analytical, he was on the other side speculative and synthetical, and viewed all the world as reduced to unity under certain

forms of thought, and, as we have said before, every philosopher's modes and forms of thought, his genius, his breadth of view, and his power of penetration, will constitute in reality his logic of science and his method of discovery.

Aristotle's Ethical system, as we saw more in detail in Essay IV., depends on certain *a priori* conceptions, End, Form, and Actuality. We are enabled to some extent to trace how these conceptions grew up out of Platonism, but in their ultimate depth and force they must be regarded as lightning-flashes from the genius of Aristotle. These ideas, by which human life is explained, are no mere results of an induction, no last development of experience, rather they come in from above, and for the first time give some meaning to experience. Aristotle shows how his definition of the chief good includes all the previous notices of the requisitions for happiness. But his definition is not derived from combining these, nor yet from any analysis of happiness in the concrete, but from an inner intuition of a law of good as manifested in life. The same procedure manifests itself throughout. Whatever use Aristotle may make of his *ἀποτίαι*, of appeals to language and experience, of the authority of the many and the few, these are only means of testing, correcting, illustrating, and amplifying his conceptions, and not the source from whence they spring. However, the maintenance of this constant reconciliation with experience and with popular points of view is characteristic of Aristotle's method. That it gives rise at times to an empirical and unphilosophical mode of writing, we have had more than once an opportunity of observing. But it is Aristotle's strength as well as his weakness. His width of mind, which is as distinguished as its profundity, enabled him to sum up all the knowledge of ancient times, as well as all its philosophy. Bacon accuses him of being 'a dogmatic,' and of

resembling the Ottoman princes who killed all their brethren before they could reign themselves. This accusation is an exaggerated and somewhat invidious way of stating the real case. Aristotle is 'a dogmatic,' inasmuch as his philosophy is *γνωριστικὴ οὐ πειραστική*, conclusive, and not merely starting the questions; and in the same sense almost every philosopher, who writes, is 'dogmatic,' for he would not write at all unless he thought that he had got a better system than any before him. Aristotle shows the relationship of all previous philosophies and contemporary opinions to his own system, by which he does not so much 'kill his brethren' as demonstrate that they are evidently 'younger brethren,' leaving his own right to the throne indefeasible. His relations, indeed, to Plato, in this respect are not entirely satisfactory; he never seems conscious of the enormity of his debt to Plato, and how much all the matter of his philosophy, as distinguished from a more precise and scientific mode of statement, had been suggested to him by the works of Plato. But if in the term 'dogmatist' arrogance or assumption is implied, this would not be true either of Aristotle's style of writing, or tone of thought. And he is by no means dogmatic on all points; on some, as we have already seen (in Essay V.), he declines to decide.

## APPENDIX B.

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### *On the ἘΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΟΙ ΛÓΓΟΙ.*

IN six places of the undoubted writings of Aristotle, and in three passages of the *Ethics of Eudemus*, reference is made to 'Exoteric discourses,' or 'arguments' (*ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*). Ever since the revival of letters this phrase has attracted a wonderful amount of notice, and a whole literature of works has been composed in support of the different meanings which have been attributed to it. This literature begins perhaps with Octavianus Ferrarius (1575),<sup>1</sup> and, after receiving contributions from all the great modern authorities on Greek philosophy, it ends with the names of Bernays,<sup>2</sup> Spengel,<sup>3</sup> and Grote.<sup>4</sup> We must endeavour now to give some results of this controversy, in which, however, no important question has ever been involved; except so far as everything connected with Aristotle, and his mode of writing, is interesting and important.

Before the period when the Aristotelian MSS. were brought to Rome and edited by Andronicus, we know that

<sup>1</sup> *Octaviani Ferrarii Hieronymi F. Mediolanensis De Sermonibus Exotericis Liber, ad Bartho'endum Capram Joannis F. Juricorsultum. Venetiis MDLXXV. apud Aldum.*

<sup>2</sup> *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles in*

*ihrem Verhältniss zu seinen übrigen Werken* (Berlin, 1863).

<sup>3</sup> *Aristotelische Studien*, I. p. 13 (Münich, 1864).

<sup>4</sup> *Aristotle*, vol. i. pp. 63 sqq. (London, 1872).

many Dialogues, ascribed to Aristotle as their author, had been spread over the world and much read and admired, even to the exclusion<sup>5</sup> sometimes of any knowledge of the more important treatises which we look upon as the works of Aristotle. When these latter works had been collectively edited, they were contrasted by the ancients with the lighter works in dialogic form which had before been known. And thus Cicero tells us, probably on information received by him from the learned Tyrannion (*De Finibus*, v. 5, 12), that ‘On the *summum bonum* (Aristotle and Theophrastus) had two classes of books, one in popular style, which they called “exoteric,” the other written in a more exact manner, which they left behind in their commentaries (or notebooks),’ and that this difference in the style of treatment gave rise to an appearance of inconsistency of view, which, however, was not real.<sup>6</sup> This, then, was the state of things in the time of Cicero—that the Dialogues attributed to Aristotle were considered genuine, and spoken of as ‘exoteric’ writings. The Greek Commentators treated them in the same way, but there is no evidence that these dialogues were identified by the ancients with those particular references, in which Aristotle appeals to the ‘exoteric discourses.’

The writers of the later empire, who were accustomed to the idea of mystical and hierophantic teachings, as professed by the neo-Platonic and neo-Pythagorean sects, got hold of this word ‘exoteric,’ and out of it created the fable that Aristotle had a double doctrine, the one form of it ‘esoteric,’ secret, and confined to an intimate circle of initiated scholars,

<sup>5</sup> See above, page 8.

<sup>6</sup> ‘De summo autem bono quia duo genera librorum sunt, unum popula-riter scriptum, quod ἐξωτερικόν ap-pellabant, alterum limatus, quod in

commentariis reliquerunt, non semper idem dicere yidentur, nec in summa tamen ipsa aut varietas est ulla apud hos quidem, quos nominavi, aut inter ipsos dissensio.’

the other 'exoteric,' containing only superficial truth with which the profane vulgar might be put off and satisfied. In accordance with this notion, Aulus Gellius (xx. 4) gives the apocryphal story that Alexander the Great, having heard that the Acroatic (i.e. abstruse and intimate) discourses had been published, wrote from the East to complain of what had been done, 'since he should now have no superiority over the common herd,' and that Aristotle replied that 'the treatises, though published, were not published, for nobody would understand them.' Such a statement does not require refutation. After the Renaissance, when the works of Aristotle in their original form were widely studied, all the nonsense about his double doctrine was at once dissipated; and the simple, plain-sailing character of his philosophy was admitted on all hands. The only question then which remained was, whether on the few occasions when Aristotle mentions 'exoteric discourses,' he means to refer to his own more popular writings, or to something else. About the meaning of the term 'exoteric' itself, as used by Aristotle, there is no divergence of opinion. 'Exoteric' is not to be taken as opposed to 'esoteric' or secret, but the *ἐξωτερικὸς λόγος* is the external, non-philosophical, non-scientific treatment of a subject, opposed to the *οἰκεῖος λόγος*, or internal, appropriate, and scientific treatment of it. Such being the case, whenever Aristotle says, 'Enough is said on such or such a point, even in the exoteric discourses,' the only doubt is whether he means to refer to those works of his own in which he had treated of philosophical questions after a not strictly scientific method, or to the ordinary debates and discussions on such subjects, rife enough in Athenian society, but of course unscientifically conducted. The latter is the view of Madvig, Zeller, and Spengel, and Grote's opinion

would seem to be in the same direction.<sup>7</sup> Bernays, on the other hand, argues that the points which Aristotle refers to as having been debated and settled in exoteric discourses were too abstruse and subtle to have been handled 'in the salons and coffee-houses (or what corresponded thereto) of Athens.' In an elaborate monograph he essays to prove that whenever Aristotle mentions 'the exoteric discourses' he is alluding to some passage in his own, now lost, Dialogues. The attempt, however, is infelicitous, and the result unconvincing.<sup>8</sup> Three passages in which the ἔξωΤΕΡΙΚΟΙ ΛÓΓΟΙ are mentioned, but which make against Bernays, he ignores, or but slightly mentions. The first of these occurs in the *Physical Discourse*, iv. x. 1; the other two in the *Eudemian Ethics*. Spengel very properly observes that any discussion on the nature of the ἔξωΤΕΡΙΚΟΙ ΛÓΓΟΙ should start from an examination of the passage in the

<sup>7</sup> Grote identifies 'exoteric' with the 'dialectical' treatment of a subject, and says: 'Properly speaking, the "exoteric" does not designate, or even imply, any positive doctrine at all. It denotes a many-sided controversial debate, in which numerous points are canvassed and few settled; the express purpose being to bring into full daylight the perplexing aspects of each. There are a few exceptional cases in which "exoteric discourse" will of itself have thrown up a tolerably trustworthy result; these few Aristotle occasionally singles out and appeals to.' This judgment, however, is unsatisfactory, and does not settle the question. 'Exoteric discourses' were doubtless 'dialectical' and not demonstrative, but this might apply equally to Aristotle's

*Dialogues*, or to the discussions of cultivated circles.

<sup>8</sup> Bernays shakes the confidence one might otherwise feel in him as a scholar, by an unfortunate slip in page 135 of his work, where he says, 'Nach Diogenes Laertius 5, 19, soll Aristoteles an Platon einen "Vorsprung des Naturells (*προτέρημα φύσεως*)" anerkannt haben.' Whereas what Laertius really said was, that 'Plato defined Beauty as "a natural superiority.'" The sentence occurs in a list of *Aristoteliana*: Τὸ κάλλος παντὸς ἔλεγεν ἐπιστολίου συστατικότερον. Οἱ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν Διογένη φασὶν δρίσασθαι· αὐτὸν δέ, δῶρον εἰπεῖν εὔμορφας· Σωκράτη δέ, διλιγοχρόνιον τυραννίδα· Πλάτωνα, προτέρημα φύσεως· κ.τ.λ.

*Physical Discourse* of Aristotle, which actually gives specimens of them. The question is as to the nature of Time, on which Aristotle says *καλῶς ἔχει διαπορῆσαι περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν λόγων πότερον τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ή τῶν μὴ ὄντων, εἰτα τίς ή φύσις αὐτοῦ*, and then follows a string of these ‘exoteric arguments,’ which are dialectical reasons for doubting whether Time can be said to exist, and dialectical difficulties as to its attributes. There seems no reason for holding, with Bernays, that such arguments were too abstruse for discussion in educated society, outside the philosophic schools, in Athens. The whole of the *Topics* of Aristotle, not to mention the Dialogues of Plato (which are obviously meant to have a dramatic truth), are against Bernays upon this point. And, at all events, it is impossible that Aristotle by the term *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*, in the passage now quoted, can have been referring to his own Dialogues.

Again, in the *Ethics of Eudemus* (I. viii. 4) we find it said of Plato’s doctrine of Ideas, that the subject belongs to another department, and is too subtle for discussion in an ethical treatise; that the writer (if he must briefly indicate his opinion) considers the Ideas to be vain abstractions; and that ‘the question has already received manifold consideration both in exoteric and in philosophical discussions.’<sup>9</sup> Here there is evidently no reference to the Dialogues of Aristotle. Eudemus is only mentioning, as Aristotle so often did,<sup>10</sup> two classes of opinions and arguments on any subject—

<sup>9</sup> Εἰ δὲ δεῖ συντόμως εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν, λέγομεν δτι πρῶτον μὲν τὸ εἶναι ιδέαν μὴ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλου δυνοῦν λέγεται λογικῶς καὶ κενῶς· ἐπέσκεψται δὲ πολλοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόποις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *Pol.* ΙΙΙ. xii. I. δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν ίσουν τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ μέχρι γέ-

τινος διολογοῦσι τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, ἐν οἷς διάρισται περὶ τῶν ἡθικῶν, ‘people in general (=οἱ ἐξωτ. λόγ.) agree with the philosophical theories of ethics.’ *Eth.* I. viii. I. Σκεπτέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπερδοματος καὶ ἐξ ὅν δ λόγος (=ἐκ τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν) ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς, &c.

the popular and the philosophical. A few pages later in the same work (*Eth. Eud.* II. i. 1), we find the old and common division of goods, into ‘external goods and goods in a soul,’ mentioned in the following terms, *Πάντα δὴ τάγαθὰ ἢ ἐκτὸς ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ τούτων αἱρετώτερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διαιρούμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔξωτερικοῖς λόγοις· φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὥν ἔνια ἢ πάντα τέλος εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν.* Eudemus says that we make this distinction ‘even when speaking popularly,’ ‘for all men consider either thought, virtue, or pleasure, to be an end-in-itself.’ Thus the opinions<sup>11</sup> of ‘all men’ are identified with the *ἔξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*.

In the fifth book of his treatise (*Eth. Nic.* VI. iv. 2) Eudemus makes a similar appeal to the distinctions established, apart from philosophy, in popular opinion and language, *ἕτερον δὲ ἐστι ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις πιστεύομεν δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἔξωτερικοῖς λόγοις.* Bernays, however, considers that the distinction of *ποίησις* from *πρᾶξις* was too fundamental a doctrine in the Aristotelian system to be merely taken for granted, or accepted as having been established by the discussions of cultivated society. He therefore conjecturally infers that Aristotle must here be citing the conclusions arrived at in his own dialogue *Περὶ Ποιητῶν*, though none of the fragments of that dialogue, now existing, in the least bear out this supposition. On the other hand, it must be remembered (1) that in all probability Eudemus, and not Aristotle, wrote this passage, (2) that Plato (in *Charmides*, p. 163) describes an ‘exoteric argument’ between

<sup>11</sup> Aristotle himself (*Eth.* I. viii. 2) mentions the distinction here referred to, as one of the *λεγόμενα* on the subject of Happiness. He says that it is an old opinion, which has received the approval of philosophers

\*(*κατά γε ταῦτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιὰν οὐσαν καὶ δμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων*). It is therefore out of the question to suppose that Eudemus should seek to derive it from the Dialogues of Aristotle.

Critias and Socrates on the difference between *ποίησις* and *πρᾶξις*. The distinction there given is imperfect, and is meant as a caricature of the manner of Prodicus (see above, p. 125), but still it shows that the question itself had been mooted at a comparatively early period in Athenian talk. And there is no reason for doubting that in the century (or thereabouts) which intervened between Prodicus and Eudemus, the cleverness of the Sophists, and of the society in which they moved, should have sufficed to settle so simple a matter as the difference between 'making' and 'acting.'

Returning now to the undoubted works of Aristotle, we find in *Metaphys.* XII. i. 4, the sentence Σκεπτέον πρῶτον μὲν περὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν—ἐπειτα μετὰ ταῦτα χωρὶς περὶ τῶν ἴδεῶν ἀπλῶς καὶ ὅσον νόμου χάριν· τεθρύλληται γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν λόγων—'We have first to consider mathematical substances (their nature, &c.), and afterwards we must enter into a separate consideration of the Ideas, looking at them by themselves, and only so far as courtesy demands (*ὅσον νόμου χάριν*), for most points regarding them have been made common property even by the exoteric discussions upon them.' The first thing that strikes us in this passage is the parallel which it presents to the *Eudemian* saying (*Eth. Eud.* I. viii. 4), that 'the doctrine of Ideas had already received manifold consideration both in popular and in philosophical reasonings.' It is possible, indeed, that Aristotle may in this place of the *Metaphysics* be referring to those dialogues of his own in which, according to ancient authority (see above, page 213, note), he was 'always declaring his inability to sympathise with the doctrine of Ideas.' But if he does so, he does it by implication, not mentioning his own dialogues, but merely referring to the general class of 'exoteric discussions,' in which his own dialogues would be included. On the other hand, it is easy

to believe that Aristotle's early dissent from Plato's doctrine of Ideas gave rise to much talk in the intellectual circles of Athens, and it is more consonant with the expressions used that Aristotle is merely alluding to the results of that talk.

The next passage to be examined is *Politics*, III. vi. 5, 'Αλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους ράδιον διελεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἔξωτερικοῖς λόγοις διοριζόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν πολλάκις—' It is easy to classify the so-called forms of government, for even in unscientific discussion we often draw distinctions about them.' Here we have the same formula as in the *Eudemian* remark about the common division of goods (*καθάπερ διαιρούμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔξωτερικοῖς λόγοις*). The very term *λεγομένους* points to matter of widely spread, ordinary, cognisance. Bernays, however, rejecting this simple explanation, conjectures a reference to the four dialogues, mentioned in the catalogue of Aristotle's writings, *Πολιτικός*, *Περὶ Βασιλείας*, *Περὶ Ἀποικιῶν*, *Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης*, which all *may have* discoursed on the forms of government. And this, he says, would justify the adverb *πολλάκις*. It would not, however, justify the present tense *διοριζόμεθα*, which, if taken as Bernays suggests, would imply that Aristotle, when he wrote his *Politics*, was still going on with dialogues and exoteric discourses. And this it is impossible to believe. If Aristotle ever wrote dialogues, he wrote them in his youth, and had left them far behind him, both in thought and manner, when he came to compose his systematic philosophy.

In *Politics*, VII. i. 2, it is said, *Διὸ δεῖ πρῶτον ὁμολογεῖσθαι τίς ὁ πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν αἱρετώτατος βίος· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, πότερον κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἡ ἔτερος.* *Νομισάντας οὖν ἵκανως πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς—* 'Considering, then, that many of the statements made on the subject of the Best Life even

in not strictly philosophical discourses are adequate, we must even now make use of them.' The expressions used in this passage are different from those in any of the passages previously reviewed. The phrase, 'we must even now make use of them,' is very striking. It looks as if Aristotle, for once in a way, was condescending to avail himself of a portion of one of his earlier writings. And this supposition is borne out by the strange appearance of what follows. Bernays is quite right in remarking that 'one who has been long accustomed to the severe atmosphere of Aristotle's ordinary style, finds himself greeted by a breath of unwonted mildness' in the paragraphs which immediately succeed that now quoted.<sup>12</sup> A fulness and even redundancy of expression, very unlike the usual crabbed brevity of Aristotle, now shows itself. The sentences are harmoniously rounded. A hortatory and somewhat fervent tone is observable. The whole passage, down to the end of the chapter, looks like the peroration of a dialogue, on a level—say with the *Menexenus*. The concluding words, which would have been suitable to such a peroration, look out of place in their present position in the *Politics*. We are willing, then, to concede to Bernays, that in the first chapter of the seventh book of the *Politics* we have not only a reference to, but an actual excerpt from, one of the

<sup>12</sup> The following quotations may illustrate the style of this passage:—  
 Οὐδεὶς γάρ ἢν φαῖ μακάριον τὸν μηθὲν μέριον ἔχοντα ἀνδρίας μηδὲ σωφροσύνης μηδὲ δικαιοσύνης μηδὲ φρονήσεως, ἀλλὰ δεδιότα μὲν τὰς παραπετομένας μυλας, ἀπεχθέμενον δὲ μηθενός, ἐν ἐπιθυμήσῃ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἡ πιεῖν, τῶν ἐσχάτων, ἔνεκα δὲ τεταρτημορίου διαφθόροντα τοὺς φιλτάτους φίλους, ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν διάψιαν οὕτως ἀφρονα καὶ διεψευσμένον ὥσπερ τι παιδίον ἢ μαινό-

μενον.—"Οτι μὲν οὖν ἐκάστῳ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον δόσον περ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας, ἐστω συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, δις εὐδαιμων μέν ἐστι καὶ μακάριος, δι' οὐθὲν δὲ τῶν ἔξωτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτῶν αὐτὸς καὶ τῷ ποιός τις εἶναι τὴν φύσιν.—Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας ἔσαντας ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν μεθόδου, διασκεπτέοντας ὑπερέργον, εἰ τις τοῖς εἰρημένοις τυγχάνει μὴ πειθόμενος.

'exoteric discourses' of Aristotle. Bernays does not pronounce with certainty to which of the dialogues this passage originally belonged; he thinks it may have come either from a moral dialogue, called in the catalogue *Nήρινθος*, but which may perhaps be identified with that mentioned elsewhere<sup>13</sup> under the name *Κορίνθιος*—or from the *Προτρεπτικός*, or 'Exhortation to Philosophy.'

The last passage to be noticed is *Eth.* i. xiii. 9, where, in speaking of the soul, Aristotle says, *Λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἔντα καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς· οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον*—'But some points about the soul seem to be sufficiently stated even in the unscientific discussions of the subject, and we must avail ourselves of them;—as, for instance, that part of it is irrational and part rational.' The terms used here are nearly the same as those in the last-quoted passage, only with the important omission of *καὶ νῦν* before *χρηστέον*. Bernays finds here a reference to the dialogue of Aristotle called *Eudemus* (on which see above, page 301). But there is no appearance of any writing here likely to have come from such a work. And after the publication of Plato's *Republic*, there seems no reason to think it impossible that a society which gave rise to the *Topics* of Aristotle (see above, page 132), should have arrived at the dichotomy of the soul into rational and irrational, as one of the results of its discussions. And of this rough basis of psychology Aristotle here seems to avail himself.

The conclusions, then, to which we venture to come with regard to the *ἔξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*, are as follows:

(1.) That Aristotle always uses the phrase generically, in a sense capable of including both his own not strictly

scientific writings, and also the informal and dialectical discussions of other men.

(2.) That in different places he makes a different specific application of this generic term.

(3.) That in *Phys.* iv. x. 1, he uses it in reference to dialectical difficulties and questions, as to the nature of time, in vogue at Athens.

(4.) That in *Metaphys.* xii. i. 4; *Pol.* iii. vi. 5; and *Eth.* i. xiii. 9, he indicates by it the results arrived at by the extra-scholastic discussions and theories of the day.

(5.) That in *Pol.* vii. i. 2, he uses it in especial reference to one of his own earlier works, and actually proceeds to incorporate an extract from that work with his Political treatise.

(6.) That Eudemus, in the three places where he employs the phrase, means by it 'popular,' as opposed to 'philosophical' discussion.

The available fragments of the lost Dialogues of Aristotle have been collected by Valentine Rose, and are now prefixed to the splendid Index to Aristotle which forms the conclusion to the great Berlin Edition. The question of the genuineness of these fragments cannot here be thoroughly attempted. We cannot go with Valentine Rose the entire length of believing that Aristotle never wrote anything of the kind. Indeed, the passage in *Pol.* vii. i. 2 would be sufficient to prevent our holding such an opinion. There often occur fanciful and ornamental phrases in the works of Aristotle, which he may have 'availed himself of' from his earlier writings. Such, for instance, are: *μία γάρ χελιδών ζερ οὐ ποιεῖ* (*Eth.* i. vii. 16), *διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν τοῦτοις ἔξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλῳ* (*Pl.* i. v. 3), and *οὐθ' ἐσπερός οὐθ' ἐφος οὐτωθαυμαστός* (adopted by Eudemus, *Eth.* v. i. 15). These and

many more such 'purple patches' may have originally appeared in the more youthful works of Aristotle. But that a considerable element of forgery contributed to the making up of the long catalogue of Aristotle's writings, we can hardly doubt.

## APPENDIX C.

### *On the Political Ideas in the Ethics of Aristotle.*

IT may seem a strange omission that, while we have so often alluded to Aristotle's identification or confusion of Ethics with Politics, we have never specified any very important consequences of this view ; except, indeed, that we have noticed sometimes a restricted mode of dealing with certain questions, more appropriate to Politics than to philosophy. It remains then to ask, were there any such consequences ? Does Aristotle write on Ethics differently because he considered that his science was a kind of Politics ? Is the individual in his eyes always regarded as a citizen ? Do his views of law, the State, and different questions of the constitution influence his views upon moral action ? Every one will be ready to answer that such effects are hardly traceable. We read the *Ethics* as containing discussions on happiness, virtue, friendship, pleasure, and philosophy ; we find it replete with anthropology, dealing with the heights and the depths of the human consciousness, and quite away from any consideration of the welfare of masses of mankind. Happiness, as here described, does not depend on any particular constitution or form of government. Aristotle, indeed, specifies the various forms of government, and declares which is the best among them (*Eth.* VIII. x.), but this is only for the purpose of illustration, for the sake of comparing the dif-

ferent degrees of equality in various kinds of friendship with the different degrees of liberty in various forms of the constitution. Aristotle's entering into detail here with regard to the governments is not so much a mark of consistency in preserving a political point of view, but rather it is a want of art and an entrenchment upon the subject of Politics proper. It would be called too long a digression, supposing there were a settled co-ordination of subject between the different parts of Aristotle's system. A still greater entrenchment on the province of Politics occurs in the theory of justice given in Book V. It is remarkable that this book, in all probability by Eudemus, sets forth a closer dependence of moral on political principles than any other book in the *Ethics*. Eudemus, as we saw before (p. 26), does not, at the outset like Aristotle, commence under the name of Politics. But in Book V. he probably merely reproduced, in perhaps imperfect form, the theory of Aristotle. Justice is here defined according to principles of Jurisprudence and Political Economy. To make these a part of morals would be a confusion we should never now fall into; though we might confess that it would be hard to give the ethical idea of justice its full content without appealing to these extraneous sciences.

Other allusions to Politics occur (*Eth.* I. xiii. 21), where Aristotle says that 'the true politician must study the nature of virtue'; (III. i. 1) where he says that 'a theory of the voluntary and involuntary will be useful to legislators'; (VIII. i. 4) 'friendship holds States together; legislators seem more anxious for this than for justice.' Lastly, we have the most remarkable place of all, when at the conclusion of his ethical treatise (x. ix. 8), he makes the transition to Politics proper, by saying that 'for virtue, not only nature, but habits and teaching are requisite, and these last must be provided.

by the State. Hence,' he says, 'the nurture and the discipline should be fixed by law, and use will make them easy. Not only, perhaps, ought men while youths to receive good discipline, but also we want laws about their conduct when they are grown up; and, in short, about the whole of life. For the many will rather obey necessity than reason, punishment than the inducements of the beautiful.'

With these evidences before us, let us now sum up the bearing of Aristotle's political thought upon what we now call the *Ethics*. There seems to be an analogy between Aristotle's views of man in relation to the State, and his views of man in relation to nature. We have seen before (Essay V.) that in his *Physics* he considers man as part of nature, and, because he is a part, inferior to and less divine than the heaven and the universe; so, too, in his political system, he considers the State prior to and greater than the individual (*Politics*, i. ii. 13), just as the whole is prior to and greater than the part. The individual without the State has no meaning; the State must be presupposed; man is not a whole in himself (*αὐτάρκης*), he is born to live in relationship to others (*πολιτικός*), if he lived alone he must be either more or less than man (*ἢ θηρίον  
ἢ θεός*). Just as Aristotle said 'the universe is diviner than man,' so he says 'the End for the State is diviner than that for the individual.' Politics, then, are the greatest science, the legislator is an *ἀρχητέκτων*, a master builder laying the plan of that greatest practical thing, a fitly framed human society. This idea, if it were carried out, would tend to overwhelm all individuality. It actually does so in Plato's *Republic*, and the last-quoted passage (*Eth. x. ix. 8*) is a reproduction of the same feeling as Plato's. The laws are to regulate the whole of life, and to force a good discipline on those who would not choose virtue for its own sake. This

idea, then, forms one side of Aristotle's view, it is a sort of background to his ethical system. The End for the State, as he depicts it (see above, p. 228), is something almost mystical, it is like the identification of State and Church. But the other side of his view is that which seemed forced on him by the truth, as soon as he commences a course of ethical inquiries. It consists in an acknowledgment, to the full, of the absolute worth of the individual consciousness. Not only is a reaction thus made against the system of Plato, but also, by the whole treatment which Aristotle gives his subject, Ethics are virtually and for ever separated from Politics.



# THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS



BOOKS I.-II.



## PLAN OF BOOK I.

THIS Book may be roughly divided into the following four parts :—

(1.) The statement of the leading question of political science ; namely, What is the Practical Good ? Ch. I.—VI.

(2.) The answer to this question as given by Aristotle himself. Ch. VII.

(3.) A comparison of Aristotle's definition of the Good with existing opinions on the subject. Ch. VIII.—XII.

(4.) A commencement of the analysis of the different elements which constitute his definition. Ch. XIII.

With respect to these divisions, we may remark that they are not with entire precision separated from one another. For the first part professes to examine the most important opinions on the subject of Happiness or the Good (Ch. IV. § 4), and accordingly reviews men's conceptions of it as exhibited in their lives (Ch. V.), and refutes Plato's theory that the Good is a transcendental Idea, on the ground of its being both metaphysically untenable and practically inapplicable.

After developing his own conception, Aristotle returns (in Ch. VIII. *sqq.*) to compare it with *τὰ λαγόμενα*—‘that goods of the mind are highest ;’ ‘that happiness consists in virtue,’ &c. Now we may ask, Why did not a statement of these theories open the Book ? Both in Part 1st and Part 3rd we have to do with the existing opinions. Had Aristotle pursued his usual method, he would have preluded his *Ethics* with a brief critical history of the previous progress of the science, in which the leading systems would have been refuted or shown to be inadequate. But it seems as if he did not set out with so clear a conception of ethics

as he does of physics and metaphysics. Before Aristotle, Ethics cannot be said to have existed as a separate science. Even in the present work there is no name for it as yet. Though  $\eta\theta\kappa\nu$  and  $\tau\alpha\ \eta\theta\kappa\alpha$  are spoken of in the *Politics* (III. xii. 1, VII. xiii. 5), and in the *Metaphysics* (I. i. 17), yet the word  $\eta\theta\kappa\eta$  does not occur. The science is still  $\pi\omega\lambda\tau\kappa\eta\ tis$  (*Eth.* I. ii. 9); as in the *Rhetoric* it had been specified as  $\eta\ \pi\epsilon\rho\tau\ \tau\alpha\ \eta\theta\eta\ \pi\gamma\mu\mu\kappa\tau\eta\ \pi\delta\kappa\alpha\iota\eta\ \iota\sigma\tau\ \pi\phi\sigma\alpha\gamma\eta\phi\eta\pi\eta\ \pi\omega\lambda\tau\kappa\eta\ (\text{I. ii. 7})$ .

Hence we may recognise something tentative and uncertain in Aristotle's treatment of the subject. He seems not clear as to how far he is entering on a merely practical and political science, and how far on something speculative. He professes to lay the foundations for his science inductively (Ch. IV. §§ 5-7) in experience, but really obtains his own theory from *a priori* grounds, arguing what the Good *must* be. That Aristotle's principle, thus obtained, is truly profound, we need not fail to acknowledge. Only, with regard to the science as a whole, we see that he was feeling his way; and we must not expect to find, even in the First Book of his *Ethics*, a finished work of art.

With this proviso we may rapidly trace the sequence of ideas contained by the Book, as follows:—The distinction between means and ends characterises every part of life and action. Given the subordination of means to ends, there must be some end which is never a means. This End-in-itself of all action is obviously identical with the Practical Chief Good ( $\delta\eta\lambda\eta\ \omega\pi\ \tau\omega\pi\ \ddot{\alpha}\ \iota\eta\ \tau\dot{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\ddot{\theta}\eta\ \chi\alpha\ \tau\ddot{\alpha}\ \ddot{\alpha}\pi\pi\tau\eta$ ). What, then, is this chief Good—which must be the determinator of life—and which is the object of Politics, the supreme practical science?

To this question no answer is to be obtained from the common opinions of men; nor from their lives, for the most part; nor from the metaphysical system of Plato.

The Good and the End are always identical; hence, as already said, the Chief Good is identical with the End-in-itself. In this conception the idea of absoluteness and all-sufficiency would seem to be implied ( $\tau\omega\ \gamma\ddot{\alpha}\ \tau\dot{\alpha}\lambda\eta\ \dot{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\ddot{\theta}\eta\ \omega\pi\pi\pi\ \iota\eta\ \dot{\alpha}\pi\pi\pi$ ). It must be realised in the proper sphere of man, which a consideration of the scale of life leads us to see must be a rational and moral existence. To give meaning to the conception of this existence

we must assume that it falls under the category of the actual ; in other words, that it is 'vital action' or 'the realisation of man's nature ;' and this must be in accordance with its own proper law of excellence, and not frustrated by external adversity or shortness of duration. Hence we get a definition of the Chief Good for man—that it consists in 'a rightly harmonised consciousness in adequate external conditions.'

Comparing this fundamental principle (*ἀρχή*) with the opinions and theories of others, we find that it includes or supersedes them. From it we get an answer to the common question, 'Is happiness to be acquired by human efforts ?' and by means of it we are able to see the shallowness of Solon's view implied in the saying that 'No man can be called happy while he lives.' It at once renders nugatory the question, Is happiness praiseworthy or above praise ?

Assuming, then, the definition as above, let us examine its component parts. And, first, what is that law of excellence (peculiar to man) which is to regulate his mind ? A popular psychology serves as a basis for discussing this. Man is a compound of a rational and an irrational nature. Part of his irrational nature (the passions) rises into communion with reason. This part, then, and the reason itself, are two elements in which human excellence may be exhibited. According to this division, we distinguish, on the one hand, intellectual excellence ; on the other hand, moral excellence or virtue : and these two may henceforth be separately discussed.



# ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ Ι.

ΠΑΣΑ τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξις τε καὶ πραιτερισις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ

I. The opening of Aristotle's *Ethics* might be paralleled with that of his *Metaphysics*—πάντες ἀνθρώποι τοῦ εἰδήναι δρέγονται φύσει. As there it is first said that 'all by a natural instinct desire knowledge,' and then Aristotle proceeds to distinguish among the various kinds of knowledge a supreme kind, which is Philosophy or Metaphysics; so here he says that every human impulse is prompted by the desire of some good; or is, in other words, a means to some end, and among ends there is one supreme end, which is never a means, the object of politics—the chief good, or human happiness. The beginning of the *Politics* is also very similar. All actions are done for the sake of what is thought to be good. Therefore all societies aim at some good, and that society which includes all others aims at the highest good. See Essay I. p. 22.  
I πᾶσα τέχνη—δοκεῖ] 'Every art and every science, and so, too, each act and purpose, seems to aim at some good,' i.e. 'every exercise of the human powers.' The enumeration here given answers to the division of the mind (*Eth.* vi. ii.) into speculative, productive, and practical. *Μέθοδος* is literally 'way' or 'road' to know-

ledge, i.e. a research or inquiry. The metaphor still appears in such places as Plato's *Republic*, VII. p. 533 c, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτη πορεύεται. *Phaedrus*, 269 D; οὐχ ἡ *Tisias*—πορεύεται δοκεῖ μοι φαίνεσθαι ἡ μέθοδος. It is farther used in the sense of a regular or scientific method, and it stands here, as elsewhere (*Eth.* I. ii. 9, *Poet.* xix. 2, *Phys.* I. i. 1), for science itself. The word is well defined by Simplicius (in *Arist. Phys.* fol. 4), ἡ μετὰ δόσον τινὸς εὐτάκτου πρόσοδος ἐπὶ τῷ γνωστόν. *Πρᾶξις* and *πραιτερισις*, action and purpose, go to make up one conception, that of 'moral action.' They are related as language to thought, the outer to the inner. *Δοκεῖ* does not imply any doubt in the assertion. Sometimes it denotes the opinion of others, not of Aristotle himself (*Eth.* I. iii. 2, X. viii. 13, where see note), but sometimes it is a part of style, to avoid the appearance of dogmatism. With this use of *δοκεῖ* may be compared that of similar words, such as *ἴσως*, 'no doubt,' (IV. viii. 9) *ἔδει δ' ίσως καὶ σκώπτειν* (κωλύειν); *σχεδὸν*, 'nearly,' 'something like,' (I. viii. 4) *σχεδὸν γάρ εὑρίσκει τις εἰρηγναί καὶ εὐτραξταί*; *μαλιστα*, 'upon the whole,' (I. v. 2) *τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι μαλιστα οἱ*

2 καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τάγαθόν, οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται. διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν. τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτὸς ἔργα τινά. ὁν δ' εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίω πέφυκε τῶν ἐνέργειῶν 3 τὰ ἔργα. πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἰατρικῆς μὲν γάρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ πλοίου, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. ὅσαι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπὸ μίαν

*προδόχοντες (βίοι).* Such phrases arise partly from Attic usage, partly from the genius of Aristotle's philosophy. A similar hesitation or moderation of statement is observable in his use of interrogations; e.g. (i. vi. 12 δλλ' ἀρδ γε τῷ ἀφ' ἐνὸς εἶναι. In such questions *πότερον* is very frequent, (i. vii. 11) Πότερον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἔστιν ἔργα τὰ καὶ πρᾶξεις; and ή, which generally introduces the opinion to be preferred, i.e. ή καθάπερ ὄφθαλμοῦ—οὗτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θεῖη τις ἀν ἔργον τι; also ή frequently stands by itself, (i. vii. 1) τι οὖν ἐκάστης τάγαθόν; ή οὐ χάρις τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται;

διὸ καλῶς—ἐφίεται] 'Hence people have well defined the good to be, that at which all things aim.' This same definition is mentioned in the *Rhetoric*, i. vi. 2, i. vii. 3. It is of uncertain authorship. At first sight its introduction here appears parenthetical; but rather it constitutes a sententious way of opening the subject. 'All we do aims at good, the very idea of good is that which is aimed at. But among ends (or aims) there is a subordination of one to the other.'

2 τὰ μὲν γάρ—ἔργα των] 'For sometimes the end coexists in the exercise of a faculty for its own sake, at other times in certain external results beyond this.' Strictly, according to the Aristotelian system, to speak of

an 'Ενέργεια not containing its end in itself is a contradiction in terms. But in a subordinate and relative sense, just as some τέλη are also means to ulterior ends, so some functions may be called ἐνέργειαι, which are also mere γενέσεις of external results: cf. *Metaphysics*, x. ix. 11, and see *Essay IV.* p. 236.

4 ὅσαι δ' εἰσὶ—διάκεται] 'Now all such operations as fall under some one faculty, as under riding, bridle-making, and all other manufactures of the instruments of riding; while this again, and every warlike operation, falls under strategy; and so (δή) in the same way, other operations under some different faculty—in all, I say (δέ), the ends of the master faculties are more excellent than all those that are subordinate, for, for the sake of the former, the latter are sought after.' This sentence exhibits many of the peculiarities of Aristotle—(1) the indefiniteness of *ὅσαι*. Cf. a similar indefiniteness as to the substantive referred to in *τεπι αὐτῆς* (*Eth.* i. viii. 1). It would be most natural to supply to the first *ὅσαι* the word *πρᾶξεις*, to the second the word *τέχναι*. But *τέχναι* and *πρᾶξεις* are not here sharply distinguished, as appears by the words *τολεμικὴ πρᾶξεις*. (2) *Διάκεται* is here used in a sense from which the modern application of the word 'faculty' to law and medicine, &c., has been de-

τινὰ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἴππικην ἡ χαλινοποική καὶ δσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἴππικῶν ὁργάνων εἰσὶν· αὐτῇ δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικήν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἄλλαι ὑφ' ἔτέρας. ἐν ἀπάσαις δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων ἐστὶν αἱρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά· τούτων γὰρ χάριν κάκεῖνα διώκεται. διαφέρει δὲ οὐδὲν 5 τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἡ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν.

Εἰ δὴ τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὁ δι' αὐτὸν βουλόμεθα, 2 τἄλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἔτερον αἱρούμεθα

rived, through the term *facultas*, which was used by the Schoolmen. This belongs to the associations connected with *δύναμις* in Aristotle's metaphysical system. The use of this word for 'an art' appears, though less distinctly, in Plato. Aristotle, opposing *δύναμις* to *ἐνέργεια*, treats the arts as a class of *δυνάμεις*, i.e. certain capabilities of action; though they differed from other *δυνάμεις* in being themselves not only developed into *ἐνέργειας*, but also formed out of them; cf. *Eth.* II. i. 4, *Metaph.* VIII. v. 1, and see *Essay* IV. p. 239. (3) δέ in *ἐνδιδούσαις* δέ is used to mark the apodosis. This is common in the *Ethics*, cf. *Eth.* VII. iv. 5, x. ix. 11. Looking to the protasis δσαι, we must also say that the sentence is an anacoluthon. The whole style might be called a *σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ σημαντόνεσσον*. (4) The adjective *ἀρχιτεκτονικός*, as applied to the 'hierarchy' of the sciences, is not found in writers before Aristotle. The metaphor implied by it may have been suggested by Plato; cf. *Politicus*, p. 259 ε: *καὶ γὰρ ἀρχιτέκτων γε πᾶς ὅφεις αὐτὸς ἐργατικός, ἄλλα ἐργατῶν ἀρχῶν*. The architect conceives the design, the labourers carry out the details: the former is concerned with the end, the latter with the means. In like manner the higher

arts and sciences subject to themselves the lower; cf. *Eth.* I. ii. 7, VI. viii. 2.

5 διαφέρει δὲ—*ἐπιστημῶν*] 'But it makes no difference (to our argument) whether the development of faculties be in itself the end of the different actions, or something beyond this again, as in the case of the arts above mentioned,' i.e. the principle of subordination in the scale of means and ends will not be affected by the fact that *ἐνέργειαι* are ends as well as *ἔργα*. In taking a walk, the end is walking for its own sake, i.e. an *ἐνέργεια*. In house-building, the end is the house, an external result, or *ἔργον*. But walking may again be viewed as subordinate to some other end, e.g. health or life, just as the house is.

*ἐπιστημῶν*] When speaking strictly (*Eth.* III. iii. 9), and in his later terminology, as represented by Eudemus (*Eth.* VI. iii. 1), Aristotle distinguishes between *ἐπιστήμη* and *τέχνη*. But he frequently uses the former indiscriminately with the latter (cf. *Eth.* I. vi. 15), as also Plato has done, cf. *Philebus*, p. 57 ε, and as 'science' is now in common language often used for 'art.'

II. i. *Εἰ δὴ—ἀρθρον*] 'If then there is some end in the sphere of action which we wish for its own sake,

(πρόειστι γάρ οὗτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστ' εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὅρεξιν), δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἀν εἴη τάγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. ἀρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ηγεμονίας αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ρόπτην, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες, 3 μᾶλλον ἀν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ δὲ οὕτω, πειρατέον

while we wish all other things for the sake of this—and if we do not choose all things merely as means to something beyond (since in that case the process will be infinite, so that our desire will be empty and useless), it is plain that this end in the sphere of action must be the chief good and the best.' This is the argument upon which the whole system of the *Ethics* is based. But from the undogmatic way in which it is expressed it is rendered at first sight obscure. It might be put thus: We have desires, these cannot be in vain: hence we cannot always be desiring means. There must be some end which is never a means, and which constitutes the true object of desire.

*τέλος τῶν πρακτῶν*] Aristotle is not inquiring after a metaphysical and transcendental good, like the Platonic Idea, but after a good attainable in action. *τὰ πράκτα* implies the whole class and sphere of means and ends which fall under the control of human will. A sort of scholium upon this term is to be found in the *Eudemian Ethics*, I. vii. 4:

*πρέβεσι γάρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον*] The opposite and correlative terms *ἴεται εἰς ἄπειρον* and *ἴστασθαι* are used with various nominatives in Aristotle, and sometimes, as here, impersonally. Cf. *Eth.* 4, vii. 7; *εἰς ἄπειρον πρέβεσιν*. VI. viii. 9, *στρατεῖαι γάρ κάκεῖ*.

*ὅτε εἴναι κερῆρι κ.τ.λ.*] Aristotle applies here to the human mind and to the human desires his principle of universal import, *οὐδέποτε ἀτελές ποιεῖται*

*φύσις*. As everything in nature has its proper end, so too has human desire. There must therefore be some absolute good, desirable for its own sake, towards which our life ought to be directed.

2 *ἀρ' οὖν—δέοντος*] 'Must it not be, then, that for the conduct of life the knowledge of the good is of weighty influence, and that, like archers who have a mark to aim at, we shall be more likely to attain the requisite?' Cf. *Rhet.* I. v. 1: *Σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ίδιᾳ ἐκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι σκοπὸι τίς ἔστιν, οὐ στοχαζόμενοι καὶ αἱροῦνται καὶ φεύγοντιν.*

*μᾶλλον*] i.e. 'more than if we lived at haphazard without knowledge of the true end to be aimed at.' The metaphor of the archers comes from Plato: cf. *Repub.* p. 519 B; *ἀνάγκη μήτε τοὺς ἀκαίδευτους ἴκανος ἀν ποτε πόλιν ἐπιτροπεύεισαι, μήτε τοὺς ἐν παιδείᾳ ἑωμένους διατρίψειν διὰ τέλοντος, τοὺς μὲν δτι σκοπὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐκ ἔχοντις ἔνα, οὐ στοχαζόμενους δεῖ ἀπαρταῖ πράττειν ή διὰ πράττωσιν ίδιᾳ τε καὶ θημοσιᾳ, τοὺς δὲ, κ.τ.λ.*

*οὐδὲ δέοντος*] Not 'our duty' in the modern sense, this conception not having been as yet developed, but more generally 'what we ought to do' from any motive. The word *δέον* was a received term with reference to moral subjects. Cf. Plato's *Repub.* p. 336 D, where Thrasymachus, calling upon Socrates to define Justice, says, 'Mind you don't tell me that it is the *δέον*, or the *ώφελον*, or the *λιτότελον*, or the *κερδαλέον*, or the *ξυνάρρεον*.' Cf. also *Charmides*, p. 164 B. Xen.

τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸν τί ποτ' ἔστι καὶ τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἡ δυνάμεων. δόξειε δὲ ἀν τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς· τοιαύτη δὲ η πολιτικὴ φαίνεται. 5

*Memorab.* I. ii. 22. But the exact import of the term was not fixed. Aristotle in the *Topics*, II. iii. 4, mentions among the πολλαχώς λεγόμενα, Οἷον εἰ τὸ δέον ἔστι τὸ συμφέρον η τὸ καλόν.

3 εἰ δὲ οὕτω—δυνάμεων] ‘But if this be the case, we must endeavour to comprehend, in outline at all events, what it is, and which of the sciences or faculties it belongs to.’ Aristotle, proceeding tentatively to work, does not ask, ‘What science treats of the supreme end?’—but ‘To what science or art does its production belong?’ He seems at first encumbered with Platonic associations—that virtue is a science—that there is an art of life, &c. Just as in a Platonic dialogue we might have found this train of questions—‘What is the science of healing called?’—Medicine. ‘What is the science of counting called?’—Arithmetic. ‘What then is the science of the welfare of states and individuals called?’—Politics. So here Aristotle says, ‘Every art has an end. There is some supreme end: of what art then is it the end?’ Accordingly he starts with the impression that the present treatise is an art rather than a science (cf. *Eth.* I. iii. 6, II. ii. 1). He speaks of his present method aiming at the chief good. (I. iii. 1) Ή μέθοδον μέθοδος τούτων ἔφελεται, πολετική τις οὖσα. Cf. I. iv. 1, τί ἔστιν οὐ λέγομεν τὴν πολετικήν ἔφελεται. Afterwards (*Eth.* x. ix. 1) he makes an imperfect separation between the scientific theory of virtue and the practical attainment of it.

4 δόξειε δὲ ἀν — ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς] ‘Now it would seem to be the end of

that which is the most absolute, and most of a master science.’ The word κυριωτάτης seems used somewhat indefinitely. Two trains of association are mixed up in it. κύριος means (1) what is authoritative, what determines; cf. *Eth.* I. x. 9, κύριαι εὐδαιμονίας. (2) What has validity, especially the validity of custom, what is established. Cf. *Poet.* xxi. 5, 6, and *Rhetor.* III. ii. 2, where κύριον δνομα stands for ‘a word in its proper sense,’ opposed to all uncommon turns and applications. In *Eth.* vi. xiii. 1, κυρία ἀρετή is ‘virtue in the full sense of the term,’ opposed to φυσική ἀρετή, ‘a virtuous disposition.’ *Eth.* VII. iii. 14, τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης, ‘that which might properly be called science.’ Hence, τὸ κύριον comes to mean that which is striking, characteristic, and essential in a conception. Cf. *Eth.* I. vii. 13, κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. IX. ix. 7, τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῷ ἐνεργείᾳ. In the passage above, κυριωτάτης seems partly to mean ‘most authoritative’ or ‘absolute,’ partly ‘that which is most absolutely a science.’

5 τοιαύτη δὲ η πολιτικὴ φαίνεται] Plato generally represents virtue as a science, and politics as inseparable from dialectic or metaphysics. In the *Zethydemus*, however (p. 291 b), he describes politics as the supreme art of terms from which the present passage is obviously borrowed. See *Essay* III. p. 191. Aristotle says that all the other arts and faculties, however dignified, are subordinate to this (ὑπὸ ταῦτην) and are its instruments (χρωμένης ταῦτης τὰς λοιπὰς). Their very existence depends on the flat of

6 τίνας γάρ εἶναι χρεῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ ποίας ἔκάστους μανθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνος, αὕτη διατάσσει. ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην 7 οὐσας, οἷον στρατηγικήν, οἰκονομικήν, ῥητορικήν. χρωμένης δὲ ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ νομοθετούσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι, τὸ ταύτης τέλος περιέχοι ἀν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἀν 8 εἴη τὸνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. εἰ γάρ καὶ ταύτον ἔστιν ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει, μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελεώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν· ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὺρ καὶ ἐνὶ μόνῳ, 9 κύλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτική τις οὖσα.

politics (*τίνας εἶναι χρεῶν διατάσσει*). Hence, as all others are means to it, the end of politics must embrace the ends of all the other arts. Politics will be the art whose end is the chief human good.

8 εἰ γάρ καὶ ταύτον—πόλεσιν] 'For even supposing the chief good to be identical for an individual and a state, that of the state appears at all events something greater and more absolute (*τελεώτερον*) both to attain and to preserve. Even for an individual by himself it is indeed something one might well embrace with gladness, but for a nation and for states it is something more beautiful and divine.' In Aristotle's *Politics* (vii. iii. 8) the chief good, or end-in-itself, for a state is portrayed as consisting in the development and play of speculative thought, all fit conditions and means thereto being implied and presupposed. To this high, but indefinite, ideal, the term *θεῖον* would be naturally applied. Like the word 'divine' with us, *θεῖος* is used by Aristotle to express the highest kind of admiration, tinctured with a feeling of enthusiastic joy, but also with some degree of vagueness. It is specially appropriated by him to the various

manifestations of Reason (*νοῦς*) in the universe: thus (1) to the substance of the Heavens, *De Caelo*, i. ii. 9, οὐσία σώματος θειοτέρα καὶ προτέρα τούτων ἀκάντων (see *Essay V.* p. 273), (2) to the Heavenly Bodies, *Ib.* ii. xii. 13, τὸν σωμάτων τῶν θεῶν, (3) to the intellect of man, *De Part. An.* iv. x. 8, διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι θεῖαν· Ἐργον δὲ τοῦ θειοτάτου τὸ γοῦν καὶ φρονεῖν, (4) to the life of contemplation, *Eth.* x. vii. 8, οὐ γάρ γε ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν οὔτω βιώσεται, δλλ' γε θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, (5) to happiness in general, *Eth.* i. ix. 3, φαίνεται τῶν θειοτάτων εἶναι, (6) to superhuman virtue, consisting in unalloyed reason. *Eth.* vii. i. 1, ἡρῷϊκήν τινα (*ἀρετήν*) καὶ θεῖαν, (7) to the instinct of bees, *De Gen. An.* iii. x. 27, θεῖον τι (*ἔχει*) τὸ γένος τὸ τῶν μελισσῶν.

9 πολιτική τις οὖσα] Aristotle has not yet arrived at the conception of Ethics as a separate science. He still, following Plato, identifies it with politics, or makes it 'a kind of politics.' By his treatment, however, of the questions of Ethics he prepared the way for its separation from politics, which indeed was partly made by Eudemus, and afterwards entirely by the Stoics.

Δέγοιτο δ' ἀν ἴκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὅλην δια- 3  
σαφηθείη· τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὄμοιώς ἐν ἄπασι τοῖς λόγοις  
ἐπιζητέον ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις· τὸ δὲ καλὸν 2  
καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, τοσαύτην ἔχει  
διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει

III. In connection with every science, Aristotle never fails to pay attention to the logic of science,—to ask what the proper method of the science ought to be. In Ethics, where he is entirely feeling his way, without predecessors to guide him, it was especially natural that he should make a pause to inquire what is the proper form and logical character of the science on which he is entering. Accordingly we find three digressions relative to the logic of Ethics in this first book. (1) In the present chapter he decides that it cannot be an exact science. (2) Chapter 4th, §§ 5-7, he declares, though not dogmatically, that it must be rather inductive than based on *a priori* principles. (3) In chapter 7th, §§ 17-21, not quite consistently with the last assertion, he dwells upon the importance, for the future development of the science, of the principle (*δρχή*) which he has evolved in his definition of the chief good; which principle is henceforth to be applied to the elucidation of all difficulties in detail.

ι λέγοιτο δ' ἀν ἴκανῶς—δημιουργουμένοις] ‘Now we must be satisfied with the statement of our science, if its distinctness be in proportion to the nature of the subject-matter. For exactness is not to be expected equally in all reasonings, any more than in all the productions of art.’ Matter as opposed to form was called by Aristotle *ὕλη*, or *τὸ ὑποκείμενον*, that which underlies the form. Cf. *Pol.* i. viii. 2: Λέγω δὲ ὕλην τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐξ οὗ τι

ἀποτελεῖται ἔργον, οἷον ὑφεντη μὲν ἔρια, ἀνδριαντοποιῷ δὲ χαλκόν. The matter of a science, i.e. the facts or conceptions with which it deals, must determine its method or form, according as they admit of being stated with more or less *ἀκρίβεια*. It is one of the first questions about a science, how much *ἀκρίβεια* it admits: cf. *De Anima*, i. i. 1; *Metaphys.* & *Ἠλαττον*, iii. 2, &c. On the different shades of meaning implied in the word *ἀκρίβεια*, see below, i. vii. 18, note. It combines the notions of mathematical exactness, metaphysical subtlety, minuteness of detail, and definiteness of assertion. Also as applied to the arts (*ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις*) it denotes finish or delicacy.

2 τὰ δὲ καλὰ—μῆ] ‘But things beautiful and just, about which the political science treats, exhibit so great a diversity and fluctuation that they are thought to exist by convention only, and not by nature.’ Nothing can be more characteristic of Greek morality than these words, ‘the beautiful’ and ‘the just,’ applied to sum up all that we should call ‘the right.’ The former is the more enthusiastic term, and is connected with all the artistic feelings of the Greeks. In the present passage we may notice two indications of the immaturity of Aristotle’s ethical system. (1) He speaks of *Politics* as the science treating of right action. (2) He seems to accept for the moment, as at all events worth considering, the scepticism of the Sophists, and to start accordingly with an empirical

3 δὲ μή. τοιαύτην δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τάγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν. ἦδη γάρ τινες 4 ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἔτεροι δὲ δί' ἀνδρείαν. ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ τάληθὲς ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιάτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεῶν ἔκαστον τῶν λεγομένων πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τοσούτον τάκριβὲς

point of view about moral distinctions, which in reality his subsequent procedure entirely sets aside.—*νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή*. On the position of this opinion in the history of philosophy, see *Essay II.* pp. 150–151.

3 τοιαύτην δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τάγαθδ] ‘And things good also exhibit a similar sort of fluctuation.’ The two leading questions of morals may be said to be, What is right? and What is good? The ancient Ethics rather tend to absorb the former into the latter; the modern systems *vice versa*. Aristotle here, from his present empirical ground, says there is an equal uncertainty about things good as about things right. Cf. *Eth.* v. i. 9; *Xen. Mem.* iv. ii. 33.

4, 5 ἀγαπητὸν οὖν—*πεπαιδευμένος*] ‘We must be content then, while speaking on such subjects, and with such premises, that the truth should be set forth roughly and in outline, and, as we are reasoning about and from things which only amount to generalities, that our conclusions should be of the same kind also. In the same way must each particular statement be received. The man of cultivation will in each kind of subject demand exactness so far as the nature of the thing permits: for it appears equally absurd to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and

to demand demonstration from an orator. Every one judges well of things which he knows, and of these he is a good critic. In particular subjects then the man of particular cultivation will judge, and in general the man of general cultivation.’

*περὶ τοιούτ. καὶ ἐκ τοιούτ.]* A common formula in Aristotle. Cf. *Rhetor.* II. i. 1.

*γένος* is with Aristotle the object of a single science: *μία ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν ἡ ἐνδεικνύεται γένος* (*Anal. Post.* I. xxviii.). Cf. the whole of *Met.* II. iii.

*πεπαιδευμένοι*] In his preliminary inquiries as to the right method of different sciences, Aristotle elsewhere adds that it will be the office of *παιδεῖα*, or the *πεπαιδευμένος*, to arbitrate on the question. *Παιδεῖα* has of course in these places a restricted sense. It does not imply the cultivation of the whole man, but a certain special cultivation in relation to science, in short much the same state of acquirement as in modern times is expressed by the name *connoisseur*. The chief passage on this subject occurs *De Partibus Animalium*. I. i. 1: *περὶ παιδείας θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον, ὅμοιας ταπεινοτέραν τε καὶ τιμωτέραν, δύο φαινονται τρόποι τῆς ἔξεως εἶναι, ὃν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δ' οὐον παιδεῖαν τινά*. Then follow the characteristics of the *πεπαιδευμένος*, which are said to be *κρύψις*

ἐπίζητεῖν καθ' ἔκαστον γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ρήτορικὸν ἀποδέξεις ἀπαιτεῖν. ἔκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἢ γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἔστιν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. καθ' ἔκαστον ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, ἀπλῶς δ' ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος. διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οὐκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος. ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὁν ματαίως 6

εὐστόχως τι καλῶς ή μὴ καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν δ λέγων. Thus the chief function of this ‘cultivation’ is acute criticism. It is critical as opposed to science, which is constructive. It will have certain standards (*ὅρους*) by reference to which it will form a judgment on the shape and manner of the propositions presented, quite independently of their truth and falsehood (ἀποδέξεται τὸν τρόπον τῶν δεικνυμένων χωρὶς τοῦ πῶς ἔχει τἀληθές, εἴτε οὔτως εἴτε δὲλλως). This, which was a current popular conception of *παιδεία*, Aristotle not only accepts as related to all matters of science (τὸν δὲλλως πεπαιδευμένον—περὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν κριτικὸν τινα νομίζομεν), but also he adds a refinement on his own part by constituting a special *παιδεία* in relation to each separate science (περὶ τίος φύσεως ἀφωρισμένης· εἰη γὰρ ἦν τις ἔτερος περὶ ἐν μόριον). The idea of the πεπαιδευμένος as a judge of method is to be found in Plato. Cf. *Timaeus*, p. 53 c: ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐπει μετέχετε τῶν κατὰ παιδευσιν ὀδῶν, δι' ὧν ἐνδεικνυσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα ἀρδγκη, ξυνέψεσθε. In the *Euthyphron*, p. 135, a popular description of the philosopher is given, exactly answering to Aristotle's πεπαιδευμένος. Among the qualifications is mentioned ὡς εἰκός ἄνδρα ἑλεύθερὸν τε καὶ πεπαιδευμένον, ἀπακολουθήσα τε τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ οἷον τε εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν παρόντων. Socrates

on this remarks, that it makes the philosopher like a Pentathlos,—*πακρός τις*, or second-best in all specialties.—We see in the present passage Aristotle's distinction of περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδ. from καθ' ἔκαστον πεπαιδ. The latter term shows that not only is a general knowledge of logic (ἀναλυτική) requisite to constitute *παιδεία* (cf. *Metaph. I. min. iii. I, III. iii. 5, III. iv. 2*); but also that some acquaintance with the special subject is requisite for the connoisseur of that subject. Cf. *Pol. III. xi. 11*: 'Ιατρὸς δ' δ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ δ ἀρχιτεκτονὸς καὶ τρίτος δ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην· εἰοι γὰρ τινες τοιοῦτοι καὶ περὶ πάσας ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰς τέχνας, ἀποδίδομεν δὲ τὸ κρίνειν οὐδὲν θητὸν τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ή τοῖς εἰδόσιν. Cf. *Eth. Eud. I. vi. 6*.

μαθηματικοῦ, κ.τ.λ.] Taken from Plato, cf. *Theatetus*, p. 162 ε: εἰ ἴολοις Θεόδωρος η ἀλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν (τῷ εἰκότι) χρώμενος γεωμετρεῖν, δέξοι οὐδὲν ἐθελόντων ἀν εἴη. σκοπεύετε οὖν σύ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογία τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ τούτων λεγομένους λόγους. \*

5 διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς, κ.τ.λ.] From a want of sufficient knowledge of the special subjects to be treated, the youth is no fit to be a hearer, i.e. (1) critic, (2) student of political science.

6 ἔτι δὲ—πρᾶξις] 'Nay, moreover, as he is given to follow his passions, he will hear uselessly and without

ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἔστιν οὐ γνῶσις  
7 ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις. διαφέρει δὲ οὐθὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ  
ἡθος νεαρός· οὐ γάρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἡ Ἑλλειψις, ἀλλὰ  
διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἔκαστα. τοῖς γάρ  
τοιούτοις ἀνόητος ἡ γνῶσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρα-  
τέσιν· τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὄρεξεis ποιουμένοις καὶ  
8 πράττουσι πολυωφελὲς ἀν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι. καὶ  
περὶ μὲν ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τί προτιθέ-  
μεθα, πεφροιμάσθω τοσαῦτα.

4 Δέγωμεν δὲ ἀναλαβόντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνῶσις καὶ  
προαιρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ὄρεγεται, τί ἔστιν οὐ λέγομεν  
τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον  
2 τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν. ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν

profit, since the end (of our science) is not knowledge but action.' Aristotle goes off into a digression here, and adds that the youth will not only be an incompetent, but also an unprofitable student, on account of a moral disqualification in the weakness of his will. In saying of Politics that 'its end is action,' we must not suppose that Aristotle meant to imply that it was 'practical' in the modern sense, i.e. hortatory, as opposed to philosophical. As before, he is viewing Politics as a sort of supreme art. Cf. *Eth.* II. ii. 1. Afterwards, *Pol.* III. viii. 1, he takes quite a different attitude; he excuses himself for prolixity by saying τῷ δὲ περὶ ἔκαστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκεῖόν ἔστι τὸ μὴ παρορᾶν μηδὲ τι καταλείπειν.

*ματαίως δικούσεται]* Shakspeare had seen the present passage quoted somewhere, and by a remarkable anachronism he puts it into the mouth of Hector. Cf. *Troilus and Cressida* act II. sc. 2.

'Paris and Troilus, you have both said well:  
And on the cause and question now  
in hand

Have glazed—but superficially; not  
much  
Unlike young men, whom Aristotle  
thought  
Unfit to hear moral philosophy.'

7 οὐ γάρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἡ Ἑλλειψις]  
'For the deficiency is not caused by time.' Cf. Thucyd. I. 141, οὐ γάρ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀμελείαν οὔται βλάψειν. Arnold compares παρὰ in this sense with the English vulgarism 'all along of.' Cf. *Eth.* III. v. 19, τι καὶ παρ' αὐτόν.

IV. 1 Returning from a parenthetical discussion of method, Aristotle takes up (λέγωμεν δὲ ἀναλαβόντες) the original question, 'What is it that politics aim at, what is the highest practical good?' The original four terms τέχνη, μέθοδος, πρᾶξις, προαιρεσις, are here reduced to two, *μέθοδος* and *προαιρεσις*. In the latter is implied. And τέχνη is omitted, falling under the practical powers in man (cf. *Eth.* VI. ii. 5). Thus human nature, which was before classified as productive, scientific, and moral, is here summed up as moral and intellectual.

πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται. τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν, τὸ δὲ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταύτην ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῦ. περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἔστιν, ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ ὅμοιως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν 3 ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμήν, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλο, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἔτερον νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ πλοῦτον· συνειδότες δὲ ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας

2 There is a verbal agreement, but under this an essential difference, between men as to their opinion of the chief good. All use the same word, ‘happiness.’ They go a step beyond this together, and say it consists in ‘living-well and doing-well.’ Any further attempt at definition shows the discrepancy of their notions. On theories of the chief good, see Essay II. pp. 102–103.

οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες] ‘The many and the refined.’ This classifies the whole body of thinkers. The many are opposed to the philosophers (*οἱ σοφοί*) and to the educated, the refined, the few. This opposition has always existed. It appears most strongly in the philosophic isolation of Heraclitus the ὀχλολοιδόρος. It is a natural distinction, since philosophical views are not inborn, but acquired, and imply education, leisure, development. That both classes, however, are in a different way possessed of the truth (wholly or partially), Aristotle would always acknowledge. Cf. *Eth.* vi. ii. 7.

*εὖ παρεῖν* is an ambiguous phrase. In its usual acceptation it would rather mean ‘faring-well’ than ‘acting-well.’ It occurs in the *Gorgias* of Plato, p. 507 c, in a way which seems to contain the transition between these two ideas — πολλὴ διάγκη, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, τὸ

σώφρονα, ὥσπερ διῆλθομεν, θίκαιον δυτα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ δσιον ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρα εἶναι τελέως, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ κακῶς πράττειν ἢ ἀν πράττη, τὸν δὲ εὐδαιμονα εἶνα, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα μακάρην τε καὶ εὐδαιμονα εἶνα, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα μᾶθιον. Aristotle was at no pains to solve the ambiguity. Cf. *Eth.* vi. ii. 5.

3 οἱ μὲν γὰρ—ἀγαθά] ‘For the one class (i.e. the many) specify something palpable and tangible, as, for instance, pleasure, or wealth, or honour; in short, different of them give different accounts, and often the same individual gives an answer at variance with himself, for when he has fallen sick he calls it health, but being poor wealth; and when people are conscious of ignorance they look up with admiration to those who say something fine and beyond their own powers. On the other hand certain (philosophers) have thought that beyond all these manifold goods there is some one absolute good, which is the cause to these of their being good.’ ‘Ενιοι δὲ corresponds to οἱ μὲν γάρ. ‘Palpable and tangible’ are analogous though not identical metaphors with ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν.

συνειδότες, κ.τ.λ.] Consciousness of ignorance makes people fancy wisdom to be the chief good.—So the Paraphrast explains the passage.

θαυμάζουσιν. ἔνιοι δ' φοντό παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὸν ἄλλο τι καθ' αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τοῖσδε πᾶσιν αἴτιον ἐστι 4 τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθά. ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν τὰς δόξας ματαιότερον ἵστως ἐστίν, ἵκανὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολα- 5 ζούσας ἡ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. μὴ λανθανέτω δ' οἵμης ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· εὐ γὺρ καὶ Πλάτων ἡπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἔζητει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἡ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἡ ἀνάπαλιν. ἀρκτέον μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ

ἄλλο τι καθ' αὐτὸν εἶναι] This of course relates to Plato's theory of the Idea.

4 *ἵκανὸν δὲ—λόγον]* ‘But it is sufficient to examine the opinions most widely spread, or that seem to have some reason in them.’ A similar canon of authority is given, *Eth.* i. viii. 7.

*ἐπιπολαζόνσας]* ‘Lying on the top,’ ‘obvious.’ The original sense is found in *Hist. Anim.* viii. ii. 17: Πονοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀπόλλυνται πολλάκις (al χελώναι), δταν ἐπιπολάζονται ξηρανθώσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου· καταφέρεσθαι γάρ πάλιν οὐ δύνανται φαῦλως. Hence ἐπιπολάζω and ἐπιπλαίω come to mean ‘what lies on the surface,’ ‘is easily to be found.’ *Eth.* iv. viii. 4, *ἐπιπολάζοντος τοῦ γελοού*, ‘constantly turning up;’ and in the *Axiochus* which bears Plato's name, p. 369 D, ἐκ τῆς ἐπιπολαζόνσης τὰ νῦν λεσχηνεῖς. *Rhet.* iii. x. 4, *ἐπιπλαίαι γάρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα καὶ δημόδην δεῖ ξητήσαι.* *Eth. Eud.* iii. ii. 4, ἐστι δ' οὐ πάνυ γνώριμον τὸ πάθος οὐδὲ ἐπιπλαίαι. From this meaning to that of ‘superficial’ is but a slight transition. i. v. 4, *φαλνεῖται δ' ἐπιπολαύτερον εἶναι τοῦ ηγούμενου.*

5 From hence to the end of the chapter follows the second digression on the method of ethics. The question now is, whether the Science is to be inductive or deductive, whether the reasoning is to be ‘to principles,’ or

‘from principles.’ Aristotle gives a qualified decision in favour of the former of these alternatives.

εὐ γὺρ—ἀπλῶ] ‘For Plato rightly used to doubt and question whether the way was from principles or to principles, as, in the stadium, whether from the judges to the goal, or reversely. We must begin, at all events, with things known, and these are of two kinds; for some things are known relatively, and some things absolutely.’ There is no particular passage in the works of Plato which we can say is here referred to. That at the end of Book vi. of the *Republic* has a widely different scope. It does not compare the Inductive with the Deductive Method, but describes dialectic as a progress up the ladder of hypotheses to the idea of good, and a descent again without any help from the senses, by successive steps, which are ideas, and are connected with the idea of good. The use of the word Πλάτων here without the article shows that a personal reference to the philosopher is intended (see note on *Eth.* viii. iii. 3). The use of the imperfect ἡπόρει shows

‘that the reference is general; when Aristotle quotes from a particular passage in the *Laws* of Plato (*Eth.* ii. iii. 2), he says ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησί.

ταῦτα δὲ διττῶν· τὰ μὲν ἡμῶν, τὰ δὲ ἀπλῶ] This is Aristotle's favourite

διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γάρ ήμῖν τὰ δ' ἀπλῶς. οὐσὶ οὖν ήμῖν γε 6 ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ημῖν γνωρίμων. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἥχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἴκανῶς. ἀρχὴ γάρ τὸ δτί· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαί- 7 νοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεῖσει τοῦ διότι. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦ- τος η ἔχει η λάβοι ἀν ἀρχὰς ρᾳδίως. ω δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου·

οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,  
ἴσθλὸς δ' αὖ κακιῶντος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται.

division of knowledge, into things ‘relatively’ and things ‘absolutely’ known. The former implies the knowledge of experience, so far as it depends on the individual perception; it is therefore concrete (*ἔγγνητερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως, Post. Analyt. I. ii. 5*), while the latter is abstract (*τὰ πορρώτερα*), but being independent of individual experience, it is absolute (*τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα, Phys. Ause. I. i. 1*). We must observe that the distinction is not between things relatively and absolutely ‘knowable,’ but ‘known.’ The highest truths are actually in themselves better known than the phenomena of the senses. This is said independently of individual minds, and implies a reference to the impersonal and absolute reason; when Aristotle speaks of the universal being in itself more known than the particular, this is as much as to say it has a more real existence, just as Plato said that the Ideas were most *true*, while phenomena only partake of truth (*μετέχει τῆς ἀληθείας*).

6 Ιων—οὐδεὶς γνωρίμων] ‘Perhaps then we at all events must commence with what we know.’ Aristotle was probably unconscious of the sort of pun in this sentence. He merely asserts that we (i.e.) ethical philosophers must start from a basis of personal experience.

6-7 διὸ δεῖ—ρᾳδίως] ‘Therefore he should have been well trained in his

habits who is to study aright things beautiful and just, and in short the whole class of political subjects. For the fact is a principle, and if the fact be sufficiently apparent we need not ask the reason. Now he who has been well trained either has principles already, or can easily obtain them.’ He returns to the qualifications of the *ἀκροατῆς*. But here previous knowledge seems required in a different way from that mentioned above (I. iv. 5). The object is here not *κρίνειν τὰ λεγόμενα*, but *ἐπιστασθαι*.

ἀρχὴ γάρ τὸ δτί] The same is repeated below (I. vii. 10). The term *ἀρχή* appears to be used here ambiguously. It may either mean a starting-point or a universal principle. It seems to hover between those meanings, and to express that a moral fact has something at all events potentially of the nature of a universal. *Ἀρχὰς* (in § 7) is used definitely for universal principles.

οὐ δὲ ταῦθις] i.e. ο καλῶς τρυμένος. Such a one is in possession of moral facts, which either stand already in the light of principles, or can be at once recognised as such on the suggestion of the philosopher. In the former case he will resemble Hesiod’s *πανάριστος*, in the second case the *ἴσθλὸς δι εἰπόντι πίθηται*. If he can neither discover nor recognise principles he is *ἀρχῆς δικῆρος*.

οὗτος μὲν, κ.τ.λ.] Hesiod, Works

ὅς δέ κε μῆτ' αὐτὸς νοίη μῆτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων,  
ἴν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς ἀρχήιος ἀνήρ.

5 'Ημεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν, τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν· οἱ μέν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι τὴν ἡδονὴν, διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν. τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι μᾶλιστα οἱ προῦχοντες, ὁ τε νῦν εἰρημένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικὸς

and Days, 291-295. After *νοήσῃ* in the editions of Hesiod, in some MSS. of the *Ethics*, and in the *Paraphrase*, comes this verse, *φρασσόμενος τά κ' ἔπειτα καὶ ἐς τέλος γίνων ἀμεινων*. The whole passage succeeds one quoted by Plato, *Repub.* II. 364 c; *Leyg.* IV. 718 E; and by Xenophon, *Memorab.* II. i. 20, on the difficulty of virtue. The sentiment is borrowed by Livy, xxii. xxix. Cf. Cicero *pro Caelentio*, c. xxxi.; Soph. *Antig.* 720; Herod. VII. xvi.

V. 1 'Ημεῖς δὲ—ὑπολαμβάνειν] 'But to return from our digression,—since people seem with reason to form their conceptions of the chief good and of happiness from men's lives' (sc. 'let us examine these'). The *γὰρ* shows that the above clause explains the object of this chapter, which is, to examine men's opinions of the chief good, in the concrete, by a criticism of their lives. Men's lives exhibit practically their ideas of what is desirable.

ἐκ τῶν βίων] *βίος* is the external form, opposed to *ζωή*, the internal principle of life. Thus *βίος* is 'line of life,' 'profession,' 'career.' Cf. *Eth.* IX. ix. 9, x. vi. 8; Plato, *Repub.* X. 618 A, τὰ τῶν βίων παραδείγματα.

2 οἱ μὲν—θεωρητικός] 'Now the many and the vulgar (conceive) pleasure (the chief good), whence also they follow the life of sensuality. For the most prominent lives are on the whole (*μᾶλιστα*) three in number, that just mentioned, and the political life,

and thirdly the life of contemplation.' With *τὴν ἡδονὴν*, *ὑπολαμβάνοντι τάγαθόν* must be supplied, though it was used in a different way in the sentence before. The punctuation of Zell has been adopted. Bekker places no stop after *ὑπολαμβάνειν*, but ends the sentence after *ἡδονὴν*.

*ἀπολαυστικὸν*] a word not occurring in Plato, nor perhaps in any writer before Aristotle.

τρεῖς γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] In the celebrated metaphor attributed to Pythagoras (cf. Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* v. 3), the world is compared to an Olympic festival, in which some are come to contend, for honour; others to buy and sell, for profit; the best of all, as spectators, for contemplation. In Plato a similar division occurs. *Repub.* IX. 581 c: Αἱδα ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἀνθρῶπων λέγωμεν τὰ πρώτα τριτὰ γένη εἶναι, φιλόσοφος, φιλόνεικος, φιλοκερδές; κομιδῆ γε. This passage appears to be alluded to in the words at the opening of the chapter, οὐκ ἀλόγως ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν. The Paraphrast explains Aristotle's omission of the life of gain by saying that 'the seekers both of pleasure and honour are wont to amass money also.' Plato, on the contrary, says that pleasure and gain are merely two forms of concupiscence. The life of pleasure then was included under Plato's *γένος φιλοκερδές*. Aristotle's classification, which separates these, is much more true to nature. But the reason given by the Paraphrast

καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός. οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς 3 ἀνδραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκημάτων βίου προαιρούμενοι, τυγχάνοντι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἔξουσίαις ὄμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλῳ. οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτεῖ 4 κοὶ τιμήν· τοῦ γὰρ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος. φαίνεται δὲ ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἡ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, τάγαθὸν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα. ἔτι 5

is untenable. Aristotle omitted the *βίος χρηματιστής*, as he tells us presently; because, as not being purely voluntary (*βλαύς τις*), it does not exhibit a conception of happiness. Though it may have many adherents, these do not seek it spontaneously, as containing happiness in itself.

*οἱ μὲν οὖν—Σαρδαναπάλῳ]* The life of sensuality is that which the vulgar propose to themselves as their ideal of happiness. This they would pursue if they could obtain the ring of Gyges (Plato, *Repub.* II. p. 359 c). And though Aristotle repudiates it immediately as vile and abject, yet he places it on the scale (*τυγχάνοντι λόγου*) because great potentates (*πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἔξουσίαις*) show themselves of the same mind as Sardanapalus, thinking nought but sensuality 'worth a fillip,' while they have everything at their disposal, and are of all men most free to choose.

*τυγχάνοντι λόγου]* 'They obtain consideration,' i.e. both in the eyes of men in general, and also in the present treatise. Cf. *Eth.* x. vi. 3.

*Σαρδαναπάλῳ]* Cicero, in *Tusc. Disp.* v. xxxv. (cf. *De Finibus*, II. xiii.), mentions the epitaph of Sardanapalus as quoted by Aristotle, 'Ex quo Sardanapali, opulentissimi Syriae regis, error agnoscitur, qui incidi jussit in busto :

*Hec habeo, que edi, quæque exsatirata libido*

*Haec habeo; at illa jacent multa et præclara relicta.*

Quid aliud, ait Aristoteles, in bovis, non in regis sepulchro inscriberes? No such passage is to be found in any of the extant works of Aristotle.

*οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες—τέλος]* 'But the refined and active conceive honour to be the chief good; for this may be said to be (*σχεδὸν*) the end of the political life.' οἱ δὲ answers to *οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι*. The desire for honour is of course a higher instinct than the desire for pleasure. It is 'the last infirmity of noble minds.' Honour is the price paid for political service, the garland of the magistrate and the statesman. Cf. *Eth.* v. vi. 7 : *μεθόδος δρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας.*

*φάίνεται δὲ—μαντευόμεθα]* 'But it appears too superficial for that which we are in search of, for it seems to rest more with the honourer than the honoured; whereas we have a presentiment that the chief good must be one's own, and not in the power of others to take away.' Honour is evidently a precarious advantage depending on others. No labours or merits could prevent its being withheld by an ungrateful or unappreciating age. • •

*μαντευόμεθα]* A phrase worthy of attention. It occurs *Eth.* vi. xiii. 4 : *τοκαστι δὴ μαντεύεσθαι τως ἀπαρτεῖστι η τοιαύτῃ Εξις ἀρετὴ έστιν, η καὶ*

δ' ἔοίκασι τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν, ἵνα πιστεύωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ' οἷς γιγνώσκονται, καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῆ̄ δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατά δι γέ τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων. τάχα δε καὶ μᾶλλον ἀν τις τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι· φαίνεται δὲ ὑπελεστέρα καὶ αὐτῇ· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετήν, ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κακοπιθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτω ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἀν εὐδαιμονίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλις· ἰκανῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις

τὴν φρόνησιν. Cf. also *Rhet.* I. xiii. 2: Εστι γὰρ δι μαντεύονται τι πάντες φύσει κουνόν δίκαιον καὶ ἀδίκον. It is probably suggested by Plato, in whom both μαντεύεσθαι and ἀπομαντεύεσθαι frequently occur; e.g. *Crat.* 411 b: δοκῶ γέ μοι οὐ κακῶς μαντεύεσθαι δι καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐνεργῆσα, κ.τ.λ.

5-6 Moreover, honour is not only an insecure possession, but it seems not even desired for its own sake. It is desired by men as an evidence of their merits. Cf. *Eth.* viii. 2, where he says more at length that most men appear to seek honour κατὰ συμβεβηκός; the many seek it at the hands of those in power, as an earnest of future advantage; the good seek it from the excellent and from competent judges, as a confirmation of their own opinion about themselves. Thus the consciousness of virtue is the end, to which honour is the means. If virtue then be regarded as the end of the political life, will this answer to the chief good? No, it falls short of being a supreme end (*ἀπελεστέρα καὶ αὖτη*). For it might subsist in a life of absolute inaction, or of the heaviest misfortunes. And to call this happiness would be paradoxical.

ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετήν] It is the *ξειρά* ἀρετῆς, virtue regarded as a mere quality, which Aristotle repudiates.

Past merits, or the passive possession of qualities whose existence depends on the attestation of fame, cannot be thought to constitute the chief good. Very different from this is *ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν*, an actual life of virtue in the present.

εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων] 'Unless defending a paradox.' Θέσεις in demonstration are those unproved principles necessary to the existence of each separate science, just as *δξιώματα* are to the existence of reasoning in general (*Post. Analytics*, I. ii. 7), but θέσεις in dialectic (the kind here meant) are paradoxical positions resting on the authority of some great name; *Toxics*, I. xi. 4: θέσις δὲ ἐστιν ὑπόληψις παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν, οἷον, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστιν ἀντιλέγειν, καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀντισθένης, κ.τ.λ. The above paradox (*ὅτι αὐτόρρκης ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν*) was one the Stoics afterwards ventured to maintain. Cicero (*Paradoxa*, II.) defends it with rhetorical arguments —arguing the greatness of Regulus in his misfortunes, as though that were identical with his happiness.]

καὶ περὶ μὲν—αὐτῶν] 'But enough on this subject, for it has been sufficiently discussed even in popular philosophies.' Cf. *De Coto*, I. ix. 16; καὶ γὰρ καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις

εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν· τρίτος δ' ἔστιν ὁ θεωρητικός, περὶ τοῦ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις ποιησόμεθα. ὁ δὲ 8 χρηματιστῆς βίαιος τίς ἔστιν, καὶ ὁ πλούτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ

φιλοσοφήμασι περὶ τὰ θεῖα πολλάκις προφανεῖται τοῖς λόγοις ὅτι τὸ θεῖον ἀμετάβλητον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πᾶν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ἀκρότατον, on which Simplicius notes with regard to ἐγκυκλίοις—*ἄτινα καὶ ἔξωτερικὰ καλεῖν εἰώθε.* We may translate the passage, ‘As in the popular philosophical doctrines about things divine, it is often set forth in argument that the divine must necessarily be unchangeable, being the First and the Highest.’ (There seems to be something wrong in the Greek text. Perhaps we should read *δν* for *πᾶν*.) This evidently refers to no work of Aristotle's, but to the common unscientific discourses of men upon scientific subjects. So above, it is intimated that the insufficiency of virtue for happiness had been the subject of commonplace discussion. ‘*Ἐγκύκλιος*’ is used three times in the *Politics* of Aristotle to express ‘that which belongs to the daily round of life.’ *Pol.* I. vii. 2, *τὰ ἐγκύκλια διακονήματα*, ‘daily duties of servants;’ cf. II. v. 4, *τὰς διακονίας τὰς ἐγκυκλίους*; II. ix. 9, *χρησίμου δ'* οὐσῆς τῆς θρασύτητος πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων, ‘Boldness is of no use for every-day life.’ Hence the word comes to mean ‘commonplace,’ ‘popular,’ ‘unscientific.’ Two other explanations need only be mentioned to be rejected: (1) Eustatius thinks that a poem of Aristotle's is meant, ending with the same line with which it began—hence called *Encyclic*; (2) Julius Scaliger refers us to two books, ‘*Ἐγκύκλιον*, α', β', mentioned in the list of Diogenes Laertius, v. 26.

7 τρίτος δ'-ποιησόμεθα] ‘Third is the life of contemplation, about

which our investigation shall be made hereafter.’ This promise is fulfilled in Book x. We have here undoubtedly proof of an idea of method, of a constructive whole; see *Essay I.* p. 46.

8 δὲ χρηματιστῆς—χάριν] ‘But the life of gain is in a way compulsory, and it is plain that wealth is not that good we are in search of, for it is an instrument and means to something else.’ With *χρηματιστῆς* understand *βλος*. Lainbinus finds in two MSS. *χρηματιστῆς βλος ἀθίστης τις ἔστι*. This is evidently a gloss. *βλαος* is to be explained by comparing the parallel passage in *Eth. Eudem.* I. ix. 2: Διηρημένων δὲ τῶν βλων, καὶ τῶν μὲν [οὐδ'] ἀμφισβητούντων τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας, ἀλλ' ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων χάριν σπουδαζομένων, οἷον τῶν περὶ τὰς τέχνας τὰς φορτικὰς καὶ τῶν περὶ χρηματισμὸν καὶ τὰς βανανσούς—τῶν δὲ εἰς ἀγωγὴν εὐδαιμονικὴν ταττομένων τριῶν δυτῶν. ‘Now the lives of men being divided, and the one class laying no claim at all to this kind of good fortune, but being devoted to the obtaining the necessaries of life, as for instance those engaged with mean arts and lucre and sordid crafts; while the others, which are ranked severally as in the enjoyment of Happiness, are three in number.’ Here *οὐδ'* is restored by the absolutely certain conjecture of Bonitz. *βλαος τις* exactly corresponds with *οὐδ' ἀμφισβητούντων—σπουδαζομένων*, and so it is understood by the Paraphrast: *καὶ ἔστι βλαος*. Οὐδέ γάρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διώκει, οὐδὲ πάντα δοκεῖ διώκειν. Οὐθεν οὐ πολλοῖς ἔστιν ἀραστός· ὀλίγοι γάρ εἰλθυτο πάσῃς τῆς ἐν τῷ ποιησόμεθα τέλοις τὰ χρήματα ἔχειν. It is to be taken in a passive, not an

τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν.  
διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἀν ύπολύβοι·  
δι' αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑγαπάται. φαίνεται δὲ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι  
πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται.

6 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἵστως

active sense. It is the opposite of *ἐκούσιος*, meaning 'forced,' as in *Eth.* III. i. 3. It implies that no one would devote himself, at the outset, to money-making, except of necessity, 'parce qu'il faut vivre.' It assigns the reason for not discussing the life of gain. An additional and final reason is subjoined—that wealth is a mere means. Other and mistaken explanations of this place are (1) that of Eustратius. 'The usurer is violent,' *ὕπερ βίαν ἐνδείκνυται πρὸς τὸ κτήσασθαι*. The same has been adopted in the Latin translations, where 'violentus' is used. In Dante's *Inferno*, Canto XI., there is a complete commentary on this. Dante, who only knew Aristotle in the Latin, but studied him much, places usurers among 'the violent' in hell, and gives learned reasons for this classification. (2) That of Giphanius, who, rightly taking *βίος* to be the omitted word, interprets 'vita natura contraria.' It is true that in several places *βίας* is opposed to *κατὰ φύσιν*, and in such contexts means 'unnatural'; *Phys. Ause.* IV. viii. 4, v. vi. 6; *Politics*, I. iii. 4. But without such a context, it cannot simply stand for *παρὰ φύσιν*. The life of gain is truly not a life which one would naturally choose, but this does not amount to its being 'unnatural.'

*κατροι—καταβέβληνται*] The general meaning is: 'Although much has been said to show that each of these is the chief good, it has been unavailing.' But a doubt remains as to the precise force of *καταβέβληνται*. Does it mean, 'have been wasted'? or

simply, 'have been laid down, promulgated'? This latter rendering is confirmed by *De Mundo*, vi. 3: διὸ καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν εἰπεῖν τινὲς προήχθσαν, διὰ πάντα ταῦτα ἔστι θεῶν πλέα . . . τῷ μὲν θεὶ δυμάτει πρέποντα καταβαλλόμενοι λόγον, οὐ μὴν τῷ γε οὐσιᾳ. By a slight extension of meaning we have in the *Politics*, *καταβεβλημέναι μαθῆσεις* (VIII. ii. 6), *καταβεβλημένα παιδεύματα* (VIII. iii. 11), 'ordinary, usual branches of learning.'

VI. Aristotle now proceeds to examine, or rather to attack, the Platonic doctrine of the Idea of Good. To test the worth of this criticism belongs to a consideration of the entire relation of Aristotle to the views of Plato. See Essay III. The arguments used are as follows: (1) The Platonists allow that where there is an essential succession between two conceptions, these cannot be brought under a common idea—but there is such between different manifestations of good, e.g. the useful is an essentially later conception. (2) If all good be one, it ought to fall under only one category, whereas it can be predicated under all. (3) If it were one, it would be treated of by only one science. (4) The Idea is, after all, only a repetition of the phenomena; for with these it is really identical. (5) Even the most essential and absolute goods seem incapable of being reduced to one idea. (6) It is more natural to consider good an analogous word, and to assign to it a nominalistic, rather than a realistic, unity.

ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γνομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἶδη. δόξειε δὲ ἀνίστησις βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν, ἀλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὅντας ἀμφοῖν γάρ ὅντοι φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀληθείαν. οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες<sup>2</sup>

(7) But however this may be, it is plain that the idea can have no relation to practical life, and therefore it does not belong to ethics.

I τὸ δὲ καθόλου—ἀληθείαν] ‘But perhaps it were as well to consider the nature of the universal term (good) and to discuss in what sense it is predicated, although an inquiry of this kind is rendered disagreeable owing to those who are our friends having introduced their doctrine of Ideas. Still it is the best course, and even incumbent on us, where the safety of truth is concerned, to sacrifice even what is nearest to us, especially as we are philosophera. For where both are dear, friends and the truth, it is our duty to prefer the truth.’

τὸ καθόλου] As part of the logic of Ethics, Aristotle is proceeding to inquire into the nature of the universal term — Good — when he is stopped by the necessity of considering Plato's doctrine of the Idea of Good. His answer to the question is given in §§ 11–12. Aristotle also held the necessary existence of universals, only more as a conceptualist, saying that they were κατὰ πολλῶν (predicable of particulars), not παρὰ τὰ πολλά (existing independent of particulars). Cf. *Post. Anal.* I. xi. 1: Εἰδη μὲν οὖν εἶναι ἡ ἐν τι παρὰ τὰ πολλά οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἰ πρόσδεξις ἔσται, εἶναι μέντοι ἐν κατὰ πολλῶν δληθεῖς εἰτέντες ἀνάγκη· οὐ γάρ ἔσται τὸ καθόλου δι μὴ τοῦτο γ.

κατέρρει προσέκρους] The personal feeling expressed by Aristotle towards

Plato, here as elsewhere, is in the highest degree cordial. But in the argument used there is something captious.

καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν] Cf. *Thuc.* I. 41: ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα χεῖρον τίθενται φιλονεικίας ἔνεκα τῆς αὐτίκα.

ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀληθείαν] This is Plato's own sentiment about Homer; *Repub.* x. p. 595 c, ἀλλ' οὐ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνήρ. It also applies the word *ὅσιον* in a similar context, *Repub.* II. p. 368 B: δέδοικα γάρ μη οὐδὲ ὅσιον γάρ παραγενόμενον δικαιοσύνης κακηγορούμενη ἀπαγορεύειν, κ.τ.λ.

2 οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες — κατεσκενάζον] ‘Now they who introduced this opinion used not to make ideas of things of which they predicated priority and posteriority, and hence they constructed no idea of numbers.’

κομίσαντες] Cf. *Top.* VIII. v. 6, κομίσαντες ἀλλοργας δόξας. The words δόξαν παύτην and ἐτολονν ιδέας seem used, as if purposely, to express an arbitrary and fictitious system. With the above cf. *Metaph.* II. iii. 10: ἔτι ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ θυτέρον ἔστιν οὐκ οὖν τε τὸ ἔτι τούτων εἶναι τι παρὰ ταῦτα· οὐον εἰ πρώτη τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἡ δύσις, οὐκ ἔστι τις ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὰ εἴδη τῶν ἀριθμῶν. *Eth. Eudem.* I. viii. 8: ἔτι ἐν δοσισθ ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ θυτέρον, οὐκ ἔστι κοινὸν τι παρὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοῦτο χωριστόν· εἴη γάρ ἀν τι τοῦ πρώτου πρότερον. Πρότερον γάρ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ χωριστὸν διὸ τὸ διαιρουμένου τοῦ κοινοῦ διαιρεῖσθαι τὸ πρώτον. Οὐον εἰ τὸ διπλάσιον πρώτον τῶν πολλαπλα-

τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποίουν ιδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὑστερον ἔλεγον, διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ιδέαν κατεσκεύαζον· τέ δὲ ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τι ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸν καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρός τι· παραφυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔσικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος, ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινή τις 3 ἐπὶ τούτων ιδέα. ἔτι ἐπεὶ τάγαθὸν ἴσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ

σιων, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πολλαπλάσιον τὸ κοινῷ κατηγορούμενον εἶναι χωριστὸν· ἔσται γὰρ τοῦ διπλασίου πρότερον, εἰ συμβαίνει τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι τὴν ιδέαν. Aristotle often remarks about Plato, that he distinguished with regard to number, making two species of it, mathematical number, and transcendental or ideal number. We may ask of which kind of number it is here asserted that it contains priority and posteriority, and therefore admits of being brought under no one idea? The answer is to be found, Arist. *Metaph.* XII. vi. 7: Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέρους φασὶν εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς, τὸν μὲν ἔχοντα τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὑστερον τὰς ιδέας, τὸν δὲ μαθηματικὸν παρὰ τὰς ιδέας. It is the ideal numbers of which Aristotle says that they stand in essential and immutable succession to and dependence on each other, and therefore can be brought under no common idea. Hence the mention of the *δυάς* and the *διπλάσιον* in the above-quoted passages, which refer to the Platonic doctrine of the *δυάς* *ἀριθμός*, which by union with the one becomes *ἡ πρώτη δυάς*, the first actual number. This *δυάς* is itself the first idea of all number, there can be no idea of it. (Cf. *Met.* XII. vii. 18 sqq.) In some cases the ideas are identical with the manifestations of those ideas. Cf. *Metaph.* VI. xi. 6: καὶ τῶν τὰς ιδέας λεγόντων οἱ μὲν αὐτογράμμητοι δυάδα, οἱ δὲ τὸ εἶδος τῆς γράμμης· Ενια μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτα τὸ εἶδος καὶ

οὐ τὸ εἶδος, οἷον δυάδα καὶ τὸ εἶδος δυάδος.

*παραφυάδι—ὄντος]* ‘For this may be compared to an offshoot and accident of substance.’ Cf. *Rhet.* I. ii. 7, συμβαίνει τὴν δημοκρικὴν οἰον παραφυές τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι. Aristotle argues that the relative good (*ἐν τῷ πρός τι*) must be a sort of deduction from the substantively good (*ἐν τῷ τι ἐστι*), therefore posterior to it in thought, and therefore incapable of being brought under a common idea.

3 ἔτι ἐνει τάγαθὸν—τῷ ὄντι—δῆλον—μόρῳ] ‘Again, since the good is predicated in just as many ways as existence is, it plainly cannot be a common universal, or a unity, else it would not have been predicated in all the categories, but in one alone.’ Good cannot be one, because it is predicated in all the categories. This is a logical, not a metaphysical test of Plato’s doctrine. That Aristotle made ten categories—that these were metaphysical *summa genera*, or an ultimate classification of all existence, is rather a deduction from his philosophy than what he had actually arrived at. The Categories with Aristotle were a classification of the modes of predication, and the number ten seems by no means fixed. The so-called book of the ‘Categories’ is in all probability not from the hand of Aristotle himself, but it shows a tendency in the Peripatetic school to merge the logical into a metaphy-

δύντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ αἱ ἀρεταὶ, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρός, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαιτα καὶ ἔτερα τοιαῦτα), δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἀν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἔν· οὐ γὰρ ἀν ἐλέγετ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν μᾶς μόνῃ. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν 4 μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἦν ἀν μία τις ἐπιστήμη· μὲν δὲ εἰσι πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν. ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον καιροῦ ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν στρατηγικὴ ἐν νόσῳ δὲ ἱατρική, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν τροφῇ μὲν ἱατρικὴ ἐν πόνοις δὲ γυμναστική. ἀπορήσειε δὲ ἂν τις τί ποτε καὶ βούλον-5 ται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ ἔν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ εἰς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἔστιν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ἦ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν· εἰ δὲ οὔτως, οὐδὲ ἥτις ἀγαθόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ αἰδίον εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, 6 εἴπερ μηδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον τοῦ ἐφημέρου. πι-7 θανάτωρον δὲ ἔοίκασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ,

sical classification. Cf. *Topics* I. iv. 12.

4 There are many sciences of the good, therefore it cannot be reduced to unity.—This argument is certainly unsatisfactory if applied to Plato's point of view. Plato would say dialectic is the science of the Idea of good, and in this all other sciences find their meeting-point. Even of the *πράκτοντας ἀγαθά* it might be said that according to Aristotle's own account it falls (in all its manifestations, whether as means or ends) under the one supreme science—*Politics*.

5-6 *Διερήσειε δὲ τις—ἐφημέρου]*  
 'Now one might be puzzled to say what they mean by an "absolute" thing—if, for instance, in man and absolute-man there is one and the same conception of man. For *qua* man they will not differ. If so, the same will apply to good. Nor is it any use to say that the absolute good will be more good by being eternal,

since what is ever so old is not whiter than that which lasts but a day.' Aristotle brings against the idea an accusation which he has also used in the *Metaphysics* (I. ix. 1), that it only multiplies phenomena, as it exhibits the same law or conception as they. He adds to it a captious objection, that it is no use to say the absolute differs from the conditional in being eternal, since length of duration does not constitute a distinction between identical qualities;—as if length of duration were the same as eternity. Cf. *Eth.* vi. iii. 2; and see *Essay III.* p. 210.

7 *πιθανώτερον δὲ—δοκεῖ]* 'But the Pythagoreans seem to give a more probable account of it, placing unity in the row of goods; whom Speusippus too, it must be observed (*δη*), appears to follow.' We have to deal here with the subtle differences between the Greek schools of metaphysical philosophy. There came in

τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἐν· οἵ δὴ καὶ  
8 Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολούθησαι δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων

succession,—first, the Eleatic principle, that ‘the One’ is the only really existent. Second, the Megarian development of this, ‘the One is identical with the good.’ Third, Plato’s adoption of this with modifications,—the One is the idea, opposed to plurality, or phenomena; the highest idea, and most essential, is that of the Good; this is transcendental, self-existent, the cause of existence to phenomena, and also of our knowing them; phenomena, however, have still a conditional existence, dependent on the idea (*μερέχει τῆς οὐσίας*). Fourth, opposed to Plato, and here contrasted with him, we find the Pythagorean doctrine which places ‘the One’ among the various exhibitions of good, whether as causes of good, or manifestations of it. The Pythagorean system was said to be devoid of dialectic (*διαλεκτικῆς οὐ μετεῖχον*, Ar. *Metaph.* i. vi. 7). We do not find in them anything like ‘critical’ philosophy, nor any *rationale* of cognition. They seem content to have seized on a few principles, the conception of harmony, order, and proportion in the world, &c. Their system, however, had a definite bearing, and part of this seems to have been the ignoring any transcendental principle, any principle otherwise than as exhibited in phenomena. In *Metaph.* xi. vii. 10, we find Aristotle repudiating a doctrine which Speusippus shared with the Pythagoreans, namely, that good is rather a result of things than their cause. Speusippus, nephew of Plato, and successor to him as head of the Academy, seems, after the death of his master, to have manifested in several points a Pythagorean leaning (see *Essay III.* p. 217). It is

mentioned, *Metaph.* xiii. iv. 10, that of those who held the doctrine of ideas, some considered ‘the One’ as identical with ‘the good,’ others not as identical, but as an essential element. If the one be identified with the good, it follows that multitude, or, in other words, matter, will be the principle of evil. To avoid making ‘the many’ identical with evil, some Platonists denied the identity of the one with the good. Of this section Speusippus was leader. He accordingly adopted a Pythagorean formula, saying that ‘the one’ must be ranked among things good. In the present place Aristotle must be regarded as not really entering on the question. His own metaphysical system stood quite beside all these mentioned. But he does not enter here upon a metaphysical consideration of the Good, as not belonging to ethics. He merely states objections to Plato’s doctrine, and in a cursory way alleges a *prima facie* preference (*πιθανώτερον ζεκασιν λέγειν*) for the Pythagorean theory, according to which the good was not transcendental, or separate from phenomena.

8 ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἀλλοι ζοτῷ λόγος] ‘But let us put off to another occasion the discussion of these questions,’ i.e. the whole subject of the good and its relation to unity—to existence—to the world. This is, in short, the scope of Aristotle’s entire *Metaphysics*. We need not confine the reference of *περὶ τούτων* to the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, or refer it, with some commentators, to the books mentioned in the list of Diogenes (v. 25), *περὶ τῶν Πυθαγορέων, d. περὶ Σπεύσιππου καὶ Κεραπάδρου, d.*

ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος, τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν ἀμφισβῆτησίς τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τὸν λόγον εἰρῆσθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἐν εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἡ φυλακτικά πως ἡ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ' ἀν τάγαθά, καὶ τὰ<sup>9</sup> μὲν καθ' αὐτά, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα. χωρίσαντες οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ σκεψώμεθα εἰ λέγεται κατὰ μίαν ἴδεαν. καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἄν; ἡ ὅσα καὶ<sup>10</sup> μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὄραν καὶ ἡδονή τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώκομεν, δῆμος τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἄν. ἡ οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς ἴδεας; ὥστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος. εἰ δὲ<sup>11</sup> καὶ ταῦτ' ἔστι τῶν καθ' αὐτά, τὸν τάγαθοῦ λόγον ἐν ἀπαστιν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι δεῖσει, καθάπερ ἐν χιόνι καὶ ψυμμυθίᾳ τὸν τῆς λευκότητος. τιμῆς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς ἔτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταῦτη ἡ ἀγαθά.

*τοὺς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν ἄλλον]* ‘But against my arguments an objection suggests itself, namely, that the Platonic theory was not meant to apply to every good (*διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τὸν λόγον εἰρῆσθαι*), but that under one head are classified those goods that are sought and loved in and for themselves (*καθ' αὐτά*), while things productive of these, or in any way preservative of them, or preventive of their opposites, are spoken of as “secondary goods” (*διὰ ταῦτα*), and in another fashion.’ It seems best to refer *τοὺς λόγους* to the Platonic theory. The words *καθ'* *ἐν εἶδος* are used, not in the peculiarly Platonic sense, ‘under one idea,’ but in the more common and also Aristotelian sense, ‘under one species.’

*οὐδὲ ἄλλο—εἶδος]* ‘Or is none of these, nor anything except the idea, to be called an absolute good; in which case the class good will be devoid of content and indivi-

duals.’ The Platonic idea was meant to be not only an *ἴδεα*, or absolute existence, transcending the world of space and time, but also an *εἶδος*, or universal nature, manifesting itself in different individuals. This latter property, Aristotle argues, will be lost if we keep denying of different attainable goods, even those that seem most plainly so, that they are goods in themselves.

*τιμῆς δὲ—δύαθδ]* ‘Thought.’ The word is used in a general sense as the substantive of *φρονεῖν* (cf. *Eth.* vii. xii. 5), and not in its technical sense as defined in (the Eudemian) Book vi.

*τιμῆς δὲ—δύαθδ]* ‘Now honour, thought, pleasure, exhibit distinct and differing laws when viewed as goods.’

\*The same instances are given below, I. vii. 5, of goods sought for their own sake. Obviously here Aristotle is not doing full justice by the question he has started. What are the ‘different laws’ of good in these objects, calls for

12 οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔουκε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὄμωνύμοις. ἀλλ' ἄρα γε τῷ ἀφ' ἐνὸς εἶναι, ἢ πρὸς ἐν ἀπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατ' ἀναλογίαν; ὡς γὰρ ἐν σώματι 13 ὅψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ. ἀλλ' ἵσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον τὸ μὲν ἔξακριβον γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἀν εἴη φιλοσοφίας οἰκειότερον. ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἐν τι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστόν τι αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτό, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἀν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ· μὲν δὲ τοιούτον τι ζητεῖ- 14 ται. τάχα δέ τῷ δόξειν ἀν βέλτιον εἶναι γυωρίζειν αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ παράδειγμα τοῦτ' ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθά, 15 καν εἰδῶμεν, ἐπιτευχόμεθα αὐτῶν. πιθανότητα μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ ὁ λόγος, ἔουκε δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις διαφωνεῖν· πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφιέμεναι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεεῖς ἐπιζητοῦ-

a subtle investigation ; whereas there is here a summary assertion. We might urge, on the other hand, that honour is not an instance of an absolute good (cf. i. v. 5), that pleasure and thought really exhibit the same law of good—as being both *ἐνέργεια*. But Aristotle here partly trifles and partly dogmatises. He would, of course, refer us to metaphysics for the question in point.

11-12 οὐκ ἔστιν—*διαλογίαν*] ‘Good, therefore, is not something generic under one idea. But how then is the term used? For if does not seem like an accidental coincidence of name. Shall we say then that it is so used because all goods spring from one source, or because they all tend to one end, or rather that it is on account of an analogy between them?’ ‘Ομώνυμα answers to ‘equivocal’ words in logic. The so-called ‘Categories’ of Aristotle begin ‘Ομώνυμα λέγεται ὃν δύοντα μόνον κοινόν. A nominalistic

explanation of the general conception of good is here substituted provisionally for the realism of Plato.

13 ἀλλ' ἵσως—*ζητεῖται*] ‘But perhaps we should dismiss these questions for the present, for to refine about them belongs more properly to another kind of philosophy. So too about the idea. Even if there is any one good universal and generic, or transcendental (*χωριστόν*) and absolute, it obviously can neither be realised nor possessed by man, whereas something of this latter kind is what we are inquiring after.’ Cf. *Eth.* x. ii. 4. The whole force of the present chapter is contained in this sentence. The Idea is not *πρᾶξις τι*, and therefore does not belong to ethics. The concluding paragraphs of the chapter are occupied with proving that the Idea is not available even as a model (*παράδειγμα*) for practical life.

15 ἐνδεεῖς] Cf. *Pol.* vii. xvii. 15 : *τέσσας γάρ τέχην καὶ παιδεῖα τὸ προ-*

σαι παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ. καίτοι βοήθημα τηλικούτον ἀπαντας τὸν τεχνίτας ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μηδὲ ἐπιζητεῖν οὐκ εὔλογον. ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὁφεληθήσεται ὑφάντης ἡ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς αὐτὸν τάγαθόν, ἡ πῶς ἰατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ιδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν τοῦδε· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰατρεύει. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

Πάλιν δὲ ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, τί γε ποτέ ἀν εἴη. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ

λεῖπον βούλεται τῆς φύσεως ἀναπληροῦν.

15-16 καίτοι — τεθεαμένος] ‘And yet it is not likely that all artists should be ignorant of, and never so much as inquire after, so great an aid, if really existing. But it is hard to see in what a weaver or carpenter will be benefited with regard to their respective arts by knowing the absolute good; or how one is to become a better doctor or general by having contemplated the absolute Idea.’ It has been objected that Aristotle fixes on too mean specimens of the arts, that he might have spoken differently if he had adduced the fine arts. But the question is, whether for practical life the Idea (that is, a knowledge of the absolute) could be made available? This forms a great point of divergence between Plato and Aristotle. The latter seems to regard the Idea as an object of the speculative reason alone, something metaphysical and standing apart; and between the speculative and practical powers of man he sets a gulf. Plato, on the other hand, speaking without this analytical clearness, seems to think of the Idea as an object for the imagination, as well as the reason, as being an ideal as well as an

idea. In this its many-sided character he would make it affect life, as well as knowledge; for by contemplation of it the mind would become conformed to it. Cf. *Repub.* vii., and see *Essay III.* p. 205.

VII. Ι πάλιν δὲ ἐπανέλθωμεν—εἴη] ‘But let us return to the good we are in search of, and ask what is its nature.’ τὸ ζητούμενον is emphatic; it distinguishes the πρακτὸν ἀγαθὸν of ethics, here ‘sought for,’ from the transcendental supreme good of metaphysics. Failing to obtain a satisfactory answer to his question, either from the common opinions of men, or from the philosophers, Aristotè starts anew, by asserting that though the conception of good may vary ‘in each art and action,’ yet it has this unvarying characteristic, that it is the ‘end.’ From this starting-point the argument easily comes round to the position already anticipated (*μεραρχίων δὴ διλόγος εἰς ταῦτα δῆκται*), that the πρακτὸν ἀγαθὸν is identical with the τέλος τέλειος, or end-in-itself of action, and with this basis, by a series of *a priori* principles, some already enunciated by Plato and others peculiar to his own system, Aristotle de-

τέχνη· ἄλλο γάρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὁμοίωσ. τί οὖν ἑκάστης τύγαθόν; ἡ οὐ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; τοῦτο δὲ ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δὲ οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ ἄλλο, ἐν ἀπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος· τούτου γάρ ἔνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι πάντες. ὥστ' εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάντων ἔστι τέλος, τοῦτ' ἀν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω, ταῦτα. μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταύτον ἀφίζεται. τοῦτο δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον διασυφῆσαι πειρατέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαίνεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δὲ αἱρούμεθά τινα δι' ἔτερα, οἷον πλούτον αὐλοὺς καὶ δλως τὰ δργανα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δὲ ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται. ὥστ' εἴ μέν ἔστιν ἐν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἀν εἴη 4 τὸ ζητούμενον, εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν διώκτον τοῦ δι' ἔτερον καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἱρετὸν τῶν καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' αἱρετῶν, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν αἱρετὸν ἀεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο. τοιοῦτον δὲ η εὐδαιμονία μά-

velops his conception of happiness or the chief good. (1) It is *τέλειον*; (2) Also, it must be *ἀθαρκές*; (3) It must be found in the "Εργον of man. (4) This "Εργον is a rational and moral life; (5) We must conceive of it 'in actuality,' in other words, as 'conscious life'; (6) We must add the condition of conformity to its own proper law; (7) And also the external condition of sufficient duration and prosperity.

*ζῶον πλοθτον αὐλοὺς καὶ δλως τὰ δργανα]* 'As, for instance, wealth, flutes, and instruments in general.' Wealth is a mere means (cf. I. v. 8). *Αὐλοί* seems a stock example with Aristotle of the instruments to an art. Cf. *De Anima*, I. iii. 26, where he argues against the doctrine of the migration of souls, saying, you might as well speak of the carpenter's art migrating into states: *παρατλήσιον* δὲ λέγονον *ὦστερ εἰ τις φαῖη τὴν τεκτονικὴν εἰς αὐλοὺς ἐνδεσθαι*—δεῖ

γάρ τὴν μὲν τέχνην χρῆσθαι τοῖς δργάνοις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι. Cf. Xenophon, *Econ.* I. 10, where Socrates says: *ὦστερ γε αὐλοί τῷ μὲν ἐπισταμένῳ ἀξίως λόγου αὐλεῖν χρήματά εἰσι, τῷ δὲ μὴ ἐπισταμένῳ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον η δηχρηστος λίθοι, εἰ μὴ ἀποδιδόντες γε αὐτούς.*

4 καὶ δπλῶς—ἄλλο] 'And therefore we call that absolutely of the nature of an end which is desirable in and for itself always, and never in order to anything else.' The conception of ends was not fully developed in Plato; at the beginning of the second book of the *Republic*, those are said to be the highest goods which are desired both for themselves and for their results (cf. *Eth.* I. vi. 10). Aristotle's conception of the practical chief good is that while it is solely an end, it yet sums up the results of all means. Hence he adds that it is not only *τέλειον*, but *ἀθαρκές*. These two

λιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ· ταύτην γὰρ αἴρούμεθα ἀεὶ δί' αὐτὴν καὶ 5 οὐδέποτε δί' ἄλλο, τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ὑδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἴρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δί' αὐτά (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἐλοίμεθ' ἀν ἔκαστον αὐτῶν), αἴρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. τὴν δὲ εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἱρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδὲ ὅλως δί' ἄλλο. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ 6 αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκεῖ εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δὲ αὐταρκεῖ λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτεκὸς ἀνθρωπος. τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὄρος τις· ἐπεκτείνοντι 7 γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τὴν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσανθισ ἐπισκεπτέον, τὸ δὲ αὐταρκεῖ τίθεμεν ὃ μαρτυρούμενον αἱρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεῖ· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι. ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἱρετωτάτην μὴ συν- 8 αριθμουμένην, συναριθμουμένην δὲ δῆλον ὡς αἱρετωτέρων μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μεῖζον αἱρετώτερον ἀεί. τέλειον δή τι φαίνεται καὶ αὐταρκεῖ ἡ εὐδαιμονία,

qualities are attributed to the chief good in the *Philebus* of Plato, p. 20 c: τὴν τάγαθον μοῖραν πέτερον ἀνάγκη τέλεον ή μὴ τέλεον εἶναι; τάντω δὴ του τελεώτατου, ὁ Σώκρατες. τι δέ; Ικανὸν τάγαθον; πῶς γὰρ οὗ; κ.τ.λ.

6 τὸ δὲ αὐταρκεῖ—ἀνθρωπος] 'We do not apply the term "self-sufficiency" only to the individual who leads a solitary life, but in reference to parents and children, and wife, and in general friends and fellow-citizens, since man is by nature social.' The Greek οὐκ αὐτῷ μοῖρα—ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῖσι is defective in the grammar; the meaning apparently is, that αὐτάρκεια does not imply isolation.

7 τούτων δὲ—ἐπισκεπτέον] 'But of these we must take some limit; for if one extends the circle to ancestors

and descendants and the friends of a man's friends, it will go on to infinity. But this point we must consider hereafter.' γονεῖς seems to be used in a different sense in § 7 from γονεῖσι in § 6. Aristotle promises here to return to the question how far a man's αὐτάρκεια is liable to be affected by his relationship to others. To some extent this is done in chapter xi. of this book, which discusses τὰς τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων διπλαντῶν as to their influence upon a man's happiness, whether he be alive or dead.

8 ἔτι δὲ πάντων—δεῖ] 'Moreover we think it (οἴμεθα) the most desirable of all goods, provided it be not (μή) reckoned as one among them; but if it were so reckoned, it is plain that it would become more desirable

9 τῶν πρακτῶν οὐσα τέλος. ἀλλ' ίστως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται, 10 ποθεῖται δὲ ἐναργέστερον τί ἔστιν ἔτι λεχθῆναι. τάχα δὴ γένοιτο ἀν τοῦτ', εἰ ληφθείη τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ὡσπερ γὰρ αὐλητὴ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ δῆλως ὃν ἔστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τάγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὗτοι δόξειν

with the addition of the slightest good, for the addition constitutes a preponderance of goods, and the greater good is always the more desirable.' This remark points out the difference between the *τέλειον καὶ αὐταρκεῖς ἀγαθὸν* and any other thing to which the word 'best' can ever be applied. The all-comprehensive and supreme good, happiness, is indeed the best, but not as being really placed on a level with other goods, or ranked among them; not as being 'best of the lot,' but as including all the lot in itself, so that beside it there is no good left that could possibly be added to it. The Paraphrast gives exactly this meaning to the passage, rendering the word *συναριθμουμένην* by *σύστοιχον τοῖς ἀλλοῖς ἀγαθοῖς*. καὶ εἰ σύστοιχον αὐτὴν τοῖς ἀλλοῖς ποιήσομεν ἀγαθοῖς, φανερὸν θτι, εἰ προσθήσομεν τι τῶν ἀλλῶν αὐτῇ, αἱρετῷραν ποιήσομεν, καὶ οὕτως οὐκ ἀν εἴη αὐτῇ τὸ ἄκρον τῶν αἱρετῶν. And that the above was the meaning of Aristotle is shown by the author of the *Magna Moralia* (κ. ii. 7), who starts the question: Πῶς τὸ ἄριστον δεῖ σκοπεῖν; πότερον οὕτως ὡς καὶ αὐτοῦ συναριθμουμένου; to which he answers: Ἀλλ' ἀτοκον. τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον ἐπειδὴ ἔστι τέλος τέλειον, τὸ δὲ τέλειον τέλος ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ἀν δῆλο δόξειν εἶναι ή εὐδαιμονία,—ἐὰν δὴ τὸ βελτιστον σκοτῶν καὶ αὐτὸ συναριθμῆς, αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ στοιβαὶ βελτιστον αὐτὸ γὰρ βελτιστον ἔσται. In other words, the end is the sum of the means, and

therefore cannot be compared with the means, for that would only be comparing it with itself. The whole consists of parts, and cannot be called the best of the parts. Nor can it be made better by the addition of one of the parts than it was in itself. The present passage is quoted by Alexander Aphrodis. *ad Ar. Topica*, III. 2 (Brandis's *Scholia*, 274b, l. 17), to illustrate the point that knowledge plus the process of learning cannot be called better than knowledge by itself, οὐτι τὸ μανθάνειν διὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αἱρόμεθα. 'Αλλ' οὐδὲ εὐδαιμονία μετὰ τῶν ἀρετῶν αἱρετῷρα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας μενης, ἐπειλ ἐν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ περιέχονται καὶ αἱ αἱρετα—οὐ γὰρ συναριθμεῖται τοῖς περιέχοντι τινα τὰ περιεχόμενα ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὡς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ἡθικῶν ἐφρήθη. The word *συναριθμεῖσθαι* in the sense of 'to be reckoned as one of a class,' occurs *Rhet.* I. vii. 3: ἀνδργη τὰ τε πλεῖστα, τοῦ ἐνδέ καὶ τῶν ἀλλαττόνων, συναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἐνδέ ή τῶν ἀλλαττόνων, μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. 'The more numerous must be a greater good than the fewer, if they be placed in the same scale of comparison with it.' Eustatius takes the passage to mean that 'happiness would be the most desirable of all things, even if not joined with other good, though with any addition it would be *a fortiori* better.' This contradicts the very principle that Aristotle wished to establish, that 'best' and 'most desirable' are to be applied.

ἀν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον αὐτῷ. πότε- 11  
 πορ οὖν τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἔστιν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ  
 πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου δὲ οὐδέν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἀργὸν πέφυκεν; ἡ  
 καθάπερ ὄφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως ἐκάστου  
 τῶν μορίων φαίνεται τι ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ  
 πάντα ταῦτα θείη τις ἀν ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἀν εἴη  
 ποτέ; τὸ μὲν γάρ ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυ- 12  
 τοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τὴν θρεπτικὴν  
 καὶ αὐξητικὴν ζώνην. ἐπομένη δὲ αἰσθητική τις ἀν εἴη, φαί-  
 νεται δὲ καὶ αὐτῇ κοινή καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῦ καὶ παντὶ ζῷῳ.  
 λείπεται δὴ πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος. τούτου δὲ 13  
 τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον.

to the supreme good not meaning that which merely as a fact is better than other things, but, ideally, that than which nothing can be better. Aristotle accepts from the Platonists the doctrine that the chief good is incapable of addition. Cf. *Eth.* x. ii. 3.

*ιι πότερον οὖν τέκτονος κ.τ.λ.]* This argument—by which, from the analogy of the different trades, of the different animals, and of the separate parts of the body, the existence of a proper function for man is proved—comes almost *verbatim* from Plato's *Republic*, i. 352-3. The *ἔργον* of anything Plato there defines as that which can alone or best be accomplished by the thing in question. *Ἄρα οὖν τοῦτο ἀν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ὅλου ὄντος ἔργον δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐκείνῳ ποιῆτις τις ἡ ἀριστά;* Of course *ἔργον* in this sense is to be distinguished from such uses as in *Eth.* i. i. 2, where it means an 'external result'; iv. ii. 10, 'a work of art'; ii. ix. 2, 'a labour' or 'achievement.'

*ιι τὸ μὲν γάρ ζῆν—ἔχοντος]* 'Now mere life is shared even by the plants, whereas we are seeking something peculiar. We may set aside therefore the life of nutrition and growth.'

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Succeeding this will be a principle of life that may be called the *perceptive*: but this too appears shared by horse and ox and every animal. There remains then what may be called a moral life of the rational part.' The argument here as to the proper function of man, and the division on which it is based, belongs entirely to the physiological and psychological system of Aristotle. See Essay V. p. 295. The meanings of the word *πρακτικός* are (1) with a genitive 'able to do,' or 'disposed to do,' as iv. iii. 27, δλίγων πρακτικόν, i. ix. 8, πρακτικός τῶν καλῶν. (2) 'Active,' 'practical,' opposed to quiescent or speculative, i. v. 4. Οἱ δὲ χαρέντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμήν. vi. viii. 2. (3) 'Moral,' as here, opposed to the life of animal instinct. Cf. vi. ii. 2, τῷ τὰ θηρία αἰσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν, πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. Or, as vi. iv. 2, vi. xii. 10, opposed to the artistic and the scientific.

*ιι τοῦτο δὲ—διανοούμενον]* With regard to the present passage, Bekker exhibits no variation in the MSS., and the Paraphrast evidently had it in his text. All that can be said, therefore, is that the present sentence interrupts the sense and grammar of the

διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον·  
 14 κυριωτερον γὰρ αὐτῇ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἔργον  
 ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγου ή μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸ  
 δ' αὐτό φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπου-  
 δαίου, ὡσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ  
 ἀπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων, προστιθεμένης τῆς κατ' ἀρε-  
 τὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον· κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὸ  
 κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ  
 τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωήν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ  
 πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, σπουδαίου δὲ ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ

context, and that it is conspicuously awkward in a book which for the most part reads smoothly.

διττῶς δὲ—λέγεσθαι] ‘But further, since this life may be spoken of in two ways’ (either as an existing state or developed into actuality), ‘we must assume it to be in actuality; for this seems the more distinctive form of the conception.’ *καθ' ξέν* is the opposition to *κατ' ἐνέργειαν*. Cf. I. viii. 9.

14 We have here a fourfold protasis: *εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἔργον*—*τὸ δ' αὐτὸ φαμεν ἔργον*—*ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν—ξεστον δὲ εὖ*. The apodosis to all of these is *εἰ δ' οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν*, where *γίνεται* is used as denoting a deduction from premises, just as the future tense is often employed. Similar long-drawn arguments occur II. vi. 9, III. v. 17, &c.

*εἰ δ' ἐστιν—λόγου*] ‘Now if the proper function of man be vital action according to a law, or implying a law.’ *ψυχή*, substituted for the previous term *ζωή*, denotes the entire principle of life, thought, and action, in man. The additional term *κατὰ λόγον* gives an equivalent to *πρακτική*, since the reason necessarily introduces a moral point of view into every part of life. (cf. *De Anima*, ix. x. 7). It is difficult to translate *κατὰ λόγον*, because the word *λόγος* is ambiguous. Partly it

means reason, partly a law or standard (cf. *Eth.* II. ii. 2). As compared with *μηδεν λόγου*, *κατὰ λόγον* would express a marked, direct, and prominent control. In the *εὐφυῆς* and the *σώφρων*, where the desires flow naturally to what is good, reason would seem rather to be presupposed (*οὐδὲν οὐκ ἀνεν*) than directly to assert itself. The more significant expression, however, is that which follows, *πράξεις μετὰ λόγου*. A machine might be said to move *κατὰ λόγον*, ‘in accordance with a law,’ but not *μετὰ λόγου*, ‘with a consciousness of a law.’ It is this consciousness of the law which, according to Hegel, distinguishes morality (Moralität) from mere propriety (Sittlichkeit). On the transition of meaning from *κατ' ἐνέργειαν* to *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς*, and on the translation of these terms, see *Essay IV.* pp. 237, 247.

*τὸ δ' αὐτὸ—κιθαριστοῦ*] ‘And we say that the function is generically the same of such a one, and such a one good of his kind, as, for instance, of a harper, and of a good harper.’ *φαμέν* is an appeal to language and general consent. *τοῦδε* is used indefinitely as above, I. xi. 19, *τὴν τοῦδε*, ‘the health of such and such an individual’; VI. xi. 6, *ηὔδε η̄ φλεγία*, &c. The present passage vindicates the introduction of *τοῦδε* into the definition by

καλῶς, ἔκαστον δ' εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖ- 15  
 ται· εἰ δὲ οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια  
 γίνεται κατ' ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν  
 ἀρίστην καὶ τελειωτάτην. ἔτι δὲ ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. μία γὰρ 16  
 χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ  
 μακάριον καὶ εὐδάίμονα μία ἡμέρα οὐδὲ ὀλίγος χρόνος.  
 περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τὰ γαθὸν ταύτῃ. δεῖ γὰρ ἵσως 17  
 ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἴθ' ὑστερον ἀναγράψαι. δόξειε δὲ  
 ἀν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς  
 ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὑρετὴς  
 ἡ συνεργὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶναι. ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγόνασιν  
 αἱ ἐπιδόσεις· παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλλείπον. μεμνῆ- 18

showing there is nothing illogical in doing so, that by taking a genus in its best form we do not go off into another genus.

15 ἔκαστον δ' εὖ—ἀποτελεῖται] 'And everything is well completed in accordance with its own proper excellence.' Cf. *Eth.* II. vi. 2. This principle of the connection between the proper function of a thing and the peculiar law of excellence of that thing is taken from Plato; cf. *Repub.* I. p. 353. It is introduced here to justify the term *κατ' ἀρετήν* in the definition of happiness. This term is not at once to be interpreted 'according to virtue,' which would destroy the logical sequence of the argument. It comes in at first in a general sense, 'according to the proper law of excellence in man,' whatever that may be.

εἰ δὲ οὕτω—τελειωτήν] 'If so, I say, it results that the good for man is vital action according to the law of excellence; and if the excellences be more than one, according to that which is best and most absolutely in itself desirable.' Whatever awkwardness and strangeness there may appear in this attempt to render the definition of Aristotle, it will be found on consideration to approach at all

events, nearer to his meaning than the usual rendering: 'an energy of the soul, according to virtue,' &c.

16 ἔτι δὲ ἐν βίῳ—χρόνον] 'But we must add also "in a complete period and sphere of circumstances." For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so neither one day nor a brief time constitutes a man blest and happy.' *Βίος* the external form and condition of life, implies both fortunes and duration. By adding this last consideration, Aristotle gives a practical aspect to his definition. Ideally, a moment of consciousness might be called the highest good, independent of space and time. *τέλειος*, as we have seen above (§ 4), means 'that which is of the nature of an end,' 'that which is desirable for its own sake.' But no doubt the popular sense of the word comes in to some degree in the present passage; partly Aristotle had before his mind the conception of a 'complete' or 'perfect' duration of life, partly of an external history and career that could be designated as 'desirable for its own sake.'

17 περιγεγράφθω—ἀλλείον] 'Thus far, then, for a sketch of the chief good; for we ought surely to draw the

σθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρή, καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ἀπασιν ἐπίζητεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἑκάστοις κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὥλην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκεῖον τῇ 19 μεθόδῳ. καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφερόντως ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὄρθην. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὁ δὲ τί ἐστιν ἡ ποιόν τι θεατὴς γὰρ τάληθοῦς. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιητέον, ὅπως μὴ 20 τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἔργων πλειόνως γίγνηται. οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ' οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἀπασιν ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἵκανὸν ἐν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ' ὅτι

outline first, and afterwards to fill it up. And it would seem that any one could bring forward and complete what fits in with the sketch, and that time is a good discoverer of such things, or at least a good co-operator. Hence it is, too, that the development of the arts has taken place, for every man can supply that which is defective.' From this point to the end of the chapter, Aristotle dwells on the importance of a principle (like his definition of the chief good) as an outline or comprehensive idea, afterwards to be developed and filled up (cf. a similar phrase in *De Gen. Anim.* II. vi. 29: *καὶ γὰρ οἱ γραφεῖς ὑπογράψαντες τὰς γραμμαῖς οὕτως ἐναλείφουσι τοῖς χρώμασι τὸ ζῷον*). He adds, however, the caution that mathematical exactness must not be required in filling up the sketch. He seems here to dwell with some pride on the foundation he has laid for ethics: a similar feeling betrays itself with regard to his logical discoveries, *Sophist. Elench.* xxxiii. 13, where is a parallel passage to the present on the importance of *ἀρχαί*: *τὰ δὲ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εὐρισκόμενα μικράν τὸ πρώτον ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν εἰσθε, χρησιμάτερος μέντοι τολμῶ τῆς οὐτερού ἐκ τρίτων αἰτήσεων, μέγιστον γὰρ ξώς ἀρχή παντός, διοτερλάγεται.*

18 τὴν ἀκρίβειαν—ἐπιζητεῖν] Cf. I. iii. 1. The word *ἀκρίβεια*, with its

cognate *ἀκριβής*, has different shades of meaning which may be here specified. (1) 'Minuteness of details.' Cf. Plato, *Repub.* III. 414 A, *ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, μὴ δέ ἀκριβεῖται.* *Eth.* II. vii. 5. (2) 'Mathematical exactness,' which implies every link of argument being stated, and the whole resting on demonstrative grounds. Cf. *Metaph.* I. 6, *ἀλλαττον*, iii. 2. *Eth.* VII. iii. 3. (3) 'Definiteness,' or 'fixedness.' Cf. VIII. vii. 5, *ἀκριβής οὐκ ἔστι δρισμός.* II. ii. 4, *δὲ λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τάκριβές,* answering to *ἔστηκες*, IX. ii. 2, III. iii. 8. (4) Applied to the arts it denotes 'finish.' Cf. I. iii. 1, II. vi. 9, VI. vii. 1. (5) By a slight transition from the last, when applied to sciences, it means also 'metaphysical subtlety.' This transition is made VI. vii. 2; cf. X. iv. 3; *De Anima*, I. i. 1. In the passage before us *ἀκρίβεια* seems to combine several of the above-mentioned meanings. It seems to say that *mathematical exactness* is not suited to ethics—that too much *subtlety* is not to be expected (*καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης κ.τ.λ.*)—that too much *detail* is to be avoided (*ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα, κ.τ.λ.*)

20 οὐκ—*ἀρχαί*] 'Nor must we demand the cause in all things equally,—in some things it is sufficient that the fact be well established, as is the case with first principles.' Now the

πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή· τῶν ἀρχῶν δ' αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγὴ θεω- 21  
ροῦνται, αἱ δὲ αἰσθῆσει, αἱ δὲ ἐθισμῷ τινὶ, καὶ ἄλλαι δὲ  
ἄλλως. μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἐκάστας ἡ πεφύκασιν, καὶ  
σπουδαστέον ὅπως ὀρισθῶσι καλῶς· μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι  
ροπὴν πρὸς τὰ ἐπόμενα. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἡ ἡμίσυ πάντος  
εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῆ γίνεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς τῶν  
ζητουμένων.

fact constitutes a first point and principle.' The bearing of this somewhat obscure sentence seems to be to repeat the remark made, I. iv. 6-7, that in morals a fact appealing to the individual consciousness has a paramount validity. Just as in the other sciences we do not ask the why and wherefore of the axioms, so in morals we accept the facts because we feel them without their being demonstrated. Cf. Eth. vi. viii. 9.

21 τῶν ἀρχῶν δ'—ἐπόμενα] 'But of principles some are apprehended by induction, others by intuition, others by a sort of habituation of the mind, and, in short, different principles in different ways. But we must endeavour to attain each in the natural way, and we must take all pains to have them rightly defined, for they are of great importance for the consequences drawn from them.' This digression seems partly suggested by the immediately preceding paragraph on the relation of facts in morals to principles of science, partly it belongs in general to this part of the subject. Aristotle, having laid down his ground principle of ethics, makes a pause, in which some remarks are introduced on principles, their importance, and the method of attaining them. The words καὶ ἄλλαι δὲ ἄλλοι show that the list of methods is not meant to be exhaustive. The commentators, misunderstanding the Greek, have inquired by what 'other methods [other principles]' could be

sought. But, of course, these words only generalise the whole proposition (cf. Eth. I. iv. 3, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλο).

θεωροῦνται] 'are perceived'; cf. vi. iii. 2, vii. iii. 5. Answering to μετιέναι we have the term θηρεύειν ἀρχάς, *Prior Analytics*, I. xxx. 2. With ἡ πεφύκασι we must understand a passive infinitive, 'in the way in which they are meant by nature to be reached. As to the method of obtaining principles, cf. *Prior Analytics*, I. xxx. 1, where the study of nature and of facts is pointed out as the only source of ἀρχαί or universal premises. 'Ἡ μὲν οὖν ὁδὸς κατὰ πάντων ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ περὶ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ περὶ τέχνην ὀποιανοῦν καὶ μάθημα· δεῖ γὰρ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει περὶ ἔκαστον ἀθρεῖν.—Διὸ τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς τὰς περὶ ἔκαστον ἐμπέιπλας ἔστι παραδοῦνται. Connecting then the recognition of ἀρχαί with the knowledge of facts, we see that (1) ἐπαγωγὴ is the evolution of a general law out of particular facts, (2) αἰσθησις is the recognition of the law in the fact. Αἰσθησις is not to be restricted to the perception of the senses, or confined (as the Paraphrast would have it) to the physical sciences. Rather it is opposed to ἐπαγωγὴ, as intuition to inference. Cf. Eth. vi. xi. 5, τούτων οὖν ἔχει δεῖ αἰσθησιν, αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶ νοῦς. (3) ἐθισμός is a sort of unconscious induction, a process by which general truths may be said to grow up in the mind. Nor is this process peculiar to moral truths.

8 Σκεπτέον δὴ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν γάρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνίδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, 2 τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τάληθες. νενεμημένων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἑκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆν καὶ σῶμά, τὰ περὶ ψυχῆν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μᾶλιστα ἀγαθά. τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς

alone: it is a question whether even the truths of number do not derive part of their validity as necessary axioms from their frequent repetition. See Mill's *Logic*, book II. ch. v.

VIII. We now enter upon a fresh division of the Book. From hence to the end of Chapter 12th Aristotle tests his great ethical principle, his definition of the chief good, by comparing it with various popular or philosophic opinions, and by applying to it certain commonly mooted questions and distinctions of the day.

I σκεπτέον δὴ—τάληθες] 'We must consider it (*i.e.* the first principle) therefore not only from the point of view of our own conclusion and premises, but also from that of *sayings* on the subject. For with what is true all experience coincides, with what is false the truth quickly shows a discrepancy.'

περὶ αὐτῆς] especially with δή, can only be referred to ἡ δρᾶ in the preceding line. This is a general doctrine of science, though Aristotle immediately exemplifies it with regard to his definition of happiness.

εἰς ὅν] is compressed for εἰς ἔκεινων εἰς ὅν. The clause τῷ μὲν—τάληθες contains an indistinctness and a difficulty overlooked by the commentators. For they content themselves with explaining that 'truth in the thought is identical with existence in

the thing.' 'Ο γάρ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ δληθές, τούτο ἡ ὑπαρξίς ἐν τῷ πράγματι. Βαρούσι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα τῷ πράγματι συνάδει τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις, δῆλον ἀν εἴη, θτι δληθες ὁ λόγος (Eustathius). The difficulty is, that Aristotle is not talking of comparing theory with facts, but his own theory with the theory of others. Τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, however, cannot exactly mean 'opinions' or 'theories.' It is plain that there is some confusion in the expressions used, which is increased by the word τάληθες in the second part of the sentence answering to τὰ ὑπάρχοντα in the first. There is here a mixing up of the objective and the subjective sides of knowledge. Our word 'experience' may perhaps serve to represent τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, meaning neither 'facts' nor 'opinions,' but facts as represented in opinions. In the same way τάληθες is not simply the true fact, nor the true theory, but 'the truth'—that is, fact embodied in theory. τὰ ὑπάρχοντα would usually mean the natural attributes of a thing, the facts of its nature. Cf. *Prior. Anal.* I. xxx. 1 (quoted above). *Eth. I. x. 7.*

2 νενεμημένων—δγάθει] 'To apply our principle (δή), goods have been divided into three kinds, the one kind being called external goods, and the others goods of the soul and goods of the body; and we call those that have to do with the soul most distinctively and most especially goods.' This

ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν. ὥστε καλῶς δὲ λέγοιτο κατά γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιὰν οὖσαν καὶ ὀμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων. ὅρθως δὲ καὶ δτὶ πράξεις 3 τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος οὗτω γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν γίνεται, καὶ οὐ τῶν ἔκτος. συνάδει δὲ 4 τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαιμονίαν σχεδὸν γὰρ εὐζωία τις εἴρηται καὶ εὐπρᾶξία. φαίνεται δὲ 5 καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἄπανθ' ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετή, τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις, ἄλ-

classification is attributed by Sextus Empiricus, *adv. Ethicos* xi. 51, to the Platonists and Peripatetics; but in the *Eudemian Ethics* II. i. 1, it is spoken of as a popular division, καθάπερ διαιρούμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑξαπερικοῖς λόγοις. Accordingly here Aristotle calls it 'an ancient division that is admitted by the philosophers.'

τὰς δὲ πράξεις—τίθεμεν] 'But vital actions and realisations have of course to do with the soul.' By these words Aristotle claims that his definition of the chief good for man (*ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια, κ.τ.λ.*) is in accordance with the received idea that 'goods of the soul' are the highest class of goods.

3 δρθῶς δὲ—ἐκτός] 'And our definition is right in that certain actions and modes of consciousness are specified as the End. For thus it comes to be one of the goods of the soul, and not one of those that are external.' πράξεις stand for the development of the moral nature of man, ἐνέργεια more generally for the development of any part of his nature into consciousness. In either case the man departs not out of himself; the good is one existing in and for his mind.

4 συγάδει—εἰσαγάγει] 'And with our definition the saying' (cf. *Eth.* i. iv. 2) 'agrees that "the happy man lives well and does well." For we have described happiness pretty much

as a kind of well-living and well-doing.'

5 φαίνεται δὲ—λεχθέντι] 'Moreover the various theories of what is requisite with regard to happiness seem all included in the definition.' There is a sort of mixed construction here, ἐπιζητούμενα being used in a doubtful sense. The meanings of the word ἐπιζητεῖν are: (1) to 'require' or 'demand,' VIII. xiv. 3, τὸ δυνατὸν ἡ φίλα ἐπιζητεῖ: (2) to 'search after,' I. vi. 15, ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μηδ' ἐπιζητεῖν: (3) to 'examine' or 'investigate,' I. vii. 19, ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν δρθήν, VIII. i. 6: (4) to 'question,' like ἀπορεῖν, IX. vii. 1. In the passage before us, τα ἐπιζητούμενα partly means 'the things demanded, or thought requisite'; partly, as going with περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, 'the discussions or investigations on the subject of happiness.' The words δὲ καὶ mark a transition from considering the merely popular opinions, to the more philosophic 'investigations' of the subject.

6 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ—συμπαραλαμβάνουσι] As we learn from the next section, Aristotle is rather running over the chief heads of opinion than giving any accurate classification of the different schools of philosophy. The opinion that identified happiness with virtue may perhaps be attributed to the Cynics; with practical thought (*φρόνησις*) to Socrates; with philosophy (*σοφία*) to Anaxagoras (cf. *Eth.*

λοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἡ τούτων τι μεθ' ἥδονῆς ἡ οὐκ ἄνευ ἥδονῆς· ἔτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐ-  
7 επηρίαν συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ  
καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες· οὐδε-  
τέρους δὲ τούτων εὐλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' ἐν  
8 γέ τι ἡ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατορθοῦν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι

x. viii. ii), Heraclitus, Democritus, &c. 'That it consisted in these things or one of these, with pleasure added or implied,' is the doctrine asserted by Plato in the *Philebus*. That 'favourable external conditions' must be included, seems to have been the opinion of Xenocrates, who attributed to such external things a δύναμις ὑπηρετική. See Essay III. p. 219.

ἢ τούτων δὲ—κατορθοῦν] One MS. omits ἢ καὶ, leaving the sentence οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὐλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' ἐν γέ τι τὰ πλεῖστα κατορθοῦν, for which Dr. Cardwell suggests the emendation κακορθοῦντας. 'It is not likely that either class should be altogether at fault, but only in some particular point, their general conclusions being correct.' This is confirmed by the interpretation of the Paraphrast: ὃν οὐδετέρους εὐλογον τῇδε ἀληθεῖας ἔτι πᾶσι διαμαρτάνειν· ἀλλὰ καθ' ἐν τις μόνον τοῖς, ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις δὲ ἀληθεύειν. But the text, as it stands above, gives a sense most in accordance with what Aristotle would be likely to say. 'Now some of these are opinions held by many, and from ancient times; others by a few illustrious men; but it is not probable that either class should be utterly wrong; rather that, in some point at least, if not in most of their conclusions, they should be right.'

8 sqq. Aristotle now proceeds to show his own coincidence with these pre-existent theories. It is to be ob-

served that he says nothing here in reference to those who made happiness to consist in 'thought,' or 'a sort of philosophy.' This is one of the marks of systematic method in the *Ethics*. He will not anticipate the relation of φρόνησις and σοφία to εὐδαμονία. The rest of the argument is very simple. (1) The definition of 'happiness,' 'vital action under the law of virtue,' agrees with, includes, and improves upon the definition that says 'virtue is happiness.' For it substitutes the evocation, employment, and conscious development of virtue, for the same as a mere possession or latent quality. (2) Such a life implies pleasure necessarily and essentially (*καθ' αὐτὸν ἥδος*); for pleasure, being part of our consciousness (*τὸ μὲν γάρ ἥδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν*, cf. *Eth.* x. iii. 6), necessarily attaches to all that we are fond of, or devoted to, or that we follow as a pursuit (*ἐκδοτῷ δ' ἐστὶν ἥδος πρὸς δ λέγεται φιλοτοιοστός*, cf. *Eth.* ii. iii. 1-3, and thus will arise out of a life of virtue to him that pursues such a life. He will experience a harmony of pleasures unknown to others (*τοῖς φιλοκαλοῖς ἐστὶν ἥδεια τὰ φύσει τῇδε*). Hence we may supersede the addition proposed by some philosophers of *μεθ' ἥδονῆς* to the conception of happiness. Our conception, says Aristotle, needs no such adjunct 'to be tied on like an amulet.' (3) He accepts the requirements of Xenocrates. External prosperity is a condition without which happiness

τὴν ἀρετὴν ἡ ἀρετὴν τινα συνῳδός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος· ταύτης γάρ ἐστιν ἡ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια. διαφέρει δὲ ἵσως οὐ 9 μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἡ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν, καὶ ἐν ἔξει ἡ ἐνέργεια. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔξιν ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι ἡ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἔξηργηκότι, τὴν δὲ ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἶδόν τε· πράξει γάρ ἔξι ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει. ὥσπερ δὲ Ὁλυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ' οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τούτων γάρ τινες νικῶσιν), οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες ὅρθως ἐπίβολοι γίγνονται. ἐστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ' αὐτὸν ἡδύς. τὸ 10 μὲν γὰρ ἥδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, ἐκάστῳ δὲ ἐστὶν ἡδὺν πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος, οἷον ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θέαμα δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ. τοῖς 11 μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτα εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα. τοι-

cannot practically exist, though it is not to be confounded with happiness.

τὴν ἀρετὴν ἡ ἀρετὴν τινα] 'Virtue or excellence of some sort.' The ambiguity of the word *ἀρετὴ* renders it impossible to be translated uniformly. It comes into the *Ethics* with the general meaning of excellence, but constantly tends to restrict itself to human virtue, and indeed to moral virtue, as distinguished from other human excellence.

9 τῷ καθεύδοντι ἡ ἄλλως πως ἔξηργηκότι] 'To one asleep, or otherwise totally inactive.' Cf. I. v. 6.

πράξει γὰρ ἔξι ἀνάγκης καὶ εὖ πράξει] Both the terms 'action' and 'well' are implied in *ἐνέργεια κατ'* *ἀρετὴν*. Εὖ πράξει, however, goes off into a different train of associations.

οὕτω — γίγνονται] 'In the same way it is they who act rightly that attain to the beautiful and good things in life.' *ἐπίβολος* repeats the metaphor of the archer, *Eth.* I. ii. 2; cf.

Aesch. *Prom.* 444, *Eth.* I. x. 14. With καλῶν κἀγαθῶν (applied to things) of Plato, *Apol.* 21 D, οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι, and below § 13.

11 τοῖς μὲν οὖν — ἡδέα] 'Now to most men there is a sense of discord in their pleasures, because they are not naturally pleasant; but the lovers of what is beautiful find pleasure in those things which are naturally pleasant.' With *μάχεται* may be compared the 'Surgit amari aliquid' of Lucretius. *Φιλόκαλος* occurs in the *Phædrus* of Plato, where it is said that the soul which in its antenatal state saw most clearly the Ideas, in life enters *εἰς γονὴν ἀνθρὸς γενησομένου φιλοσόφου* ή, *φιλοκάλον* ή *μονοκοῦ τινος* καὶ *ἔρωτικον*. Plato uses it, in accordance with his context, to denote one with a poetic feeling and love for the beautiful, like the verb *φιλοκαλέειν* in Thucydides, II. c. 40. In Aristotle the meaning is more restricted to a love of the noble in action. *Eth.* iv.

αῦτα δὲ αἱ καὶ ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν  
 12 ἡδεῖαι καὶ καθ' αὐτὰς. οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ  
 βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν  
 ἑαυτῷ. πρὸς τοὺς εἰρημένους γάρ οὐδὲ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ  
 χαίρων ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· οὕτε γάρ δίκαιον οὐδεῖς ἀν  
 εἴποι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν, οὗτ' ἐλευθέριον  
 τὸν μὴ χαίροντα ταῖς ἐλευθερίοις πράξεσιν· ὅμοιώς δὲ καὶ  
 13 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δὲ οὕτω, καθ' αὐτὰς ἀν εἶναι αἱ καὶ  
 ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαὶ γε καὶ  
 καλαῖ, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἔκαστον, εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει  
 14 περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει δὲ ὡς εἴπομεν. ἄριστον  
 ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἡδιστον ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οὐ διώ-  
 ρισται ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα·

κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, λῶστον δὲ ὑγιαίνειν·  
 ἡδιστον δὲ πέφυχ' οὐ τις ἐρεῖ τὸ τυχεῖν.

ἄπαντα γάρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίσταις ἐνεργείαις· ταύ-  
 τας δέ, ἡ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαι-

iv. 4, it means one with a noble spirit: τὸν φιλότιμον ἐπανούμεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη καὶ φίλοκαλον. φύει ἡδεῖα denotes partly things that are, ought to be, and must be pleasures, according to the eternal fitness of things, in accordance with the whole frame of the world; cf. φύει βουλητάρ, *Eth.* III. iv. 3; partly, pleasures which are in accordance with the nature of the individual—his natural state—his highest condition; cf. VII. xiv. 7, φύει ἡδεῖα ἡ ποιεῖ τρόπῳ τῇ τοιᾶσθε φύσεως, 'Things are naturally pleasant which produce an operation of any given nature' (viewed as a whole): VII. xi. 4, γένεσις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή, 'a perceptible transition into one's natural state.' On the various meanings of φύει, see below, *Eth.* II. i. 3, note.

12 δοτερ περιάπτου τινός] 'Like an amulet to be tied on.' Cf. Plutarch, *Vit. Peric.* § 38: δ Θεοφραστος ἐν

τοῖς ἡθικοῖς διαπορήσας εἰ πρὸς τὰς τύχας τρέπεται τὰ ηθη,—ἰστόρηκεν, ὅτι νοσῶν δὲ Περικλῆς ἐπισκοπούμενός τινεὶς φίλων δελεῖει περιάπτουν ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν τῷ τραχῆλῳ περιηρημένον. Cf. also Plato, *Repib.* IV. 426 B, οὐδὲν ἀπέκδαι οὐδὲ περιάπτα, κ.τ.λ.

οὐδὲ ἐτίλις ἀγαθὸς δὲ μὴ χαίρων] This anticipates *Eth.* II. iii. 1, where it is said that pleasure is the test of a ξεῖς being formed.

14 κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα] The *Eudemian Ethics* commences by quoting this inscription, rather more circumlocution being used than here. 'Ο μὲν ἐν Δήλῳ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ τῇ αὐτοῦ γράμμην ἀποφηνόμενος συνέγραψεν ἐτι τὸ πρωτόλαιον τοῦ Ληγύφου, κ.τ.λ. The last line, as there given, stands τάπτων δὲ ἡδιστον, οὐ τις ἐρεῖ τὸ τυχεῖν. The verses also occur among the remains of Theognis, and the same sentiment in iambics is found in a fragment of the *Oreusa* of Sophocles, Stobaeus Serm.

μονίαν. φαίνεται δὲ ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἔκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδε-<sup>15</sup> ομένη, καθάπερ εἴπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἡ οὐ ράδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττει ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττε-<sup>16</sup> ται, καθάπερ δι’ ὄργανων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως· ἐνίων δὲ τητώμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας, εὐτεκνίας, κάλλους· οὐ πάντι γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναίσχης ἢ δυστγενῆς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος, ἔτι δὲ ἵσως ἥπτον, εἰ τῷ πάγκακοι πάθεις εἰναι ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες τεθνᾶσιν. καθάπερ οὖν εἴπομεν,<sup>17</sup> ἔσικε προσδεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εὐμερίας· ὅθεν εἰς ταῦτὸ τάπτουσιν ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἔτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν.

“Οθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερον ἔστι μαθητὸν ἢ ἔθιστὸν;<sup>9</sup>  
ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατά τινα θείαν μοῖραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τι ἔστι<sup>2</sup>

CIII.I 5. This classification of goods—that ‘justice is most beautiful, health best, and success sweetest,’ belongs to the era of proverbial philosophy in Greece; see Essay II. p. 102.

15 ἀχορήγητον δυτα] We should say, by analogous metaphors, ‘Unless sufficiently furnished’ or ‘equipped.’ Cf. IV. ii. 20.

πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ—τεθνᾶσιν] Cf. Rhetoric, I. v. 4, εἰ δὴ ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη εὐγένειαν, πολυφίλιαν, χρηστοφίλιαν, πλούτον, εὐτεκνίαν, πολυτεκνίαν, εὐηγ-  
ρίαν, ἔτι τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετάς, οἷον ὑγείαν κάλλος ἴσχυν μέγεθος δύναμιν ἀγωνιστικήν, δόξαν, τιμὴν, εὐτυχίαν, ἀρετὴν· οὕτω γὰρ διὰ αὐταρκέστατος εἴη, εἰ ὑπάρχοι αὐτῷ τὸ τὸν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ ἔκτὸς ἀγαθόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα. The expression in the Rhetoric—‘parts of happiness,’ is equivalent to ‘instruments of happiness,’ the more accurate designation in the present passage.

17 καθάπερ οὖν—ἀρετὴν] ‘As we have said then, it seems to require the

addition of such external prosperity. Hence some identify good fortune with happiness, as another class of philosophers do virtue.’ The Cyrenaics and Cynics appear to be alluded to here. Aristotle’s doctrine contains and gives a deeper expression to all that is true in both of the two views.

IX. 1 ὅθεν—παραγίνεται] ‘Whence also the question is raised whether it (happiness) is to be attained by teaching, or habit, or any other kind of training; or whether it comes by some divine dispensation, or lastly by chance.’ • The word *ὅθεν* expresses the thread of connection, by which this new subject of discussion is introduced. Since happiness seems to be a balance of two principles, an internal one, virtue, and an external one, circumstances, the question arises whether it is attainable by the individual through any prescribed means, or whether it is beyond his control. It seems chiefly, however, to be upon the word *ἀρετὴν* that Aristotle goes

Θεῶν δώρημα ἀνθρώποις, εὐλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν θεόσ-  
δοτον εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὅσφι βέλτιστον.

3 ἄλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἵστως ἄλλης ἀν εὗτη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον,  
φαίνεται δὲ κανεὶς εἰ μὴ θεόπεμπτός ἐστιν ἄλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν  
καὶ τινα μάθησιν ἢ ἀσκησιν παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων  
εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀθλον καὶ τέλος ἀριστον εἶναι  
4 φαίνεται καὶ θεῖόν τι καὶ μακάριον. εἴη δὲ ἀν καὶ πολύ-  
κοινον· δυνατὸν γὰρ ὑπάρξαι πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις  
5 πρὸς ἀρετὴν διά τινος μαθήσεως καὶ ἐπιμελείας. εἰ δὲ  
ἐστὶν οὕτω βέλτιον ἢ διὰ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν, εὐλογον ἔχειν

off. The question of the day, *πότερον μαθητὸν ἢ ἀρετὴν*, comes before him on mentioning that some identify happiness with virtue. Thus he says, not quite distinctly, 'It is questioned whether happiness can be learnt.' The question forms an important point at issue in the ethical systems of Aristotle and of Plato. The conclusion of Aristotle is directly opposed to that which is somewhat tentatively stated at the end of the *Meno* (99 ε): *ἀρετὴ ἀν εἴη οὐτε φύσει οὐτε διδασκτόν, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παραγίγνομένη διεν νοῦ, οἷς ἀν παραγίγνεται.*

2-3 *εἰ μὲν οὖν—εἶναι]* 'Now it must be confessed that if anything else at all is a gift of gods to men, it seems reasonable that happiness too should be the gift of God, especially as it is the best of human things. But this exact point perhaps would more properly belong to another inquiry; at all events, if happiness is not sent by God, but comes by means of virtue, through some sort of learning or training, it appears to be one of the divinest things.' We have here a characteristic exhibition of Aristotle's way of dealing with questions of the kind. We may observe: (1) His acknowledgment and admission of the religious point of view, and the *prima facie* ground for the inter-

ference of Providence in this case *if in any others*. (2) His strict maintenance of the separate spheres of the sciences. A theological question cannot belong to ethics. (3) His manner of dismissing the subject. 'Happiness, if not given by God, is at all events divine' (cf. *Eth.* x. viii. 13)—by which expression he alters the view, giving it a pantheistic instead of a theistic tendency. (4) His immediate return to the natural and practical mode of thought.

4 *εἴη δὲ ἀν καὶ—ἐπιμελεῖας]* This is an addition to the preceding epithets of happiness. Not only is it 'something divine and blessed,' as being 'the crown and end of virtue,' but also 'it must be widely common property, for it may be possessed—through a certain course of learning and care—by all who are not incapacitated for excellence.' As it stands, this last clause is a *petitio principii*. Afterwards, however, the assumption is justified by arguments in its support both from reason and experience. Aristotle insisted much less than Plato on the innate difference between man and man, and approaches much more nearly to the mechanical and sophistical view, *ἀνθρώπος ἀνθρώπου οὐ τολν διαφέρει*.

5-6 *εἰ δὲ στοιχεῖ—ἀν εἴη]* The argu-

οῦτως, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἱόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὗτῳ πέφυκεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ πᾶσαν διάτιαν, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπιτρέψαι τύχη λίαν πλημμελὲς ἦν εἴη. συμφανὲς δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ ζητούμενον· εἴρη γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν ποιά τις. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὸ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ συνεργὰ

ment, which is stated in rather a complex way, seems as follows:—‘If it were better that happiness should be attainable by certain definite means, we may conclude that it is so (because in nature, art, and every kind of causation, especially in what is higher, things are regulated in the best possible way). But it is better, because the contrary supposition (namely, that the chief good should depend on chance) is simply absurd and inconceivable.’ It is an *a priori* argument, based on a sort of natural optimism, on a belief in the fitness of things. We find a similar classification of causes into nature, chance, and human skill, *Eth.* III. iii. 7, where however necessity is added. Cf. VI. iv. 4. The *ἀριστὴν αἰτίαν* here meant seems to be virtue. Cf. *Eth.* II. vi. 9, and *De Juv. et Sen.* iv. 1: *κατὰ δὲ τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὴν φύσιν δρῶμεν ἐν πᾶσιν ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν ποιοῦσαν τὸ κάλλιστον.*

7-II The succeeding arguments may be briefly summed up. (2) He appeals to his definition of the chief good, that it is a certain ‘development and awaking of the consciousness under the law of virtue, and with certain necessary or favourable external conditions.’ This definition obviously implies the contradictory of any theory making happiness merely and entirely a contingency or chance. (3) Since the chief good is the end of politics, whose main business it is to educate and improve the citizens—

this shows that education is the recognised means of happiness. (4) Animals are not called happy, because they are incapable of the above-mentioned action of the moral consciousness. (5) The same applies to boys, whose age renders them incapable of that which has real moral worth. At this point Aristotle adds that happiness requires absolute virtue, and a completed round of life (*δρεπῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου*), and he goes off into a new train of thoughts on the uncertainty of human affairs, by which he is brought into contact with the paradox of Solon.

7 τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν—*ὅργανικῶν*] The Paraphrast explains τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ here to mean τὰ σωματικά, which he divides into τὰ αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος, such as health, which are necessary to the existence of happiness (*ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον*), and τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, as wealth, friends, &c., which are helps and instruments to happiness. Aristotle probably had not this exact division before his mind. He places happiness essentially in the consciousness; and then speaks of other and secondary conditions, partly necessary and partly favourable. He in fact hovers between the ideal and the practical. Sometimes he speaks of happiness as that chief good which includes everything (*Eth.* I. vii. 8); at other times he analyses its more essential and less essential parts, and leaves in it a ground open

8 καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὄργανικῶς. ὁμολογούμενα δὲ ταῦτ' ἀν εἴη καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ τὸ γάρ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος ἄριστον ἐτίθεμεν, αὕτη δὲ πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιούς τινας καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν. εἰκότως οὖν οὔτε βοῦν οὔτε ἵππον οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν ζώων ὀνδὲν εὐδαιμον λέγομεν· οὐδὲν γάρ αὐτῶν οἶον τε κοινωνῆσαι τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας. διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἵτιαν οὐδὲ παῖς εὐδαιμων ἔστιν· οὕτω γάρ πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν· οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται. δεῖ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου. πολλαὶ γάρ μεταβολὰ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστρον εὐθηροῦντα μεγάλαις συμφορᾶς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γῆρας, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡρῷοις περὶ Πριάμου μιθεύεται· τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρησάμενον τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.

10 Πότερον οὖν οὐδὲ ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμο-

to chance and circumstances, which admits of being improved or impaired.

8 ὁμολογούμενα—τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ] ‘In agreement with what we said at starting.’ Cf. X. vii. 2: ‘Ομολογούμενον δὲ τοῦτον δόξειν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον καὶ τῷ δληθεῖ.

10 διὰ ταύτην—μακαρίζονται] In *Politics*, I. chap. xiii., it is discussed, from a more external point of view, whether boys are capable of the same virtue in a household as men. To which the conclusion is ‘Ἐπει δὲ παῖς ἀτελής, δῆλον δτι τούτου μὲν εἰς τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐκ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔστιν, διλλὰ πρὸς τὸν τελεῖον καὶ τὸν ἡγούμενον (§ 11). The boy’s good qualities have not an independent existence; they only give the promise of such. The sentiment διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται is neatly expressed by Cicero *De Rep.* (quoted by Servius on *Aen.* vi. 877): ‘O fanni, difficilis causa laudare puerum: non enim res landanda, sed spes est.’

11 εὐθηροῦντα] aliter εὐθενοῦντα. Cf. *Rhet.* I. v. 3, εὐθηρία κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων, where also there is the variation εὐθένεια.

ἐν τοῖς ἡρῷοις] aliter Τρωϊκοῖς. Dr. Cardwell quotes Bentley, who, upon Callimachus, *Fragm.* 208, pronounces that ἡρῷες is a false reading for Τρῷες. Τὰ ἡρωϊκά means ‘the heroic legends.’

X. The mention of *βίος τέλειος* and of the Πριαμικαὶ τύχαι brings Aristotle now to consider the famous paradox of Solon, that ‘no one can be called happy as long as he lives.’ The discussion of this question is valuable not only for its own sake as a criticism upon the old saying, but as introducing a practical consideration of happiness, and tending to settle the relation to it of outward circumstances. Other points of interest are mooted rather than set at rest.

ι πότερον οὖν—διεθεργῇ] ‘Must we extend this farther, and call no man

νιστέον ἔως ἀν ζῆ, κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρεὸν ὄτελος ὄρῦν; εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ θετέον οὐτως, ἅρα γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαιμων τότε ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνῃ; ἡ τοῦτο γε παντελῶς ἀτοπον, ἀλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν; εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγομεν τὸν τεθνεώτα εὐδαιμονα, μηδὲ 3 Σόλων τοῦτο βούλεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι τηνικαῦτα ἄν τις ἀσφαλῶς μακαρίσειεν ἄνθρωπον ὡς ἐκτὸς ἥδη τῶν κακῶν ὅντα καὶ τῶν δυστυχημάτων, ἔχει μὲν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησίν τινα. δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι τῷ τεθνεώτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ, οἷον τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τέκνων καὶ ὅλως ἀπογόνων εὐπαραξίαι τε καὶ δυστυχίαι. ἀπορίαν δὲ καὶ τῶντα παρέχει τῷ γὰρ μακαρίως βεβιω- 4 κότι μέχρι γήρως καὶ τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον ἐνδέχεται πολλὰς μεταβολὰς συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους, καὶ

whatever happy as long as he lives, but, according to Solon's saying, look to the end? And if we must allow this opinion, can we say that a man is happy after he is dead?' *τέλος* is here used, not in the technical Aristotelian sense, but after the common usage, as in the Solonian proverb itself. There were two ways in which this proverb might be understood. It might express: (1) That a man is positively happy after death. (2) That negatively he now attains happiness, that is, safety from change; and thus may be retrospectively congratulated.

2 ἡ τοῦτο γε—εὐδαιμονίαν] 'Nay, surely this (the first position) is altogether absurd, especially to us who define happiness to be a kind of actuality.'

3 ἔχει μὲν—τινα] 'Still even this (second way of putting it) is open to some difficulty.' It seems not so sure that the dead is safe and clear from the changes and chances of the world,—for may he not be affected by the fortunes of his posterity?

δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι τῷ τεθνεώτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι

μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ] This is the reading of all Bekker's MSS.; but the rendering of the Paraphrast is at variance with it, and seems to imply a reading of *καὶ* instead of *μὴ*. His words are: πάλιν δὲ οὐκ ἀρκοῦσα ἡ λότις δοκεῖ. Ἀπορεῖ γάρ ἔστιν ἔτι, εἰ λέγομεν εἶναι τι τῷ τεθνεώτι καὶ κακὸν τι καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ, ὥστέρ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι. 'For it is thought that the dead has, ay and feels too, both good and evil, just as much as the living.' If the common reading be retained, we must suppose Aristotle first to have stated in the mildest form the popular belief that the happiness of the dead is connected with the fortunes of his family, and afterwards (*ἀποτον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδέν*) to have expressed this more strongly. In that case, he here seems to say that ordinary opinion ascribes happiness and misery to the dead in a figure—that is, with reference to our idea of their happiness and misery; just as good and evil may be ascribed to the living who are unconscious of them.

4 τῷ γὰρ—κατὰ λόγον] 'For to him who has lived in felicity till old

τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ τυχεῖν βίου τοῦ κατ' ἄξιαν, τοὺς δὲ ἔξ ἐναντίας. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασι πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς παντοδαπῶς ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ἐνδέχεται.  
 5 ἄτοπον δὴ γίνοιτ' ἄν, εἰ συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὼς καὶ γίνοιτο ὅτε μὲν εὐδαίμων πάλιν δὲ ἀθλιος. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν μηδὲ ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον συνικείσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐκγό-  
 6 νων τοῖς γονεῦσιν. ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπο-  
 ρηθέν, τάχα γάρ ἀν θεωρηθείν καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπιζητούμενον ἔξ  
 7 ἑκείνου. εἰ δὴ τὸ τέλος ὄρᾶν δεῖ καὶ τότε μακαρίζειν  
 ἕκαστον οὐχ ὡς ὅντα μακάριον ἀλλ' ὅτι πρότερον ἦν, πῶς  
 οὐκ ἄτοπον, εἰ δὲ ἐστὶν εὐδαίμων, μὴ ἀληθεύσεται κατ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι τοὺς ζῶντας εὐδαι-  
 μονίζειν διὰ τὰς μεταβολάς, καὶ διὰ τὸ μόνιμόν τι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπειληφέναι καὶ μηδαμῶς εὑμετάβολον, τὰς δὲ

age, and died accordingly,' *κατὰ λόγον*, 'in the same ratio'; cf. below, § 15.

δῆλον δὲ—ἐνδέχεται] 'And it is plain that in their respective degrees of removal (*τοῖς ἀποστήμασι*) the descendants may stand in an infinite variety of relationships to their ancestors.' *Ἐκγονοι* apparently answers to the *δλως ἀπέγονοι* in the preceding section. The Paraphrast omits the sentence. The Scholiast gives *πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς τῶν ἀπογόνων ἀποτασσεις πολυειδῆ εἶναι καὶ ποικίλην ἀναγκαῖον ἐστιν.*

5 ἄτοπον δὴ—γονεῦσιν] 'It would be absurd, therefore, if the dead should change in sympathy with them, and become at one time happy, and then again wretched. But it would be absurd also that the fortunes of the descendants should affect the ancestors in nothing, and *not* for some time at least,' i.e. after death. The second part of this sentence, pronounced so strongly as it is, seems to contradict what one would have supposed to be Aristotle's philosophical creed. But he is here speaking from the popular point of view, and states strongly the two sides of the difficulty that presents itself. For the nonce he accepts the

common belief on the subject (cf. I. xi. 1, I. xi. 6), but modifies it so as to leave it unimportant. On the apparently indeterminate views on the question of a future life, held by Aristotle, see Vol. I. Essay V. p. 299, sqq.

6 'But let us return to the former difficulty, for perhaps the clue to our present question also may be discovered from it.' *τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν* is not a very accurate expression. Aristotle, when he stated the question now reverted to, *εἰ δεῖ τὸ τέλος ὄρᾶν*, gave it two meanings, and showed the impossibility of holding the first, and the difficulty that attached even to the second. He now says, 'let us go back to the former difficulty.' What he means, however, is clear enough. He means to say, 'may we not after all set aside the caution of Solon in whatever way it is stated? May we not predicate happiness in the present as well as retrospectively?' By settling the question as far as the present life goes, we may perhaps get some light as to the security or insecurity of the dead.'

7 τὰς δὲ τάχας πολλάκις ἀνακυ-  
 κλεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς ἀντόβις] 'And be-

τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς; δῆλον<sup>8</sup> γὰρ ὡς εἰ συνακολούθοιμεν ταῖς τύχαις, τὸν αὐτὸν εὐδαιμονα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλιον ἐροῦμεν πολλάκις, χαμαιλέοντά τινα τὸν εὐδαιμονα ἀποφαίνοντες καὶ σαθρῶς ἰδρυμένον. ἡ<sup>9</sup> τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν οὐδαμῶς ὄρθον; οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὖ ἡ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ προσδεῖται τούτων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἴπαμεν, κύριαι δὲ εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, αἱ δὲ ἐναντίαι τοῦ ἐναντίου. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν. περὶ ιο οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων βεβαιότης ὡς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς κατ' ἀρετήν· μονιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν αἱ τιμιώταται μονιμώταται διὰ τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους· τοῦτο γὰρ

cause fortune makes many revolutions around the same individuals.' Various expressions of this sentiment are quoted from the Classics. The most beautiful is that which occurs in Soph. *Trachiniae*, 127, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πῆμα καὶ χαρᾶ Πᾶσι κυκλοῦσιν, οἷον ἀρκτοῦ στροφάδες κέλευθοι.

8 χαμαιλέοντα — καὶ σαθρῶς ἰδρυμένον] It has been remarked that these words form an iambic line, probably quoted from some play.

9 ἡ τὸ μὲν—ἐναντίου] 'Rather, to follow chances is altogether a mistake, for good or evil resides not in these, but human life, as we have said, requires them as an external condition; while what determines happiness is the rightly regulated mental consciousness, and vice versa.'

10 μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν] 'And even the present difficulty witnesses to our theory,' i.e. the difficulty felt in predicating happiness, except retrospectively, betrays a latent sense that happiness must be regarded as something more stable than the fluctuations of fortune. Aristotle finds out that this more stable

essence is to be found in his own conception of happiness, since he has placed it in the individual consciousness, in that which is the life and soul of the man himself.

περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ—ληθῆν] 'For about nothing human is there so much stability, as about the most excellent moods of the consciousness, for these are thought to be more abiding even than the sciences. And the highest among them are most abiding of all, because the happy dwell in them most entirely and continuously, which appears to give the reason for their never being forgotten.' Aristotle's doctrine of the stability and permanence of mental states was inherited by him from the Cynic Antisthenes. Cf. Xenophon, *Mem.* I. ii. 19: Οὐκ ἀν τοτε δὲκαστος ἀδικος γένοιτο, οὐδὲ δὲ σάφιως ὑβριστής, οὐδὲ δλλο οὐδέν, ἀν μάθησις ἔστιν, δὲ μαθὼν ἀντιστήμαντο τοτε γένοιτο. To speak indeed of human ἐνέργειαι as μόνιμοι ποτε συνεχεῖς is a sort of contradiction of Aristotle's own philosophy, cf. *Eth.* x. iv. 9; *Metaph.* viii. 18. The more accurate expression of his principle would be to say that while the

11 ἔσικεν αἰτίῳ τοῦ μὴ γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὸν λίθην. ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαίμονι, καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτος· ἀεὶ γάρ ἡ μάλιστα πάντων πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει τὰ κατ’ ἀρετήν, καὶ τὰς τύχας οἴσει κάλλιστα καὶ πάντη πάντως ἐμμελῶς ὅ γ’ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ 12 ψόγου. πολλῶν δὲ γινομένων κατὰ τύχην καὶ διαφερόντων μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι, τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, δῆλον ὡς οὐ ποιεῖ ῥοπὴν τῆς ζωῆς, τὸ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ γιγνόμενα μὲν εὖ μακάριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσει (καὶ γάρ αὐτὸν συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαίᾳ γίγνεται), ἀνάπταλιν δὲ συμβαίνοντα θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται τὸ μακά-

'Ἐνέργεια is perpetually blooming out, and then disappearing, the "Ἐξις abides, and is ever tending to reproduce the ἐνέργεια. Life then may be regarded as a series of vivid moments, with slight intervals or depressions between; or again, ideally, as a vivid moment of consciousness, the intervals being left out of sight. Cf. Essay IV. p. 251. The ἐνέργεια then is our life and being, and it would be absurd to speak of forgetting this. It is 'more abiding than the sciences,' i.e. than the separate parts of knowledge, which do not constitute the mind itself. The opposition here is not between the moral and intellectual ἐνέργεια, as we may see from § 11, where it is said that 'the required stability will belong to the happy man, for always, or mostly, he will act and contemplate in accordance with the law of his being.' Σοφία, viewed as a mood of the mind, is as abiding as the moral qualities, and indeed admits of more continuous exercise. Cf. Eth. x. vii. 2.

*τερπλικόν* (sc. ἐνέργεια). Cf. Eth. iii. xii. 2, Pol. vii. xiii. 3, where there occur similar transitions to a neuter pronoun.

11 δὲ γ’ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετρά-

γωνος ἄνευ ψόγου] 'He that is truly good, and foursquare without a flaw.' These terms are borrowed from Simonides. They are quoted also, and discussed, in the *Protayoras* of Plato, p. 339: *ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέων Γενέσθαι χαλεπόν, χερσὶ τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νῷ Τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον.* Cf. *Rhetoric*, iii. xi. 2: *τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἴναι τετράγωνον, μεταφορά, διμφια γάρ τέλεια.* Hor. *Serm.* ii. vii. 86: *in seipso totus, teres atque rotundus.*

12 δῆλον ὡς—ποιήσει, κ.τ.λ.] The distinction between *ζωή* and *βίος* is hardly preserved. 'Good fortunes if small, obviously do not alter the balance of the life and feelings, but if considerable, and coming in numbers, they will make one's condition more blessed.' Cf. Eth. ix. ix. 9.

*καὶ γάρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκε]* 'For they naturally add a lustre.' This is said from the practical point of view, which analyses happiness into the internal mood and the external circumstances. From the ideal point of view, which takes happiness as a whole (Eth. i. vii. 8), nothing can be added to it, or make it better.

*ἀνάταλιν δὲ—μεγαλεψυχος]* 'While contrary circumstances mar and deface

ριον· λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις. δῆμος δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλύμπει τὸ καλόν, ἐπειδὴν φέρῃ τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δὲ ὑναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὥν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος. εἰ δὲ <sup>13</sup> εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνέργειαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, οὐδεὶς ἀν γένοιτο τῶν μακριών ἄθλιος· οὐδέποτε γὰρ πράξει τὰ μισητὰ καὶ φαῦλα. τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔμφρονα πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως φέρειν καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν, καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δυθέντων σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρύπον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἅπαντας. εἰ δὲ οὕτως, ἄθλιος μὲν οὐδέ- <sup>14</sup> ποτε γένοιτ' ἀν ὁ εὐδαιμων, οὐ μὴν μακάριος γε, ἀν Πρι- αμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ. οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος γε καὶ εὐμετά- βολος· οὕτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κινηθήσεται ῥᾳδίως, οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀτυχημάτων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, ἐκ τε τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἀν γένοιτο πάλιν εὐδαιμων ἐν ολίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ καὶ τελείῳ,

felicity, by introducing pains, and often hindering the play of the mind. But nevertheless, even in these, what is beautiful shines out, when one bears easily many and great misfortunes, not from insensibility, but from being of a noble and magnanimous nature.' In this place, and in *Eth.* iii. ix. 4 (where he describes the brave man voluntarily consenting to death), Aristotle exhibits a high moral tone, quite on a level with the Stoics, and which places him above the accusation of being a mere Eudæmonist.

<sup>13</sup> εἰ δὲ εἰσὶ — φαῦλα] 'Now if life is determined by its moments of consciousness, as we have said, no one of the blessed will ever become miserable, for he will never do what is hateful and mean.' *μακάριος*, which is used repeatedly here and elsewhere, is a more enthusiastic term than

*εὐδαίμων*. Though it is applied to *βίος* in the previous section, it would seem generally more applicable to the internal feelings. By a false etymology, *Eth.* vii. xi. 2, it is connected with *χαίρειν*. In the next section it is predicated negatively of the *εὐδαίμων*. 'The happy man can never become miserable—not, however, that he will retain his joyful state, if he falls into the lot of Priam.' But no very marked distinction is kept up between *εὐδαίμων* and *μακάριος*.

<sup>14</sup> ἐκ τε τῶν τοιούτων—ἐπήβολος] 'And after such he cannot again become happy in a short time, but if at all, in a long and complete period, having attained great and noble things in it.' This shows that happiness, being deep-seated, and depending on the entire state of mind (*ἕξις*), neither lost nor won easily.

15 μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν αὐτῷ γενόμενος ἐπίβολος. τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῖς ἑκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἵκανῷς κεχορηγημένου, μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον; ἡ προσθετέον καὶ βιωσόμενον οὕτω καὶ τελευτήσοντα κιτὰ λόγον; ἐπειδὴ τὸ μέλλον ἀφανὲς ἡμῖν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τέλος καὶ τέλειον 16 τίθεμεν πάντῃ πάντως. εἰ δὲ οὕτω, μακαρίους ἐροῦμεν τῶν ζῶντων οὓς ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει τὰ λεχθέντα, μακαρίους δὲ ἀνθρώπους.

11 Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω, τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων ἀπάντων τὸ μὲν μηδοτιοῦν συμβάλλεσθαι λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ παντοίς ἔχοντων διαφορὰς

15 *τὶ οὖν—πάντως?* ‘What hinders then to call him happy who is in the fruition of absolute harmony of mind and is furnished sufficiently with external goods—not for a casual period, but an absolute lifetime? or must one add—“and who shall live on so and die accordingly”—since the future is uncertain to us, and we assume happiness to be an End-in-itself and something absolute in every possible way?’ *τέλειος*, as before said, has two associations; one popular, with the common sense of *τέλος*, and thus means ‘complete’ or ‘perfect’; the other philosophic, with the End-in-itself, and thus means that which is in and for itself desirable, that in which the mind finds satisfaction, the absolute. The word here seems to hover between its two meanings. Aristotle probably was not conscious of the collision between the frequent use of *τέλειον* here and the question to which this chapter is an answer—*εἰ χρή τὸ τέλος ὅραν*.

16 *εἰ δὲ οὕτω—ἀνθρώποις?* ‘If so, we shall call those happy during their lifetime who have and still have the qualities mentioned, but still happy as

men only.’ Solon’s view, which had rested on a too great regard to external fortune, is accordingly superseded. Happiness viewed from the inside—from its most essential part—may be predicated of the living, though still with a reserve, since they are still subject to the conditions of humanity.

XI. i He returns to the question before incidentally mooted (i. x. 4), where the happiness of the dead can be affected by the vicissitudes of the world they have left. He will not altogether deny that some consciousness of events may reach the dead, but without determining this he argues that in any case the impression produced by them must be too slight and unimportant to affect our notion of the dead.

τὰς δόξας ἐναντίον] In the so-called *Menexenus* of Plato (p. 248 b) we find this opinion stated in a wavering form.—(The dead are supposed to address their surviving parents) δεδμεθα δὴ καὶ πατέρων καὶ μητέρων τῇ αὐτῇ ταντῇ διανοίᾳ χρωμένους τὸν ἐπίλοιπον φίλον διάγειν, καὶ εἰδέναι διτοὺς θρηνοῦντες θύδι διλοφυρόμενοι ἡμᾶς ἡμῖν μάλιστα

τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συνικνουμένων τῶν δ' ἡττού, κιθ' ἔκαστον μὲν διαιρεῖν μακρὸν καὶ ἀπέραντον φαίνεται, καθόλου δὲ λεχθὲν καὶ τύπῳ τάχ' ἀν ίκανῶς ἔχοι. εἰ δή, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀτυχημάτων τὰ 3 μὲν ἔχει τι βρῖθος καὶ ροπὴν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὰ δ' ἐλαφρότεροις ἔσικεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς φίλους ὄμοίως ἅπαντας. διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἔκαστον περὶ ζώντας ἢ τελευτῆσαντας συμβαίνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παρόνομα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι, συλλογιστέον δὴ καὶ ταύτην τὴν διαφοράν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἵσως τὸ 5 διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς κεκμήκότας εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν ἢ τῶν ἀντικειμένων· ἔσικε γάρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ

χαριοῦνται, ἀλλ' εἰ τις ἔστι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσις αἰσθησις τῶν ζώντων, οὕτως ἀχάριστοι εἰλεν ἀν μάλιστα, κ.τ.λ.

3-4 εἰ δὴ—διαφοράν] There is a complex protasis, (1) εἰ δὴ, (2) διαφέρει δέ. The apodosis to both is συλλογιστέον δὴ. The argument is, that we must bear in mind the difference : (1) between misfortunes in themselves, light and heavy ; (2) between those, of whatever kind, happening in our lifetime and after our death. ‘If, then, it is the same case with regard to the misfortunes attaching to the circle of one’s friends as it is with those attaching to oneself—namely, that some have a certain weight and influence upon life, while others seem lighter ; and if, again, there is a difference between the impression made by events on the living and on the dead far greater than that between crimes and horrors enacted upon the stage or only alluded to in tragedies ; we must, I say, take account of this difference.’

προϋπάρχειν—ἢ πράττεσθαι] The contrast is that between the actual representation of horrors, or the mention of them as ‘presupposed,’ and done off the stage. It is merely the principle of Horace. A. P. 181.

συλλογιστέον] This cannot mean

‘We must conclude’; else the same proposition would form both the premises and the conclusion ; but ‘we must take account of,’ i.e. we must make ‘this difference’ part of the premises we have to go upon in all reasonings about the dead. The word is used, not in its technical Aristotelian, but rather in its earlier and natural sense, according to which it meant ‘to put together the grounds of an argument.’ Cf. Plato, *Charmides*, p. 160 D : πάντα ταῦτα συλλογισάμενος εἰτὲ εὖ καὶ ἀνδρεῖως. The Paraphrast here writes σκεπτέον οὖν περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς.

5 μᾶλλον δ' ἵσως—ἀντικειμένων] ‘Or rather, perhaps’ (we must take into account, συλλογιστέον understood), ‘the fact that a question is raised about the dead, as to whether they share at all in good or evil.’ A difficulty has been made about τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι. ‘Lambinus ex Vet. Int. et Argyrop. emendat τόδε δεῖ, eamque lectionem Zwinger in textum recepit, quae hactenus commendatur, quia sequenti διδ absorberi facile poterat δεῖ et δεῖ.’—Zell. The conjecture is supported by the rendering of the Paraphrast, who separates this clause from the preceding one. σκεπτέον οὖν περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς. βέλτιον

δικνεῖται πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁτιοῦν, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τούναντίον,  
ἀφαυρόν τι καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις ἐίναι, εἰ δὲ μή,  
τοσοῦτόν γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδάίμονας τοὺς  
μὴ ὄντας μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον. συμ-  
βάλλεσθαι μὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν αἱ εὐπρα-  
ξίαι τῶν φίλων, ὅμοιώς δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι, τοιαῦτα δὲ  
καὶ τηλικαῦτα ὥστε μήτε τοὺς εὐδάίμονας μὴ εὐδάίμονας  
ποιεῖν μήτ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν.

12 Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῆς εὐδαι-  
μονίας πότερα τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἐστὶν ἢ μᾶλλον τῶν τιμίων.  
2 δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν. φαίνεται δὴ

δέ ἔστι σκέψασθαι εἰ κοιωνοῦσι, κ.τ.λ.  
But against it these appear to be con-  
clusive reasons : (1) The authority of  
MSS. (2) We should expect διατορεύν,  
and that the sentence should stand.  
μᾶλλον δ' *τοῦτο δεῖ διατορεύν.*  
(3) The alteration would really alter  
and spoil the context. Aristotle does  
not say, 'Perhaps after all we had  
better start the question anew whether  
the dead are conscious of events.'  
This would contradict § 6. He only  
says, 'While granting the hypothesis  
that they do feel, we must take into  
account the element of doubt which  
still continues to attach to the subject.'

6 This section was pronounced suspect by Victorius on account of its being a mere repetition and summing up of former conclusions. He says it is wanting in some MSS., and that it may be a scholium, though a very old one. In favour of its genuineness we may urge that it is quite in Aristotle's manner. Cf. *Eth.* III. v. 22. It is found in all Bekker's MSS., with the exception of the words *τῶν φίλων, ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι*; which are omitted in two, the omission being obviously due to the similarity of *εὐπραξίαι* and *δυσπραξίαι*. It is also recognised by the Paraphrast and Eustratius.

συμβάλλεσθαι τι] 'to contribute,'  
or 'communicate something.' Cf.  
*Eth.* III. i. 12 : μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου  
τοῦ βιασθέντος. x. x. 19.

XII. The question which occupies this chapter—namely, in which class of goods happiness is to be placed, the admirable or the praiseworthy? is one that appears of little ethical interest, to have no important scientific bearing; in short, to degenerate into a sort of trifling. Aristotle, however, who aims at verbal precision and distinctness, and again who wishes to reconcile his theory with all questions, doctrines, and forms of language of the day, appears to have thought it worth a passing consideration. We may regard the present question as the last of that series of collateral questions growing out of his definition of happiness. It is answered by being stated; for the Chief Good and the Absolutely Desirable must necessarily be above praise, which is only given to the relatively, not to the absolutely good.

1 δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ  
ἔστιν] 'For it is plain that it is not a  
merely potential good.' This implies  
a classification of goods into (1) poten-  
tial, (2) actual, which latter are sub-

πᾶν τὸ ἐπαινετὸν τῷ ποιόν τι εἶναι καὶ πρός τί πως ἔχειν  
ἐπαινεῖσθαι· τὸν γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ δλως  
τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦμεν διὸ τὰς πράξεις καὶ  
τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν καὶ τὸν δρομικὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων  
ἔκαστον τῷ ποιόν τινα πεφυκέναι καὶ ἔχειν πως πρὸς ἀγα-  
θόν τι καὶ σπουδাইον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν περὶ 3  
τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπαίνων· γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται πρὸς ἡμᾶς  
ἀναφερόμενοι, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς  
ἐπαίνους δι' ἀναφορᾶς, ὥσπερ εἴπαμεν. εἰ δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ 4  
ἐπαίνος τῶν τοιούτων, δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν  
ἐπαίνος, ἀλλὰ μεῖζόν τι καὶ βέλτιον, καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται·  
τούς τε γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν  
ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειοτάτους μακαρίζομεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν  
ἀγαθῶν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ  
δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὡς θειότερον τι καὶ βέλτιον μακαρίζει. δοκεῖ 5  
δὲ καὶ Εὔδοξος καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῇ  
ἡδονῇ· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπαινεῖσθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὖσαν μηνύειν  
ὢτεο ὅτι κρείττον ἐστι τῶν ἐπαινετῶν, τοιοῦτον δὲ εἶναι  
τὸν θεὸν καὶ τάγαθόν· πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰλλα ἀνα-  
φέρεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπαίνος τῆς ἀρετῆς· πρακτικοὶ 6

divided into praiseworthy and admirable. There is a complete commentary on the present passage to be found in the *Magna Moralia*, I. ii. 1: 'Ἐπει δὲ ὑπὲρ τούτων διώρισται, πειραθῶμεν λέγειν, τάγαθὸν ποσαχῶς λέγεται. "Εστι γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν τίμα, τὰ δὲ ἐπαινετά, τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις. τὸ δὲ τίμιον λέγω τὸ τοιοῦτον, τὸ θεῖον, τὸ βέλτιον, οἷον ψυχή, τοῦς, τὸ ἀρχαιτέρον, ἡ ἀρχή, τὰ τοιαῦτα . . . τὰ δὲ ἐπαινετὰ οἷον ἀρεταὶ . . . τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις, οἷον ἀρχή (rule), πλοῦτος, ἴσχυς, καλλος· τούτοις γὰρ καὶ δι σπουδαῖος εἰν ἀν δύνηται χρήσασθαι καὶ δι φαῦλος κακῶς, διδ δυνάμεις τὰ τοιαῦτα καλοῦνται ἀγαθά . . . λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ τέταρτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τὸ σωστικὸν καὶ τοιητικὸν ἀγαθοῦ, οἷον γηρακόσια ὑγειας καὶ εἰ τι διλλο τοιοῦτο. 3 γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται] sc. οἱ θεοί,

*Eth. x. viii. 7.* Hence in the 'Te Deum laudamus,' *laudare* is used in a different sense from *ἐπαινεῖν*.

διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους δι' ἀναφορᾶς] 'Because praise is made by a reference to some higher standard.'

5 δοκεῖ δέ—ἀναφέρεσθαι] 'Now Eudoxus also seems to have well pleaded the claims of pleasure to the first prize, for he argued that its not being praised, although it is a good, shows that it is above the class of things praiseworthy, as God and the chief good are, to whom all other things are referred.' On Eudoxus see *Eth. x. ii. 1-2*, *Essay III.* p. 218. The metaphor of the *Aristoia* here seems borrowed from the *Philebus* of Plato, p. 22 E: 'Αλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σάκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ νῦν μὲν ἡδονή σοι πεπτώ-

7 γὰρ τῶν καθῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης· τὰ δὲ ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων  
όμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα  
μὲν ἵστις οἰκειότερον ἔξακριβοῦν τοῖς περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια  
πεπονημένοις, ἡμῖν δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ  
8 εὐδαιμονία τῶν τιμίων καὶ τελείων. ἕστικε δὲ οὕτως ἔχειν  
- καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή ταύτης γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα  
πάντες πράττομεν, τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν  
τίμιόν τι καὶ θεῖον τίθεμεν.

13 Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ'

κένται καθαπέρει πληγεῖσα ὑπὸ τῶν νῦν  
δὴ λόγων τῶν γὰρ οἰκητηρίων πέρι  
μαχομένη κεῖται. κ.τ.λ.

6 Praise is of qualities : 'encomia are for achievements, whether bodily or mental.' Cf. *Rhetoric*, I. ix. 33, where the same distinction is given : ἔστι δὲ ἐπαίνοις λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς . . . τὸ δὲ ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔργων ἔστιν . . . διὸ καὶ ἐγκωμιάζομεν πρᾶξας, τὰ δὲ ἔργα σημεῖα τῆς ἔξεως ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ ἐπαίνουμεν δὲ καὶ μὴ πετραγόντα εἰ πιστεύουμεν εἶναι τοιοῦτον. Cf. *Eth. Eud.* II. 1. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον λόγος τοῦ καθ' ἔκαστον ἔργου . . . δὲ δὲ εὐδαιμονισμὸς τέλος.

7 ἀλλὰ—πεπονημένοις] 'But perhaps to go into the details of the subject belongs more properly to the writers on encomia.' πεπονημένοις, a deponent form, as in *Eth.* I. xiii. 2. Encomia in the hands of the Sophists seem to have become a complete branch of literature, so as to have been treated as a separate art with its own proper rules.

8 ἕστικε δὲ—εἰθεμεν] 'And this seems also the case from its being a principle; for we all do all things else for the sake of this. Now the principle and the cause of goods we assume to be something admirable and divine.' The two senses of ἀρχή—ἀρχή οὐσίας and ἀρχή γνώσεως (cf. *Metaph.* IV. xvii. 2), the origin of being and the origin of

knowing—the cause and the reason—seem here to flow together. Happiness, or the practical chief good, is the ἀρχή of life, as being the final cause or τέλος. In this sense ἀρχή and τέλος, the first and the last, become identical. But the idea of happiness when apprehended becomes an ἀρχή in another way—namely, a major premise or principle for action (cf. *Eth.* VI. xii. 10). When Aristotle speaks of 'something admirable and divine, the principle and the cause of all goods,' he uses terms that approach those of Plato with regard to the Idea of Good, though his point of view is different. Cf. *Essay III.* p. 204.

XIII. With this chapter commences a new division of the treatise. Aristotle now opens the analysis of the terms of his definition. If happiness be 'vital action in conformity with the law of absolute excellence,' the question arises, what this law of excellence is?—a question essentially belonging to Politics. The answer to this Aristotle gives by the aid of a popular and empirical Psychology. Without attempting to sound the depths of the subject, he assumes, as sufficient for his present purpose, a threefold development of the internal principle (*ψυχή*) into (1) the purely physical or vegetative, (2) the semi-

ἀρετὴν τελείαν, περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον· τάχα γὰρ οὕτως ἀν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας θεωρήσαιμεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλίθειαν πολιτικὸς περὶ ταύτην μάλιστα 2 πεπονῆσθαι· βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων ἔχομεν 3 τοὺς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτας, καὶ εἴ τινες ἔτεροι τοιοῦτοι γεγένηνται. εἰ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ 4 σκέψις αὕτη, δῆλον ὅτι γένοιτ’ ἀν ἡ ζήτησις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν. περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπί- 5 νης δῆλον ὅτι. καὶ γὰρ τάγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον εἶζητοῦμεν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀνθρωπίνην. ἀρετὴν δὲ λέγομεν ἀνθρω- 6 πίνην οὐ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν. εἰ δὲ ταῦθ’ οὕτως 7

rational or appetitive, (3) the purely rational. The first being excluded from all share in virtue, or human excellence properly so called; the second is considered the sphere of moral, and the third that of intellectual virtue. This division regulates the methodical arrangement of the *Ethics*. Also it may be said to have regulated almost all subsequent human thought on moral subjects. On Aristotle's general philosophy of the ψυχή see Essay V. p. 295.

2 δοκεῖ δὲ—*ὑπηκόους*] ‘This, too, seems to have been the main concern of the true politician, for he wishes to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws.’ As we find in Plato δλήθεια is the quality most characteristic of the Ideas, so κατ’ δλήθειαν here implies a thing being absolutely, deeply, essentially what it is to the exclusion of all mere seeming. The contrast here would be to those πρακτικοὶ πολιτικοὶ mentioned *Eth.* vi. viii. 2. Also to those historical and eminent statesmen whom Plato attacks in the *Gorgias*, p. 515 c sq., as having been entirely devoid of this object—making the citizens better.

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3 παράδειγμα δὲ—γεγένηνται] ‘As an instance of this we have the law-givers of the Cretans and Lacedæmonians, and if there have been any others such like.’ Aristotle seems to have inherited the preference felt by Plato and by Socrates for the Spartan constitution; not so much as a historical fact, but rather as a philosophical idea. It presented the scheme of an entire education for the citizens, though Aristotle confesses that this became degraded into a school for gymnastic.

5 περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρω- πίνης δῆλον ὅτι] ‘Now it is obviously about human excellence that we have to inquire.’ This passage would prove, if it were necessary, the indeterminate sense with which the term ἀρετὴ is introduced into Aristotle's *Ethics*. At first it appears merely as the law of excellence, quite in a general signification. Afterwards this is gradually restricted to human excellence, and then physical or bodily excellence is finally excluded.

7 εἰ δὲ ταῦθ’—*λαρπεῖται*] ‘But if this be so, it is plain that the politician must know in a way the nature of the

ἔχει, δῆλογ ὅτι δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πως τὰ περὶ ψυχῆν, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸν ὄφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύσοντα καὶ πᾶν σῶμα, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσῳ τιμιωτέρα καὶ βελτίων ἡ πολιτικὴ τῆς ἰατρικῆς. τῶν δὲ ἵτρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες πολλὰ πραγματεύονται περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶσιν. θεωρητέον δῆ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον ἴκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλείον ἔξακριβοῦν ἐργωδέστερον ἵσως ἔστι τῶν προκειμένων.

9 λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔξωτεροις λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἔνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς. οἶον τὸ μὲν ἄλλογον 10 αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον. ταῦτα δὲ πότερον διώρισται καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια καὶ πᾶν τὸ μεριστόν, ἡ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἔστιν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς

internal principle, just as he who is to cure the eyes must also know the whole body. And this holds good the more in proportion as Politics is higher and better than medicine.' A different interpretation is given by some commentators; thus Argyropulus, following the scholium of Eustatius, translates: 'Quemadmodum et eum, qui curaturus est oculos totumque corpus, de ipsis scire oportet;' as if the analogy between the *larpōs* and the *πολιτικὸς* were this, that they both are concerned to know the nature of that which they propose to benefit. The Paraphrast, however, takes it as above, referring καὶ πᾶν σώμα not to θεραπεύσοντα but to δεῖ εἰσεναι. That this is the true interpretation is rendered almost certain by a passage in Plato (*Charmides*, B, 156 B), from which the present comparison was in all probability taken: δᾶλλ' ὥσπερ ἵσως ἡδη καὶ εἰδήκοας τῶν ἀγαθῶν λατρῶν, ἐπειδὴ τις αὐτοῖς προσέλθῃ τοὺς ὄφθαλμοὺς ἀλγῶν, λέγουσι πον. ὅτι οὐχ οὐδὲ τα αὐτοὺς μάνους φειχθεῖν τοὺς ὄφθαλμοὺς λέσθας, δᾶλλ' ἀργυριάς εἴη μάνα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν, εἰ μέλοι καὶ ἀ-

τῶν δημιάτων εὑ ἔχειν· καὶ αὖ τὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν οἰσθαι ἀν ποτε θεραπεύεινται αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἀνευ δλου τοῦ σώματος πολλὴν ἀνοιαν εἶναι. The general sense here evidently is that as the oculist must know to a certain extent the rest of the body, so the politician, who has not by any means to deal with the whole of the ψυχή, must yet, in some measure, know its entire nature. This knowledge, however, is to be limited (§ 8) by a practical scope. With χαρίεντες cf. *De Sensu*, i. 4: καὶ τῶν λατρῶν οἱ φιλοσοφώτεροι τὴν τέχνην μετιόντες.

9 λέγεται—ἔχον] 'Now even in popular accounts certain points are sufficiently stated with regard to the internal principle, and we will avail ourselves of them; as, for instance, that part of it is irrational and part rational.' For an account of the ἔξωτεροι λόγοι, and for arguments showing that they do not designate a separate class of Aristotle's own works, see Appendix B to Essays.

10 ταῦτα δέ—παρό] 'But whether these are divided like the limbs of the body, and all other divisible matter,

τὸ παρόν. τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔοικε κοινῷ καὶ φυτικῷ, 11 λέγω δὲ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι· τὴν τοιαύτην γάρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἄπασι τοῖς τρεφομένοις θείη τις ἀν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις· εὐλογώτερον γάρ ἡ ἄλλην τινά. ταύτης μὲν ὅντι κοινή τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται· δοκεῖ γάρ ἐν τοῖς ὑπνοῖς ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο καὶ ἡ 12 δύναμις αὕτη, ὁ δὲ ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ' ὑπνον, ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ βίου τοὺς εὐδαιμονας τῶν ἀθλίων. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο εἰκότως· ἀρ- 13 γία γάρ ἔστιν ὁ ὑπνος τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φαῦλη, πλὴν εἴ πη κατὰ μικρὸν δικνοῦνται τινες τῶν κινήσεων, καὶ ταύτη βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιει-

or whether they are only distinguishable in conception, while in nature they are inseparable, like the concave and convex in the circumference of a circle, makes no difference for our present purpose.' The above-mentioned division of the *ψυχή*, which is attributed to Plato, *Magna Moralia*, i. i. 7, is attacked by Aristotle, *De Anima*, i. v. 26, and again, more definitely, *De Anima*, III. ix. 3. He here avails himself of it as popularly true, though he indicates also that from a higher point of view it will not hold good—that at all events it is a distinction and not a division.

11 τοῦ ἀλόγου—τινά] 'Now of the irrational division part appears common and vegetative—I mean that which is the cause of nourishment and growth; for this sort of power of the internal principle one must assume as existing in all things that are nourished, and even in embryos, and this same also in full-grown creatures, for it is more reasonable to suppose this than any other to be the cause of nutriment and growth.' Το τὸ μὲν ἔοικε κοινῷ correspond the words (§ 15), 'Βούκε δὲ καὶ φαῦλη τις φύσις, κ.τ.λ. Aristotle first

makes the irrational side double. Afterwards (§ 19) he says that, viewing it differently, you may call the rational twofold. *κοινῷ*, i.e. 'not distinctive of man.' *τελεῖος* is used in the non-philosophical sense. Aristotle's psychology is of course constructed upon a physical basis. The principle of life develops itself into perception and reason, but the lower modes of it are necessary conditions to the higher, and exist in them. So Dryden says (*Palamon and Arcite*, III. *sub fin.*) that man is

'First vegetive, then feels, and reasons last;  
Rich of three souls, and lives all  
three to waste.'

12-13 'Now excellence in this respect seems common, and not peculiarly human; for this part or faculty seems to operate especially in sleep, and the good and bad are least distinguishable in sleep. Hence they say that, for the half of life the happy are no better off than the wretched. Now this result is as might have been expected, for sleep is an inaction of the internal principle, viewed

14 κῶν ἡ τῶν τυχόντων. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἀλις, καὶ τὸ Θρηπτικὸν ἔατέον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἀμοιρον  
15 πέφικεν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι, μετέχουσα μέντοι πῃ λόγου. τοῦ γάρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν· ὅρθως γάρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ· φαίνεται δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, δο μάχεται τε καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. ἀτεχνῶς γάρ καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυμένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαιρουμένων κινήσαι τούναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως· ἐπὶ τὰναντίᾳ γάρ αἱ 16 ὄρμαι τῶν ἀκρατῶν. ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὄρῶμεν τὸ

as something morally good or bad, except so far as certain impulses may to a trifling extent reach it, and in this way the visions of the good will be better than those of the common sort.' The physical principles here enunciated are stated at length in the interesting treatises *De Somno et Vigiliâ*, *De Insomniis*, and *De Divinatione per Somnum*, which occur among Aristotle's *Parva Naturalia*. It may be sufficient now to allude to his definition of sleep and its cause (*De Somno*, iii. 30)—that it is a sort of catalepsy of the consciousness, caused by the rising of the vital warmth so as to clog the perceptive organs, and resulting necessarily from the functions of animal life, which its object is to preserve, by providing rest for them. He speaks also (*De Somno*, ¶. 15) of the nutritive particle performing its office more during sleep than waking, 'since creatures grow most during sleep.' In his discussions about dreams we find a frequent recurrence of the words here used, *κινήσεις*—δι-<sup>τη</sup>*κνοῦνται*—*φαντάσματα*. He defines a dream to be 'that image resulting from the impulsion of the sensations which arises in sleep, and is dependent on the peculiar conditions of sleep.'

(*De Insom.* iii. 19) τὸ φαντασμα τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως τῶν αἰσθημάτων δταν ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν θ, η καθεύδει, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐνύπνιον. In his excellently wise treatise on prophetic dreams he seems especially to dwell upon the fact that in dreaming the moral distinctions between men are lost, hence dreams cannot be sent by God. (i. 3) τὸ τε γάρ θεῦ εἶναι τὸν πέμποντα, πρὸς τὴν ἀλληλ ἀλογίαν, καὶ τὸ μὴ τοὺς βελτίστοις καὶ φρονιμωτάτοις ἀλλὰ τοὺς τυχόντις πέμπειν δτον. (This is well illustrated by Plato, *Republic*, ix. p. 571c sqq.) In another place, however, he connects the illusions of dreaming with the personal character, just as the coward, he says, and the lover would form different mistakes about a distant object. (*De Insom.* ii. 15). This last coincides with what is said above about the φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν. Cf. on dreams generally Aristotle's *Problemata*, xxx. xiv.

15-16 *ἔοικε δέ—ἀντιβαῖνον*. 'But there seems also to be another nature in the internal principle which is irrational, and yet in a way partakes of reason. For in the continent and the incontinent man we praise the reason, and that within them which

παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὄρῳμεν. ἵσως δὲ οὐδὲν ἥπτον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομιστέρν εἶναι τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντίβανον. πῶς δὲ ἔτερον,<sup>17</sup> οὐδὲν διαφέρει. λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο φαίνεται μετέχειν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς. ἔτι δὲ ἵσως εὐηκοώτερόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ. φαίνεται δὴ<sup>18</sup> καὶ τὸ ἀλογον διττόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰτικὸν οὐδαμῶς

possesses reason, for this exhorts them rightly, and to what is best; but there appears also to be something else in them besides the reason, which fights and strives against the reason. For just as paralysed limbs of the body, when we mean to move them to the right, go in the opposite direction to the left, so it is with the mind. For the tendencies of the incontinent are in the opposite direction to reason. In the body we see the false movement, but with regard to the mind we do not see it. But perhaps not the less ought we to believe that there is in the mind something besides the reason which is opposed to it, and goes against it.' Zell mentions a conjecture, *τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ εὐκρατοῦς*. But a slight consideration of the context shows that no change is required. It has been said that this passage exhibits the doctrine of 'human corruption.' To say this introduces a set of associations foreign to Aristotle. Aristotle's remark (1) does not go so deep as to the contrast between sin and holiness, purity and corruption: (2) it does not point out a radical and incurable defect in the whole race of man; on the contrary, he says presently that in the *σώφρων* 'all things are in harmony with reason.' However, we may well esteem the present observation, especially when first made, as one of the most penetrating

pieces of moral psychology. Aristotle's purpose is to establish the existence of a principle, *μετέχον λόγου*, which is to be the sphere of the practical virtues. This he exhibits in the case of the continent and incontinent (i.e. man in a state of moral conflict) as opposing and fighting against the reason. This is given as a fact of nature. This same fact viewed from the side of personal repentance might be well expressed in the language of St. Paul. Before attributing anything like the above-mentioned doctrine to Aristotle, we should require to examine the whole bearing of his moral theories, instead of deciding from an isolated passage.

<sup>17</sup> πῶς δὲ ἔτερον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει] This shows that Aristotle does not propose here to seek deeply for the *rationale* of these phenomena in our moral nature.

<sup>18</sup> Εἰτε δὲ λόγῳ] 'And perhaps it is still more obedient in him who is temperate and brave. For in him all things are in harmony with reason.' We have here a character supposed which unites the two first virtues of the Aristotelian table—Courage and Temperance—the virtues *par excellence* of the *ἀλογα μέρη* (cf. Eth. III. x. 1). In a person possessing both these virtues the unreasoning instincts would *ex hypothesi* have been harmonised with the reason. Book VII.

κοινωνεῖ λόγου, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πως, ἢ κατίκοον ἔστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων φαμὲν ἔχειν λόγου, καὶ οὐχ ὡσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. δότι δὲ πείθεται πως ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ ἄλογον, μηνίει καὶ ἡ νοιθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα 19 ἐπιτίμησίς τε καὶ παράκλησις. εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγου ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως 20 καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ δὲ ὡσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι. διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἡθικάς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικάς, ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἡθικάς. λέγοντες γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἡθους οὐ

viii. 5 distinguishes the σώφρων, in whom reason has complete supremacy, from the ἔγκρατης, who maintains his virtue by a conflict.

18 τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικὸν — μαθηματικῶν] ‘But the appetitive part, and generally speaking that which desires, in a way partakes of reason, inasmuch as it is subject and obedient to it. In like manner we speak of “paying attention to” one’s father or one’s friends, not in the same sense as we speak of “paying attention to” mathematics.’ Ἐχειν λόγου οὐ μετέχειν λόγου must be said of the passions in a different way from that in which it is said of the rational part of our nature. Aristotle illustrates this by adducing the use of ἔχειν λόγου with a genitive, which exhibits also a shade of variety in the meaning. With ἔχειν λόγου πατρός, cf. Eurip. *Alcestis*, 51, ἔχω λόγου δὴ καὶ προθυμίαν σέθεν. The passions are like the slave, as defined in *Politics*, I. v. 9: “Ἐστι γὰρ φύσις δοῦλος δὲ κοινωνῶν λόγου τοσοῦτον δοὺς αἰσθανεσθαι δλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν.”

τῶν μαθηματικῶν] here apparently means, not ‘the mathematicians,’ as *Euk.* I. iii. 4, but ‘mathematics,’ as vi. viii. 9. So it is taken by the Para-

phrast: Διττῶς δὲ λέγεται τὸ λόγου μετέχειν καθάπερ καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχειν. Λέγομεν γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων λόγου ἔχειν, τὸ ἐπιστρέφεσθαι πρὸς αὐτούς, καὶ οἷς κελεύοντος ἔξακολονθεῖν. λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν λόγου ἔχειν, τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ καὶ γνῶσιν τανα καὶ ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν ἔχειν. Partly there is a play on the words λόγου ἔχειν, which it is impossible to translate; and partly there is an analogy between the obedience of the passions to the reason and the submission one pays to the advice of others; and, on the other hand, between the purely intellectual process of mathematical study and the independent action of the reason itself.

20 διορίζεται—λέγομεν] ‘According to this division also is human excellence divided. For we speak of intellectual excellences, and moral excellences; philosophy, intelligence, and thought being intellectual, liberality and temperance moral. For when speaking of the moral character we do not say that a man is philosophic or intelligent, but that he is gentle or temperate: yet we praise the philosophic man also, with regard to his state of mind, and praiseworthy states

λέγομεν ὅτι σοφὸς ἡ συνετὸς ἀλλ' ὅτι πρᾶος ἡ σώφρων,  
ἐπαινούμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν· τῶν ἔξεων δὲ  
τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν.

of mind we call excellences.' The old difficulty of translating less definite ancient words into more definite modern ones occurs here. Aristotle is founding the distinction between the Intellectual and the Moral which has lasted ever since. But he uses the word *dperē* as applicable to both spheres, whereas the instinct of men, whether rightly or wrongly, inclines to confine the name of virtue and the award of praise to the moral side,—to acts or states in which the will is prominently exerted. On this point

we can trace a progress, even in the Peripatetic school, for while the sentence *ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφόν* is repeated in the *Eudemian Ethics* (II. i. 18), it is corrected in the *Magna Moralia* (I. v. 3), κατὰ γὰρ ταῦτα ἐπαινετοί λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος οὐδεὶς ἐπαινεῖται· οὐτε γὰρ ὅτι σοφός, οὐδεὶς ἐπαινεῖται, οὐτε ὅτι φρόνιμος, οὐδὲ δλῶς κατὰ τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐθέν. The last line in the first Book contains an anticipation of much that is demonstrated in Books II. and III.

## PLAN OF BOOK II.

THE Second Book of the *Ethics* goes far to determine the course of the entire succeeding work, by laying down a programme of the separate moral virtues, which is afterwards followed in Books III. and IV.; and by suggesting for future consideration the conceptions of Ὁρθὸς Λόγος and of Προσαρτεῖσις. But it cannot be said that this book itself exhibits traces of pre-conceived arrangement or artistic design. On the contrary, it bears the same tentative character as Book I. Its parts are at first confused with each other, and design seems only to grow up as the book proceeds. Its contents may be arranged under the following heads :—

- (1) A preliminary discussion on the formation of moral states. Ch. I.—IV.
- (2) The formal definition of virtue according to its genus and differentia. Ch. V.—VI.
- (3) The exhibition of this theory in a list of the separate virtues. Ch. VII.
- (4) The relation of extremes, or vices, to each other, and to the mean or virtue. Ch. VIII.
- (5) Rules for action, with a view to attaining the mean. Ch. IX.

Of these heads the first can with difficulty be divided from the second. The first four chapters implicitly contain the whole of the definition of virtue which is afterwards formally drawn out in Chapters V. and VI. And though the reservation of Ὁρθὸς Λόγος (II. ii. 2) for future analysis really afterwards gives rise to Book VI., and the account of intellectual *ἀρετή*; yet here Ὁρθὸς Λόγος is only cursorily, and by implication, identified with intellectual *ἀρετή* (*τῇ ἀρετῇ δὲ ὁρθὸς λόγος, καὶ τῷ δὲ ἔχει πρὸς τὰς*

(*ἄλλας ἀγεράς*), and the whole conception of Book VI. seems to belong to a later development of the Psychology of Aristotle, whether due to himself or to his school. Other marks of crudeness in detail will be adverted to in the notes. At the same time it would be unjust not to recognise the analytic penetration exhibited by Aristotle in the different parts of his theory of Virtue. The merit of this theory can only be appreciated by a comparison with the results which had been previously arrived at, as they exhibit themselves in Plato.

## ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ II.

ΔΙΤΤΗΣ δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς  
δὲ ἡθικῆς, ή μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας  
ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας  
δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, ή δ' ἡθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, δῆθεν καὶ  
2 τοῦνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλίνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους. ἐξ οὐ  
καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμίᾳ τῶν ἡθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγί-  
νεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, οἷον ὁ

I. i The discussion is taken up from the point last arrived at in the analysis of happiness, namely, the distinction of intellectual from moral ἀρετή. We are not immediately told that the consideration of the former is to be deferred. That indeed only comes out incidentally, when (ii. ii. 2) the discussion of ὅρθὸς λόγος is deferred, which ὅρθὸς λόγος is afterwards (vi. xiii. 3) identified with φρόνησις, the perfection of the practical reason. Here the mention made of the two forms of ἀρετή only goes to imply that neither of them is innate—that they are both acquired. After this first paragraph, the book confines itself to moral virtue, discussing how it is acquired and what is its nature.

ἡ μὲν διανοητική—ἔθος] ‘Now intellectual excellence, for the most part, takes both its origin and its growth from teaching, and therefore it requires experience and time, but moral virtue results from habit;

whence also it has, with a slight deflection, derived its name’ (*ἡθικὴ* from *ἔθος*); a derivation which is doubtless suggested by Plato, *Laws*, VII. p. 792 E: *κυριώτατον γάρ οὖν ἐμφύεται πᾶσι τῷτε* (*scil. in youth*) *πᾶν ἔθος διὰ ἔθος*. A mechanical theory is here given both of the intellect and the moral character, as if the one could be *acquired* by teaching, the other by a course of habits. That Aristotle inclined to this mechanical view has been already noticed (*Eth.* I. ix. 4). It is qualified, however, by admissions with regard to *εὐφύΐα*, *φυσικὴ ἀρετή*, &c. (Cf. III. v. 17.)

2 ἐξ οὐ—ἐγγίνεται] ‘Whence also it is plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature.’ Additional proofs of this position are subjoined. (1) The laws of nature are unalterable, and independent of habit. (2) According to the doctrine of *διαδικτεια* and *ἐπέργεια* (see Essay IV.), moral faculties are distinguished

λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἀν ἐθισθείη, ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδὲ ἀν μυριάκις ἀπὸν ἐθίζῃ τις ἄνω ρίπτων, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως ἀν ἐθισθείη. οὗτ' ἄρα φύσει οὕτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται, οὐδὲ ἀρεταῖ, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελε-

from physical faculties in that the former are developed out of acts, and do not merely find a development in acts. (3) The whole idea of legislation is based on the supposition that virtue may be cultivated. (4) The analogy of the arts shows that out of practice grows perfection. We need only compare the theory of virtue in this book with the discussions in the *Meno* of Plato, to see how immensely moral philosophy had gained in definiteness in the meantime. While becoming definite and systematic, however, it had also to some extent become scholastic and mechanical.

3 οὔτ' ἄρα—*ἔθος*] ‘Therefore the virtues arise in us neither by nature, nor against nature, but on the one hand we have a natural capacity of receiving them, and on the other hand we are only made perfect by habit.’ (Cf. *Eth.* vi. xiii. 1-2, on the relation of φυσικὴ ἀρετή to κυρια ἀρετή.) It may be well, for the sake of clearness, to collect here some of the chief applications of the word φύσις to moral subjects in Aristotle, without going into the deeper philosophy of his conception of φύσις in relation to God, &c. φύσις is defined (*Metaph.* iv. iv. 8) as ἡ οὐσία ἡ τῶν ἔχοντων ἀρχὴν κατίστασι ἐν αὐτοῖς γένεται. ‘The essence of things having their efficient cause in themselves, by reason of what they are.’ Here, then, we have two notions blended together: (1) the essence of things, their matter and form; (2) the productive principle of that essence,

which is nothing external, but in the things themselves. From this general conception, we see the term applied in various ways.

I. φύσις denotes the self-produced, or self-producing, principle, opposed especially to that which is produced by the intelligence or will of man: thus to art (*Eth.* vi. iv. 4) or to the moral will, care, or cultivation (x. ix. 6). It is that for which we are irresponsible (*ibid.*), τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει. That which comes of itself (vi. xi. 6), οὐδεὶς ἡ τηλικατα νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας οὖσης. That which is innate, and out of the sphere of the will, (vi. xiii. 1), πάσι γάρ δοκεῖ ἔκαστα τῶν ἡθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει πάσι. (III. v. 18), τὸ τέλος φύσει η δύσις δήποτε φαίνεται. It is opposed to habit, as the original tendency to that which is superinduced, (VII. x. 4) βάσις ἔθος μετακινήσαι φύσεως. Also, to the result of circumstances, (III. v. 15) τυφλῷ φύσει η ἐκ νόσου η ἐκ πληγῆς.

II. From the idea of the self-caused (*καθ' αὐτό*), it comes to mean that which is under a fixed law opposed to the variable, (v. vii. 2) τὸ μὲν φύσει δικινητόν. Or, to the arbitrary and conventional, (i. iii. 2) νόμῳ μόνον, φύσει δὲ μή. The absolute opposed to the relative, (III. iv. 3) τὸ φύσει βουλητόν.

III. It means not only a law, but also a tendency, as v. vii. 4, φύσει η δεξιὰ κρείττων.

IV. The character and attributes of a thing, whether good or bad,

4 ουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους. ἔτι δσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν. ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον· οὐ γὺρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ίδειν ἡ πολλάκις ἀκούσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνύπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι ἔσχομεν. τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἡ γὺρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες, τὰ δ' ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι. 5 μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οἱ γὺρ νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἑθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθούς, καὶ τὸ

the powers possessed by a thing, (I. iii. 4) ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις. (III. i. 7) & τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει.

V. The whole constitution of a thing, viewed as realising its proper *télos*, or the idea of good in itself, the perfect or normal state of anything. (VII. xi. 4) γένεσις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητῇ. (III. xii. 2) ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν. Cf. *Politics*, I. ii. 8: οἷον γὰρ ἔκαστον ἔστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθεῖσης, ταῦτη φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἔκαστον, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου, ἵππου, οἰκλας.

VI. The word is sometimes almost periphrastic; *Topics*, I. i. 3, ἡ τοῦ ψεύδους φύσις. Similar to this is the usage in *Eth. Nic.* I. xiii. 15: ἀλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς δλογος.

4 ἔτι δσα—ἀνδρεῖον] ‘Again, in the case of every faculty that comes to us by nature, we first of all possess the capacity, and only afterwards exhibit it in actual operation. This is clear with regard to the senses, for we did not get our senses by hearing often or seeing often, but on the contrary we used them because we had them, and did not have them because we used

them. But the virtues we acquire only after having first acted, which is also the case with the arts: for these things which we must learn before we can do, we learn by doing; as, for example, men become builders by building, and harpers by playing on the harp. In the same manner we become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions, and brave by doing brave actions.’ On the philosophy of this doctrine, see Ar. *Metaph.* VIII. viii. and *Essay IV.* above, from which it will be seen that ‘acts’ or ‘operations’ is an inadequate translation for *ἐνέργεια*. On Aristotle’s position with regard to the question whether sight is an inherent or an acquired faculty, see below, VI. viii. 9, note.

τῶν ἀλλων τεχνῶν] ‘The arts beside,’ not as if virtue were reckoned among the arts. On the idiom, cf. Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 473 C: εὐδαιμονίζεμεν ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἀλλων ξέρων. of ἀλλας seems to imply a separate class in juxtaposition, as in the French idiom, ‘vous autre.’ Cf. *Eth.* II. ii. 8: ἔτι τῷριν ἀλλων τῶν βανερωτέρων.

μὲν βοῦλημα παντὸς νομοθέτου τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὃσι οὐδὲ μὴ εὐ  
αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν ἀμαρτάνουσιν, καὶ διαφέρει τοῦτῳ πολιτεία  
πολιτείας ἀγαθὴ φαῦλης. ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν 6  
αὐτῶν καὶ γίνεται πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καὶ φθείρεται, ὁμοίως δὲ  
καὶ τέχνῃ ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ  
κακοὶ γίνονται κιθαρισταί. ἀνάλογον δέ καὶ οἱ οἰκοδόμοι  
καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὐ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγα-  
θοὶ οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς κακοί. εἰ γὰρ μὴ 7  
οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἀν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἀν  
ἔγινοντο ἀγαθοὶ ή κακοί. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν  
ἔχει πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς  
πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι,  
πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐθίζόμενοι φοβεῖσθαι  
ή θαρρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι οἱ δὲ δειλοί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ  
περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀργάς οἱ μὲν  
γὰρ σώφρονες καὶ πρᾶοι γίνονται, οἱ δὲ ἀκόλαστοι καὶ  
ὅργιλοι, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὐτωσὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι, οἱ  
δὲ ἐκ τοῦ οὐτωσί. καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνερ-  
γεῖσιν αἱ ἔξεις γίνονται. διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀπο-

6 οὐτι ἐκ—κιθαριστα] ‘Again, every virtue, as well as every art, is produced out of and by the same things that destroy it; for it is by playing on the harp that both good and bad players are formed.’

*ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν] i.e. the circumstances and acts are generically the same, only differing as to well and ill. The doctrine here stated is no doubt true, with an addition. For it must not be supposed that all men start equal, either as artists or in morals. What is it that determines the well or ill of the first essays in art or in action? In the one case we say genius, talent, aptitude, or the reverse; in the other case, *εὐφύτα* or the natural bent of the character as modified by circumstances. Such a difference between man and man is*

quite admitted in the New Test., see Matt. xxv. 14-30.

*7 καὶ ἐν δη—γνωρια]* ‘And, in one word, states of mind are formed out of corresponding acts.’ This is Aristotle’s famous doctrine of habits, to appreciate the importance of which, we must think of it not as a philosophic or even as a practical doctrine for modern times, but rather as a new discovery and in contrast with the state of moral science in Aristotle’s own time. We can see that it arose in his mind from a combination of his penetrating observation and experience of life with the peculiar forms of his philosophy. By means of *δύναμις* and *ἐρέψεια*, he finds it possible to explain the formation of virtue, just as he does the existence of the world. In each act and mo-

διδόναι· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκόλουθοῦσιν αἱ ἔξεις. οὐ μίκρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὔτως ἡ οὔτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

2 Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἔνεκά ἐστιν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι (οὐ γὰρ ἵν' εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμενθα, ἀλλ' ἵν' ἀγαθοὶ χειρώμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν δῆθελος αὐτῆς), ἀναγκαῖον ἐστι σκέψασθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις, πῶς πρακτέον αὐτάς· αὗται γάρ εἰσι κύριαι καὶ τοῦ ποιᾶς γενέσθαι τὰς ἔξεις, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὄρθον λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω,

ment at the outset of life, something which was potential in us and quite indeterminate for good or evil (*δύναμις*) is brought into actuality (*ἐνέργεια*), and now is determinately either good or bad. This determination, by the law of habits, reproduces itself, and thus there is no longer left an ambiguous *δύναμις*, but a *ἔξις*, or definite tendency for good or evil, is superinduced (see Essay IV. p. 239, sqq.) It will be observed that why an act tends to reproduce itself Aristotle does not inquire. He contents himself with stating the fact as a universal law, and expressing it in his own formula:—(τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ δρχή, I. vii. 20).

II. 1 [Ἐπεὶ οὖν—εἰρήκαμεν] ‘Since then this present science does not aim at speculation, like the others (for we do not inquire in order to know what virtue is, but in order that we may become virtuous, else there would be no profit in the inquiry), it is necessary to consider with regard to actions how they should be done; for these are what determine the quality of the states of mind which are produced in us, as before stated.’ *πραγματεία* is used by Aristotle and his commentators to denote the whole body of a separate science,

ἡ φυσικὴ πραγματεία, ἡ πολιτικὴ πραγματεία, &c. In Plato the word only occurs in a general sense, denoting ‘business,’ ‘undertaking,’ ‘employment,’ &c. *ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι*. According to this classification, sciences will be divided into speculative and practical; elsewhere a third class is added, the productive. On Aristotle’s conception of the nature of *Politics*, see above, I. ii. 8, 9, notes.

*αὐτῆς*] Sc. τῆς σκέψεως or τῆς πραγματείας.

*αὐταὶ γάρ*] i.e. αἱ πράξεις, which are thus identified with the *ἐνέργειαι* of the last chapter.

2 τὸ μὲν οὖν—*dperds*] ‘That we must act according to the right law—this indeed is a general principle, and may be assumed as a basis of our conception—but we shall discuss hereafter, both what the right law is, and how it is related to the other virtues.’ The meaning of *κοινόν* is made plainer by VI. i. 2 *infra*. Εστι δὲ τὸ μὲν *εἰπεῖν* (scil. κατὰ τὸν ὄρθον λόγον) διηθὲς μέν, οὐδὲν δὲ σαφές. The Paraphrast has in the present passage, διηθὲς μέν, οὐδὲν δὲ ικανὸν τὰς πράξεις σημᾶναι. Cf. *Eth.* I. vii. 9.

*ὑποκείσθω*] The MSS. are at issue upon this word, the number of them giving *ὑπερκείσθω*, which reading is followed by the Paraphrast. *ὑπερκείσθω*

ρήθησεται δὲ ὑστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί ἐστιν ὁ ὄρθος λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. ἐκεῖνο δὲ προ- 3 διομολογείσθω, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν λόγος τύπω καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ κιτ' ὑρχὴς εἴπομεν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ὑλην οἱ λόγοι ἀπαιτητέοι· τὰ δὲ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδὲν ἐστηκὸς ἔχει, ὥσπερ

would mean, ‘must stand over,’ and it would be taken in close connection with the *ρήθησεται δὲ ὑστερον*. But the authority of Bekker and the usage of Aristotle seem sufficient to establish *ὑποκείσθω*. Cf. *Eth.* II. iii. 6, v. i. 3, *Rhet.* I. xi. 1: *ὑποκείσθω δὲ ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν τυπα τῆς ψυχῆς.* *Pol.* VII. i. 13: *νῦν δὲ ὑποκείσθω τοσοῦτον,* κ.τ.λ.

κατὰ τὸν ὄρθον λόγον] We find the phrase *ὄρθος λόγος* occasionally occurring in Plato, thus *Phædo*, p. 73 A, it is coupled with *ἐπιστήμη—εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὄρθος λόγος*, where it means ‘a sound understanding.’ In the same dialogue, P. 94 A, it occurs with the signification ‘sound reasoning.’ κατὰ τὸν ὄρθον λόγον κακὰς οὐδεμίᾳ ψυχὴ μεδέξει, εἰκεῖται ἀρμονία ἐστίν. Elsewhere λόγος is found joined with φρόνησις. Cf. *Repub.* IX. p. 582 A, *ἔμπειρα καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ*. It is easy to see that *ὄρθος λόγος* was in Plato a floating idea; in Aristotle it is passing into a fixed idea, as is the case with many other terms of psychology and morals. But even in Aristotle something indefinite must still attach to a word used in such a variety of kindred senses as λόγοσις. It means ‘argument’ (*Eth.* x. ii. 1, *ἐπιστεύοντο δὲ οἱ λόγοι,* I. v. 8, *πολλοὶ λόγοι*), ‘inference,’ opposed to intuition (VI. viii. 9, *ὅν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος*), ‘ratio’ (v. iv. 2, *κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτόν*), ‘reckoning’ (v. iii. 15, *ἐν ἀγαθοῦ λόγῳ*), ‘conception’ (I. vi. 5, *ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος δὲ τοῦ νιθρώπου*), ‘definition’ or ‘formula’ (II. iii. 9,

ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διαρίζεται. II. vi. 7, τὸν λόγον τὸν τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα), ‘theory’ as opposed to ‘fact’ (x. viii. 12, *λόγους ὑποληπτέον*), &c. In *Eth.* I. xiii. 9, τὸ δὲ λόγον ξεῖον, it means ‘reason,’ but still in the present passage it seems best to avoid translating *κατὰ τὸν ὄρθον λόγον*, ‘according to right reason,’ as is usually done, (1) because of the article, which seems to show that λόγος is used in a general sense here, and not to denote a particular faculty of the mind; (2) in reference to the train of associations which must have been in Aristotle’s mind, of ‘standard,’ ‘proportion,’ ‘law,’ &c. (see *Essay IV.* p. 257).

πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς] These words cursorily imply that ὁ ὄρθος λόγος is an ἀρετὴ, if indeed τὰς ἄλλας is not to be explained as above, i. 4, note.

3-4 τὰ δὲ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι κυ-  
βερνητικῆς] ‘Now the actions and the interests of men exhibit no fixed rule, as far more than the conditions of health do. And if this is the case with the universal theory, still more is the theory of particular acts incapable of being exactly fixed, for it falls under the domain of no art or regimen, but the actors themselves must always watch what suits the occasion, as is the case with the physician’s and the pilot’s arts.’ τὰ δὲ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα refers to the two classes specified, *Eth.* I. iii. 2, 3, τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια—τοιαύτην δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τάχαδα κ.τ.λ. On the meaning of τὰ συμφέροντα in morals, cf. *Eth.* III. i. 15, note.

4 οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινά. τοιούτου δ' ὄντος. τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τάκρι-  
βες· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην οὕθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν  
πίπτει, δεῖ δ' αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν  
καιρὸν σκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς  
5 κυβερνητικῆς. ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὄντος τοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος  
6 λόγου πειρατέον βοηθεῖν. πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον,  
ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπὸ ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθεί-  
ρεσθαι, (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυ-  
ρίοις χρῆσθαι) ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἴσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ὄρω-  
μεν· τά τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλεί-  
ποντα φθείρει τὴν ἴσχυν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ

[τὰ ὑγιεινά] Aristotle is fond of the analogy between health and morals. He speaks of health as a relative, not an absolute, balance of the bodily constitution, cf. *Eth.* x. iii. 3.

[τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου] It seems an over-statement of the uncertainty and relative character of morals, to say that 'the universal theory' is devoid of all fixedness. Rather it seems true to say (1) That in some things there is an absolute, immutable law of right and wrong. This Aristotle would himself acknowledge. (Cf. *Eth.* ii. vi. 19, 20.) (2) That in a large class of cases there is a law universal for the conduct of all men, but admitting also of modification in relation to the individual. (3) That there is a sphere of actions yet remaining, indeterminate beforehand, entirely depending on, relative and temporary circumstances for their determination. Aristotle however may say with truth that, on the one hand, the theory of action cannot be reduced to universal axioms, like those of mathematics; on the other hand, that it is impossible to do what the casuists would attempt, namely, to settle scientifically the *minutiae* of particular actions.

[5 πειρατέον βοηθεῖν] This is said in the spirit of the Platonic Socrates, only the uncertainty which Aristotle attributes to morals, he, from a different point of view, attributed to all knowledge.

6 δεῖ γὰρ—χρῆσθαι] 'For in illustration of immaterial things we must use material analogies.' This sentence is repeated in the *Magna Moralia* (i. v. 4) with a context that seems at first sight startling, δεῖ δὲ η̄ ἐνδεῖα καὶ η̄ ὑπερβολὴ φθείρει, τούτ' ίδεῖν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ήθικῶν. Δεῖ δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι. One might almost fancy that the writer was quoting the *Ethics* of Aristotle. Spengel, however (Transactions of Philos.-Philol. Class of Bavarian Academy, III. 513), remarks that the true reading must be not ἐκ τῶν ήθικῶν, but ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, confirming this conjecture by the words of Stobaeus, who with regard to the Peripatetic ethics says, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐνδεῖξιν τούτου τοῖς ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων μαρτυρίοις χώνται. The writer therefore is only borrowing, not quoting, from Aristotle.

[ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἴσχύος—ἴσχυν] Taken perhaps from Plato, cf. *Euth.*, p. 134, where, to prove that philosophy is not

σιτία πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γινόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὔξει καὶ σώζει. οὐτως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν· ὅτε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ μηδὲν ὑπομένων δειλὸς γίνεται, ὅτε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλαστος, ὁ δὲ πάσας φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγροίκοι, ἀναίσθητός τις· φθείρεται γὰρ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος σώζεται. ἀλλ' οὐ<sup>8</sup> μόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αἱ αὔξήσεις καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίγονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὐτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἴσχυος· γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν τροφὴν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα δύναται ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὁ ἴσχυρός. οὕτω<sup>9</sup> δὲ ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἐκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνάμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας· ἐθίζόμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.

*πολυμαθία, Socrates argues that φιλογυμναστία is not πολυτονία, but exercise in moderation. To which his opponent agrees (c), 'Αλλ' ὁμοιογώ μή τὰ πολλὰ ἀλλὰ τὰ μέτρια γυμνάσια τὴν εὐέξιαν ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. Τί δὲ τὰ σιτία; τὰ μέτρια η τὰ πολλά; κ.τ.λ. There are three points which this chapter and the next contribute tentatively to the theory of virtuous actions: (1) From the analogy of life, health, and strength, they must exhibit the law of the balance between extremes; (2) Virtue reproduces the actions out of which it was formed; (3) It is essentially concerned with pleasure, and is indeed entirely based on a regulation of pleasures and pains.*

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<sup>8</sup> ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον—*ἰσχυρός*] 'But not only do the formation, the increase, the destruction of these qualities arise out of the same given circumstances, and by the same means,—the exercise also of the qualities, when formed, will be in the same sphere. We see this to be the case with things more palpable, as for instance strength. For it arises out of taking much food and enduring much toil, and these things the strong man is especially able to do.' Virtue is developed out of, and finds its development in, the same class of *ἐνέργειαι*. But only those which succeed the formation of virtue are to be called virtuous; see below, Chapter IV.

οο

3 Σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἔξεων τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἡ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων, ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἡ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρεῖος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός. περὶ ἡδονᾶς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἔστιν ἡ ηθικὴ ἀρετή· διὰ μὲν

III. 1 Σημεῖον δὲ—δειλός] ‘Now we must consider the test of a formed state of mind to be the pleasure or pain that results on doing the particular acts. For he who abstains from bodily indulgence, and feels pleasure in doing so, is temperate, but he who does it reluctantly is intemperate; and he who endures danger gladly, or at all events without pain, is brave, while he that does it with pain is a coward.’ The doctrine expressed here has been already anticipated, *Eth.* I. viii. 12. It is an ideal perfection of virtue, in which all struggle has ceased, and nothing but pleasure is felt in the virtuous acts. Temperance and courage are pictured in this ideal way, *Eth.* I. xiii. 17. The terms *ἀκόλαστος* and *δειλός* above seem used merely as the contradictories of *σώφρων* and *ἀνδρεῖος*, so that *ἀκόλαστος* has not the more technical sense which it receives farther on in the treatise. According to Aristotle’s expanded doctrine, to abstain with difficulty, or to meet danger with reluctance, shows not intemperance or cowardice, but only imperfect self-control.

περὶ ἡδονᾶς, γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἔστιν ἡ ηθικὴ ἀρετή] ‘For moral virtue has to do with pleasures and pains.’ On this sentence the chapter goes off, giving proofs of what is here affirmed. These proofs, to some extent, run into each other, and the whole chapter may be accused of want of method, both in itself and in relation to the

entire Ethics. But we must remember that there is still something tentative about Aristotle’s theory of virtue; that psychology was still in its infancy; that Aristotle was only gradually winning his way to establish moral virtue as a state of the will in contradistinction to former systems, which had confounded it with a state of the intellect. From this point of view we may see the importance of urging the close connection of morality with the feelings, instincts, desires, in short with pleasures and pains. The arguments are: (1) Pleasures and pains induce and deter; whence Plato said that true education consists in learning to like and dislike the right things. (2) Virtue is an affair of actions and feelings, hence of pleasure and pain, which are inseparable from these. (3) Punishment consists in pain, and therefore vice, which it corrects, must consist in pleasure. (4) So much have pleasures and pains to do with the corrupting of the mind, that some have defined virtue to consist in insensibility to these. (5) There are three principles which form the motives for action: the good, the profitable, the pleasant. Of these, the last is in itself the most widely extended, and it enters into both the others. (6) Pleasure is a natural instinct from infancy upwards, which it is impossible to get rid of. (7) We all, in a greater or less degree, adopt pleasure and pain as the measure of actions. (8) The very difficulty of contending with

γάρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. διὸ δεῖ ἥχθαι πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, 2 ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, ὅστε χάρειν τε καὶ λυτεῖσθαι οἰς δεῖ· ἡ γάρ ὄρθη παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. ἔτι δὲ εἰ ἀρεταὶ 3 εἰσι περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη, παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ πάσῃ πράξει ἔπειται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας. μηνύουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολάσεις γινό- 4 μεναι διὰ τούτων· ἰατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι. ἔτι, ὡς καὶ πρότερον 5

these motives proves their claim to be the matter of virtue, and the objects of the highest science, namely, Politics. A glance at these arguments is sufficient to show that they might have been more scientifically stated. It is obvious that they are written previously to Aristotle's analysis of pleasure, as it appears in Book X. The deeper method would have been to state the connection of pleasure with ἐνέργεια, and of ἐνέργεια with moral virtue on the one hand, and happiness on the other.

2 ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν] The reference is to Plato, *de Legibus*, II. p. 653 Δ: Λέγω τοιν τῶν ταῖδων παιδικὴν εἶναι πρώτην αἰσθησιν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς καὶ κακία παραγίγνεται πρῶτον, ταῦτ' εἶναι—παιδεῖαν δὴ λέγω τὴν παραγιγνομένην πρῶτον παισιν ἀρετὴν, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ φίλα καὶ λύπη καὶ μίσος ἀν δρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωται μήπω διναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον συμφωνήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ, δρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐθῶν· αὐτῆς θ' ἡ ξυμφωνία ξύμπασα μὲν ἀρετῇ, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας τεθραμμένον αὐτῆς δρθῶς, ὅστε μισεῖν μὲν ἡ χρή μισεῖν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἡ χρή στέργειν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸν ἀποτελῶν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παιδεῖαν προσαγορεύων κατά γε τὴν ἐμήν δρθῶς ἀν προσαγορεύοις.

4 αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι] ‘But it is the

nature of remedies to be the contrary of that which they cure.’ This principle is stated by Hippocrates, *Aphorism xxii.* § 2, and repeated *Eth. x. ix. 10.*

5 ἔτι, ὡς καὶ πρότερον—προστίθεται] ‘Again, as we have already said, every mental state is essentially related to, and concerned with, those things by which it is naturally made worse or better; now our mental states are corrupted by pleasures and pains from pursuing and avoiding them, either those which one ought not, or at the wrong time, or in the wrong manner, or whatever other points of the kind are specified in the definition. Hence it is that people define the virtues to be certain apathies and quietudes,—not rightly, however, because they state this absolutely without adding, “as is right,” and “as is wrong,” and “at the proper time,” and all the other qualifications.’

ὡς καὶ πρότερον] The Laurentian MS. (K<sup>b</sup>) reads ὡς καὶ πρώην, which is adopted by Dr. Cardwell. But there does not seem to be any instance of a similar usage in Aristotle, by which πρώην might be justified. The reference is to the preceding chapter, §§ 8, 9, where it is stated that virtue finds its development in those same acts and feelings out of which it sprung.

εἴπομεν, πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἔξις, ὑφ' οἶων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν ἔχει· δὶς ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας· φαῦλαι γίνονται, τῷ διώκειν ταῦτας καὶ φεύγειν, ἢ ἀς μὴ δεῖ· ὅτε οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὁσαχῶς ἄλλως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα. διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἡρεμίας· οὐκ εὖ δέ, ὅτι ἀπλῶς λέγονται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, 6 καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται. ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας τῶν βελτίστων 7 πρακτική, ἡ δὲ κακία τούναντίον. γένοιτο δ' ἀν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν ἔτι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. τριῶν γάρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ τριῶν τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγάς, καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδεός, καὶ τριῶν τῶν ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ βλαβεροῦ λυπηροῦ, περὶ πάντα μὲν ταῦτα ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορθωτικός ἔστιν ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀμαρτητικός, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· κοινή τε γάρ αὕτη τοῖς ζώοις, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἱρέσιν παρακολούθει· καὶ γάρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμ-

ἀς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ] The οὐ must be taken immediately with δεῖ, so as to form a positive conception, 'when it is wrong'; else of course μὴ would be required.

ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου] Not 'by reason,' but 'by the formula of definition.' Cf. *Physics*, II. ix. 5: *καὶ τὸ τέλος τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ δρισμοῦ καὶ τοῦ λόγου.* The notion of a regular formula for defining virtue occurs *Eth.* vi. xiii. 4: *Σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γάρ νῦν πάντες, θεατρὶσθωται τὴν ἀρετὴν, προστιθέασι τὴν ἔξιν, εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς Δ. ἔστι, τὴν κατὰ τὸν δρόσον λόγον.*

διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται] Especially the Cynics, but other philosophers also, as, for instance, Democritus, who seems to have placed the highest good in *drapazla*. Cf. Stobæus, *Ecl.* II. 76: *τὴν δὲ εὐδημίαν καὶ εὐεστῶ καὶ ἀδυοντας συμμετρίαν τε καὶ ἀραπαζλαν καλεῖ.* Aristotle appeals to this definition, as being an evidence, though an over-statement, of the truth that

vice is often caused by the pursuit of pleasure. He appeals to a similar over-statement of the truth that prosperity is necessary for happiness, *Eth.* I. viii. 17.

οὐκ εὖ δέ, ὅτι ἀπλῶς] Amongst other oppositions, ἀπλῶς is frequently opposed to *κατὰ πρόσθετον*, or *προσθήκην*, 'absolutely' opposed to 'with a qualification.' Cf. *Eth.* VII. iv. 3: *οὐ κατὰ πρόσθετον . . . δλλ' ἀπλῶς μόνον.* This shows the force of *προστίθεται* above.

6 ὑπόκειται—τούναντίον] 'We may begin by assuming then, as a ground for future inquiries, that this kind of excellence (i.e. moral) is concerned with pleasures and pains, and tends with regard to them to the performance of what is best, while vice is the opposite.' The chapter might have ended here, but Aristotle re-opens the discussion with fresh arguments and again sums it up in § 11.

φέρον ἥδυ φαίνεται. ἔτι δ' ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέ-<sup>8</sup>  
θραπταὶ διὸ χαλεπὸν ἀποτρίψασθαι τοῦτο τὸ πάθος  
ἐγκεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ. κανονίζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις,  
οἱ μὲν μᾶλλον οἱ δ' ἥπτον, ἥδυν καὶ λύπη. διὰ τοῦτ'<sup>9</sup>  
οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ τῶν ὅσαν πραγματείαν·  
οὐ γάρ μικρὸν εἰς τὰς πράξεις εὖ ἡ κακῶς χαίρειν καὶ λυ-  
πεῖσθαι. ἔτι δὲ χαλεπότερον ἥδονῆ μάχεσθαι ἡ θυμῷ,<sup>10</sup>  
καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπότερον ἀεὶ<sup>11</sup>  
καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή· καὶ γάρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν  
τούτῳ. ὅστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ἥδονὸς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα  
ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ· ὁ μὲν γάρ  
εὖ τούτοις χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ὁ δὲ κακῶς κακός. ὅτι  
μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἥδονὸς καὶ λύπας, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν  
γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ αὔξεται καὶ φθείρεται μὴ ὠσαύτως  
γινομένων, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ τῶντα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ,  
εἰρήσθω.

'Απορήσειε δ' ἄν τις, πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια 4

8 ἔτι δ' ἐκ νηπίου—λύπη] 'Again, it has grown up along with us all from our infancy, and this makes it hard to rub off a feeling that is ingrained into our life. And all of us, in a greater or less degree, make pleasure and pain our standard of actions.'

χαλεπὸν ἀποτρίψασθαι — ἐγκεχρωσμένον] The metaphor, though not its precise application, seems taken from Plato, *Repub.* iv. p. 429 D, where the effects of right education are compared to a dye, with which the mind is to be imbued, so as to resist the deterersive effects of pleasure and pain.

10 ἔτι δὲ—'Ἡράκλειτος] 'Again, it is harder to contend with pleasure than with anger, which, as Heraclitus says, is a hard antagonist.' The saying of Heraclitus is given in full, *Politics*, v. xi. 31: ἀφειδῶς γάρ ταυτὸν θέουσιν οἱ διὰ θυμὸν ἐπιχειροῦντες, καθάπερ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος εἴπε,

χαλεπὸν φάσκων εἶναι θυμῷ μάχεσθαι· ψυχῆς γάρ ὀνεῖσθαι (i.e. that men are ready to gratify their anger at the cost of their life). It is repeated also *Eth. Eudem.* II. vii. 9. We see that Heraclitus only spoke of anger; the comparison of anger with pleasure is not due to him.

IV. 1 'Απορήσειε δ' ἄν τις] The theory thus far given of the γένεσις of virtue is now supplemented by the starting and answering of a difficulty. The theory, as stated, is a paradox. How can it be said that we become just by doing just things? If we do just things we must be just already, as he that performs music is already a musician. The answer to this difficulty is (1) in the arts, to whose analogy appeal is made, mere performance is no proof of art. The first essays of the learner may by chance, or by the guidance of his master (ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ μᾶλλον ὑποθεμένου), at-

πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ σώφρονα, ἥδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ μουσικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. ἡ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γάρ γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου. τότε οὖν ἔσται γραμματικός, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ γραμματικῶς· τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμματικήν. 3 ἔτι οὐδὲ δημοιόν ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· τὸ μὲν γάρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὑρέχει ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτα πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δικαίως η σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων πως ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς, ἔπειτ' ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον καὶ ἐὰν βεβαιώς καὶ

tain a sort of success and an artistic appearance, but the learner is no artist as yet. (2) *A fortiori*, if mere performance is no proof of art, much less is it any proof of morals. For the outward result in art is something sufficient in itself. But the outward act in morals is not enough. Hence those ‘just acts’ by which we acquire justice, are, on nearer inspection, not really just; they want the moral qualification of that settled internal character in the heart and mind of the agent, without which no external act is virtuous in the highest sense of the term. (3) As Aristotle rarely meets a difficulty arising out of his theories, without adding something in depth or completeness to those theories, so here he deepens the conception of virtue previously given, by urging that knowledge is the least important element in it; and that philosophy without action is impotent to attain it.

3 Knowledge; purpose; purity of purpose (*προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτὸν*), formed and settled stability of cha-

racter, are the internal requisites for constituting a good act. Knowledge is necessary to, and presupposed in, purpose. We are told presently that knowledge is of slight or no avail for virtue, while the other elements are all in all (*πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι μικρὸν η οὐδὲν λογίζεται, τὰ δ' ἀλλὰ οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ τὰς δύναται*). This is a reaction against the Socratico-Platonic doctrine that virtue consists in knowledge; but Aristotle only means to say—that knowledge, if taken by itself, if separate from the will, if merely existing in the intellect, is of no avail. We find afterwards a strong statement of the opposite view,—that he who has φρόνησις has all the virtues. *Eth.* vi. xiii. 6, vii. ii. 5.

*προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά]* Here would have been the place for introducing an allusion to the doctrine of moral obligation, had such formed part of Aristotle's system. But he says not that ‘good acts must be done with a feeling of duty,’ but that ‘they must be chosen for their own sake.’ A

ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ. ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ συναριθμεῖται, πλὴν αὐτὸν τὸ εἰδέναι πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι μικρὸν ή οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται, ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα περιγίνεται. τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν 4 η τοιαῦτα οἷα ἀν ὁ δίκαιος ή ὁ σώφρων πράξειεν. δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα πράττων, ἀλλα καὶ ὁ οὗτω πράττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ οἱ σώφρονες πράττουσιν. εὐ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται 5 καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἀν οὐδὲ μελλήσει γενέσθαι ἀγαθός. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν 6 λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἐσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιόν τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς κάμενοισιν, οἱ τῶν ιατρῶν ἀκούοντες μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ' οὐθὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνοι εὐ ἔξουσι τὸ σῶμα οὗτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδὲ οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὗτω φιλοσοφοῦντες.

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον. ἐπεὶ οὖν 5 τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστί, πάθη δυνάμεις ἔξεις,

good act must be chosen, loved, and done because it is beautiful (*θετικάλόν*). Aristotle does not analyse further than this.

*ἀμετακινήτως*] No point is more insisted on in these *Ethics* than the stability of the moral *ἔξεις* when once formed. Cf. I. x. 10, I. x. 14, V. ix. 14.

*6 δλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ—φιλοσοφοῦντες*] ‘But most people, instead of doing these things, take refuge in talk about them, and flatter themselves that they are studying philosophy, and are in a fair way to become good men; which conduct may be likened to that of those sick people who listen attentively to what their physician says, but do not follow a tittle of his prescriptions. Such a regimen will never give health of body, nor such a philo-

sophy health of mind.’ We often hear of ‘the modernisms in Plato.’ The above passage might be called a modernism in Aristotle.

V. \*With this chapter commences a new division of the Book, in which a formal definition of virtue according to substance or genus, and quality or differentia, is given. We find the conception of this kind of definition already existing in Plato. Cf. *Meno*, p. 71 B: ἔμαυτὸν καταμέμφομαι ὃς οὐκ εἰδὼς τερὶ ἀρετῆς τὸ παρόνταν. δὲ μὴ οἶδα τι ἔσθι, πῶς ἀν δυοῖν γέ τι εἰδεῖη; Like other parts of logic, it was elaborated and made systematic by Aristotle. See Essay III. In the present chapter the τι ἔστιν; of virtue is established, that it is a *ἕξις*, or formed state of mind. This is arrived at .

τούτων ἄν τι εἴη η ἀρετή. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὄργὴν φόβον θράσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῆτος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἰς ἔπειται ἡδονὴ η λύπη, δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ἄς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ἄς δυνατοὶ ὄργισθηναι η λυπηθῆναι η ἐλεῆσαι, ἔξεις δὲ καθ' ἄς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν ἐν η κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὄργισθηναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς η ἀνειμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὐ.

by assuming that every mode of the mind must be one of three things, either a feeling, a faculty, or a state, and by proving that virtue is neither a feeling, nor a faculty; whence by the exhaustive process it remains that it must be a state of mind. The form of the argument here is the same as that of *Eth.* I. vii. 9-14, where it is demonstrated what is the proper function of man, and that of the argument in *Republic* IV. p. 428-433, where the nature and province of justice are determined. Aristotle does not here explain why he assumes that the modes of mind are only three; but the assumption no doubt rests upon his doctrine of Quality. Virtue is a quality (I. vi. 3: *καὶ ἐν τῷ πολῷ αἱ ἀρεταὶ*), and the category of Quality is subdivided into four divisions (*Cat.* viii.), (1) *ἕξις* and *διάθεσις*. (2) *δύσις κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴη η δύναμιλαν λέγεται*. (3) *παθητικὰ ποιῶντες*. (4) *σχῆμα καὶ μορφὴ*. Of these, the last is in the present case excluded by its own nature, and it is only necessary to eliminate two of the remaining three. Apart from the subdivision of the category, the threefold partition of the mind might be defended upon its own merits; for *πάθος* may be in a sense identified with *ἐπέργεια*, and *ἕξις* is a sort of determinate *δύναμις*,—a *δύναμις*, so to speak, on the other side of *ἐπέργεια*. Granting to the human mind the power of development, and of self-determination by the law of habits, it

follows that every mode in which such a mind exists must either be its innate, undeveloped, and potential faculties, its moments of consciousness, or its acquired and formed tendencies and states.

The arguments to prove that virtue is not a *πάθος*, are: (1) An appeal to language. We are called 'good' or 'bad' on account of virtue or vice; not on account of isolated feelings. (2) A passion is by its nature involuntary; but virtue implies deliberate choice (*προσέποιησις*). (3) An appeal to language; we speak of being 'moved' in regard to the feelings; of being 'disposed' in regard to virtue or vice. Again, for the same reason, virtue is not a *δύναμις*. (1) Because we are not 'called good' for our faculties. (2) Because a faculty is something natural and innate (*δύνατοι μὲν ἔσμεν φύσει*), and virtue is not.

2 λέγω δὲ—εὖ] 'I mean by *emotions*, desire, anger, fear, boldness, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, emulation, pity; in short, everything that is accompanied by pain or pleasure. I call those *faculties*, by reason of which we are said to be capable of feeling emotions, as, for instance, capable of being angry, of suffering pain, of feeling pity; and I call those *states* by which we stand in a certain relation, good or bad, to the emotions; as, for instance, with regard to anger, we are in a bad condition if our anger is too violent, or too slack, in a

όμοιώς δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα. πάθη μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὕθ' 3 αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὕθ' αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἡ φαῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἡ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη οὗτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὕτε ψεγόμεθα (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φοβούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὄργυζόμενος, οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἀπλῶς ὄργυζόμενος ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς), κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα ἡ ψεγόμεθα. ἔτι ὄργυζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέ- 4 τως, αἱ δὲ ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἡ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ δια- κεῖσθαι πως. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάμεις εἰσὶν· οὕτε γὰρ 5 ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πάσχειν ἀπλῶς οὕτε κακοὶ, οὗτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὕτε ψεγόμεθα. καὶ ἔτι δυνατοὶ μέν ἔσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἡ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει· εἴπο- μεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν αἱ 6 ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἔξεις αὐτὰς εἶναι.

"Ο τι μὲν οὖν ἔστι τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετὴ, εἴρηται· δεῖ δὲ 6

good one if we hit the happy medium.' Aristotle contents himself with indicating what he means by these different terms, instead of giving anything like a scientific definition of them. Thus he gives specimens of the feelings in which there is no attempt at classification, 'desire' being a wider term than most of the others mentioned, 'envy' and 'emulation' being perhaps different modes of the same feeling, &c. The words used are throughout informal, *τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα—οἱς ἐπεται ήδονή—καθ' αἱ δυνατοὶ—καθ' αἱ ταῦτηκοι*. It is easy to see that a deeper psychology might have stated all that is here said in a different and better way. In his account of *ἔξεις* there is a play on words which it is impossible to render, *ἔξεις—καθ' αἱ ἔχομεν*. Cf. the use of *τῷς ἔχως* in § 3 of the preceding chapter.

4 αἱ δὲ ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς  
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This is an extreme statement, in opposition to the Socratic doctrine that virtues were *φρονήσεις*, cf. *Eth.* vi. xiii. 3. Aristotle immediately qualifies it. There has been no proof of this position as yet.

*διακένσθαι πῶς*] This word is very common in Plato (as in other Greek). Cf. *Repud.* IV. 431 B: *δικλαστον τὸν οὕτῳ διακείμενον*, &c. In the treatise on the Categories, which bears Aristotle's name, it is made to imply a *διάθεσις* in contradistinction to *ἔχειν*, which implies a *ἔξεις*. *Cat.* viii. 5: *οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔξεις ἔχοντες καὶ διακείντας γέ τῷς κατ' αὐτάς, οἱ δὲ διακείμενοι οὐ πάντως καὶ ἔξειν ἔχουσιν*.

VI. Having stated the generic conception of virtue (*τῇ ἔστι*)—that it is a developed state of mind, Aristotle now proceeds to determine it more exactly (*πολὺ τις*). He lays the ground

2 μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἔξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις. ρῆγέον  
οὐν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετή, οὐδὲ ἡ ἀρετή, αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον  
ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ  
ὁφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τόν τε ὁφθαλμὸν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ  
ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὁφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ ὄρωμεν.  
ὅμοιώς ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππον τε σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ  
ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπιβάτην καὶ μεῖναι τοὺς  
3 πολεμίους. εἰ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ  
ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἀν ἔξις ἀφ' ἣς ἀγαθὸς ἀνθρωπος γίνε-

for this more accurate determination by giving a summary (borrowed from Plato) of the characteristics of 'Aρετή. Every excellence is the perfection of an object, and of the functions of that object. Thus human excellence (or virtue) will be the perfection of man, and of the functions of man. This leads us to inquire more narrowly what are the characteristics of a perfect ἔργον (the word is ambiguous, denoting 'work of art' or 'product of nature,' as well as 'function' or 'province'). From the conception of quantity, whether continuous (*συνεχές*) or discrete (*διαιρεόν*), we get the conception of more, less, and equal, or excess, defect, and the mean, which in the case of human action must not be arithmetical but proportional (§§ 4-7.) Now a glance at the arts shows us that the skill of an artist and the perfection of a work consist in the attainment and exhibition of the relative mean, so that nothing can be added or taken away without spoiling the effect (§§ 8-9). According to this analogy, virtue, which, like nature, is finer than the finest art, aims at the mean, avoiding excess and deficiency in feeling and action (§§ 10-13). To this account of the essence of virtue witness is borne by the Pythagorean doctrine that right is one and wrong manifold (§ 14). We need only qualify our theory and

our definition of virtue by adding that it is from an abstract point of view alone we can call virtue 'a mean state.' From a moral point of view it is an extreme that is utterly removed from its opposite, vice (§§ 15-17), and we must not apply the notion of the mean and the extremes to every act. Some acts are in themselves extremes, as, for instance, acts of crime, and it will be impossible to find a mean in such as these (§§ 18-20).

**2 ρῆγέον οὐν—πολεμίους]** 'We must commence then by asserting that every excellence both exhibits that thing of which it is an excellence in a good state, and also causes the perfect performance of that thing's proper function, as, for instance, the excellence of an eye makes the eye good, and also the performance of its function, for we see well from the excellence of the eye. So, too, the excellence of a horse makes him both a good horse, and good in his paces, in bearing his rider, and in standing a charge.' This is taken almost verbatim from Plato, *Repub.* I. p. 353 B: "Ἄρ' δι ποτε θύματα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον καλῶς ἀπεργάσαντο μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν αὐτῶν οἰκεῖαν ἀρετήν, κ.τ.λ. An illustration had been drawn from the horse and its excellence before in the same book, p. 335 B.

**3 εἰ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχει,**

ται καὶ ἀφ' ἣς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει. πῶς δὲ 4 τοῦτ' ἔσται, ηδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡδὸς ἔσται φανερόν, ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν ποίᾳ τίς ἔστιν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς. ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον τὸ δὲ ἵσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἡ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἡ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ δὲ ἵσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως. λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος μέσον τὸ ἵσον 5 ἀπέχον ἀφ' ἕκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἔστιν ἐν καὶ ταῦτὸν πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὃ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε ἐλλείπει. τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ ἐν, οὐδὲ ταῦτὸν πᾶσιν, οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ 6 τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἔξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἵσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ ὑπερέχεται, τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἔστι, κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ δέκα μνᾶι φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτης ἔξ μνᾶς προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἵσως

καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle treats of human virtue as part of a general law by which *all* natural objects fulfil their several functions, and each in accordance with its own proper excellence. He next passes to the analogy of the arts, though he regards virtue as higher than them, and more akin to nature. (ἢ δὲ ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀμεινών τοτιν, ὅπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις.) In the present passage we have again to do with the conception of the *ἔργον* of man; see above *Eth.* i. vii. 14.

4 πῶς δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, ηδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν] If any special passage is referred to, it must be *II. iv. 3.*

ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ] 'Now in all quantity whether continuous or discrete.' The terms here are not meant to go together, as if it were, 'In all that is continuous, and at the same time capable of division;' but the two forms of quantity are referred to, about which we read, *Categories* vi. i: τοῦ δὲ πόσου τὸ μὲν ἔστι διωρισμένον, τὸ δὲ συνεχές.—'Ἐστι δὲ διωρι-

μένον μὲν οἷον ἀριθμὸς καὶ λόγος (a word), συνεχὲς δὲ οἷον γραμμὴ, ἐπιφάνεια, σῶμα, ἔτι δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα χρόνος καὶ τόπος. Cf. *Politics* i. v. 3: δοι γὰρ ἐκ πλειόνων συνέστηκε,—εἴτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτε ἐκ διηρημένων. *De Caelo*, i. i. 2.

5. λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος—  
ἐλλείπει] 'By an objective mean, I understand that which is equidistant from the two given extremes, and which is one and the same to all, and by a mean relatively to the person (πρὸς ἡμᾶς), I understand that which is neither too much nor too little.' The principle of Relativity forms of course an essential part of the Moral Law. The recognition of this principle under the Christian 'Law of Liberty' was a prominent feature in the teaching of St. Paul. Cf. *Romans*, chapter xiv.

7 κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν] i.e. 'arithmetical progression,' opposed to 'geometrical proportion,' which consists of four terms, cf. *Eth.* v. iv. 3.

καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ ληψιομένῳ ἡ ὀλίγον· Μίλων μὲν γάρ  
ολίγον, τῷ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολύ. ὁμοίως  
8 ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ πάλης. οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερ-  
βολὴν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ  
τοῦθ' αἰρεῖται, μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ  
9 πρὸς ἡμᾶς. εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὐ ἐπι-  
τελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέποντα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουστα τὰ  
ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὐ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι  
οὗτ' ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν οὕτε προσθεῖναι, ως τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς  
καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σω-  
ζούσης), οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῦται, ως λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο  
βλέποντες ἔργαζονται, η δὲ ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβε-  
στέρα καὶ ἀμείνων ἔστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ η φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἀν  
10 εἴη στοχαστική. λέγω δὲ τὴν ἡθικήν· αὕτη γάρ ἔστι  
περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ  
ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. οἶον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι  
καὶ ἐπιθυμῆσαι καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ ὅλως ἡσθῆ-  
ναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, καὶ ἀμφό-  
11 τερα οὐκ εὐ· τὸ δὲ δῆτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ  
οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ ως δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἔστι τῆς  
12 ἀρετῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ

[Μίλων μὲν γάρ ολίγον] This illustration may remind us of the humorous turn in Plato's *Republic*, p. 338 c, where, on Thrasymachus defining justice to be τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος. Ξυμφέρον, Socrates answers, ὁ Θρασύμαχε τί ποτε λέγεις; οὐ γάρ που τὸ γε τούδε φῆ; εἰ Ποιλυδάμας ἡμῶν κρείττων διαγρατιαστῆς καὶ αὐτῷ ξυμφέρει τὰ βθεῖα κρέα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, τοῦτο τὸ σιτίον εἶναι καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἥττοσιν ἐκείνου ξυμφέρον δῆμα καὶ δίκαιον. Cf. Erastus, p. 134, quoted above on II. ii. 6.

9 εἰ δὴ—ἔργα] 'If, then, every art thus completes its work, namely, by looking to the mean and conducting its results to this.' With the theory of art here stated cf. *Politics* III. xiii. 21, Δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλων τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν, οὕτε γάρ γραφεῖς

έσσειν ἀν τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας ἔχειν τὸ ἕδων, οὐδὲ εἰ διαφέρει τὸ κάλλος. And on the general doctrine of μεσότητος, its history, and its applications, see Essay IV.

10 λέγω δὲ τὴν ἡθικήν] The intellectual ἀρεταὶ are not μεσότητες, for this simple reason—that they are λόγοι; the 'laws' or 'standards' of the balance which is to be introduced into the passions.

11 τὸ δὲ δῆτε δεῖ—ἀρετῆς] 'But to have these feelings at the right time, and on occasion of the right things, and towards the right persons, and with the right object, and in the right manner, this is the golden mean and the highest excellence, names which are proper to virtue.' From the mention of all these qualifications it is

καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις φέγγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται· ταῦτα δὲ ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ 13 ἀρετὴ, στοχαστική γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου. ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστιν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τὸν ἀπείρον, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἴκαζον, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς· διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ράδιον τὸ δὲ χαλεπόν, ράδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν. καὶ διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις, τῆς δὲ ἀρετῆς ἡ μεσότης·

ἴσθλοι μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς παντοδαπῶς δὲ πακοί.

"Ἐστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἔξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι 15 οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὥρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν. μεσότης δὲ δύο κακῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν· καὶ ἔτι τῷ τὰς μὲν ἔλλειπεν τὰς 16 δὲ ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι, τὴν δὲ ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ εὐρίσκειν καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι. διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τί ἦν 17 εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον

easy to see that Aristotle means by his μέσον to establish something more than a merely quantitative difference between vice and virtue.

14 ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν—μοναχῶς] 'Again it is possible to err in many ways (for evil belongs to the infinite, as the Pythagoreans figured, and good to the finite), but to do right is possible only in one way.' See Essays II. and IV. The authorship of the verse ἴσθλοι μὲν γάρ κ.τ.λ. is unknown.

15 ἔστιν ἄρα—δριστεύειν] 'Virtue, therefore, is a developed state of the moral purpose in relative balance, which is determined by a standard, according as the thoughtful man would determine.' Spengel regards δρισμένη as a mere misprint in Becker's editions for δρισμένη, which all former editions had. It is the

μεσότης, and not the ἔξις which is determined by λόγος. In two places already, Eth. II. iv. 3, and II. v. 4, we have met with the tacit assumption that virtue implies προαιρέσις. This is justified by the account of προαιρέσις, and its relation to action, in the next book. The other terms of the definition have been sufficiently established in the progress of this book. The reference to the φρόνιμος as an impersonation of the 'law' or 'standard' of reason is a necessary modification of what would else be an entirely relative, individual, and arbitrary theory of virtue. The 'thoughtful man' stands as the representative of the absolute reason of man manifested in the 'individual consciousness.'

17 διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν—ἀκρότης]

18 καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης. οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ἐπιδέχεται πρᾶξις οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος<sup>1</sup> τὴν μεσότητα· ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται

‘Virtue, therefore, if viewed in the light of its essence and its constitutive conception, is a mean state, but with respect to supreme excellence and rightness, it is an extreme.’ This passage implies that the term *Μεσότης* is an abstract and metaphysical expression for the law of virtue, estimated by the understanding (though doubtless the deepest viewattainable); but that viewed in relation to the good, or (as we should say) from a moral point of view,—virtue is no mean state lying between vices (as if virtue were a little less vice, and vice a little more virtue), but an extreme, that is, utterly removed from, and opposed to, vice. It is a profound remark, showing the balance in Aristotle between an abstract and a concrete view of morals. With regard to the terminology here employed, the word *οὐσία* is, as Aristotle himself tells us, to a certain extent ambiguous (cf. *Metaphys.* vi. iii. 1 : *Λέγεται δὲ η οὐσία, εἰ μὴ πλεοναχώς, δλλλ' ἐν τέτταροι γε μάλιστα καὶ γὰρ τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ γένος οὐσία δοκεῖ εἶναι ἑκάστου καὶ τέταρτον τούτων τὸ ὑποκείμενον*). It is made definite, however, in the present place by the addition of the phrase *καὶ τὸ λόγον*, which may be regarded here as an explanation of *οὐσία*. On *λόγον—λέγοντα*, cf. *De Motu Animalium*, x. 1 : *κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸν λόγον τὸν λέγοντα τὴν αἴτιαν τῆς κινήσεως*. The formula *τι ἦν εἶναι*, like other leading parts of Aristotle's philosophy, appears in his works as already established. Though no trace of it is to be found in *Πλάτον*, familiarity with its use is presupposed by Aristotle, and no account of its *genesis* is given. Its metaphysical import is

discussed in *Metaphys.* vi. iv.-xi., from which we gather (1) that *τι ἦν εἶναι* implies the essential nature of a thing (*Ἐκαστον δὲ λέγεται καθ' αὐτό*) to the exclusion of all that is accidental; (2) that it is the definition of a thing, but not of all things, for it excludes all material associations, hence that to a conception like *σιμότης* you cannot assign a *τι ἦν εἶναι*; (3) that it is no mere abstraction, but closely connected with individual existence, and implying what the Germans call *Dasein*; hence it is separable from the *καθόλου* or universal element in a thing,—it implies this, but also something more. From the concreteness of its nature, it also differs from the Platonic idea, with which it has much in common, being the immaterial, primal, and archetypal law of the being of things; (4) ‘The knowledge of a thing,’ says Aristotle, ‘consists in knowing its *τι ἦν εἶναι*’ (*Metaphys.* vi. vi. 6). With this important conception in his theory of knowledge and of existence we may compare to some extent the ‘Forms’ of Bacon, which were no doubt borrowed from it. But fully to comprehend the *τι ἦν εἶναι* implies mastering the metaphysical system of Aristotle. With regard to the grammar of the formula we are left to conjecture, and accordingly at least two erroneous explanations have been given. (1) That of Alexander Aphrod. *ad Top.* 1. (Brandis, *Scholia*, p. 256 & 43), that *ἦν* is simply used for *εἴη*, whereas we find a frequent contrast between the formula *τι ἦν* and *τι δοτι*. (2) The whole phrase has been translated ‘substantia quae est, etsi praeterita,’ as though *τι ἦν* could be used for *ὅτεπ ἦν*. *Ti ἦν* is of course a question, and has been

συνειλημένα μετὰ τῆς φανδότητος, οἷον ἐπιχαιρεκαία ἀναισχυντία φθόνος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μδιχεία κλοπὴ ἀνδροφονία· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ψέγεται τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδὲ αἱ ἐλλείψεις. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατορθοῦν, ἀλλ' ἡτοί ἀμαρτάνειν· οὐδὲ ἔστι τὸ εὖ ή μὴ εὖ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ ἦν δεῖ καὶ στε καὶ ὡς μοιχεύειν, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς τὸ ποιεῖν ὄτιοῦν τούτων ἀμαρτάνειν ἔστιν. ὅμοιον 19 οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἐλλείψιν· ἔσται γὰρ οὕτω γε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότητος καὶ ὑπερβολῆς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλείψις ἐλλείψεως. ὥσπερ δὲ 20 σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλείψις διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναι πιος ἄκρον, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἕκείνων μεσότητος οὐδὲ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλείψις, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀν πράττηται ἀμαρτάνεται· δλως γὰρ οὕτ' ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότητος ἔστιν, οὗτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλείψις.

Δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ 7

represented by the term *Quidditas* in the Scholastic Latin. The preterite *ἦν* appears used to express the prior, i.e. the deeper and more essential nature of a thing. ‘What was the essence of the thing?’ (i.e. before its present individual manifestation). Cf. *Metaphys.* vi. vii. 6: “Ποτε συμβανεῖ τρόπον τινὰ ἐξ ὑγειας τὴν ὑγειαν γίνεσθαι καὶ τὴν οἰκλαν ἐξ οἰκλας, τῆς δὲν θλητὸς τὴν ἔχουσαν θλητον. —Λέγω δὲ οὐσιαν θλητον τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι. It is difficult to say what was the original phrase of which the three words are a disjointed remnant. Probably it may have been as follows: τι ἦν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων; ‘What was that property in man which constitutes the conception of his being a man?’ *Εἶναι* is used in Aristotle especially to denote the conception or inner essence of a thing, cf. *Eth.* v. i. 20. We may observe that *εἶναι* is never affixed to the ques-

tion *τι ἔστι*, which implies a more superficial and accidental account.

VII. Aristotle now passes on to the exemplification of his general law of virtue in the various separate virtues. He gives accordingly a list of virtues, and shows that they are severally mean states between various extremes. This list forms a table of contents for Books III. and IV., which treat of the virtues here mentioned, and in the order here given. The question arises—upon what principle is this list formed? We find at once that Aristotle has resorted to experience. He has not contented himself with applying his law to the previously recognised divisions of virtue. He has abandoned the old enumeration of four cardinal virtues, given in Plato’s *Republic*, p. 428 (and on which most of the reasoning in

τοῖς καθ' ἔκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου τκενώτεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ

that book depends), namely, courage, temperance, justice, wisdom; but these all reappear in his list, only not on the same level with each other. Wisdom is divided into *φρόνησις* and *σοφία*, of which the first is made the standard of moral virtue, and the other stands apart as a perfection of the pure intellect. Justice is separated from other practical virtues, as being something externally determined (cf. *Eth.* v. v. 17). Plato gives, in the *Protagoras*, p. 349 b, another list of five virtues, holiness (*διούρης*) being added to the other four; this answers to *εὐσέβεια*, which is frequently mentioned as a virtue by the Socrates of Xenophon. Aristotle omits it altogether, probably on account of the separation he made between ethics and religion. With this exception, Aristotle's list of virtues implies the same view of life as Plato's, only it goes more into detail and aims at more completeness. In the present chapter ten virtues are enumerated, to which are added modesty and indignation, two mean states in the feelings; and justice is mentioned as something to be treated of separately. In departing from the unity of a law to enumerate its exemplifications, there must always be something arbitrary. Why so many and no more? It would seem as if Aristotle applied his principle to the virtues ready at hand, and then afterwards believed in his own list as complete. (Cf. *Eth.* ii. vii. 9, *κῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λρετῶν*; ii. vii. 11, *ρήγτεων οὖν κ.τ.λ.*; iii. v. 23, *ἄμα δ' ἔσται δῆλος καὶ πόσαι εἰσίν.*) In the *Rhetoric* i. ix. 5-19, we find a list of virtues (or, as they are called, *Μέρη δρεψῆς*) given, which is identical with the present (not containing, how-

ever, *φιλοτιμία*, *εὐτραπελία*, *ἀληθεία*, *φιλία*), μέρη δὲ δρεψῆς *δικαιοσύνη*, *ἀνδρία*, *σωφροσύνη*, *μεγαλοπρέπεια*, *μεγαλοψυχία*, *ἐλευθερότης*, *πρατης*, *φρόνησις*, *σοφία*. Of those omitted, the first may be said to be included in *μεγαλοψυχία*, while the other three possess only a minor degree of moral importance. Even here Aristotle seems to set them on a somewhat lower footing than the rest.

i + *τκενώτεροι*] The MSS. vary here between *κενώτεροι* and *κοινώτεροι*. A similar variation is found *Eth.* iii. viii. 6, where the readings are *πολλὰ κενά* and *πολλὰ καυδ.* Bekker has decided against the majority of MSS. in favour of *κενώτεροι*. The Paraphrast, however, supports the other reading. He renders the passage, *τῶν γὰρ περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγων οἱ μὲν καθολικοὶ κοινώτεροι καὶ πλεοσιν ἐφαρμόζουσιν* · *οἱ δὲ μερικοὶ ἀληθινώτεροι.* Dr. Cardwell accordingly reads *κοινώτεροι*, which seems most natural, and is supported by the best MSS. K<sup>a</sup> and L<sup>b</sup> of Bekker. Whichever reading we take, the general meaning is not affected. *κενώτεροι*, which would be a term of disparagement, is well illustrated by *Eth. Eud.* i. vi. 4: *πολλάκις λανθάνονται λέγοντες διλλογίους λόγους τῆς πραγματείας καὶ κερούς.* *Κοινώτεροι* means 'more general,' 'of wider application.' Cf. *Eth.* ii. ii. 2: *τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν δρόδον λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω.* Accordingly with this reading we may translate the passage Δεῖ δὲ—διαγραφῆς as follows: 'This principle however must not only be stated universally, but also we must apply it to particular cases; for in theories about moral actions universal statements are it is true of wider application, but particular ones are more real. For actions

μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι· περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἔκαστα αἱ πράξεις, δέον δὲ ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν. ληπτέον οὖν ταῦτα <sup>2</sup> ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης· τῶν δὲ ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῷ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (πολλὰ δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ δὲ ἐν τῷ θαρρείν ὑπερβάλλων θρασύς, ὁ δὲ τῷ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων τῷ δὲ θαρρείν ἐλλείπων δειλός. περὶ ἡδονᾶς δὲ καὶ λύπας, οὐ <sup>3</sup> πάσας, ἥπτον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας, μεσότης μὲν σωφρόσυνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονᾶς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδὲ ὀνόματος τετυχίκασιν οὐδὲ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι. περὶ δὲ <sup>4</sup> δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθεριότης, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἐλλειψις ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία. ἐναντίως δὲ ἔαυταις ὑπερβάλλοντι καὶ ἐλλείποντι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀσωτος ἐν μὲν προέστει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ λήψει, ἐλλείπει, ὁ

are concerned with particulars, and it is necessary that our theories should be borne out when applied to these. Let us take our instances then from the table of the virtues.'

ἀληθινώτεροι] 'more real,' as being more concrete and more definite. Plato would have said the universal is more real; here, and in *Categories* v. 8, it is said that the particular is more real than the universal. In the *Politics*, I. xiii. 10, Gorgias is praised for enumerating the separate virtues, while others contented themselves with general definitions. Καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἔξαπατωσιν ἁυτούς, οἵτινες τὸ εἰδὲ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετήν, η τὸ δρόπτηρείν, η τε τῶν τοιούτων πολλὰ γὰρ δμεων λέγοντες οἱ ἔκαριθμοντες τὰς ἀρετάς, ὡσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως δριζομένων. This is directed against the *Meno* of Plato, where Socrates urges that it is absolutely necessary to know the law of virtue as a unity, instead of regarding it in its multifarious exhibitions. Aristotle, wishing to establish a practical

theory of virtue, returns to the concreto.

ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς] 'Τπογραφῆς is the word in the corresponding passage of the *Eudemian Ethics*, II. iii., where a formal table is given, containing fourteen virtues with their respective pairs of extremes. In this place in all probability an already existing 'table' or 'scheme' of the virtues, familiar to the Peripatetic School, is referred to. We have seen above (note ~~οὐδὲ~~ 1) that this table was nearly complete when Aristotle wrote his *Rhetoric*.

<sup>2</sup> οἱ μὲν τῷ ἀφοβίᾳ κ.τ.λ.] It is a sign that Aristotle is here only working his way to his theory of the mean, that he at first speaks as if there were excess and defect of both the two opposite principles, by the balance of which virtue is constituted. This would make four vices round each virtue. But it is obviously more simple to speak of each virtue as a balance of a positive and a negative tendency: which view he afterwards adopts, though he retains the present

δ' ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ πρόστει  
 5 Ἑλλείπει. ὥν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαῖς λέγομεν,  
 ἀρκούμενοι αὐτῷ τούτῳ ὑστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον περὶ  
 6 αὐτῶν διορισθῆσται. περὶ δὲ τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι δια-  
 θέσεις εἰσὶ, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (οὐ γάρ μεγαλο-  
 πρεπὴς διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· οὐ μὲν γάρ περὶ μεγάλα, οὐ  
 δὲ περὶ μικρά), ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαναυσία,  
 ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι δ' αὗται τῶν περὶ  
 τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὑστερον ῥηθῆσται.  
 7 περὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία,  
 ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χανύότης τις λεγομένη, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυ-  
 8 χία· ὡς δ' ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν  
 ἐλευθεριότητα, περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσαν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ  
 πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν οὖσαν μεγάλην, αὐτὴν  
 περὶ μικρὰν οὖσα· ἔστι γάρ ὡς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ  
 μᾶλλον ἡ δεῖ καὶ ἥττον, λέγεται δὲ οὐ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων τὰς  
 ὁρέεσσι φιλότιμος, οὐ δὲ ἐλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, οὐ δὲ μέσος  
 ἀνώνυμος. ἀνώνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλο-  
 τίμου φιλοτιμία. δύνεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης  
 χώρας. καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλότιμον  
 καλοῦμεν ἔστι δὲ ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν ἐπαι-  
 9 νοῦμεν τὸν φιλότιμον ἔστι δὲ ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. διὰ  
 τίνα δὲ αἴτιαν τοῦτο ποιοῦμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἔξης ῥηθῆσται· ὧν  
 δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον.  
 10 ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ ὄργην ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μεσότης,

refinement with regard to courage in  
 the fuller account of this virtue in  
 Book III.

5 ὑστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον] All de-  
 tails with regard to the several virtues  
 may be accordingly reserved for con-  
 sideration under Books III. and IV.

6 ἄλλαι διαθέσεις] 'other disposi-  
 tions.' The word is used here as a  
 synonym for *ἔξις*, though in *Cate-  
 gories* viii. 1. *ἔξις* is distinguished from  
 διάθεσις. 'Ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν ἀδός τοι γράμματος  
*ἔξις* καὶ διάθεσις θεγέσθωσαν' διαφέρει  
 δὲ *ἔξις* διάθεσιν τῷ πολὺ χρειώτερον  
*ἔναις* καὶ μαρτιώτερον. In the same

way, διακέσσθαι is there opposed to  
*ἔχειν*, whereas, *Eth.* II. v. 4, it is used  
 as equivalent to it.

9 κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον] 'Ac-  
 cording to the method which has  
 hitherto guided us,' τύπῳ κ.τ.λ. (cf. §  
 5). The same phrase occurs *Politicus*  
 I. i. 3: Δῆλος δ' ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον  
*ἐπισκοποῦσι* κατὰ τὴν ὑφηγημένην μέθο-  
 δον. The word frequently occurs in  
 Plato. Cf. *Protogoras*, p. 326 D: κατὰ  
 τὴν ὑφηγημένην τῶν γράμματος, *Repub.* III.  
 p. 403 E: εἰ δύστον τοῦτο τὸ τοιούτον ὑφηγημένον  
*μεθοδόν*. *Phædo*, p. 82 D: ἢ φιλοσοφίᾳ  
*φιργεῖται*.

σχεδὸν δὲ ἀνωνύμων ὅντων αὐτῶν τὸν μέσον πρᾶον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα καλέσομεν· τῶν δὲ ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω, ηδὲ κακία ὀργιλότης, ὁ δὲ ἐλλείπων ἀσργητός τις, ηδὲ ἐλλειψις ἀσργησία. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἔχουσαι μὲν τινα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἄλληλας, διαφέρονται δὲ ἄλληλων· πάσαι μὲν γάρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν, διαφέρονται δὲ ὅτι ηδὲ μὲν ἔστι περὶ τὰλθὴς τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἷον δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύτούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δὲ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὡν μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν οἵτι ἐν πᾶσιν ηδὲ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ δὲ ἄκρα οὕτ’ ὄρθῳ οὕτ’ ἐπαινετὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλειόνα ἀνώνυμα, πειρατέον δ’, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἔνεκεν καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου, περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθὲς οἱ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής τις καὶ ηδὲ μεσότης ἀλλήθεια λεγέσθω, ηδὲ προσποίησις ηδὲ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ οἱ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ εἴρων. περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ οἱ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ηδὲ διάθεσις εὐτραπελία, ηδὲ ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία καὶ οἱ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, οἱ δὲ ἐλλείπων ἀγροῦκός τις καὶ ηδὲ ἔξις ἀγροκία· περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ οἱ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὁν φίλος καὶ ηδὲ μεσότης φιλία, οἱ δὲ ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἔνεκα, ἄρετος, εἰ δὲ ὠφελείας τῆς αὐτοῦ κόλαξ, οἱ δὲ ἐλλείπων καὶ

ii. *ῥητέον οὖν—εὐπαρακολουθήτου]*  
 These also must accordingly be discussed, in order to show still more clearly that in everything the mean is praiseworthy, while the extremes are neither right nor praiseworthy, but blameable. Now most of these qualities are without names; but we must endeavour, as in other cases, to make names ourselves for the sake of clearness and of being easily followed.' After discussing ἀληθεία, the author of the *Magna Moralia* says, Εἴ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αὗται δρέπανα ηδὲ μηδέποτε, οὐλοις ἐν εἴη λόγος· οὐδὲ μεσοθητῆ εἰσὶ τῶν εἰρημένων, οὐλοις, οἱ

γὰρ καθ’ αὐτὰς ξῶντες ἐπαινοῦνται (i. xxxiii. 2).

*πειρατέον κ.τ.λ.]* Aristotle's method consists partly in accepting experience as shown in common language, &c.; partly in rectifying it, or re-stating it from his own point of view; partly in finding new expressions for it, so as to discover men's thought to themselves. He usually rather fixes the meaning of words than creates new ones. For instance, he here assigns a peculiar and limited meaning to ἀληθεία and φίλα. His influence upon the forms of language of civilised Europe can hardly be overrated.

14 ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδῆς δύστερίς τις καὶ δύσκολος. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι<sup>ι</sup> καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ αἰδὼς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ μὲν λέγεται μέσος, ὁ δὲ ὑπερβάλλων, ὡς ὁ καταπλήξ, ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος· ὁ δὲ ἐλλείπων ἡ ὁ

15 μηδὲ δύλως ἀναίσχυντος· ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων. νέμεσις δὲ μεσότητης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας. εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβάνουσι τοῖς πέλας γινομένας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δὲ ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι

It is far greater than has ever been exercised by any one man beside.

14-15 Aristotle winds up his list by adding *Αἰδὼς* and *Νέμεσις*, which he does not consider virtues, because they are not developed states of mind, but he mentions them, because he discovers the law of the balance (*μεσότητης*) existing even in these natural instincts. There is something peculiarly Greek in the conjunction of these two names. In Greek mythology they are personified and seem to represent the natural and almost indestructible ideas of justice in the human mind. Hesiod speaks of these two goddesses as being the last to clothe themselves in white raiment and to leave the earth (*Works and Days*, 198). In the fable which Plato puts into the mouth of Protagoras these qualities are said to have been sent down to man as an amelioration of his previously wretched condition, without society or the political art (Plato, *Protagoras*, p. 322 c, where, however, the names are *αἰδὼς* and *δίκη*). They seem related to one another as the instinct of honour to the instinct of right—i.e. to be two slightly differing phases of the same principle, the first being rather a sensitiveness about right in oneself, the second about right external to oneself. *Αἰδὼς* is further

discussed in Book IV., but *Νέμεσις* is not again alluded to. This is probably owing to the unfinished condition of the *Ethics*, which indeed first begins to show itself at the close of Book IV. See Essay I. pp. 43, 50.

15 *νέμεσις* δὲ—*χαλρεψ*] ‘But indignation is a balance between envy and malice. Now these are concerned with pain and pleasure resulting on what happens to others. For the indignant man is pained at those who prosper unworthily, but the envious man, exceeding him, is pained at all (who prosper), while the malicious man is so far defective in feeling pain as even to rejoice.’ This paragraph is a striking instance of crudeness, which the least after-reflection would have remedied. It is obvious that *φθόνος* (envy) and *ἐπιχαιρεκακία* (malice) are only different forms of the same state of mind. Indeed, Aristotle, when he wrote his *Rhetoric*, had been clear on the point; cf. *Rhet.* II. ix. 5: ‘Ο. γὰρ αὐτὸς ἔστιν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός. Hence they cannot be opposed as two extremes. Again, the *ἐπιχαιρέκακος* cannot be said *τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπειν* ωστε κ.τ.λ., for he does not rejoice at the success of the good, which the envious man grieves at. He rejoices at the misfortunes of the good. This mistake is set right

ώστε καὶ χαίρειν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοθι<sup>16</sup> καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν· τὸ μοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν.

Τριῶν δὲ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακῶν, τῆς μὲν γκαθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, μᾶς δὲ ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινται πως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ηδὲ μέσῃ ταῖς ἄκραις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἵσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἔλαττον

by Eudemus (II. iii. 4), who in his list writes φθόνος, ἀνώνυμον, νέμεσις. Of course the opposite to φθόνος must be ἀναισθησία τις. Socrates in Xen. *Memor.* III. ix. 8 defines φθόνος as it is here defined. Μόνος ἐφη φθονεῖν τοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν φίλων εὐπραξίαις ἀνιωμένους. Plato does not separate envy and malice; cf. *Philebus*, p. 48 B: 'Ο φθονῶν γε ἐπὶ κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν τέλεις ἡδόμενος ἀναφανήσεται. Socrates is there arguing that φθόνος being granted to be a painful feeling, it yet constitutes the chief element in comedy, so that in comedy there is a mixture of pain with pleasure.

<sup>16</sup> Δλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων—εἰσιν]  
‘But about these points in the first place we shall have another opportunity of speaking; in the second place about justice, since the term is used in more senses than one, we will separately (*μετὰ ταῦτα*) define it and show how the two species of it are severally mean states.’ This passage gives accurately enough beforehand the order of subjects for Books III. and IV.; the word ἄλλοθι seems to show that he has in view the interruption of the argument by the discussion upon will at the beginning of the Third Book. The separate treatment of justice is also announced. But it can hardly be said that the promise περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν κ.τ.λ. is exactly fulfilled in Book V. The two

kinds of justice here referred to are: (1) Justice, in the Platonic sense, = all virtue. (2) Justice, in a narrower sense, = fair dealing with regard to property. Cf. *Eth.* v. i.

+ μοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν] This passage is obelised, because of the term λογικαὶ, which never occurs elsewhere in Aristotle or Eudemus, as applied to the διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταὶ—secondly, because of the sense, since Aristotle could not possibly say that he meant to show how the intellectual excellences were μεσότητες—thirdly, because of the extreme likelihood of an interpolation here.

\* VIII. A new conception is now developed of the relation between a virtue and the extremes lying on each side of it, and that is, the conception of ‘contrariety,’ of mutual repulsion and exclusiveness between the several terms. The extremes are opposed each to the other, and both to the mean. This addition tends yet further to raise the moral distinctions from being mere distinctions of quantity into being distinctions of kind. With logical inconsistency, though with thorough truth, Aristotle proceeds to point out that one extreme is generally ‘more contrary’ to the mean than the other, either because of a greater dissimilarity to virtue in

μεῖζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ μεῖζον ἔλαττον, οὕτως αἱ μέσαι ἔξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν. ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρασὺν δειλός ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναίσθητον ἀκόλαστος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀναίσθητος, ὁ δὲ ἐλευθέριος πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀνελεύθερον ἄσωτος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἄσωτον ἀνελεύθερος. διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται τὸν μέσον οἱ ἄκροι ἑκάτερος πρὸς ἑκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι τὸν ἀνδρεῖον ὁ μὲν δειλὸς θρασὺν ὁ δὲ θρασὺς δειλόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων 4 ἀνάλογον. οὕτω δὲ ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις τούτων, πλείων ἐναντιότης ἔστι τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἀλληλα ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέσον· πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστηκεν ἀλλιγῶν ἢ τοῦ μέσου, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ μεγάλου ἢ 5 ἄμφω τοῦ ἵσου. ἔτι πρὸς μὲν τὸ μέσον ἐνίοις ἄκροις ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται, ὡς τῇ θρασύτητι πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τῇ ἀσωτίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα· τοῖς δὲ ἄκροις πρὸς ἀλληλα πλείστη ἀνομοιότης. τὰ δὲ πλείστον ἀπέχοντα ἀλλιγῶν ἐναντία ὅριζονται, ὥστε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐναντία τὰ 6 πλείον ἀπέχοντα. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἀντίκειται μᾶλλον ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ἡ ἐλλείψης ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἡ ὑπερβολή, οἷον ἀνδρείᾳ

the tendency itself, or from our following a natural bent and pushing out the tendency to extravagance.

<sup>2</sup> ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος—δειλός] ‘For the brave man appears rash in comparison with the coward, but a coward in comparison with the rash man.’ Of course oppositions of this kind are relative and depend upon the point of view. If the cowards had to settle the question, all bravery would be deemed rashness. Hence we see that Aristotle’s system depends on faith in a certain standard inherent in the general reason of mankind. The *μεσότης* is ὡρισμένη λόγῳ. And this law or standard of the absolute reason finds its exponent in the thoughtful man, ὡς ἀν δ φρόνιμος δράσειν.

<sup>3</sup> ἔτι πρὸς μὲν—ἀπέχοντα] ‘Again,

while some extremes appear to have a sort of similarity to the mean, as, for instance, rashness to bravery, and prodigality to liberality;—the extremes have the greatest dissimilarity to each other. But things most removed from each other people define to be “contraries,” therefore things more removed are more contrary to each other.’ In the present passage it is easy to see a logical inconsistency. If contraries be τὰ πλείστον ἀπέχοντα, how can we speak of them as πλείστη ἀπέχοντα? Aristotle commences with an idea of absolute contrariety, and afterwards takes up one of relative contrariety, admitting of degrees. But repugnance admits of degrees, if contrariety does not, so the inaccuracy is merely verbal.

μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα, ἀλλ' ἡ δειλία ἔλλειψις οὖσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἔνδεια οὖσα, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα. διὸ δύο δ' αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν μὲν τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἔτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τούναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον, οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομοιότερον δὲ ἡ δειλία, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὸ γὰρ ἀπέχοντα πλείον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι. μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἔτερα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀτῶν πρὸς ἄγαρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πως, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαινεται. οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἥδονάς, διὸ εὔκατύφοροί ἐσμεν μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα. ταῦτ' οὖν μᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ἣν ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὸ τοῦτο ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

7 διὸ δύο δ' αἰτίας—μᾶλλον] 'Now this takes place from two causes, one (external to us) depending on the nature of the thing itself; for that extreme which is nearer to and more like the mean, we do not oppose so much to the mean, as its contrary.' The first thing, says Aristotle, which makes one extreme more repugnant to the mean than the other extreme, is a difference of kind. Some faults are errors 'on virtue's side,' and while rashness, for instance, is the same tendency as courage, only carried too far, cowardice differs from it in kind. This difference then is one with which the agent has nothing to do.

8 ἔτερα δὲ—σωφροσύνῃ] 'A second cause depends on ourselves; for those things to which we are in a way more disposed by nature appear more repugnant to the mean. As, for instance, we are in ourselves more disposed towards pleasures, hence we are more carried away in the direction of

intemperance, than in that of (excessive) orderliness. Therefore we call those things more contrary to the mean in which we run to greater lengths; and thus intemperance, which is the excess, seems more contrary to temperance (than the other extreme).' Passing over the false explanation of this passage, which pretends to find in it the doctrine of human corruption—as if Aristotle said that we are by nature prone to what is worst, whereas he says that 'what we are most prone to appears to be the worst,' there are two modes of explanation left; one is that of the Paraphrast, who renders it, ἐπει γὰρ δ πόλεμος τῷ σπουδαίῳ πρὸς τῷ ἄκρᾳ γίνεται, τὴν μεσοβοῆτα ἤγροντι, πρὸς δ τῶν ἄκρων μεζῶν ἡ μάχη, ἐκεῖνο ἐναντιώτερον τῷ μέσῳ δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ., namely, that there is the greatest struggle in avoiding that extreme to which we are prone, and therefore it appears most opposed to the mean. This interpretation is

9 "Οτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἡθικὴ μεσότης, καὶ πῶς, καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴν τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν, 2 ἵκανως εἴρηται. διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι· ἐν ἑκάστῳ γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οὗτον κύκλου τὸ μέσον, οὐ παντὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὄργισθηναι παντὸς καὶ ράδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανῆσαι· τὸ δ' φ' καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ ὡς, οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ράδιον· διότερον τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ

slightly favoured by § 4 of the next chapter, *σκοπεῖν* δὲ δεῖ κ.τ.λ.; but on the other hand, not a word is here said of avoiding either extreme; the question is rather of following one's bent. (2) The other explanation is that which the author of the *Magna Moralia* espouses, *Mag. Mor.* I. ix. 5: ή οὖν ἐπίδοσις γίνεται μᾶλλον πρὸς ἡ πεφύκαμεν πρὸς & δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπίδοσιμεν, ταῦτα καὶ μᾶλλον ἐναντία. ἐπιδίδομεν δὲ πρὸς ἀκολασταν μᾶλλον ή πρὸς κοσμιδήτα. This is surely what Aristotle means, and his general sense may be given as follows: 'One difference is in the act itself, a difference of kind; the other difference proceeds from ourselves, a difference of degree, for wherever we have an inclination towards one side, we run into extravagance on that side, and so aggravate that form of error, and make it seem worse than its opposite.' In order to make the words suit a preconceived meaning, people have translated ἐπίδοσις 'inclination,' whereas it can only mean 'advance,' 'progression,' 'development,' &c. As the *Magna Moralia* give it, πρὸς & πεφύκαμεν is the 'inclination,' and ἐπίδοσις is the result of this. The addition of γίνεται might have been sufficient to prevent the above misinterpretation. It is observable that

*σωφροσύνη* is here first contrasted with *κοσμιδήτης*, as if that meant 'asceticism,' and afterwards the corresponding term is omitted. Aristotle seems unwilling to employ the term *ἀναισθησία*, being too strong a word; cf. *Eth.* II. ii. 7: δ δὲ πόσας φεύγων—*ἀναισθητός* τις. II. vii. 3: ἔλλειποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάντα γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδὲ δύναμας τετυχήκασαν οὐδὲ οι τοιούτοι, ξεστώσαν δὲ *ἀναισθητούς*.

IX. The book is concluded with certain practical rules for attaining the mean. (1) Avoid the worst extreme; (2) Find out your bent and go even farther than is necessary in the direction opposite to it; (3) Beware of the delusions of pleasure; (4) After all, the appeal must be in the last resort to the intuitive judgment.

2 διδ—εἰδότος.] 'On this account it is a hard task to be good: for it is always hard to ascertain the mean; as, for instance, not every man, but only the mathematician, can find the centre of a circle.' The words of Simonides (quoted by Plato, *Protag.* p. 339, and referred to above, *Eth.* I. x. 11), *ἀνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαζέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν κ.τ.λ.*, may have been in the mind of Aristotle, who here gives a *rationale* of them, and indeed shows that it is hard not only

ἐπινετὸν καὶ καλόν. διὸ δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου 3 πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ.

τούτου μὲν καπιοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔργος  
ιῆται.

Τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μέν ἔστιν ἀμαρτωλότερον, τὸ δὲ ἡττον· 4 ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως χαλεπόν, κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον φασὶ πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν· τοῦτο δὲ ἔσται μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον δν λέγομεν. σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ἄλλα πεφύκαμεν. τοῦτο δὲ ἔσται γνώριμον ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γνομένης περὶ ἡμᾶς. εἰς 5 τούναντίον δὲ ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ ἀπαγαγόντες τοῦ ἀμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἥξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὄρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν. ἐν παντὶ δὲ 6 μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἥδν καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν οὐ γὰρ ἀδέ-

to become, but to be, good, σπουδαῖον εἶναι, not only γενέσθαι. See Essay II. p. 96.

3 καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ] There is a mistake here in which Aristotle is followed by the Paraphrast. It was Circe (not Calypso) who advised Ulysses (*Od. xii. 108-109*), when sailing between Scylla and Charybdis, to keep nearest to the former, as being less dangerous. Two of the MSS., with a view of setting Aristotle right, substitute Κίρκη for the authentic reading. The verse here given Homer puts not into the mouth of Circe, but of Ulysses ordering his pilot, according to the directions he had received (*Od. xii. 219, 220*).

4 κατὰ τὸν δεύτερὸν φασὶ πλοῦν] A common Greek proverb, which is variously explained. It is sometimes said to mean 'on the voyage home, if not on the voyage out'; but it seems very much better to take the words as meaning 'with oars, if not with sails,' an explanation which is twice given by Eustathius; p. 661, δ τῶν

κωπηλατούντων πλοῦς δεύτερος λέγεται πλοῦς, ὡς πρῶτου δυτος τοῦ πλέειν πρὸς δινεμον. Also in page 1453. Other instances of the proverb are *Politics*, III. xiii. 23; *Plato, Philebus*, p. 190; *Phaedo*, 99 D.

5 εἰς τούναντίον—ποιοῦσιν] 'But we must drag ourselves away in the opposite direction; for by bending ourselves a long way back from the erroneous extreme, like those who are straightening a crooked stick, we shall at length arrive at the mean.' The metaphor is borrowed from Plato, *Protog.* p. 325 D, where it is applied to education, not, however, in precisely the same sense as here. Καὶ ἔτν μὲν ἐκών πελθηται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφομενον καὶ καρπτόμενον εὑδύνοντος ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς.

6 ἐν παντὶ δὲ—ἀμαρτησθεθα] 'But in everything we must especially be on our guard against the pleasant and pleasure. For we are not impartial judges in her cause. Therefore, just as the old counsellors felt towards Helen, so might we to feel towards

καστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν. ὅπερ δὲν οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἐλένην, τοῦτο δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ήμᾶς πρὸς τὴν ἥδονήν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· οὐτω 7 γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποτεμπόμενοι ἡττον ἀμαρτησόμεθα. ταῦτ' οὖν ποιοῦντες, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, μάλιστα δυνητόμεθα τοῦ μέσου τυγχάνειν. χαλεπὸν δὲ ἵσως τοῦτο, καὶ μάλιστ' ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἔκαστον οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον διορίσαι πῶς καὶ πίστι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὄργιστέον· καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ὅτε μὲν τοὺς ἑλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πρόνους φαμέν, ὅτε δὲ τοὺς χαλεπινόντας ἀνδρώδεις ἀποκαλούμεν. 8 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν μικρὸν τοῦ εὗ παρεκβάνων οὐ φέγγεται, οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἡττον, ὁ δὲ πλέον· οὗτος γὰρ οὐ λανθάνει. ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτὸς οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἔκαστα, καὶ ἐν τῇ 9 αἰσθῆσει ἡ κρίσις. τὸ μὲν ἄρα τοσοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι ἡ μέση ἔξις ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπαινετή, ἀποκλίνειν δὲ δεῖ ὅτε μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ὅτε δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὕτω γὰρ ῥᾶστα τοῦ μέσου καὶ τοῦ εὗ τευχόμεθα.

pleasure, and in everything apply their saying; for by sending her out of our sight we shall err the less.' The reference is to Homer, *Iliad* III. 156-160:

Οὐ νέμεσις Τρῶας καὶ ἔυκυημέδας  
Ἄχαιοις τοιῦδ' ἀμφὶ γυναικὶ πολὺν χρόνον  
ἀλλεα πάσχειν.  
Αἰώνις ἀδιανάγοις θεῖς εἰς ὧπα  
ἴσικεν,  
ἄλλα καὶ ὡς τοιη περ ἔοῦσ' ἐν τηνοι  
νεέσθω  
μηδ' ἡμῶν τεκέεσσι τ' ὀπίσσων τῆμα  
λίποιτο.

ἀδέκαστοι] 'Unbribed,' 'uncorrupted.' δέκαστο, the origin of which is obscure, finds a parallel in the Latin 'decuriare,' which meant to

bribe the tribes at elections. See Cicero, *pro Flacco*, c.-xviii. 44.

8, δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτός] a condensed phrase meaning 'to what point and how far a man (may go before he) is blameable.'

ἐν τῇ αἰσθῆσει ἡ κρίσις] 'The decision of them is a matter of perception.' Aristotle meant that general rules are often inapplicable to particular cases, which must then be decided by a kind of 'intuition' or 'tact,' not derived from philosophy, but natural. Compare III. iii. 13: ἐπειδὴ ἡ τελευταλα πρότασις δόξα τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ κυρια τῶν πραξέων.—διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου μηδὲ ἐπιστημονικὸν ὄχολος εἶναι δοκεῖν τῷ καθόλου τὸν ἐδχατὸν δρον.









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